Anu Koshal

The plaintiffs sued their former law firm and former in-house counsel for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from a commercial transaction and subsequent settlement.

The court found that the former in-house counsel breached his fiduciary duty by acting for the opposing party at a mediation, and that the law firm breached its standard of care by failing to warn the plaintiffs of this conflict.

The court also found the law firm breached its fiduciary duty by obtaining an ineffective conflict waiver.

However, the court concluded that these breaches did not cause the plaintiffs' claimed business losses, as the plaintiffs would have settled regardless and suffered no loss of chance.

The court awarded nominal damages of $2,000.

At the eleventh case management conference in this action, the plaintiffs sought an expedited trial date and an order for a summary trial under Rule 76.12.

The defendants opposed the summary trial process and sought time to complete discoveries and deliver responding expert reports.

The court declined to order a summary trial at this stage but established a timetable for the delivery of amended pleadings, completion of discoveries, and exchange of expert reports, with the next case management conference scheduled for January 2020.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision on an appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The respondent abandoned his right to seek costs under Rule 58.06.

The appellant and amicus curiae reached an agreement on costs, with amicus curiae entitled to costs fixed at $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation regarding the purchase of a condominium unit, arguing that the unit was purchased by a corporation rather than the plaintiffs personally.

The court dismissed the motions on two grounds.

First, the motions were brought after an inordinate and unexplained delay, contrary to rules 2.02 and 21.02.

Second, on the merits, it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiffs' claims in their personal capacity as prospective purchasers and intended occupants would fail, nor was it plain and obvious that they lacked legal capacity to bring the claims.

An orthopaedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for failing to obtain informed consent before performing total wrist fusion surgery on a 73-year-old professional golfer.

The trial judge awarded $20,000 in general damages and $40,000 for lost income.

The surgeon argued the trial judge erred in applying the causation test, in finding a duty to warn about regional sympathetic dystrophy (RSD), and in misapprehending expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law of informed consent and causation, and that her factual findings were entitled to deference.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and the granting of the defendants' summary judgment motion, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The defendants sought a combined total of approximately $150,000 in partial indemnity costs, while the plaintiffs argued for a significantly reduced amount of $60,000.

Applying the overriding principle of reasonableness, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay $65,000 to the lead defendant and $30,000 to the remaining defendants.

The plaintiffs sought early redemption of their syndicated mortgage investments from Hi-Rise Capital Ltd. (HRC) and 54 Shepherd Road Inc., arguing HRC was contractually obligated to redeem.

HRC and 54 Shepherd Road Inc. brought cross-motions for summary judgment, asserting no such obligation existed and raising issues of standing and res judicata for one plaintiff.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding no unqualified right to early redemption based on a holistic interpretation of the Loan Participation Agreements (LPAs) and mandatory disclosure forms.

The court granted the defendants' cross-motions, dismissing the plaintiffs' action.

The defendants, Ted Slightham and Tatiana Doubovsky, sought to schedule motions under Rule 21.01 to dismiss the action against them, arguing the Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim did not plead a reasonable cause of action or that the plaintiffs lacked legal capacity.

The plaintiffs, Walter Zuppinger and Min Yan, opposed, arguing the motions were untimely and would cause delay.

The court, exercising its gatekeeping function in a case-managed action, determined that granting the defendants' request to advance these motions was proportionate, efficient, and timely given the significant change in the action following a partial settlement.

The court provided detailed case management directions for the scheduling and conduct of the motions, reserving substantive assessment to the motions judge.

The appellant mortgagee sought to enforce a mortgage through power of sale against the respondent mortgagor.

The mortgagee attempted two purported sales of the property to itself.

The trial judge dismissed the mortgage action, finding that the mortgagee's enforcement rights were suspended under section 22 of the Mortgages Act due to failure to provide proper mortgage statements in response to the mortgagor's requests.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the mortgagee's ability to enforce the mortgage was statutorily suspended at the time of both purported sales because it had not complied with the requirement to provide accurate and complete mortgage statements within 15 days of the mortgagor's requests.

La demanderesse, un organisme de bienfaisance enregistré, a contesté l'interprétation et l'application par l'Agence du revenu du Canada (ARC) du paragraphe 149.1(6.2) de la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu.

L'ARC limitait à 10 % les ressources qu'un organisme pouvait consacrer à des activités politiques non partisanes.

La Cour a conclu que cette restriction portait atteinte à la liberté d'expression garantie par l'alinéa 2b) de la Charte, car elle empêchait la demanderesse de poursuivre ses fins de bienfaisance par la défense d'intérêts publics.

L'atteinte n'était pas justifiée au regard de l'article premier de la Charte.

La Cour a déclaré que les activités politiques non partisanes contribuant aux fins de bienfaisance doivent être considérées comme des activités de bienfaisance sans restriction de pourcentage.

The applicant, a registered charity focused on poverty relief through public advocacy, challenged the Canada Revenue Agency's (CRA) interpretation and enforcement of section 149.1(6.2) of the Income Tax Act.

This section limits non-partisan political activities to "substantially all" of a charity's resources, which the CRA interpreted as 90% or more, effectively capping political activities at 10%.

The applicant argued this restriction infringed its freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the CRA's 10% rule and the distinction between charitable and non-partisan political activities were unconstitutional, as they burdened the applicant's effective pursuit of its charitable purpose through advocacy.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 34.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to compel the responding parties to produce documents in advance of cross-examinations on affidavits sworn in support of the responding parties' summary judgment motions.

The responding parties argued the motion was prohibited under Rule 48.04(1) because the action had been set down for trial, and that the requests were disproportionate.

The court held that Rule 48.04(1) did not bar the motion and the moving party had not waived the right to documentary discovery.

However, because the responding parties had never served affidavits of documents, the court dismissed the motion without prejudice, directing the responding parties to first serve affidavits of documents so that relevance and proportionality could be properly assessed.

The plaintiff, a golf professional, brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant orthopedic surgeon regarding an elective total wrist fusion surgery.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to obtain informed consent by not disclosing alternative, less drastic surgical options that would have preserved some wrist mobility, which was essential for his livelihood.

The court found that the defendant breached his duty of disclosure by failing to explore the plaintiff's specific needs, inadequately describing the surgery, and failing to discuss viable alternative procedures like a four-corner fusion or proximal row carpectomy.

The court concluded that both the subjective and objective tests for causation were met, as neither the plaintiff nor a reasonable person in his position would have consented to a total wrist fusion if properly informed.

The plaintiff was awarded $20,000 in general damages and $40,000 for past loss of income.

The appellants appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim for professional negligence against their former solicitors.

The law firm had been retained for nearly five years to represent the appellants in protracted litigation and subsequently sued for unpaid fees.

The appellants counterclaimed for damages, alleging the firm failed to provide a meaningful assessment of potential damages that would have enabled an earlier settlement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no causal link between the firm's failure to obtain a formal damages assessment and the continuation of the litigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law and that genuine issues requiring trial existed.

At a case management conference, the plaintiffs sought costs against the defendant condominium corporation for the late production of over 4,600 pages of documents.

The late production necessitated vacating a scheduled mediation and modifying the case management timetable.

The court found that the defendant's breach of the court-ordered timetable resulted in foreseeable delay and wasted costs.

The plaintiffs were awarded $1,500 in costs payable forthwith.

The plaintiffs brought an action for condominium deficiencies against the condominium corporation, board members, and the vendor.

Multiple third, fourth, and fifth party claims were subsequently issued, resulting in nineteen parties.

A case management conference was convened to address the scheduling of examinations for discovery and mediation.

To balance the parties' discovery rights with the need for proportionality and cost-efficiency, the court ordered time-limited 'summary' examinations of three hours per witness to take place prior to a mandatory mediation session.

If the matter does not settle at mediation, full examinations will be completed thereafter.

Aird & Berlis LLP, a law firm, moved for summary judgment for unpaid legal fees and disbursements totaling $182,569.63 from its former clients, Oravital Inc. and Alliance H. Inc. Oravital counterclaimed for professional negligence, alleging deficiencies in legal services and claiming over $600,000 in damages.

The court found that Oravital's principals were sophisticated businesspeople who understood the litigation risks and value of their claim.

The court determined there was no causal link between the alleged failure of Aird & Berlis to obtain an earlier formal damages assessment and Oravital's decision to continue the litigation.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was granted in favour of Aird & Berlis, and Oravital's counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to produce independent expert medical evidence establishing breach of the applicable standard of care.

The self‑represented plaintiff alleged negligent wrist surgery and relied primarily on the poor surgical outcome and a later procedure removing a metal plate.

The court held that expert evidence is generally required to establish medical negligence where the alleged breach is not obvious to a layperson, and the plaintiff had failed to provide such evidence despite prior directions.

The malpractice claim was therefore dismissed.

However, the court found that the defendants had not clearly raised the separate pleaded allegation of lack of informed consent on the motion and adjourned that aspect to permit the plaintiff to file admissible evidence.

The appellant appealed an order varying an assessment officer's report regarding legal fees.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings that the assessment officer provided only conclusory reasons for reducing the respondent's hourly rates and had no evidentiary basis for disallowing the cost of two lawyers appearing in court.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $8,000.