Christopher Michael Davis Hubbard

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision to invoke Rule 52.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to overturn a jury's finding of negligence against the respondent doctor.

The jury had found that the respondent's delay in transferring the appellant to another facility caused his paraplegia.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that while the respondent breached the standard of care by delaying the transfer, the appellants failed to adduce any expert evidence proving that an earlier transfer would have resulted in a timely diagnosis and surgery to prevent the paralysis.

The appeal was dismissed.

Class counsel appealed a motion judge's order fixing their fees at $14.5 million instead of the requested $27.5 million following the settlement of a class action regarding payday loans.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge did not err in applying section 32(4) rather than the base fee/multiplier approach in section 33(7) of the Class Proceedings Act, as the fee agreement was not approved by the court.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's decision to treat the fees of consultants and other lawyers retained on a contingency basis as disbursements.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, ruling that the representative plaintiff's $3,000 compensation should be paid out of the settlement fund rather than out of class counsel fees.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a defamation claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for reasons given in a related file.

The court also noted that a non-party making allegations against the respondent physician had no standing in the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered costs payable forthwith to the respondent in the amount of $19,000.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a hospital board's motion decision regarding the termination of his hospital privileges due to disruptive conduct.

The applicant argued that the Medical Advisory Committee lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its recommendation, that a board member's comments breached the Public Hospitals Act, and that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant must first exhaust his statutory remedies, including an appeal to the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, before seeking judicial review.

The respondent commenced arbitral proceedings against the appellant.

The arbitrator ordered the respondent to post security for costs.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to set aside the arbitrator's order.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge lacked jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1991 to review the arbitrator's procedural order for security for costs, as it was neither an award nor a ruling on the arbitrator's jurisdiction to conduct the arbitration.

The appellants sought costs for their unsuccessful appeal against the dismissal of a summary judgment motion, arguing the appeal was necessary to establish that the motion judge's observations were obiter.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, noting the law was already well-established, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The respondents claimed $120,000, but the court fixed costs at $75,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST, finding the claimed amount excessive for a one-day appeal.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging that a hospital and a doctor discriminated against her based on her Aboriginal ancestry by making stereotypical comments in a discharge summary.

The respondents raised preliminary objections, including that the complaint was filed out of time.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was aware of the material facts in December 2001 but did not file the complaint until February 2004.

The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that she was medically incapacitated from filing earlier, noting she had pursued other legal and complaint avenues during that time.

Finding no good faith reason for the delay and potential prejudice to the respondents, the Tribunal dismissed the application as out of time under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The defendants in a class action regarding payday loans appealed the dismissal of their renewed motion to stay the proceeding based on arbitration clauses in the loan agreements.

They argued that recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions changed the law, entitling them to a stay despite their previous unsuccessful stay motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the doctrine of issue estoppel applied.

The court exercised its discretion against allowing relitigation, finding that the plaintiffs' reliance on the prior determination and the advanced stage of the litigation outweighed the defendants' loss of the right to arbitrate.

The self-represented plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a discretionary, administrative decision made by a motion judge in Triage Court.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and no matters of public importance involved.

The court noted the decision did not affect the plaintiffs' substantive rights or infringe any constitutional rights.

The applicant physician sought judicial review to quash a motion by the hospital's Medical Advisory Committee (MAC) requiring him to undergo independent conduct and clinical assessments before the MAC would make a recommendation on his reappointment application.

The applicant argued the MAC's process lacked procedural fairness and was tainted by bias due to a history of conflict and a failure to provide timely disclosure of complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding that the hospital had a statutory duty to assess qualifications and that the applicant had adequate alternative remedies, including a full hearing before the hospital board and an appeal to the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, to address any procedural unfairness.

The plaintiff commenced a proposed class action in Ontario against Money Mart and its American parent company, Dollar Financial, alleging they charged criminal interest rates on pay-day loans.

Dollar Financial appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to set aside service ex juris and stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding a good arguable case against Dollar Financial based on alter ego, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment theories.

Applying the Muscutt factors, the Court held there was a real and substantial connection between Dollar Financial and Ontario, giving the Ontario court jurisdiction.

The appellant railway company appealed a trial judgment finding it solely liable for property damage and business interruption losses caused when its railcars rolled down a siding and struck the respondent's plant.

The appellant also appealed the trial judge's awards of prejudgment interest from the date of the accident and costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability and damages findings but allowed the appeal regarding interest and costs.

The Court held that prejudgment interest on past pecuniary loss must be calculated at six-month intervals under s. 128(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, and reduced the costs award to a partial indemnity scale because the respondent's offer to settle lacked a genuine element of compromise.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence, revoking his license, and imposing a $25,000 costs award.

The misconduct stemmed from his failure to supervise an EEG clinic where a technician infected numerous patients with Hepatitis B. The Divisional Court upheld the misconduct findings but found the penalty of license revocation unreasonable, as the appellant posed no risk practicing solely as a neurologist.

The court substituted a two-year suspension and a lifetime ban from acting as a medical director, while upholding the costs award.