Family and Matrimonial Law

The appellant, G.C., appealed a lower court's dismissal of his appeal from a summary judgment motion that found his children in need of protection due to a risk of sexual harm by him under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the summary judgment procedure was suitable given the significant consequences and the appellant's inability to cross-examine affiants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the motion judge and appeal judge correctly applied the summary judgment test in child protection cases, including the principles from Kawartha-Haliburton, and properly weighed the evidence.

The appellants, comprising an individual and two corporations, appealed a lower court decision that dismissed their application for specific performance.

They sought to compel the respondent, a separated spouse, to execute a Non-Solicitation and Non-Competition Agreement (NCA) as part of a corporate share sale.

The application judge found no evidence that the respondent had agreed to the NCA.

The respondent cross-appealed the costs award from the lower court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's finding regarding the NCA.

Leave to cross-appeal costs was denied, as the appellate court found the original costs award to be reasonable despite a potential misdirection by the application judge.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant, AA, was previously awarded reasonable disbursements.

AA filed submissions seeking $1,382.75 in disbursements.

Respondent CC had no issue with the amount, and respondent BB did not file any submissions.

The court awarded AA the full amount of disbursements sought, payable jointly and severally by BB and CC.

The appellant, David Joseph Lesko, appealed three aspects of a divorce order: an equalization payment to the respondent, Kelly Sue Lesko, based on her 50% interest in a pre-marriage property due to unjust enrichment; the determination of his income for support purposes; and the disallowance of his claim for credit against retroactive support for post-separation expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, upholding the trial judge's findings regarding unjust enrichment, income calculation, and the discretion to deny the appellant's late-claimed expenses.

The appellant mother challenged the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction over her youngest child, who was born in the U.S. and had never been to Canada, in the context of temporary parenting orders.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding of jurisdiction, holding that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Divorce Act because the father was ordinarily resident in Ontario.

Furthermore, the mother had attorned to the court's jurisdiction by actively participating in the merits of the underlying motions without formally challenging jurisdiction.

The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs due to the mother's reliance on public assistance.

Appeal from an application judge's decision regarding the division of property following the breakdown of a common law relationship.

The appellant sought sole beneficial ownership of a jointly-titled residential property (Brookdale Avenue) or, alternatively, a credit for his repayment of a joint line of credit used to finance its purchase.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the respondent held a 50 per cent legal and beneficial interest in the property, but allowed the appeal in part by granting the appellant a $500,000 credit on division of sale proceeds for his repayment of the respondent's share of the joint debt.

Appeal from trial judge's decisions regarding spousal and child support, and division of family home value in a common-law relationship of over 16 years.

The trial judge found a joint family venture and awarded the respondent $595,530 as her share of the family home, imputed $150,000 annual income to the appellant, and ordered costs of $280,000.

The appellate court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the respondent's share to $527,000 by deducting the outstanding mortgage balance, but upheld the imputation of income and dismissed the cross-appeal and motion for leave to appeal costs.

Following dismissal of a motion to set aside a prior order, the successful party sought recovery of legal costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court considered the Rule 24(11) factors and the costs consequences of an unaccepted Rule 18 offer to settle.

The moving party had pursued relief despite ongoing non‑compliance with financial disclosure obligations and ignored an early settlement offer.

The court found the litigation conduct unreasonable and ordered full recovery of the costs claimed.

Seventy‑five percent of the costs were characterized as relating to child support issues and were therefore enforceable by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office under the Family Law Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996.

An estate trustee brought a motion seeking authorization to set aside estate funds to pay anticipated legal fees incurred in defending a surviving spouse’s claim for equalization of net family property.

The respondent argued that the trustee should personally fund the litigation because he was also a beneficiary and the estate assets might be insufficient to satisfy a potential equalization payment.

The court reaffirmed the long‑standing principle that trustees are entitled to indemnification from estate assets for reasonably incurred legal expenses in the administration and defence of the estate, including litigation expenses.

The existence of a co‑existing interest as beneficiary did not defeat the trustee’s right to indemnity.

The court authorized $100,000 to be set aside from the estate for legal fees subject to oversight and without prejudice to the respondent’s right to challenge reimbursement at trial.

A procedural endorsement in a family law motion to change where the originally scheduled hearing dates conflicted with the judge’s schedule.

Following a conference call with counsel and consultation with the trial office, the court vacated the previously scheduled dates and set new hearing dates.

The motion was directed to be heard in Brampton.

The judge noted that although not formally seized of the matter, it was anticipated that he would hear the motion.

In a custody and access trial concerning a two‑year‑old child, the father sought joint custody, expanded access, transportation sharing, a hyphenated surname for the child, and reduced child support based on obligations to another child.

The court found the parents were unable to communicate effectively and were subject to criminal no‑contact conditions arising from a pending charge, making joint custody inappropriate.

Sole custody was granted to the mother, who had been the child’s primary caregiver, but extensive parenting time and communication safeguards were ordered to preserve the father’s relationship with the child.

The court ordered a temporary two‑out‑of‑three weekend access schedule transitioning to alternating weekends when the child begins school or the mother obtains significant employment.

The child’s surname was ordered changed to a hyphenated name including both parents’ surnames, and the father was required to pay full table child support.

On a motion to change a prior custody and child support order, the father sought sole custody, termination of his child support obligations, retroactive reimbursement, and child support from the mother after the child began residing exclusively with him.

The mother opposed the motion and sought confirmation of the original order, return of the child to her school, and appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the child’s decision to live with the father but held it was premature to vary custody without independent investigation.

The OCL was appointed to represent the child’s interests, the child’s principal residence was temporarily confirmed with the father, and structured access with the mother was ordered.

The mother was ordered to pay guideline child support while the child resides with the father, with retroactive issues reserved for trial.

Following a motion concerning interim child support, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The moving party had succeeded in imputing income to the responding party under s. 19(1)(h) of the Child Support Guidelines by grossing up dividend income received from a solely‑owned corporation and also succeeded on the commencement date of increased interim support.

The responding party argued for divided success, but the court rejected that position and found the moving party was presumptively entitled to costs.

However, the court reduced the amount sought because the successful party failed to serve a Rule 18 offer to settle.

Costs were fixed and ordered payable forthwith.

In a family law motion concerning parenting time, the father sought a regular access schedule with the child while the mother preferred a flexible arrangement dependent on the child’s willingness to visit.

The court considered the child’s participation in a behavioural therapy program addressing oppositional defiance and anxiety disorders and the ongoing involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The judge concluded that leaving access entirely dependent on the child’s choice was inappropriate.

An interim structured access schedule was ordered, with expanded overnight access contingent on the father’s participation in the child’s therapy program and subject to the therapist’s recommendation.

The order was to remain in force pending the Office of the Children’s Lawyer report and further court direction.

Following earlier findings that the respondent parent had frustrated court‑ordered access and had been found in contempt, the court considered whether the contempt had been purged and whether sanctions such as suspension of child support or probationary conditions should be imposed.

Evidence showed that several access visits eventually occurred and the child, now 15, expressed a preference to arrange contact directly with the father.

The court found the respondent had made genuine efforts and successfully purged the contempt.

The court declined to suspend child support and ordered that future access be arranged directly between the child and the father, with the respondent facilitating transportation and encouraging the relationship.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the applicant due to the respondent’s unreasonable conduct that necessitated repeated court attendances.

The responding parent brought a motion to vary an existing parenting order to obtain equal parenting time with the parties’ children.

The other parent opposed the motion on the basis that no material change in circumstances had occurred and that the proposed arrangement was not in the children’s best interests.

The court held that the evidence largely repeated the material filed on the original motion and did not establish a material change affecting the children.

The moving parent had also failed to exercise a number of scheduled access visits under the existing order.

The court concluded that the motion amounted to a thinly disguised appeal of the prior order and dismissed the motion to change, leaving the issue of equal parenting time to be determined at the upcoming trial.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to make the child a crown ward with a plan for adoption.

The respondent mother opposed the motion and sought the child's return to her care or, alternatively, placement with maternal relatives under a kinship plan.

The court found that while the child could not be returned to the mother's care due to her history of physical abuse and lack of engagement, there remained a genuine issue for trial regarding whether a viable kinship placement with the maternal uncle and aunt could succeed with appropriate therapeutic intervention and family support services.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion and adjourned the proceeding for trial on the discrete issues of the viability of the kinship plan and the child's access to family members.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for two children based on parental drug use and alleged protection concerns.

The court found that while both parents struggle with long-standing drug addictions, the Society's apprehension of the children was not justified on the evidence presented.

The court determined that the children should be returned to parental care pursuant to a supervision order with a reintegration plan, finding that the parents' drug addictions, while a legitimate concern, did not preclude their ability to parent with appropriate support and monitoring.

The court was critical of the Society's restrictive approach to access and lack of support for the parents' rehabilitation efforts.

A default hearing brought by the Director, Family Responsibility Office against a support payor for arrears of child and spousal support totalling $68,335.56.

The payor had been in default since December 2008 following job loss and subsequent development of severe clinical depression and anxiety disorder.

The Director sought an order for incarceration.

The court found that the payor had discharged his burden of proof by demonstrating he was unable, for valid reasons, to pay the arrears or make subsequent payments.

The court dismissed the incarceration remedy and instead imposed reporting and disclosure obligations, including annual submission of tax returns, financial statements, and medical reports regarding the payor's employability.

The applicant mother sought child support and section 7 expense contributions from the respondent father for three children.

The father acknowledged his legal responsibility but disputed the income imputation and special expenses claimed.

The court found the father was intentionally under-employed and imputed annual income of $36,960.00, resulting in monthly child support of $717.00.

The court awarded contributions toward swimming lessons, religious studies, and child care for the youngest child only.

The restraining order against the father was terminated.