Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CV-23-00695663-00ES DATE: 20230704 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: JOE NACCARATO, in his capacity as attorney for property and attorney for personal care of ANNA NACCARATO, Applicant AND: ANNA NACCARATO, THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN AND TRUSTEE and GARDINER ROBERTS LLP, Respondents
BEFORE: Dietrich J.
COUNSEL: Jan Goddard and Mallory Laurie, for the Applicant Preston Tu, counsel for the Respondent, Gardiner Roberts LLP Laura Cardiff, Section 3 counsel for the Respondent, Anna Naccarato
HEARD: June 22, 2023
Endorsement
[1] The Applicant, Joe Naccarato, and his wife, the Respondent, Anna Naccarato, have been married for 33 years.
[2] The Respondent has been facing mental health challenges for the last several years. The Applicant and others in the Respondent’s family are very concerned about the Respondent’s ability to make decisions regarding her property and her personal care.
[3] On April 9, 2014, with the assistance of Gardiner Roberts LLP, the Respondent granted each of a continuing power of attorney for property (“CPOAP”) and a power of attorney for personal care (“POAPC”) to the Applicant, as sole Attorney.
[4] The CPOAP is effective as of April 9, 2014. It may be exercised during the future incapacity of the grantor, and it is not subject to any conditions or restrictions. At the time the Respondent signed the CPOAP, she also signed a direction to Gardiner Roberts LLP (the “Direction”) directing them to hold the CPOAP in safekeeping and to release it to the Applicant only upon her written instructions or receipt of a letter from her personal physician confirming her incapacity to manage her property.
[5] According to the affidavit evidence of the Applicant, the Respondent’s sister, Mary Vinelli, and the Respondent’s daughter, Claudia Naccarato (“Claudia”), the Respondent’s mental illness prevents compliance with the terms of the Direction. They state that the Respondent’s symptoms include, but are not limited to, paranoia, delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking, social isolation and hypergraphia.
[6] The affiants deposed that the Respondent has refused all medical treatment and assessments since 2019. They attest that the Respondent will neither provide written instructions to Gardiner Roberts LLP to release the CPOAP, nor will she meet with a physician, who would likely provide the necessary letter.
[7] The Applicant seeks the advice and direction of the court on a) whether the Respondent is incapable of managing property and personal care; b) whether the CPOAP and POAPC should be released to him; and c) whether he should be appointed as the partial, time-limited guardian of the Respondent’s person. The Applicant has the consent of the Respondent’s closest family members, being Claudia, the Respondent’s son, Anthony Naccarato, Ms. Vinelli, the Respondent’s brother-in-law, Claudio Vinelli, and the Respondent’s mother, Emilia Nativio, to his appointment as guardian of the Respondent’s person.
[8] For the reasons that follow, I find that there is sufficient evidence of the Respondent’s incapacity to manage her property such that Gardiner Roberts LLP should be directed to release the CPOAP to the Applicant. I also find that the Respondent is incapable of managing her personal care in the domains of health care, shelter, and safety, and that it is in the Respondent’s best interests that the Applicant be appointed as her partial, time-limited guardian of the person.
Law
[9] Pursuant to s. 39 of Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1994, c. 27 (the “SDA”), if an incapable person has an attorney under a continuing power of attorney for property, the court may give directions on any question arising in connection with the power of attorney, and the court may by order give such directions as it considers to be for the benefit of the person and consistent with the SDA.
[10] Pursuant to s. 2(1) of the SDA, a person who is 18 years of age or more is presumed to be capable of entering into a contract. Pursuant to s. 2(2), a person who is 16 years of age or more is presumed to be capable of giving or refusing consent in connection with his or her personal care. These presumptions are rebuttable.
The Respondent’s Capacity to Manage Property
[11] The Applicant seeks an order directing Gardiner Roberts LLP to release the CPOAP to him on the basis that the precondition of its release has, in substance, been met. That is, the Respondent is incapable of managing property. However, the proof of this conclusion cannot be provided in the form set out in the Direction – a letter from the Respondent’s personal physician confirming the Respondent’s incapacity to manage her property.
[12] To find that the Respondent lacks capacity, there must be sufficient current and credible evidence to rebut the presumption that she has capacity.
[13] I must apply the evidence before me to the statutory test for capacity. According to s. 6 of the SDA, a person is incapable of managing property if the person is not able to understand information that is relevant to making a decision in the management of his or her property or is not able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.
[14] For the reasons that follow, I find that there is sufficient current and credible evidence to rebut the presumption. Accordingly, I find that the substance of the precondition of the Direction has been met, and it is appropriate that the court order the release of the CPOAP to the Applicant in lieu of a letter from the Respondent’s personal physician.
[15] Based on the evidentiary record, the Respondent has not been assessed by a capacity assessor. Nor has she been seen by any physician since 2019, when she suffered a broken ankle and underwent surgery and rehabilitation.
[16] Neither medical evidence nor a capacity assessment is required for the court to make a finding of incapacity. The court determines incapacity on a balance of probabilities. However, the Court of Appeal for Ontario has cautioned against concluding that certain chronic medical conditions necessarily lead to a lack of capacity: see Lewis v. Lewis, 2019 ONCA 690, 49 E.T.R. (4th) 175, at para. 6, relying on Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 722, at para. 77.
[17] In Dimitrova v. Dimitrova, 2021 ONSC 3239, at para. 37, Emery J. found that, in the absence of a capacity assessment and current medical evidence, there was sufficient current and credible evidence from the applicant, who was the daughter of the alleged incapable person, to find that the alleged incapable person did not have capacity to manage her property. A similar finding was made in W.A.C. v. C.V. F., 2021 ONSC 6894, at para. 69, where Finlayson J. stated that medical evidence may not always be required in order to make a finding of incapacity.
[18] The evidence of the Respondent’s incapacity is set out in the affidavits of the Applicant, Claudia, and Ms. Vinelli. Each of them swore an affidavit in support of the within application in May 2023.
[19] The three affiants are consistent in their view that the Respondent cannot comply with the terms of the Direction because she refuses to sign any document and she will not attend any appointment with a physician who could provide a letter confirming her incapacity to manage property.
[20] Each of the three affiants deposed that the Respondent’s symptoms of serious mental illness developed around 2015 or 2016 and include paranoia, delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking, social isolation, and hypergraphia. None of the affiants is a physician or otherwise medically qualified to diagnose the Respondent’s condition, but each has considerable contact with the Respondent. The Applicant has lived with the Respondent for at least 33 years. Ms. Vinelli and the Respondent have lived in the same neighbourhood for years, and Ms. Vinelli deposed that they chose to live close to one another so they could raise their families together. Claudia deposed that her mother contacts her regularly, sometimes many times a day, and Claudia visits the Respondent often, and tries to assist her in managing her symptoms.
[21] Each of the affiants adduced evidence of the Respondent’s belief that she is a victim of fraud, identity theft and organized crime. These concerns were reported to the police, but they were unfounded. The Respondent will not provide her signature on any documents relating to her various real property holdings, her banking, taxes, or corporate holdings. As a consequence, she has been late in her tax filings, and she has been removed from the board of two family corporations.
[22] The Applicant’s evidence is that the Respondent does not know what date it is on a given day and has an altered perception of time. She does not believe that it is 2023, and her delusional and paranoid thinking have resulted in missed bill payments, agitation, and financial loss to the Respondent and her family.
[23] The Applicant also adduced evidence of the Respondent’s refusal to meet with a social worker to discuss her fear of being surveilled. He deposed that the Respondent has put herself and others at risk by having driven the family vehicle without a licence or insurance. She is without a driver’s licence because she refused to renew it when it expired.
[24] On a balance of probabilities, I find that the Respondent is not capable of understanding information relevant to making a decision about her property, and she is not able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.
[25] This latter inability is evident in the Respondent’s disorientation regarding the date. The consequence of not knowing what date it is has led to her failure to pay bills and to meet income tax obligations. Her failure to understand the consequences of a decision or lack of decision is also evident in her failure to secure a tenant for her income property, which resulted in increased home insurance for a vacant unit and the need to pay vacant home tax; her failure to divide, sell or transfer properties owned jointly with family members to facilitate estate planning; and her failure to provide the necessary documentation to receive an inheritance from a deceased family member’s estate. The Respondent’s failure to fulfill her responsibilities as a director has caused her to be voted off the boards of family companies. The Respondent’s apparent paranoia prevents her from using a debit card, credit card or online banking facilities.
[26] In addition to the affiants’ evidence, Laura Cardiff, who was appointed s. 3 counsel for the Respondent, reported to the court that, despite several calls to the Respondent, she only reached the Respondent once, on June 2, 2023. Ms. Cardiff reported that, at that time, she explained to the Respondent that she would be representing the Respondent in the within application. According to Ms. Cardiff, the Respondent stated that she knew nothing about the application and that Ms. Cardiff could “hand it over to the Law Society of Canada” if she wanted to.
[27] Ms. Cardiff reported that, following her call with the Respondent, she sent a comprehensive letter to the Respondent in which she explained the relief sought by the Applicant, and she sought the Respondent’s views. Ms. Cardiff provided her contact information and provided the Respondent with the date and time of the hearing, and confirmed that it would take place via videoconference. The Respondent’s only view that Ms. Cardiff could relay to the court was that the Respondent did not wish to participate in the application. Ms. Cardiff informed the court that it is quite possible that the Respondent expressed this view without any knowledge of the relief sought in the application or its effect on her.
[28] Based on the anecdotal evidence from the three affiants, all of whom are very close to the Respondent, and all of whom have spent considerable time with her, and based on Ms. Cardiff’s report to the court, I am persuaded that the Respondent’s mental illness is serious. Her condition is impeding her ability to understand information that is relevant to making decisions in the management of her property and her ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.
[29] As an alternative to making this finding on the evidence available to me, I could order the Respondent to undergo a capacity assessment, pursuant to s. 79(1) of the SDA. However, courts have recognized that such an assessment is an “intrusive and demeaning process”: Abrams v. Abrams, at para. 50, citing Flynn et al. v. Flynn (December 18, 2007), Toronto, 03-66/07 (S.C.); Ying (Cindy) Zheng v. Long Zheng, 2012 ONSC 3045, 295 O.A.C. 294 (Div. Ct.), citing Abrams, at para. 50. In my view, ordering a capacity assessment in this case risks agitating the Respondent and is unlikely to add materially to the evidentiary record. Based on the record, it is highly unlikely that the Respondent would cooperate and submit to an assessment voluntarily. In that case, a further order enforcing the assessment would be required. On the facts of this case, I am satisfied that such actions are not necessary and would be inconsistent with the objective of the SDA that is aimed at protecting vulnerable persons, including from multiple demeaning processes.
[30] The substance of the precondition to the release of the Direction is a finding of incapacity. I am satisfied that there is sufficient evidence before the court to make the finding required to satisfy the precondition to the release of the CPOAP by Gardiner Roberts LLP to the Applicant.
[31] Considering s. 39 of the SDA, I am satisfied that the release of the CPOAP would be a benefit to the Respondent. It would fulfill her intention that the Applicant should manage her property as her attorney for property in the event of her incapacity, without the need for a guardianship application. In addition, if a guardianship application can be avoided, the Respondent would avoid a formal declaration of her incapacity to manage property; the confidentiality of the Respondent’s financial information would be preserved; and the confidentiality of the financial information of the Respondent’s close family members, with whom the Respondent engages in business, would also be preserved.
[32] Counsel on behalf of Gardiner Roberts LLP submits that the firm takes no position on whether the CPOAP should be produced to the Applicant or anyone else and that it will comply with whatever order the court makes. Gardiner Roberts LLP seeks an order that the balance of the application be dismissed against it, without costs.
[33] For the foregoing reasons, the CPOAP should be released to the Applicant.
The Respondent’s Capacity to Manage Personal Care
[34] The Applicant seeks a declaration that the Respondent is incapable of managing personal care, specifically in the domains of her health care, shelter, and safety and, as a result, needs to have decisions made on her behalf by a person who is authorized to do so.
[35] The Applicant also seeks an order that Gardiner Roberts LLP deliver the POAPC to the Applicant immediately. The Applicant submits that because the POAPC does not include all the necessary authority to fully manage the Respondent’s personal care, he also seeks to be appointed as a partial, time-limited guardian of the Respondent’s person. The Applicant has the consent of the Respondent’s closest family members, namely the Respondent’s two children, her mother, her sister and her brother-in-law, to his appointment as the guardian of the Respondent’s person.
[36] Under the SDA, the Respondent is presumed to be capable of managing her personal care.
[37] Again, I must determine whether the presumption has been rebutted by applying the evidence before me to the statutory test for capacity. Pursuant to s. 45 of the SDA, a person is incapable of personal care if the person is not able to understand information that is relevant to making a decision concerning his or her own health care, nutrition, shelter, clothing, hygiene, or safety, or is not able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.
[38] For the reasons that follow, I find that there is sufficient current and credible evidence before the court to rebut the presumption that the Respondent is capable of managing her personal care in respect of her health care, shelter, and safety. There is no evidence before the court to suggest that the Respondent is incapable of managing her personal care in respect of nutrition, clothing or hygiene. I am satisfied that decisions respecting the Respondent’s health care, shelter, and safety must be made on her behalf by another person authorized to do so.
[39] In respect of the Respondent’s health care, each of the three affiants attested to the fact that the Respondent has refused all medical appointments, treatment and assessment since 2019. Their evidence is that the Respondent sustained injuries at home in 2018 and 2019, including a broken ankle, which required surgery and rehabilitation. Based on the record, after the surgery in 2018, the Respondent reported to her doctor that she did not have anyone at home who could assist her. Seemingly, she had no understanding of the arrangements her family had made for her to receive in-home care. After the 2019 injury, the Respondent confided in family members that she believed that she was controlled by a “back window”, which physically pushed or threw her down causing the ankle injury. The affiants also deposed that the Respondent can often be heard to be speaking to someone when no one is present.
[40] The affiants deposed that the Respondent is not capable of managing her personal care in the domain of health care principally because she has not addressed her own mental health concerns and, consequently, lives in a state of constant fear and paranoia. She sleeps for many hours of the day, she has socially isolated herself, and she is highly distrustful of others.
[41] The evidentiary record also shows that the Respondent experienced an episode of distress, triggered by a fear that she was being surveilled. The Applicant called for assistance and the police responded. The police contacted a social worker to talk to the Respondent, but the Respondent refused to meet with the social worker.
[42] In terms of her physical health, the Applicant submits that the Respondent was diagnosed with high blood sugar and high cholesterol, but these conditions continue to be untreated and unmonitored and put the Respondent’s health at risk.
[43] In respect of the Respondent’s safety, the Applicant deposed that, on January 5, 2023, unbeknownst to the Applicant, the Respondent drove the family vehicle without a driver’s licence and without insurance. The Applicant contacted the police to report the incident because, in addition to the lack of a licence and insurance, he was concerned that the Respondent may not be mentally fit to safely operate the vehicle.
[44] Based on this anecdotal evidence, it is apparent that the Respondent fails to understand information relevant to making a decision about her personal care, and she is unable to appreciate the consequences of making or not making a decision in the areas of health care, shelter, and safety. The Respondent does not appear to have any real insight into her condition that would allow her to appreciate that seeking medical attention could perhaps relieve her of some of the symptoms she is experiencing. The Respondent appears to be vulnerable to taking risks, such as driving without a licence or insurance, without appreciating the potential harmful consequences to herself and to others of such conduct.
Partial Guardianship of the Respondent
[45] The Applicant submits that even if the court declared the Respondent to be incapable of managing her personal care in one or more domains, and the Applicant were in possession of the POAPC, the Applicant would still be unable to make certain decisions on behalf of the Respondent regarding her health care and her shelter. Such decisions may only be made by a guardian of the person as opposed to an attorney for personal care. For this reason, the Applicant seeks to be appointed as the Respondent’s guardian of her person respecting decisions to be made relating to the Respondent’s health care, shelter, and safety. The Applicant is also prepared to limit such guardianship, for the time being, to a duration of approximately four months. Within those four months, he would make arrangements to have the Respondent admitted to a hospital where she could be properly assessed, diagnosed, and treated.
[46] The court may on application appoint a guardian of the person for a person who is incapable of personal care and, as a result, needs decisions to be made on her behalf by a person who is authorized to do so: see SDA, s. 55(1).
[47] The court may order a partial guardianship over limited domains of the Respondent’s personal care: see SDA, s. 58(3). The guardianship may also be limited in duration: see SDA, s. 58(2).
[48] The court shall not appoint a guardian if it is satisfied that the need for decisions to be made will be met by an alternative course of action that does not involve finding a person incapable of managing property and is less restrictive on the person’s decision-making rights than the appointment of a guardian: see SDA, s. 55(2); Hunt v. Worrod, 2017 ONSC 7397, 32 E.T.R. (4th) 232, at para. 13.
[49] In many cases, a power of attorney for personal care will meet the need for decisions to be made on behalf of the incapable person regarding his or her personal care. However, an attorney acting under a power of attorney for personal care does not have the same decision-making scope as a guardian of the person.
[50] Based on the evidentiary record, it appears that some of the powers available to a guardian will be necessary in order that personal care decisions may be made in the Respondent’s best interests.
[51] For example, the record shows that since the onset of her mental illness, the Respondent has consistently refused to seek or accept medical and psychiatric evaluations and care. In light of this posture, it is more likely than not that the Applicant will need to avail himself of the custodial power (set out in s. 59(2)(a) of the SDA) and power to apprehend (set out in s. 59(3) of the SDA) of a guardian of the person. Absent an ability to rely on these powers, the Applicant would be precluded from apprehending the Respondent, if necessary, to ensure that she is admitted to a suitable hospital for evaluation and diagnosis and that she remains in the hospital for treatment.
[52] I am satisfied that appointing the Applicant as the guardian of the Respondent’s person, at least until her mental health can be evaluated, and a treatment plan, if necessary, can be put in place, would be in the Respondent’s best interests.
[53] During the period of his guardianship, the guardian would be subject to certain guidelines set out in s. 66 of the SDA, which aim to protect the interests of vulnerable persons like the Respondent. In making personal care decisions, among other considerations, the guardian is required to consider the wishes of the incapable person, if they can be ascertained. The guardian of a person must consider whether his decision is likely to a) improve the quality of the person’s life; b) prevent the quality of the person’s life from deteriorating, or c) reduce the extent to which, or the rate at which, the quality of the person’s life is likely to deteriorate. The guardian is also required to consider whether the benefit the person is expected to obtain from the decision outweighs the risk of harm to the person from an alternative decision.
[54] The affiants deposed that they do not know of any capable wishes expressed by the Respondent regarding the treatment she would want, or decisions she would have made for herself, if capable, if she were facing a serious psychiatric condition. They deposed that the Respondent has no insight into her medical condition. However, Claudia deposed that the Respondent obtained a degree in psychology and encouraged family and friends to seek professional advice if they were experiencing mental health issues. An inference can be drawn that if the Respondent understood her own medical issues, she would likely follow her own advice.
[55] The Applicant submits that the most critical step in the improvement of the Respondent’s health care is admission to a hospital for a comprehensive assessment and the development of a treatment plan. An attorney for personal care is not authorized to consent to the admission of an incapable person to a hospital as a voluntary or involuntary patient under the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7.
[56] The Applicant’s proposed guardianship plan includes arrangements for the Respondent’s admission to hospital for medical and psychiatric assessments and treatment. The Applicant submits that the Respondent’s mental health has deteriorated progressively since approximately 2015. He further submits that, in his view, the only prospect for improvement lies in the implementation of his plan, which begins with the Respondent’s admission to hospital.
[57] To advance his plan, the Applicant submits that he has contacted a suitable hospital into which the Respondent could be admitted as an inpatient in the mental health unit for evaluation and treatment. The Applicant submits that, depending on the Respondent’s diagnosis, or the proposed long-term treatment plan, he would amend his management plan and seek further advice and direction of the court, if necessary.
[58] I am satisfied that appointing the Applicant as the time-limited guardian of the Respondent’s person in the domains of health care, shelter, and safety, at least until her mental health can be evaluated and a treatment plan put in place, would be in the Respondent’s best interests. The appointment of a guardian in this case should assist in meeting the goal of the SDA to create a calm, stable and supportive framework in which decisions promote the best interests of the Respondent: see Lily Man-Lee Chu v. Kin Kwok Chang, 2010 ONSC 294, at para. 31, aff’d 2011 ONCA 389. I am satisfied that, at this stage in the proceeding, there is no less restrictive approach to the Respondent’s personal care.
[59] The court may provide a guardian with custodial powers to apprehend a person, with the assistance of a police officer, if necessary. The Applicant seeks such an order, and I am satisfied that without a power to apprehend, there is a strong possibility that the Applicant would be unable to execute his plan. The Respondent has been consistent in her refusal to voluntarily submit to an assessment and to seek treatment.
[60] An order to apprehend is made with reference to a specific date and time. Accordingly, following the Applicant’s appointment as partial, time-limited guardian, and after he has made arrangements for the Respondent to be admitted to hospital, he may need to be heard by the court on an expedited basis to seek an order to apprehend the Respondent. Based on the evidentiary record, the Applicant cannot reasonably expect the Respondent’s cooperation in the necessary arrangements.
[61] At this point in the proceeding, the Applicant seeks a guardianship order for a limited time and for limited purposes. He seeks to be appointed as guardian so that he may arrange for the Respondent’s hospitalization, diagnosis and treatment. Such an order is permitted per s. 58(2) of the SDA.
[62] Having reviewed the record and heard the submissions of counsel, I am satisfied that the Applicant is a suitable guardian of the Respondent’s personal care in the domains of health care, shelter, and safety. The Respondent named the Applicant as her attorney for personal care and her attorney for property. He has been living with and caring for the Respondent for more than 33 years. The Applicant has the support of all the Respondent’s closest family members, who agree with his approach as set out in his management plan. I am also satisfied that the Applicant’s management plan is appropriate for the time being.
Release of the POAPC
[63] I decline to grant the Applicant’s request to order Gardiner Roberts LLP to deliver the POAPC to the Applicant forthwith. There is no evidence before the court regarding the arrangement, if any, that the Respondent made with Gardiner Roberts LLP regarding the custody and release of the POAPC. There is no evidence of a Direction in respect of the POAPC, similar to the one she signed regarding the CPOAP, which contains a precondition to its release.
[64] The POAPC authorizes the attorney for property to make decisions in all six domains. At this time, I find the Respondent incapable in the domains of health care, shelter, and safety only. Based on the record, it is in these domains that decisions need to be made on the Respondent’s behalf in the short term. I am satisfied that on the appointment of the Applicant as partial, time-limited guardian, he will be in a position to make those decisions in accordance with his guardianship plan, in the best interests of the Respondent.
Disposition
[65] A judgment (the “Judgment”) shall issue in the form signed by me. The Judgment includes:
a) an order directing Gardiner Roberts LLP to deliver the CPOAP to the Applicant;
b) an order declaring the Respondent incapable of personal care in the domains of health care, shelter, and safety;
c) an order appointing the Applicant as partial, time-limited guardian of the Respondent’s person, and an order approving his guardianship plan;
d) an order granting the Applicant custodial powers over the Respondent and powers to determine her living arrangements, and to provide for her safety;
e) an order regarding the production and release of the Respondent’s health information and records;
f) an order authorizing the Applicant to make decisions on the Respondent’s behalf to which the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2. Sched. A applies;
g) an order permitting the Applicant to make decisions about the Respondent’s health care and about social services provided to her;
h) an order dismissing the balance of the application as against Gardiner Roberts LLP, without costs;
i) an order permitting the Applicant to obtain an additional hearing date on an expedited basis; and
j) an order permitting any party to seek further direction from the court on notice.
Costs
[66] The Applicant does not seek any costs in respect of his application.
[67] Section 3 counsel seeks costs of $4,766.99, all inclusive. When a costs claim is made against the property of an incapable person, the court will examine the benefit the incapable person derived from the legal work that generated the costs. Though s. 3 counsel was unable to ascertain any capable wishes of the Respondent, she made reasonable efforts to do so, made a written submission to the court, and appeared at the hearing to make submissions. In addition, I have considered the factors set out in r. 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as they apply to this matter, and I find the fees charged by s. 3 counsel for her service to be reasonable. I fix the fees of s. 3 counsel at $4,766.99, inclusive or fees, disbursements, and HST, to be paid from the property of the Respondent within 30 days.
Dietrich J. Date: July 4, 2023