Cory A. Gilmore

The plaintiff Bank brought a motion for summary judgment on a demand loan and for possession of a mortgaged commercial property.

Although the borrower was current on monthly payments, the Bank demanded repayment based on non-financial defaults, including the unauthorized transfer of the property to a limited partnership, late financial statements, and misrepresentations in statutory declarations.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the loan documents clearly permitted demand at any time and that the non-financial breaches justified the Bank's decision to call the loan.

Appeal from a Small Claims Court judgment dismissing a claim for damages arising from a power of sale transaction.

The appellant, a second mortgagee, alleged that the first mortgagee conducted an improvident sale by transferring the property for $175,000 without listing it on the open market.

The trial judge accepted the appraisal evidence supporting the sale price and rejected market valuation opinions from real estate agents and an appraisal where the author did not testify.

The court held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding the appraised value represented the market value and that the mortgagee acted in good faith.

The appellant failed to provide cogent evidence that a higher price would have been obtained but for any alleged breach.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death and bodily harm after his vehicle collided with a group of oncoming motorcyclists.

The Crown alleged the accused crossed the centre line while distracted by a text message.

The court reviewed conflicting eyewitness testimony and expert accident reconstruction evidence regarding the point of impact and whether the accused crossed the centre line.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence on dangerous driving, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was texting, that he crossed the centre line, or that his driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an order granting the respondent exclusive possession of the matrimonial home under s. 24(3)(f) of the Family Law Act based largely on hostile and threatening text messages sent during the parties’ separation.

The appellant argued the motion judge misapplied the law and that conflicting case law required more than text messages to establish “violence.” The court held that differing outcomes in other cases reflected discretionary factual determinations rather than conflicting legal principles.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the original order and held that intimidation or psychological abuse conveyed through text messages can constitute violence depending on the factual context.

Leave to appeal was therefore denied.

An elector applied for a declaration that a municipal mayor breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by participating in a council closed-session discussion concerning potential defamation litigation related to online blog posts.

The applicant sought disqualification from office and restitution of municipal legal fees allegedly incurred for the mayor’s benefit.

The court first considered the six‑week limitation period under s. 9 of the Act and held that the applicant had sufficient knowledge of a potential breach when a newspaper article reported the litigation and municipal funding of legal costs.

Because the application was commenced well after the limitation period expired, it was statute‑barred.

In obiter, the court held that even if the limitation period had not expired, the evidence did not establish that the mayor had a pecuniary interest at the time of the council meeting or that litigation in her personal name had been decided.

The judgment creditor brought a motion for directions regarding enforcement of a writ of seizure and sale and related garnishment proceedings against the judgment debtor.

A mortgagee who was not a party to the action sought an adjournment to permit filing further materials and cross‑examinations, while opposing the judgment creditor’s request that any proceeds of sale of the debtor’s property be paid into court pending determination of mortgage priority issues.

The court found several concerning circumstances surrounding the mortgage assignment, including its timing after registration of the writ and the non‑arm’s‑length relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee.

To preserve the rights of all parties while related family law, power of sale, and enforcement proceedings continued, the court granted the adjournment but imposed a condition that sale proceeds be paid into court if the property sold.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence arising from a police strip search and penile swab following arrest for sexual assault.

The court found the removal of clothing and penile swab constituted a strip search and that the police lacked properly articulated grounds and failed to conduct the search in a reasonable manner, resulting in breaches of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court also found the accused should have been re‑informed of the right to counsel prior to the intrusive procedure.

Although the breaches were serious, they did not meet the threshold for a stay of proceedings.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the DNA evidence from the penile swab but admitted a later blood sample and ruled that the accused’s videotaped statement was voluntary.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing several defamation claims arising from a condominium requisition notice seeking his removal as president of the condominium board.

The appellate court found that the impugned words stating that the appellant failed to act honestly and in good faith were capable of being defamatory and that certain respondents had participated in publication of the material.

However, the court held that the respondents established the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege in the condominium governance context.

The evidence demonstrated a factual foundation for the statements relating to the appellant’s conduct as president.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs in a medical negligence action brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking a determination before trial of whether the defendant could summons plaintiffs’ counsel to testify and produce documents related to communications with the plaintiff.

The defendant argued the evidence was relevant to the issue of discoverability in relation to a limitations defence.

The court held that the motion did not raise a question of law in a pleading and therefore was not properly brought under Rule 21.

Issues concerning witness summonses, privilege, waiver, and the admissibility of documents are evidentiary matters best decided by the trial judge.

Discoverability is a fact-based analysis and does not constitute a pure question of law suitable for pre‑trial determination under Rule 21.

A costs decision following a summary judgment motion concerning the priority of motor vehicle liability insurance coverage under s. 277 of the Insurance Act.

The moving parties sought full indemnity costs exceeding $39,000, arguing that where insurers share a duty to defend, equitable principles require full reimbursement of defence costs.

The third party insurer opposed, submitting the dispute concerned priority of coverage rather than the existence of a duty to defend, and that only modest partial indemnity costs should be awarded.

The court held that priority disputes between insurers do not give rise to the same contractual obligation to fully indemnify defence costs as duty-to-defend cases.

Considering delay in bringing the motion and the unsettled nature of the law, the court awarded reduced costs.

The Crown applied for a ruling that a criminal trial had commenced and that the accused had absconded, seeking authorization to continue the proceedings in the accused’s absence under ss. 475 and 598 of the Criminal Code.

The accused, charged with large-scale tax fraud involving thousands of income tax returns and millions of dollars in understated tax liability, failed to appear for scheduled trial proceedings despite prior compliance with court appearances.

The court found that the accused had deliberately absconded and that the trial had commenced when pre-trial motions were heard following the preferring of the indictment.

The court further held that the accused had waived her election for a jury trial by failing to appear without legitimate excuse.

However, the court concluded that it was not yet in the interests of justice to proceed with the trial in the accused’s absence and adjourned the Crown’s application to allow further efforts to locate the accused.

The defendants were involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving a 'loaner' vehicle provided by a dealership while their own vehicle was being repaired.

The defendants' personal insurer and the dealership's garage insurer disputed which policy should respond in priority.

The court found that the loaner vehicle was not a 'leased' vehicle under the Insurance Act, but rather a temporary substitute vehicle.

The court held that the dealership's garage policy was an owner's policy and therefore stood as first loss insurance.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, requiring the garage insurer to defend and indemnify the defendants.

The appellant father sought leave to appeal and a stay of an interlocutory order finding him in contempt and requiring him to reinstate a $400,000 life insurance policy to secure child support, or alternatively travel to Ontario for a medical examination.

The father argued that his child support obligations had been previously suspended, and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction under the Family Law Act to order life insurance to secure a non-existent support obligation.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of ordering life insurance as a 'future fund' without an existing support obligation, and stayed the lower court orders pending the appeal.