Christina Sibian

The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (Glock handgun), two counts of unlawful possession of overcapacity cartridge magazines, and breaches of a weapons prohibition order.

The Crown sought five years imprisonment; the defence sought a conditional sentence and probation.

The court imposed a global sentence of 17 months after accounting for Summers credit, Duncan consideration, Downes credit, and a three-month reduction for Charter breaches.

The sentencing considered the defendant's strong rehabilitative potential, experiences with systemic anti-Black racism, remorse, and family support, balanced against the serious nature of firearm offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was arrested on a Feeney warrant by the Emergency Task Force.

During the dynamic entry, an officer stomped on the accused's head, causing injury.

Police subsequently searched a backpack found in the unit, discovering cocaine and cash, which they used to obtain a search warrant for the unit.

The search yielded a loaded prohibited firearm, ammunition, and large quantities of drugs.

The court found breaches of the accused's s. 7 rights (excessive force) and s. 8 rights (unlawful search of the backpack and unit), but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the high public interest in adjudicating the serious firearm and drug charges.

At trial, the accused was acquitted of the drug charges due to reasonable doubt about his knowledge and control of the substances, but convicted of the firearm charges based on his admission of ownership.

Paul Molinari appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" following a collision.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made palpable and overriding factual errors regarding his post-collision alcohol consumption, knowledge of police attendance, and the nature of the collision.

The appeal court found no material misapprehension of evidence or palpable and overriding errors, concluding that the trial judge's findings were open to her on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's calculation of defence delay, noting that defence counsel was unavailable for 17 blocks of trial dates offered by the court.

The net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the appellant failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a 12-year-old complainant from British Columbia to testify by video link in a sexual assault and sexual interference trial.

Alternatively, the Crown sought an order permitting testimony via closed-circuit television.

The defendant opposed the video link application but did not oppose the closed-circuit television application, though he sought to cross-examine the witness from within the closed-circuit television room rather than from the courtroom.

The court granted the video link application, permitting the complainant to testify remotely from British Columbia, and addressed the placement of defence counsel during examination.

The accused was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault.

During deliberations, the jury inquired whether misidentification of the victim relieved the accused of intent.

The court ruled that the doctrine of transferred intent applied, meaning the accused's potential misidentification of the victim did not negate the intent to apply force, as the intention was transferred from the intended victim to the actual victim.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a 17-year-old complainant.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge committed several errors, primarily misapprehending the complainant's evidence regarding her prior inconsistent statements and deliberate falsehoods to the police.

The trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize the complainant's explanations for these inconsistencies and omissions, which were central to her credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant brought a motion to sever two counts of sexual assault involving two separate complainants, seeking to have two separate trials during a scheduled four-day trial period.

The Crown opposed the application, intending to bring a similar fact application between the counts.

The court applied the "interests of justice" test under section 591(3) of the Criminal Code, considering factors including general prejudice, legal and factual nexus, testimonial intention, avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings, and the viability of a similar fact application.

The court found that while some factors favoured severance, the viability of the similar fact application and the truth-seeking function of the trial weighed significantly against severance.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Peter Korgbor, was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

During a pre-charge conference, the court considered whether the defence of self-defence should be put to the jury.

The court applied the "air of reality" test, reviewing the evidence from Crown witnesses regarding the altercation where the accused stabbed one individual and assaulted another with a knife.

The court found no direct or circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable belief that force was being used or threatened against the accused, nor that his actions were for defensive purposes or objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

Consequently, the court declined to leave the defence of self-defence with the jury, concluding that doing so would invite speculation.

The appellant, Fawzi Kamakh, appealed his conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial judge's refusal to allow further cross-examination of the complainant after a Browne v. Dunn issue arose, and insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice due to counsel's conduct given the overwhelming evidence, deeming the cross-examination issue moot as the Crown did not rely on the reply evidence, and affirming that the mens rea elements for criminal harassment were met, as the appellant knew or was wilfully blind to the complainant's harassment and fear for her safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand, that his identity as the driver was not proven, and that the breath tests were not administered 'as soon as practicable'.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in concluding that reasonable grounds existed, that the appellant was the driver, and that the breath tests were administered within a reasonably prompt time following the collision.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating with excess blood alcohol following an erratic driving report.

A Charter application was brought to exclude evidence obtained following an alleged violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that police delayed providing the right to counsel for 26 minutes after arrest, constituting a breach.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as the breach was serious and the impact on the accused's Charter rights was significant.

However, the court found the accused guilty of the included offence of care or control while impaired, as the Crown established the accused was in the driver's seat with keys in possession and was heavily intoxicated, presenting a realistic risk of danger.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent after accepting expert evidence that the absence of a value for 'uncertainty of measurement' raised a reasonable doubt about the proper functioning of the approved instrument.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that uncertainty of measurement is not required by law and that speculative evidence regarding potential instrument malfunction is insufficient to constitute 'evidence tending to show' under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused were charged with firearms offences after a gun was seized during a traffic stop.

They brought Charter applications to exclude the gun evidence under s. 24(2), alleging violations of their s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) rights.

The court found that while the initial traffic stop was lawful, the police unlawfully detained the passenger, requested his identification without justification, and conducted an unlawful search of the vehicle based on a hunch, not reasonable grounds for a CDSA arrest.

Consequently, the court excluded the gun evidence against both accused, leading to their acquittal.

A voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to a police officer during breath testing procedures.

The Crown sought to introduce utterances made by the defendant during the breath room interaction.

The court found that statements made before the first breath sample were voluntary, as the defendant was properly cautioned regarding his right to remain silent and appeared to have freely chosen to speak with the officer.

However, the court found that statements made between the two breath samples were not established to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant may have believed the questions related to the Alcohol Influence Report were part of the compulsory breath testing process and no caution was provided before those questions.

The offender was convicted after trial of aggravated assault for stabbing an unarmed man in the upper chest within two seconds of the start of a consensual fight.

The victim suffered a collapsed lung requiring hospitalization.

The offender had no prior criminal record at the time of the offence but had subsequent convictions for violent offences.

The sentencing hearing was protracted, involving psychiatric and psychological assessments that revealed significant intellectual deficits, personality disorders with antisocial and borderline features, and a moderately high risk of violent reoffending.

The court imposed a sentence below the typical range for such offences, considering the offender's rehabilitative potential, intellectual limitations, and family support.

Nuzhat Mamoon, a first offender, was convicted of defrauding eight vulnerable individuals of $98,400 through a breach of trust, leveraging her perceived status as a wealthy, religious businessperson and her charitable organization.

The court considered aggravating factors including the duration, planning, number of victims, significant impact on victims, and abuse of community regard.

Mitigating factors were limited to no prior record.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, imposing 18 months' incarceration, a three-year probation order with specific prohibitions, and a restitution order for the full amount.

Nuzhat Mamoon was charged with fraud exceeding $5,000, contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown alleged that Mamoon defrauded eight individuals by making false representations about investment opportunities in non-existent businesses (catering, laptop sales, fashion shows) and a property transfer, promising unrealistic and guaranteed profits.

The court found Mamoon guilty, concluding that she intentionally used deceit and falsehood to obtain funds from vulnerable, financially unsophisticated individuals, often leveraging her charitable organization to gain trust.

The total amount defrauded from the complainants exceeded $5,000.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, leading to a breach of Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9).

The trial judge found the arrest lawful despite contradictory police testimony regarding subjective grounds.

On appeal, the court found the arrest unlawful due to the absence of subjective reasonable and probable grounds by the directing officer, which invalidated the arresting officer's actions.

Consequently, the breath samples obtained were deemed to be in breach of Charter rights.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court determined that the police conduct was serious and had a significant impact on the accused's rights, outweighing society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal.

A secondary issue regarding s. 11(b) Charter rights was declined due to lack of timely objection at trial.

The accused was charged with driving with blood alcohol content over 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown sought to introduce a Certificate of Analysis as evidence.

The sole issue was whether the Crown had proved compliance with section 258(7) of the Criminal Code, which requires that the accused be given a copy of the certificate prior to trial.

The investigating officer's evidence was contradictory and ultimately revealed that he did not provide the certificate to the accused.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the accused received a copy of the certificate and ruled the certificate inadmissible.

The accused was acquitted.