Craig Parry

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the respondent for possession of stolen property.

The trial judge imposed too high a standard by requiring the officer to know the specific modality of the crime.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in concluding that a Charter breach on the first arrest necessarily tainted a subsequent arrest and search by another officer relating to separate incidents.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately address inconsistencies in the Crown witnesses' evidence and erred in applying the R. v. W.(D.) framework by not following its exact order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that trial judges are not required to answer every argument raised by counsel, provided the reasons clearly explain the result.

The Court further held that W.(D.) does not mandate a strict, pre-ordained order for assessing evidence, but rather ensures the proper application of the burden of proof when an accused testifies.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was within the acceptable range and the trial judge made no error in principle.

The court noted that this was not a case of a joint submission, and the sentence imposed was not a significant departure from the Crown's suggested range.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found crack cocaine in the bathroom of an apartment she shared with a co-occupant.

The appellant had been absent from the apartment for 32 hours prior to the search.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence establishing constructive or joint possession.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error and that the circumstantial evidence supported the inference of knowledge and control.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge erred in departing from a joint submission.

The Crown conceded that the joint submission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and was not contrary to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by departing from the joint submission without explaining why it was contrary to the public interest and failing to consider the appellant's minor role.

The sentence was reduced to a 13-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 18-month sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to declare a mistrial based on an alleged breach of his section 14 Charter right to an interpreter, and that the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably gave no weight to a hearsay affidavit regarding the interpreter issue, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range with no error in principle.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's brother's evidence as corroborative, given his admission that he was not in the room during the alleged incident.

The trial judge also erred in finding the mother's evidence corroborative, as it was effectively exculpatory.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges related to marihuana cultivation.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of a light bulb and fertilizer found in the respondent's possession, reasoning that they lacked a specific connection to the particular operation.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error, as the items were probative of knowledge when considered in context with the respondent's possession of keys to the basement where the marihuana was growing.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown brought ex parte applications under s. 487.055(1) of the Criminal Code for DNA databank orders against two repeat sexual offenders on parole.

The issuing judge granted the orders ex parte.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provision and the ex parte procedure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the provision but found that the issuing judge lost jurisdiction by proceeding ex parte without any evidence justifying the need to do so.

The appeals were allowed and the authorizations quashed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying the respondent's second-degree murder trial for abuse of process and unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found over 150 Charter breaches by police and Crown counsel.

On appeal, the respondent conceded the trial judge's findings were unsupportable but argued the stay should be upheld because her trial counsel's incompetence caused the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding no evidence the respondent was unaware of her counsel's strategy, and set aside the stay of proceedings and costs order, directing a new trial.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment dismissing its counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred by reversing the onus of proof on a motion for summary judgment and by failing to apply the 'plain and obvious' test when treating the motion as one brought under Rule 21.01(1).

The respondents had failed to file evidence addressing the appellant's allegations, and the counterclaim was not destined to fail.

The appellant was acquitted of assault with a weapon and aggravated assault but convicted of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public after stabbing the complainant during an altercation at a pool hall.

He appealed the conviction, arguing errors in the jury charge and inconsistent verdicts, and appealed the sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed and the verdicts were not inconsistent.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to time served, given the appellant's good conduct in the four years since the offence.

The appellant, a youthful first offender with no criminal record, appealed the manner of service of a nine-month custodial sentence.

The only issue was whether the custodial term should be served in the community.

The court held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's refusal to identify a co-perpetrator as aggravating and by speculating about future criminal influence.

Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was allowed, with the sentence to be served conditionally from the date of judgment.