Brian Brody

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an Approved Screening Device.

He argued his refusal was equivocal because he believed he was not the driver and wanted to speak to counsel first, and that the demand was not made forthwith.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions that the refusal was unequivocal, the demand was made forthwith, and no Charter breach occurred since the offence was complete before the right to counsel was engaged.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol in blood following a motor vehicle accident on January 27, 2015.

The defence challenged the arrest on Charter grounds under section 8, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the impaired driving charge.

The defence also argued the toxicologist's opinion was inadmissible due to the Crown's failure to prove the absence of bolus drinking, and that symptoms of impairment could be attributed to head injuries from the accident.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, rejected the bolus drinking defence as lacking an air of reality, and found the Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit and impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The accused brought a motion alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable period of time under s.11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been infringed, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The total delay was approximately 14.5 months from the date of the alleged offence.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that while the delay fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases, the defence had not met its onus of demonstrating that the delay was markedly unreasonable.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol content over 80 mg/100 ml on April 6, 2015.

A McDonald's employee reported observing an impaired driver, providing a license plate.

Police located the vehicle and observed erratic driving before stopping it at the accused's residence.

The Crown relied on breath test evidence and expert toxicology opinion.

The defence challenged the arrest under section 8 of the Charter and argued the expert report's assumptions were not established.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest but excluded the expert report due to evidence of bolus drinking (consumption of alcohol shortly before testing).

The court acquitted on both charges, finding the evidence of impairment insufficient to meet the beyond reasonable doubt standard.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the investigating officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test based on the totality of circumstances: the vehicle's position facing the wrong direction in live traffic lanes, the driver sleeping at the wheel with the engine running on New Year's Day morning, and contextual information about the driver's activities the previous evening.

The court rejected arguments that specific indicators such as odour of alcohol or admission of consumption were prerequisites to reasonable suspicion.

All Charter applications were dismissed, the breath samples were admitted, and a conviction was registered.

The defendant brought a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The total delay from arrest to trial was approximately 13 months.

The court found that while a reasonable intake period of 6 weeks was appropriate, the Crown's delay in providing disclosure was unjustified, taking over three months to provide 14 pages of police notes.

The court also found that the defendant suffered actual prejudice in the form of emotional and physical symptoms, including depression, anxiety, and stress-related health issues.

Balancing the factors under the Morin test, the court found the delay unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit (over 80) following a traffic stop in downtown Toronto.

The defendant conceded all factual elements of the Crown's case but challenged whether police complied with the Charter right to counsel of choice under section 10(b).

The defendant indicated a desire to speak with a friend he believed to be a lawyer, but police did not adequately facilitate this request before offering duty counsel.

The court found a breach of the defendant's section 10(b) rights and excluded the breath test evidence as the appropriate remedy under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

After providing a first breath sample, the accused became argumentative and claimed the officer was contradicting the legal advice she received from duty counsel.

The officer placed a second call to duty counsel but proceeded to take the second breath sample when the accused stated she wanted to get it over with.

The accused argued her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached because she was not given a second opportunity to consult counsel and the officer failed to hold off.

The court found no s. 10(b) violation, concluding there was no objectively observable change in circumstances requiring a second consultation, and the accused unequivocally waived any further right.

The court also held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated when the officer did not wait for a second consultation with duty counsel before obtaining the second breath sample.

The defendant became distressed after the first breath sample and expressed confusion about legal advice received, requesting to speak with counsel again.

The officer placed a call to duty counsel but did not wait for a callback before proceeding with the second sample.

The court found no Charter violation occurred and admitted the breath sample evidence, resulting in a conviction.

The accused was charged with operating a stolen motor vehicle, impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, and care or control with blood alcohol exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft but not guilty to the impaired and over 80 charges.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, having only a suspicion based on observations that did not meet the objective threshold.

The officer also breached the accused's Charter rights by delaying the reading of rights to counsel and the breath demand, and by interrupting the accused's consultation with duty counsel.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging an infringement of his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1).

The applicant was charged with impaired driving offences in July 2012, with the trial initially scheduled for May 30, 2013, and subsequently adjourned to October 4, 2013.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay of approximately 14 months and 19 days exceeded Morin guidelines, the defence counsel's actions in seeking the adjournment on May 30, 2013, were the primary cause of the delay.

The court found that the defence failed to take reasonable steps to prepare despite having full disclosure and that the adjournment appeared to be a tactical decision to establish a s. 11(b) application rather than a genuine necessity.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the validity of the roadside screening device demand on Charter grounds, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion that she had alcohol in her body.

The court found that the officer had observed the defendant's vehicle during a RIDE spot check, smelled alcohol, and heard the defendant speak before making the demand.

The court accepted the officer's testimony that he smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath and found that his suspicion was both subjective and objectively reasonable.

The Charter motion was dismissed and the defendant was found guilty.

At a preliminary inquiry, the defendant, a police officer, was charged with 46 counts relating to insurance fraud through staged motor vehicle accidents.

The Crown sought committal on counts relating to a fake accident on August 24, 2010, and on counts of attempt to obstruct justice.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit the defendant to trial on the fraud counts based on the defendant's creation of a forged accident report that contained personal details of the fraudulent claimants and was circulated in a manner consistent with facilitating their insurance claims.

The court also found sufficient evidence to commit on attempt to obstruct justice counts, holding that the insertion of false provincial offense ticket information into accident reports constituted an attempt to pervert the course of justice by misleading police superiors.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after driving approximately 50 meters while intoxicated.

The Crown conceded that the accused was impaired and had driven the vehicle.

The sole issue was whether the defence of necessity was available.

The accused testified that he was assaulted by a group of hostile males, one of whom brandished a knife, and that he drove to escape the imminent peril.

The court found that all three elements of the necessity defence were satisfied: there was clear and imminent peril, no reasonable legal alternative existed, and the harm inflicted was proportionate to the harm avoided.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a motor vehicle accident on Mississauga Road in Caledon.

The Crown relied on observations by civilian witnesses and a police officer, as well as toxicology evidence showing blood alcohol concentration well over the legal limit.

The defendant testified that she consumed alcohol after the accident while waiting for help.

The court found that while the defendant's version of events was barely believable, the investigating officer's evidence was completely unreliable due to inexperience, poor note-taking, and inconsistencies between his observations and those of civilian witnesses.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the necessary elements of both charges beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding care or control of the vehicle, and acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The accused applied for a bail review after being detained on secondary grounds following charges involving drug trafficking, firearms, identity theft-related offences, and breaches of recognizance.

The reviewing judge found that the justice of the peace erred in principle by failing to properly assess the proposed supervision plan and by making a factual error regarding the amount of money found on the accused.

The court reassessed the detention decision under both the secondary and tertiary grounds of s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

Although the allegations were serious and involved drugs, firearms, and identity theft, the court concluded that the proposed surety and strict supervision plan sufficiently mitigated the risk of reoffending.

Detention was therefore not justified and release was ordered with strict conditions.