Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law

The accused was tried without a jury on one count of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The allegations involved multiple incidents of sexual assault occurring between January 1, 2016 and January 9, 2024, perpetrated by the accused against his daughter while she was sleeping.

The complainant testified that the accused would enter her bedroom while intoxicated and touch her breasts, buttocks, and vagina.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's evidence as not credible due to material inconsistencies regarding his alcohol consumption, evasiveness, and implausible precision in recalling details.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

C.P. was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to a conditional sentence.

C.P. appealed the conviction, and the Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence, arguing for incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment or fact-finding.

While the Court found the conditional sentence demonstrably unfit for a serious sexual assault, it dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal, concluding that re-incarceration was not in the interests of justice given the time already served on the conditional sentence and the appellant's compliance and rehabilitation prospects.

M. D. was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault against his granddaughter, M. V., alleged to have occurred in 2008.

The complainant testified that the defendant sexually assaulted her while she was watching television.

The defendant denied the allegations, citing his severe mobility issues due to Paget's disease, which would have made the alleged actions physically impossible within the described timeframe.

The court applied the principles from R. v. W.(D.) regarding credibility and reasonable doubt.

While finding the complainant believable, the court found the defendant's and his son's evidence regarding his physical limitations credible, creating a reasonable doubt as to whether the incident could have occurred as described.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, voyeurism, assault, and sexual assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of sexual assault (Count 1), unlawful confinement (Count 2), and voyeurism (Count 3).

Count 4 (assault) was stayed as the act constituted sexual assault, which was not an included offence to assault simpliciter.

For Count 5 (sexual assault with a weapon), the accused was found not guilty of the weapon charge but guilty of the lesser included offence of sexual assault, as the black marker used was not deemed a "weapon" under the Criminal Code due to lack of intent to injure or actual injury.

The court assessed consent, credibility, and the "air of reality" test for mistaken belief in consent, ultimately preferring the complainant's evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm under section 267(b) of the Criminal Code.

The victim suffered severe facial injuries requiring major reconstructive surgery including multiple fractures and orbital floor reconstruction.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with three years of probation, a section 110 weapons prohibition for ten years, a DNA order, and a $100 victim fine surcharge.

The sentencing considered the serious nature of the injuries, the unprovoked nature of the assault, the accused's remorse, his completion of anger management counselling, his stable employment, and his prior conditional discharges.

The accused was charged with Operation over 80 and Disobey Stop Sign contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The defence argued that the officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by failing to provide an opportunity to consult counsel between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the arrival of the roadside screening device (ASD).

The defence further contended this led to an unlawful seizure of breath, breaching s. 8 rights, and sought exclusion of the breath readings under s. 24(2).

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights, as the officer had a reasonable expectation the ASD would arrive within minutes and was prepared to facilitate counsel access within 10 minutes.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court would not exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) following a Grant analysis, as the seriousness of any breach was minimal and the public interest in adjudicating the serious charge on its merits outweighed exclusion.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown applied to determine whether a provincial court has jurisdiction to revisit the constitutionality of a law after a Superior Court has issued a declaration of invalidity pursuant to section 52 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown argued that despite prior declarations finding mandatory minimum sentences unconstitutional, courts of coordinate jurisdiction may continue to consider the same issue constrained by principles of comity.

The court held that a section 52 declaration is a unique constitutional remedy that renders a law of no force and effect in the province and is binding on all parties and courts.

The Crown's application was dismissed.

Criminal trial involving charges of assault and uttering threats against two defendants arising from allegations of child abuse occurring between November 1 and December 23, 2016.

The prosecution relied primarily on testimony from two teenage witnesses, one of whom was a close friend of the family.

The court found credibility issues with the witnesses' evidence, particularly regarding exaggeration and inconsistencies.

The defendants were charged with failing to provide necessaries of life, assault, and uttering threats.

The fail to provide necessaries charges were dismissed on application for directed verdict.

The court found the defendants guilty of two assault charges but acquitted them of the remaining charges.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was stopped on Highway 417 in Ottawa after driving at high speed without headlights.

He failed an approved screening device test and was arrested.

The defendant challenged whether the Intoxilyzer breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that delays at the roadside scene and during a stop on Metcalfe Street to provide rights to counsel and formal breath demand violated the statutory requirement.

The court found that the officer acted reasonably promptly throughout and that the Intoxilyzer tests were administered within a reasonably prompt time in the overall circumstances.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer tests taken more than two hours after the defendant was stopped, requiring expert toxicology evidence to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown's expert opined the defendant's BAC was 95 to 140 mg/100ml at the time of driving, based on an assumption of no "bolus drinking." The defendant challenged the admissibility of his weight statement on Charter grounds and argued the Crown failed to prove the absence of bolus drinking.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, admitted the defendant's weight statement, and found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not consume two standard drinks within 20 minutes before driving.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Operation over 80 following an incident on September 28, 2016.

A civilian witness reported erratic driving to police.

The accused was stopped at his residence and arrested.

Breath tests conducted approximately 90 minutes after the incident showed readings of 135 mgs and 131 mgs.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, determined that breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, and found the accused guilty on both counts based on the evidence of impaired driving and the breath test results exceeding the legal limit.

The accused, a licensed paralegal, pleaded guilty to attempting to defraud Aviva Canada Insurance of monies not exceeding five thousand dollars between September 21, 2015 and November 16, 2015.

She participated in an insurance fraud scheme operated by a chiropractor, Dr. Edward Hayes, whereby she assisted undercover insurance investigators in preparing fraudulent insurance claims and provided advice on how to maximize claims and avoid detection.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence with house arrest or jail time, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with one year probation, 100 hours of community service, $1,000 restitution, and a $100 victim fine surcharge, finding that the unique and cumulative mitigating circumstances warranted this exceptional outcome despite the serious breach of public trust.

The offender pleaded guilty to communicating by computer with a person he believed to be under 16 years of age for the purpose of facilitating sexual touching, contrary to s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-week period, the offender engaged in sexually explicit communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl, including requesting intimate images and sending explicit videos.

The offender arranged an in-person meeting and travelled to the meeting location with items the purported victim had requested.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, along with mandatory DNA and SOIRA orders and a 20-year s. 161 prohibition on computer and internet use for communicating with minors.

Appeal of a conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a fatal workplace accident at a steel processing plant.

The defendant was convicted on one count of failing to provide information, instruction and supervision to a worker, and acquitted on two other counts.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in failing to consider the worker's negligence in assessing whether the Crown had proven the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt, and also erred in failing to consider the defence expert's evidence.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, finding either that the actus reus had not been established or, alternatively, that the defendant had proven due diligence.

The accused was convicted at trial of three counts of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

While providing hair salon services, he touched the breasts of three female customers on separate occasions, with the touching being deliberate and repeated, and in one case occurring under the victim's bra.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 4 to 6 months followed by probation.

The defence sought a conditional sentence or, alternatively, a 90-day intermittent sentence, citing the accused's status as a permanent resident and potential immigration consequences.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence followed by two years of probation with restrictive conditions, finding that incarceration was necessary to meet the principles of denunciation and deterrence despite the accused's lack of criminal record and stable employment.

The accused brought a motion for a mistrial based on concerns raised by the Crown during trial that the accused may have been drinking alcohol and impaired.

The Crown's concern was based on observations by an officer in the hallway.

Defence counsel confirmed with the accused that he had not been drinking and was fit to proceed.

The defence argued that the mention of the issue could prevent a fair trial given that the charge related to alcohol and driving.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that trial courts routinely hear prejudicial evidence later found inadmissible and must disregard such evidence.

The court noted that no prejudicial result occurred from the Crown's concern, which was appropriately raised and addressed.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired, blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

The Crown alleged the defendant operated a vehicle in an erratic manner, struck a mailbox, and fled the scene.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of statements and evidence on Charter grounds, arguing improper detention and lack of grounds for arrest.

The court rejected all Charter claims, finding no detention prior to arrest, proper grounds for the breath demand, and voluntary statements.

The court found the defendant guilty of all charges based on eyewitness testimony of erratic driving, observations of impairment indicators, breath test results showing blood alcohol level more than twice the legal limit, and admissions by the defendant.

The accused was charged with simple possession of crack cocaine.

The sole issues at trial were Charter violations.

The defence alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the initial detention for investigative purposes regarding a robbery was lawful, the arrest for public intoxication lacked objective grounds.

The court also found violations of the right to counsel, as the accused was not advised of his right to counsel in relation to the drug charge until over an hour after the drugs were discovered, and was further delayed in implementing that right for over six hours due to his intoxication.

The court excluded the evidence of the crack cocaine as a remedy for the Charter breaches.

The accused was charged with assault arising in a domestic context.

The accused brought a motion alleging a breach of his section 11(b) Charter rights regarding trial delay.

The Crown and defence disagreed on when the section 11(b) clock begins to run.

The defence argued it starts when the information is sworn; the Crown argued it starts when process is executed or brought to the attention of the accused.

The court found that the information was sworn on August 27, 2014, but the warrant was not executed until October 16, 2016—approximately two years and two months later.

The court held that the section 11(b) clock starts when the information is sworn and process is issued, and that the delay far exceeded the 18-month threshold established in R. v. Jordan.

Finding no exceptional circumstances justifying the delay, the court granted a stay of charges.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences after police stopped his vehicle and discovered small quantities of marijuana and crack cocaine on his person and a loaded revolver hidden behind the vehicle’s dome light.

The Crown alleged the drugs were possessed for the purpose of trafficking and that the accused knowingly possessed the firearm.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence, including a suspected exchange with another vehicle and the presence of a firearm, did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were intended for trafficking.

The hidden firearm’s location and the accused’s control of the vehicle were insufficient to prove knowledge of the weapon.

The accused was acquitted of all firearm offences and drug trafficking counts but convicted of the included offences of simple possession of marijuana and cocaine.