Bernadette Dietrich

This case involves a dispute among three siblings, Bill, Mary, and John, concerning the management of their 92-year-old mother, Alpida Vrantsidis', property and personal care.

Bill and Mary sought declarations regarding the validity and enforceability of the 1995 Powers of Attorney (POAs) and an order for John to account for $61,000 he received from their mother.

John, self-represented, brought a cross-application seeking to invalidate the POAs or remove Bill and Mary as attorneys.

The court dismissed John's request for an adjournment, declared the 1995 POAs valid and operative, confirmed Alpida Vrantsidis' incapacity to manage her property and personal care, and ordered John to account for the $61,000 under a resulting trust.

John's application to remove Bill and Mary or invalidate the POAs was dismissed due to lack of merit and evidence of misconduct.

The respondent, Litigation Administrator for the Estate of Rita Persaud, successfully moved for an order declaring the applicant, Mohini Persaud, a vexatious litigant.

The court found a persistent pattern of vexatious proceedings and conduct across multiple court levels, including repeated issues, failure to comply with court directions, excessive communication, and non-payment of costs awards.

As a result, the applicant was barred from instituting further proceedings in Ontario courts without leave and required leave to continue her current application.

The Litigation Administrator for the Estate of Rita Persaud brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement against Chabiraj Persaud, the deceased's son, concerning the sale of a residential property.

The Litigation Administrator alleged that Chabiraj breached the agreement by further encumbering the property, increasing existing charges, and improperly withdrawing funds for an unsecured line of credit from the sale proceeds.

The court found that Chabiraj breached the settlement agreement by taking out new mortgages/lines of credit and improperly deducting funds, awarding damages of $220,578.48 plus pre-judgment interest to the Estate.

The court declined to find a breach regarding a commercially unreasonable realtor commission due to lack of evidence and also denied the request for injunctive relief.

This case involves two consolidated applications concerning the estate of Veronica Bishop.

Carolyn Mae Reeves sought interpretation of the will regarding executor appointments and asset vesting, and an accounting from Anne Marie Veronica Inglis, a de facto executor.

Margaret Bishop, the deceased's daughter, sought dependant's relief, an accounting, and the removal of Anne Marie as executor.

The court determined that Anne Marie and Carolyn are the current executors.

It clarified that non-residence assets vested at the deceased's death, while residence proceeds vested upon sale.

The court ordered Anne Marie to provide a formal accounting.

Margaret was found to be a dependant and awarded $725,000 from her trust, inclusive of her share of the residue and dependant's support, subject to Anne Marie's proven expenses.

The decision on Anne Marie's removal as executor was adjourned pending the accounting.

The Landlord sought leave to appeal an arbitration award concerning the rent reset for a 99-year ground lease, and alternatively, to set aside the award for excess of jurisdiction.

The arbitration tribunal had valued the "Demised Premises" at $63.3 million, while the Landlord argued for $95 million.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Majority's interpretation of the lease or its valuation mandate.

The court also dismissed the application to set aside the award, holding that the Landlord's arguments were an attempt to re-litigate the merits under the guise of a jurisdictional challenge.

The applicant, Cronos Group Inc., sought a declaration that it had a contractual right to exercise an Optional Extension Period (OEP) under its Excess Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Policy issued by the respondent, Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A., and that it successfully exercised this right.

The respondent denied coverage, arguing the OEP was not incorporated into the Excess Policy and the premium paid was insufficient.

The court found that the OEP was incorporated into the Excess Policy by reference to the Primary Policy, as it was not explicitly excluded.

The court also determined that the applicant's calculation and payment of the OEP premium, based on twice the original policy premium, was commercially reasonable and consistent with prior representations.

The application was granted, declaring the OEP right enforceable and the premium calculation valid.

This motion involved a dispute between a sister (applicant) and brother (respondent) over their mother's personal care and property.

The applicant challenged the validity of two Powers of Attorney (for Personal Care and Property) signed by their 89-year-old mother, June Lockhart, in 2018, which appointed the respondent brother as sole attorney.

The court found both 2018 Powers of Attorney void ab initio due to the mother's lack of capacity and the respondent's failure to prove capacity, as well as his actions in preventing a full capacity assessment and withholding the documents.

The court authorized both the applicant and respondent to make personal care and treatment decisions for their mother jointly under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, dismissing the respondent's motion to validate the POA and exclude the applicant.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

This case concerns an atypical receivership where the court-appointed receiver sought approval for its activities, including a cash collateral arrangement with Tarion Warranty Corporation and the payment of unsecured creditors' proven claims.

The debtor and a related party objected, arguing that the unsecured claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that Tarion was not an unsecured creditor or not entitled to full indemnification for legal fees.

The court approved the receiver's reports, finding that the Limitations Act, 2002 bars the remedy of commencing a proceeding but does not extinguish the underlying debt.

It held that a court-authorized claims process in a receivership is a separate remedy not barred by the Act.

The court also approved the cash collateral arrangement and Tarion's claim for indemnified legal fees, confirming its status as an unsecured creditor.

This motion concerned the approval of a Memorandum of Agreement between the receiver of the Norshield entities, appointed by the Ontario Superior Court, and the class representative of a Québec class action.

The agreement sought to facilitate the production of information from the receiver to the class representative for use in the Québec class action.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), a defendant in the Québec class action, opposed the motion, arguing that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction to approve what amounted to a non-party discovery in a Québec proceeding.

The court found that RBC had standing to oppose the motion and dismissed the class representative's request, ruling that the Superior Court of Québec, as the class action judge, was the appropriate forum to determine the relevance and necessity of the information sought.

The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company, as guardian of property for Asha Kumra, sought advice and direction from the court regarding whether Minutes of Settlement, entered into by Asha's sons Sanjiv and Rajiv Kumra, were binding on the guardian and precluded it from pursuing claims related to property transfers made by Asha prior to a one-year limitation period specified in the Minutes.

The court found that the Minutes were not binding on Scotiatrust or Asha Kumra, as neither was a party to the agreement, nor was Asha legally represented during its negotiation.

Consequently, Scotiatrust retains the discretion to pursue claims in Asha Kumra's best interests, irrespective of the limitation period in the Minutes.

The applicant sought to enforce a settlement agreement regarding the distribution of a deceased's estate, specifically concerning a life lease occupancy agreement.

The respondent argued that no formal acceptance occurred, his lawyer acted without full instructions, and an essential term (appraisal) was missing.

The court found that a binding settlement was reached by counsel with apparent authority and that an appraisal was not an essential term.

The court enforced the settlement, finding no real risk of clear injustice, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The appellant, a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, appealed two decisions by Masters sitting as Registrars in Bankruptcy.

The appellant sought an order under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) to pursue a claim that a property registered in the respondent mother's name was beneficially owned by the bankrupt former spouse.

He also sought an order under s. 163(2) of the BIA to examine witnesses regarding the property and the bankrupt's alleged undisclosed income.

Both Masters dismissed the motions, primarily relying on a prior consent family law order (the "Vallee Order") which explicitly stated the property would not form part of the bankrupt's estate for any purpose.

The court dismissed both appeals, affirming that the Masters did not err in principle or law.

It was held that the appellant failed to establish threshold merit for the s. 38 motion given the Vallee Order, and it would be inequitable to allow him to indirectly pursue what he had expressly agreed not to.

For the s. 163(2) motion, the court found the appellant did not demonstrate "something amiss" with the estate administration, concluding the proposed examinations were a fishing expedition.

Giuseppe Paolo Magnotta died intestate, survived by his wife, Melissa Magnotta (Applicant), and his mother, Rossana Magnotta (Respondent).

Melissa applied for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee without a Will.

Rossana objected, initially citing Melissa's alleged threat to exhume the deceased's remains and misrepresentation of estate liabilities, and sought a neutral third-party trustee.

The court found Rossana's objections unreasonable, as Melissa was the sole beneficiary and her "threat" to exhume was not acted upon.

Rossana's claim of a financial interest as a creditor for funeral expenses was also deemed insufficient to grant standing under Rule 75.03, as creditors have other remedies.

The court granted Melissa's application, dispensed with the administration bond, and awarded Melissa partial indemnity costs against Rossana.

The plaintiff, Atlas Copco Canada Inc., brought a motion for contempt of a Mareva injunction against Dirk Johannes Plate and Maria Van Noorden Plate for selling properties despite court orders.

The defendants brought a cross-motion seeking a stay of action against Mr. Plate and dismissal of the action against Mrs. Plate.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's contempt motion, finding no intentional breach by the defendants due to the plaintiff's own non-compliance with the orders and lack of pursuit of real property claims.

Mr. Plate's cross-motion for a stay was dismissed, as the plaintiff was entitled to set off appeal costs against Mr. Plate's restitution debt.

Mrs. Plate's cross-motion to dismiss the action against her was granted on the grounds of merger of claims and, alternatively, inordinate and inexcusable delay by the plaintiff causing prejudice.

Raymon DeRanney died intestate.

Fritzie Deleon and her daughter Caseylynn Deleon brought an application for dependant's relief from his estate.

Fritzie's claim was abandoned.

The court found that Caseylynn, though not a biological child, was a "dependant" under the Succession Law Reform Act because the deceased had demonstrated a settled intention to treat her as a child of his family, primarily through providing shelter and significant financial support for over 15 years.

The court awarded Caseylynn $40,955 for her post-secondary education, rejecting her claim for an equal share of the estate with the deceased's biological daughter, Sonya, due to insufficient evidence of equal treatment intention and Caseylynn's own financial disclosure deficiencies.

The court also addressed costs for the abandoned claim.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's fraud action for inordinate and inexcusable delay spanning over nine years.

The plaintiff attributed delays to corporate restructurings, database corruption, and translation requirements.

The court found the delay inordinate and inexcusable, noting the plaintiff's responsibility to advance the action and the lack of compelling reasons for the multi-year inaction.

The court also found a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible due to fading memories of critical viva voce evidence, especially given the fraud allegations.

The motion was granted, and the action dismissed with costs to the defendants.

The applicant, a shareholder, sought reimbursement from the corporation for expenses incurred in requisitioning, calling, and holding a shareholders meeting under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The corporation resisted, arguing the applicant did not act in good faith and did not technically "hold" the meeting.

The court found the applicant acted in good faith and was entitled to reimbursement, rejecting the corporation's technical argument regarding holding the meeting.

The court then determined the reasonable quantum of expenses, distinguishing between legal fees and disbursements and setting time limits for recoverable expenses, ultimately awarding the applicant USD$117,047.38.

The plaintiff, Canada Bread, sued the defendants (First Gulf and Mallot Creek) for negligence and breach of contract related to a bakery's design and construction.

An initial action was settled, and a release was executed for "known" claims.

Before the release, a fire occurred at the bakery.

Canada Bread's insurer was aware of First Gulf's potential liability for the fire, but Canada Bread itself was not.

Canada Bread subsequently commenced a second action for fire-related damages.

First Gulf brought a summary judgment motion before an arbitrator, arguing the release barred the second action.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding the release only covered "known" claims and that Canada Bread was unaware of First Gulf's fire-related liability at the time of the release.

First Gulf appealed this decision to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court granted leave to appeal on questions of law but ultimately dismissed the appeal, upholding the arbitrator's decision as reasonable.

The applicants, Saniia Agisheva and Andrii Grynyshyn (Grynyshyn shareholders), sought leave to bring a derivative action on behalf of Sunbex Corporation against the respondents, Dmitri Petrov, Natalia Lobanova, Alex Miadelets, Ventus Consulting Inc., and Midstream Infrastructure Protection Technologies Inc. (Petrov shareholders), alleging misappropriation of corporate opportunities.

The respondents brought a cross-application for leave to bring a derivative action against the Grynyshyn shareholders for alleged warranty claims and misappropriation of funds.

The court granted the Grynyshyn shareholders' application, finding they met the four-part test for leave to commence a derivative action, demonstrating good faith and an arguable case in the corporation's interest.

The respondents' cross-application was dismissed, as their claims were found to be de minimis or more akin to a personal contractual dispute, and not in the best interests of the corporation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interlocutory Mareva injunction to freeze $200,000 from a property sale, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty by the responding parties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs, as shareholders, lacked standing to claim directly for corporate losses.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty, as they could not prove direct inducement, reliance, or specific losses.

The court also found no evidence of irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction, nor sufficient evidence of asset dissipation.