Carolyn J. Horkins

The appellants appealed a Master's order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to comply with a prior order to answer discovery refusals and produce records.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by stating she had 'no choice' but to strike the pleadings, thereby failing to exercise her discretion.

Conducting a de novo review, the Court held that striking pleadings is an extreme remedy of last resort and granted the appellants a 'last chance' order to comply within a short timeframe.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim for negligent issuance of a building permit as statute-barred.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, arguing she did not discover the claim until receiving freedom of information documents.

The Divisional Court denied the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the requisite test.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the claim was issued beyond the two-year limitation period and rejected arguments of procedural unfairness.

The applicant brought multiple interim motions in a family law dispute concerning custody, access, child support, travel with the child, birth registration, and spousal support following a short marriage and the birth of one child.

The court declined to grant interim sole custody, determining that custody should be decided at trial while maintaining the existing access schedule recommended by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and implemented in a prior order.

Child support was recalculated after imputing income to the respondent based on add-backs of personal business expenses, resulting in support of $565 per month, while retroactive support was deferred to trial due to conflicting evidence.

Requests for a restraining order, interim spousal support, and certain additional restrictions on access were denied.

The court also ordered the respondent to be added to the child’s birth registration, established terms for travel within North America, addressed section 7 expenses, and required disclosure regarding life insurance securing child support obligations.

In a high-conflict parenting dispute, the mother sought a declaration that the father breached a prior court order requiring him to make all reasonable efforts to support a shared parenting schedule.

Evidence showed the children had lived exclusively with the father for several years and had become estranged from their mother.

The court found multiple instances where the father failed to co-parent or support the residential arrangements, including unilateral decision‑making, permitting the children to determine their residence contrary to the order, and failing to meaningfully participate in court‑ordered reunification therapy.

A separation agreement resolving financial matters did not displace the prior parenting order.

The court declared the father in breach of the order but granted him sole custody given the children’s ages, the passage of time, and the existing status quo.

Parents brought competing motions concerning custody, residence, schooling, counselling, and access for their young child amid high parental conflict following separation.

The court found the father had engaged in conduct harmful to the child, including involving the older sibling in litigation and unilaterally terminating access for several months.

The court ordered that the child receive counselling with a qualified psychologist, authorized the mother to arrange educational and psychological assessments without the father’s consent, and required the parents to share counselling costs.

The father’s request to change the child’s primary residence and school was rejected due to the importance of preserving the status quo pending trial.

Access with the father was reinstated on a structured alternating‑weekend schedule with behavioural conditions.

Following a seven‑day family law trial addressing equalization of property, child support, and spousal support, the court determined costs after the parties failed to agree.

The successful party sought substantial indemnity costs, while the respondent argued the decision should await the outcome of his appeal.

The court held that costs must be determined as part of the trial decision notwithstanding a pending appeal.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the principles in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario, the court considered the complexity of the issues, counsel’s rates, time spent, and the parties’ conduct.

The respondent’s unreasonable positions and conduct at trial justified a significant costs award.

The applicant was awarded partial indemnity costs plus disbursements totaling $89,595.96.

Following a family law summary judgment motion regarding custody and access, the court addressed costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The applicant had obtained summary judgment granting sole custody but the access issue was directed to trial.

The applicant sought approximately $39,773 in costs using a “hybrid full recovery” approach.

The court held that although the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs as the successful party on custody, the amount claimed was excessive for a one‑day motion decided on affidavit evidence.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 as fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Following a four‑day family law trial concerning the calculation of income for child support purposes, both self‑represented parties sought costs.

Although three of four trial issues were decided in the applicant’s favour, other matters were settled in the respondent’s favour and the applicant was ordered to pay both past and ongoing child support.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and principles governing costs awards to self‑represented litigants, the court considered the limited complexity of the issues and the parties’ unreasonable conduct in prolonged litigation.

The court held that neither party achieved sufficient success to justify a costs award and that certain claimed expenses such as lost wages, pension contributions, babysitting, and parking were not recoverable.

No costs were ordered.

Following a family law trial concerning child support, retroactive child support, and spousal support, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The successful party sought approximately $79,766 in costs for a seven‑day trial, while the opposing party argued no costs should be ordered due to alleged divided success.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court considered factors including the complexity of the issues, counsel’s hourly rate and time spent, the parties’ conduct, and the parties’ settlement offers.

The court found that while the successful party did not achieve a result superior to her final offer for all issues, she substantially exceeded the opposing party’s offers and was presumptively entitled to costs.

The court concluded that a reduced award constituted a fair and reasonable amount in the circumstances.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking security for costs in the amount of $25,000 for an upcoming custody trial, while the respondent father sought to adjourn the scheduled trial.

The respondent resided outside Ontario, had failed to pay substantial prior costs awards totalling $79,000 plus interest, and maintained assets outside the jurisdiction.

Applying r. 24(13) of the Family Law Rules, the court held that multiple factors justifying security for costs were present, including unpaid costs orders and the respondent’s residence outside Ontario.

The court further found the respondent’s position lacked merit and that the circumstances constituted an exceptional case warranting security for costs in a custody matter.

The adjournment request was dismissed and the respondent was ordered to post $25,000 security for costs or risk having his Answer struck.

The applicant brought a motion for retroactive and ongoing child support and interim spousal support following separation after a 13‑year marriage with one child.

The respondent argued child support should be calculated only on base salary because his employment bonus was uncertain and claimed undue hardship due to supporting his sponsored mother.

The court held that child support is presumptively based on line 150 income and rejected the undue hardship claim, finding the respondent had consistently received bonuses and failed to prove exceptional hardship.

Retroactive child support was awarded applying the principles in D.B.S. v. S.R.G., along with ongoing table support based on prior year income.

Interim spousal support was also ordered, with the court relying on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines as a non‑binding tool and considering the income disparity between the parties.

Two related actions challenged a municipality’s expropriation of commercial land that formed part of a 1,000‑acre assembly for a vehicle manufacturing plant.

The plaintiffs argued that the municipality unlawfully expropriated the property and conferred an illegal “bonus” on a private manufacturer by transferring the land at the expropriation price rather than its alleged fair market value, contrary to s. 106 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The court held that the municipality had lawful authority to expropriate the land for valid public purposes related to economic development.

Applying the contextual approach to s. 106 adopted in Friends of Lansdowne Inc. v. Ottawa (City), the court concluded that the transaction did not confer an “obviously undue advantage” on the private enterprise.

Accordingly, the expropriation and subsequent transfer did not breach the statutory prohibition on municipal bonuses.

The applicant sought child support and ongoing spousal support following the breakdown of a short marriage in which the respondent had sponsored the applicant and her child to Canada.

The central issue was whether the respondent stood in the place of a parent to the applicant’s child, who was not his biological child.

Applying the principles in Chartier, the court found that the respondent had assumed a parental role through financial support, representation to others as the child’s father, and participation in the child’s life.

The child was therefore a “child of the marriage,” and the respondent was ordered to pay guideline child support, including retroactive support.

The court also ordered time‑limited spousal support and granted the divorce.

The applicant father brought a motion for child support arrears from the respondent mother, who had relocated to New Brunswick and ceased paying support.

The court interpreted a prior consent order to determine the mother's minimum income for support purposes.

The mother claimed undue hardship under s. 10 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines due to the costs of exercising access and alleged inability to work.

The court dismissed the undue hardship claim, finding the mother had not proven exceptional circumstances and had the ability to earn income.

The mother was ordered to pay $30,328 in child support arrears and ongoing monthly support.

The appellant father appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice dismissing his motion to vary a separation agreement governing child support obligations and quantifying arrears for special expenses.

The father argued that a material change in circumstances existed due to a decline in his income and an increase in the mother’s means, and that the trial judge erred by failing to adjust his support obligations accordingly.

Applying the principles from Willick v. Willick and the deferential appellate standard described in Housen v. Nikolaisen and Hickey v. Hickey, the court held that the alleged financial deterioration was foreseeable and largely the result of the father’s own choices regarding employment and business ventures.

Because the circumstances relied upon were apparent at the time the agreement was executed and did not constitute a qualifying material change, the refusal to vary the agreement was upheld.

The respondent mother’s cross‑appeal seeking trial costs was also dismissed, as the costs determination fell within the trial judge’s discretion.

Following the dismissal of a motion to certify a class proceeding related to policing during the G20 Summit, the court determined the costs payable to a successful defendant.

The plaintiff argued that no costs should be ordered because the case raised novel legal issues and matters of public interest.

The court held that although the action involved issues of public interest, the certification motion was seriously flawed and the novelty argument was unfounded.

Applying the governing principles for class proceeding costs and considering comparable certification cost awards, the court concluded that a reduced costs award was appropriate.

Costs were fixed at $200,000 in fees plus disbursements and applicable taxes, payable by the plaintiff and indemnified by the Class Proceedings Fund.

The applicant father sought to vary ongoing child and spousal support and rescind significant support arrears following the collapse of his car racing business.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the father's extreme financial hardship, including over $300,000 in debt and reliance on social assistance.

The court rescinded all existing support arrears, ordered ongoing child support of $508 per month based on his new $35,000 salary, and ordered time-limited spousal support of $192 per month to assist the mother while she completed her PhD.

A mother appealed a child protection summary judgment that found the child to be in need of protection and placed the child in the care of a child protection society as a Crown ward with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, misapprehended the evidence under s. 37(2) of the Child and Family Services Act, and erred in denying access under s. 59(2.1).

The court held that the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment test under rule 16 of the Family Law Rules and carefully reviewed extensive largely unopposed evidence demonstrating significant parenting risks and inability to meet the child’s needs.

Fresh evidence regarding the mother’s updated plan of care did not sufficiently address the safety concerns identified in the original decision.

The court deferred to the motion judge’s findings and upheld the Crown wardship and no‑access order.

The applicant brought a motion seeking interim child support after a shared parenting arrangement ended when the respondent relocated and began operating a dog‑boarding business that generated minimal income.

The respondent argued that support should be based on his actual business income.

The court found that the respondent was intentionally underemployed within the meaning of s. 19(1)(a) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, noting his limited efforts to obtain comparable employment, the voluntary decision to invest his time and savings in a start‑up business with little anticipated income, and his historical earning capacity from long‑term employment.

Relying on prior earnings history and the principles in Lawson v. Lawson and Drygala v. Pauli, the court imputed income of $60,000.

Interim child support for two children was ordered retroactive to January 1, 2011 with credit for amounts already paid.

The applicant mother brought a motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The parties continued to reside together with their two children in a highly tense and hostile environment following their separation.

The court considered a psychotherapist's report indicating that the 16-year-old daughter was suffering from anxiety and depression due to the respondent father's behavior, which the court found amounted to psychological assault.

Applying section 24 of the Family Law Act, the court determined it was in the best interests of the children to grant the applicant interim temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.