William L. Roland

The applicant law firm sought costs of $32,307.82 following its successful appeal of an assessment officer's decision that had ordered it to refund $662,455.98 to the respondent clients.

On appeal, the court had substituted its own determination, ordering the law firm to pay $475,000.

The respondent clients sought partial indemnity costs of $20,000 for the appeal.

The court held that while the law firm was technically successful in setting aside the certificate of assessment, the substantial award against it should not be diluted by awarding costs against the clients.

The court awarded the respondent clients $15,000 in costs.

The applicant law firm appealed a Certificate of Assessment that reduced its legal accounts of nearly $600,000 to nil and ordered a refund of $662,455.98 to the respondent clients.

The Assessment Officer had found the fees to be so grossly excessive as to amount to fraud.

On appeal, the Superior Court held that the Assessment Officer did not exceed her jurisdiction in assessing the accounts or in making circumscribed findings of fraud.

However, the court found an error in principle in reducing the value of the legal services entirely to nil despite the poor outcome for the clients.

Rather than remitting the matter, the court substituted its own determination, ordering the law firm to refund $475,000 inclusive of interest and substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants (clients) appealed an order granting the respondent solicitors' motion to oppose confirmation of an assessment officer's report.

The assessment officer had disallowed a $500,000 bonus payable under a contingency fee agreement, finding it unfair and unreasonable.

The motion judge held that the assessment officer lacked jurisdiction to consider the fairness and reasonableness of the agreement, and found the agreement to be fair and reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that assessment officers do not have jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of contingency fee agreements unless explicitly delegated, and upheld the motion judge's finding that the bonus was reasonable given the risk and the $20 million value of the property saved from foreclosure.

The appellant appealed an order varying an assessment officer's report regarding legal fees.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings that the assessment officer provided only conclusory reasons for reducing the respondent's hourly rates and had no evidentiary basis for disallowing the cost of two lawyers appearing in court.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $8,000.

Following a decision regarding the assessment of a law firm's accounts, the court received cost submissions.

The respondent law firm sought $14,800 in costs, including a $10,000 disbursement for a transcript.

The applicant opposed the transcript costs and alleged duplication.

The court found the requested costs modest, upheld the necessity of the transcript, and fixed costs at $10,800 inclusive of disbursements and HST, to be set off against the amount the law firm was ordered to repay the applicant.

On cross-motions under Rule 54.09 opposing confirmation of an assessment officer’s report on three solicitor accounts, the court declined to further reduce the assessed fees apart from a disallowed contingency bonus.

The court held that the assessment officer lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity and fairness of the contingency fee agreement because that issue had not been referred for assessment.

In any event, the officer misconstrued the written agreement and made palpable and overriding factual errors in finding the bonus unfair.

The report was varied to restore the $500,000 contingency bonus, subject to further submissions on costs of the assessment, prejudgment interest, and costs of the motion.

The applicant sought several forms of relief in connection with the assessment of a law firm's account, including a declaration regarding whether a negligence finding at assessment would be res judicata, a ruling on the admissibility of surreptitious audio recordings, and an order requiring the assessment to proceed before a judge rather than an Assessment Officer.

The court found the res judicata issue moot because no negligence action had been commenced and the limitation period had expired.

Allegations of administrative delays and errors in the assessment office did not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias warranting transfer of the assessment to a judge.

The court ordered the matter to proceed before an Assessment Officer and required the applicant to disclose complete audio recordings rather than edited excerpts.

No costs were awarded.