Health Law

The appellant appealed a 2008 disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which ordered his continued detention in a medium security ward.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The Court declined to remit the matter for the imposition of conditions, finding the issue moot because the Board was already conducting a multifaceted hearing that would address the appellant's current circumstances and conditions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that he should be transferred to a medium security facility, that his liberty interests were not respected, and that an independent assessment should have been ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by the record.

The Court noted the appellant was making progress in his treatment program and that his liberty interests were currently less restricted at his current facility than they would be in a medium security facility.

The Court also declined to remove family members from the appellant's no-contact list.

The respondent suffered a Colles' fracture and underwent closed reduction surgery performed by the appellant emergency room doctor.

The appellant failed to take a post-cast x-ray and failed to inform the respondent of the high risk of displacement and the need for weekly x-rays.

The respondent's wrist did not heal properly, requiring multiple corrective surgeries.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent and awarded $90,000 in general damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of negligence and causation regarding the failure to inform, but found the trial judge erred in assessing general damages by holding the appellant responsible for all consequences of the fracture rather than just the incremental harm caused by the delayed detection of displacement.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing general damages to $30,000.

The appellant, who suffers from a delusional disorder and believes he is the rightful King of Canada, appealed a decision upholding the Consent and Capacity Board's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued that the test for capacity under section 4 of the Health Care Consent Act was unconstitutionally vague and that the Board's decision was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statutory test was not vague and had been defined with reasonable precision by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court held that the Board's decision was reasonable, as the appellant's mental condition prevented him from recognizing his illness and appreciating the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his medical negligence and battery action against a surgeon and hospital defendants.

The Court of Appeal found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the appellant gave informed consent to the surgery and failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of the standard of care.

The court also held the hospital was not vicariously liable for the surgeon, who was not an employee.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against a hospital, nurses, and doctors following the birth of a child who suffered severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation prior to an emergency Caesarean section.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while there were shortfalls in care, the cause of the oxygen deprivation was unknown and therefore not caused by the defendants' negligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on liability, holding that the trial judge erred in law by deciding the issue of factual causation before determining whether the standard of care was breached, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to explain why the plaintiffs' theory of liability was rejected.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period in section 4 of the Limitation Act.

They argued the motion judge conflated fraudulent concealment with discoverability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cause of action was discoverable when counsel received OHIP reports, and the appellants failed to investigate for 28 months before filing their claim.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in favour of the respondent emergency room physician in a medical malpractice case following the death of Dave Palmer from cardiac arrest secondary to a bowel obstruction.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to provide an adequate jury instruction by not reviewing the evidence or identifying factual issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while a trial judge should ordinarily outline the evidence, the failure to do so here did not result in a miscarriage of justice because the factual issues were straightforward and thoroughly canvassed by counsel in closing addresses.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was enough evidence to raise a genuine issue for trial regarding the standard of care, the appellants failed to put forward sufficient evidence on causation to raise a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board detaining him at a mental health centre.

The appellant argued the Board failed to meaningfully consider how he could be conditionally discharged.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to explain why detention was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, particularly given the availability of conditions regarding medication and statutory mechanisms for return to hospital.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant physicians, who performed cosmetic surgery without formal surgical residency, were investigated by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario for potential professional misconduct or incompetence.

The College sought to have investigators observe their surgical practices, which the appellants refused, arguing the governing legislation did not authorize compelled observation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the power to 'inquire into and examine the practice' under s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code encompasses the direct observation of a member's practice, particularly to protect the public interest.

The respondent doctor prescribed Accutane, a teratogenic drug, to the mother of the appellant child, relying on the father's 4.5-year-old vasectomy as birth control.

The vasectomy failed, the mother became pregnant, and the child was born with severe disabilities.

The child sued the doctor for negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that a doctor does not owe a duty of care to a future, unconceived child of a female patient when prescribing medication, as recognizing such a duty would create an impossible conflict of interest between the best interests of the future child and the best interests of the patient.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, an optician and his associated companies, appealed a finding of contempt and a $1 million fine for flagrantly breaching a court order.

The underlying order prohibited them from prescribing and dispensing corrective lenses without a prescription from an optometrist or physician.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the notice of application was adequate, the self-represented appellant received a fair hearing, and the consolidated hearing on liability and penalty did not vitiate the contempt finding.

The $1 million fine was upheld due to the appellants' deliberate and protracted disobedience of the court order.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their medical malpractice action on a motion for summary judgment because it was commenced outside the one-year limitation period under the Health Professions Procedure Code.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by refusing to consider medical evidence acquired after the action was commenced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the relevant period for the discoverability doctrine is before the action is commenced, and the appellants knew or should have known the material facts to base their claim prior to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that the Board failed to apply the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code when it denied a community living condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board was aware of and applied the correct test.

The Court held that the evidence, including the appellant's continuing substance abuse and personality disorder, amply supported the Board's conclusion that a community placement condition did not meet the mandated test.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of her medical negligence claim regarding the administration of the Energix B vaccine.

The trial judge found that the nurse did not breach the standard of care, as the risk of serious neurological damage was not known in 1994, and that the appellant would have consented regardless.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, concluding that the trial judge's findings on standard of care, informed consent, and causation were unassailable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for medical malpractice following a colonoscopy procedure.

The trial judge found the physician breached the standard of care by failing to order an urgent CT scan when the plaintiff presented with severe abdominal pain and low haemoglobin, which would have diagnosed an intra-abdominal haemorrhage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the expert evidence on standard of care and causation.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part and varied the order below in accordance with the agreement of the parties.

No costs were ordered.

The appellant, suffering from liver cancer, was deemed ineligible for a liver transplant in Ontario.

He obtained a life-saving living-related liver transplant in England at a cost of $450,000 and sought reimbursement from OHIP.

The Health Services Appeal and Review Board denied the claim, finding the treatment was not an 'insured service' under s. 28.4(2) of Regulation 552 because it was not generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in his medical circumstances.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the regulation did not violate section 7 of the Charter, as it did not deprive the appellant of life or security of the person but merely limited a financial benefit.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action.

The trial judge found that the obstetrician negligently failed to obtain informed consent for a mid-forceps delivery, which caused the infant's brachial plexus injury and brain damage.

However, the trial judge concluded that even with proper disclosure, the doctor would have recommended the forceps delivery and the mother would have consented.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings on causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding error.