Christopher Michael Davis Hubbard

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of a medical malpractice action arising from the death of his common law spouse from terminal brain cancer.

The appellant alleged that the defendant physicians breached the standard of care by terminating the drug dexamethasone without tapering and by failing to obtain informed consent.

The motion judge dismissed the action after finding that the appellant's expert evidence was insufficient to establish a genuine issue requiring trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant failed to provide qualified expert evidence on standard of care and causation, and that the evidence supported informed consent had been obtained.

Family members brought a medical negligence action after a hospital patient died from viral myocarditis shortly after presenting to the emergency department.

A civil jury found two treating physicians liable and awarded $600,000 in damages.

On appeal, the physicians argued the trial judge made multiple procedural and instructional errors, including permitting further discovery at trial, limiting expert evidence, improperly charging the jury on standard of care and causation, misphrasing the causation question, misdirecting the jury on agreement requirements, and refusing to poll the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that most alleged errors were unfounded and that the causation wording error in the verdict questions caused no substantial wrong because the jury was repeatedly instructed on the correct “but for” test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Sarah Salisbury, sued Dr. Stephen Kraft for medical negligence, specifically alleging a lack of informed consent for a strabismus surgery that resulted in permanent double vision (diplopia).

Dr. Kraft moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not satisfy the modified objective test for causation or establish a breach of his disclosure obligations.

The court, applying Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have opted for the surgery given the limited alternatives and her prior positive experience with the same procedure.

The court also found the plaintiff's evidence regarding the alleged lack of disclosure unreliable when weighed against Dr. Kraft's contemporaneous notes and invariable professional practice.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against several physician and hospital defendants following the death of his common-law spouse from aggressive brain cancer.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing a lack of expert evidence to establish professional negligence and causation, and that the duty to obtain informed consent rested with the physicians, not the hospital pharmacies.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the plaintiff's expert evidence was insufficient and causation was not established.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring them vexatious litigants.

They failed to appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the application judge's reasons and the appellants' written arguments, finding no merit to the appeal and agreeing that the appellants' conduct met the definition of vexatious litigants.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following a jury verdict in a medical negligence action, the plaintiffs moved for judgment in accordance with the verdict, while the defendant physicians sought dismissal of the action or a retrial on the basis that there was no evidence supporting causation.

The court reviewed the narrow circumstances under which a trial judge may refuse to enter judgment consistent with a jury’s verdict under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 52.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs failed to establish a key link in the causal chain regarding whether mechanical cardiac support could have been obtained within a limited treatment window.

The court found there was some evidence from expert testimony and surrounding facts permitting the jury to infer that appropriate mechanical assistance could have been obtained through inter‑hospital transfer.

Because the verdict was supported by some evidence and the jury’s answers could sustain judgment, the court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents for damages related to his HIV infection, which he alleged was linked to a sponsorship undertaking given to the federal government.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court declined to entertain new arguments regarding exceptions to the limitation period raised for the first time on appeal.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidence establishing a causal link between the government's actions and the appellant's infection.

Following a motion where the plaintiff was successful, the court considered costs submissions.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs based on a settlement offer, which the court rejected.

Applying the factors in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Boucher, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $22,500, in accordance with the parties' prior agreement on the quantum for partial indemnity costs.

The moving defendant sought to bifurcate the action so that the plaintiff's successor liability claim against it would be determined before the negligence and related claims against the remaining defendants.

Applying the governing bifurcation principles, the court held that bifurcation is an exceptional remedy available only in the clearest cases where the preponderance of factors favours severance and the proceeding will more likely than not be resolved justly, expeditiously, and inexpensively.

The court found the successor liability issue was not simple, the case was not extraordinary merely because it involved a novel American doctrine, and any clear advantage or costs savings were largely limited to the moving defendant.

The proposed procedure would also create delay, multiplicity of proceedings, and prejudice to the plaintiff.

The motion was dismissed, with costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim against a family physician for alleged negligence in prenatal care that resulted in the infant appellant being born with cerebral palsy.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in rejecting their theories that the mother suffered from pre-eclampsia or elevated blood pressure, and that the physician was negligent in failing to induce labour or refer her to an obstetrician.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings that the physician met the standard of care and that the appellants failed to prove causation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion seeking dismissal or a stay of an Ontario action arising from a landslide at a Costa Rican gold mine, arguing that Costa Rica or Colorado was the more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The court applied the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda and Breeden v. Black.

While the moving defendants established certain connections between the dispute and the proposed foreign forums, they provided little evidence regarding the characteristics of those forums or how litigation there would be fairer or more efficient.

The court held that merely identifying geographical connections and residence locations was insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating that an alternative forum was clearly more appropriate.

As the evidentiary record did not establish that either Colorado or Costa Rica was better positioned to resolve the dispute, the motion was dismissed.

Physicians applied under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act for an order declaring the respondents vexatious litigants following years of repetitive and abusive litigation arising from reports made to the Children’s Aid Society concerning a newborn’s health.

The respondents had commenced multiple lawsuits against doctors, a hospital, and others, repeatedly raising the same allegations despite several summary judgment dismissals and appellate rulings confirming the claims had no legal basis due to statutory reporting obligations and qualified privilege.

The court reviewed the history of motions, appeals, unpaid costs awards, and scandalous allegations against judges, counsel, and institutions.

Applying established criteria for vexatious litigation, the court found the respondents persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable grounds and abused court processes.

Orders were granted prohibiting them from commencing or continuing proceedings in any court without leave of the Superior Court, together with substantial indemnity costs.

During a Commercial List proceeding involving cross-applications between a technology services provider and a provincial agency, the court conducted a case conference addressing litigation management issues.

The court reviewed the parties’ progress under an agreed Litigation Plan, including pleadings exchange and initial documentary production consisting of thousands of documents.

The parties were directed to exchange annotated production requests identifying disputed categories and to meet to resolve disagreements.

A further case conference was scheduled to address remaining production disputes.

The court also encouraged the parties to organize disputed issues chronologically to clarify the technically interrelated events underlying the dispute.

The plaintiff alleged that his former spouse knowingly infected him with HIV and sued multiple defendants, including the federal Crown, an immigration medical examiner, and the employer of the spouse.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment dismissing the claims.

The court held that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of material facts when he was diagnosed as HIV‑positive in March 2004 but commenced the action in 2008.

The court further held that neither the federal government nor the immigration physician owed a private law duty of care to the plaintiff under the Anns/Cooper framework, and there was no evidentiary basis for negligence or vicarious liability against the nightclub employer.

The claims against all moving defendants were dismissed.

The appellant, an Ontario mining company, sued American engineering consultants for negligent misrepresentation regarding studies for a Costa Rican gold mine.

The defendants successfully moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the tort of negligent misrepresentation was committed in Ontario, as the studies were received and relied upon at the appellant's Toronto head office.

This established a presumptive real and substantial connection that the defendants failed to rebut.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to determine forum non conveniens.

Competing applications were brought concerning whether a contractual dispute arising from the termination of an agreement to design and build a diabetes registry should proceed by arbitration or litigation.

One party sought appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to the dispute resolution clause in the agreement, while the other sought to have the dispute determined through litigation in the Superior Court and consolidated with related defamation proceedings.

Before hearing the applications, the court proposed procedural options, and the parties agreed to proceed with litigation in the Superior Court under case management with an expedited trial schedule.

The applications were adjourned to a case conference to establish a litigation plan, and related defamation actions were transferred to the Commercial List for coordinated management.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action alleging that the defendant family physician's negligence during the mother's pregnancy and delivery caused the infant plaintiff to be born with cerebral palsy.

The plaintiffs argued the doctor failed to properly monitor the mother's hypertension, failed to refer her to an obstetrician, and negligently prescribed enalapril, an ACE inhibitor, shortly before birth.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the doctor met the standard of care of a family physician in the circumstances and that his clinical judgments were reasonable.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the enalapril or the mother's hypertension caused the infant's injuries, which were likely the result of an acute intrauterine event such as cord compression.

An Ontario mining company sued numerous foreign engineering firms and engineers for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract following a landslide that closed a gold mine in Costa Rica.

The moving defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Ontario court.

Applying the framework from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court considered whether presumptive connecting factors established a real and substantial connection with Ontario.

The court held that neither alleged reliance on advice in Ontario, damages suffered in Ontario, nor business connections through related companies established sufficient jurisdictional ties.

Any connection to Ontario was tenuous, as the engineering services, alleged wrongdoing, and resulting physical damage occurred primarily in Costa Rica and the United States.

The court concluded that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and therefore declined to assume jurisdiction over the moving defendants.

The moving parties brought a motion to set aside an order requiring them to post security for costs of their appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a summary judgment dismissing their action against the responding parties.

The moving parties argued the summary judgment order was made without jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in their position and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the responding parties.

The applicant physician brought an appeal and an application for judicial review challenging an interlocutory decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee had ruled it had jurisdiction to hear allegations regarding patients not specifically named in the Notice of Hearing.

The Divisional Court quashed the application for judicial review for prematurity, finding no exceptional circumstances to intervene in the ongoing disciplinary process, as the Committee reasonably concluded it had jurisdiction.

The Court also quashed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Health Professions Procedural Code to hear an appeal from an interlocutory decision.