Ann Marie Christian-Brown

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude video footage of an interview between a deceased plaintiff and a documentary filmmaker.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the unsworn footage to demonstrate the deceased plaintiff's sincerity and counter credibility attacks in the defendants' expert reports.

The court held that the video footage did not meet the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay, noting that the best available evidence was the deceased plaintiff's sworn examination for discovery transcript and affidavit.

The motion to exclude the evidence was granted.

The Crown brought an ill-conceived motion to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from the Plaintiffs on the eve of trial in a multi-plaintiff action concerning alleged inhumane experimentation at a mental hospital.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Plaintiffs had made good faith efforts to provide disclosure given their health limitations and the age of the records.

The judge emphasized that the Rules of Civil Procedure are to facilitate, not impede, litigation, and that proportionality and common sense must guide discovery.

Many of the Crown's requests were deemed a "fishing expedition" or sought information the Crown could obtain independently.

The Plaintiffs were awarded $30,000 in substantial indemnity costs due to the Crown's conduct in unnecessarily lengthening the proceeding.

The plaintiffs brought a civil action arising from a pretrial detainee's placement in the same correctional unit as an inmate who had previously committed a violent home invasion against him.

The court held the Crown vicariously liable for correctional staff negligence extending beyond the admitted inmate-tracking error, including inadequate supervision, failure to protect, and degrading conduct by officers, and rejected contributory negligence and mitigation defences.

The court accepted the treating psychologist's evidence, rejected the defence psychological opinion, found serious and permanent psychological injury, and awarded substantial non-pecuniary, income loss, future care, special, and Family Law Act damages.

The court also found violations of ss. 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and awarded separate Charter damages for vindication and deterrence.

During a trial for damages arising from an inmate assault due to a cell placement error, the plaintiffs sought an order compelling the Crown to produce the notes and testing results of a vocational rehabilitation specialist.

The Crown had retained the specialist but later decided not to call her as a witness or request a formal report.

The Crown argued the plaintiffs waived their right to the report by not requesting it earlier.

The court held that Rule 33.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the production of such reports and ordered the Crown to produce the specialist's notes and testing results forthwith.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order determining that claims for recovery of legal expenses incurred in connection with a coroner's inquest into the death of a family member were potentially recoverable under section 61(1) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in answering the question of law under Rule 21.01(1)(a) without proper pleadings raising the issue.

The pleadings predated the inquest and contained no reference to legal expenses.

The motion judge's answer that the expenses were "potentially recoverable" if they qualified as pecuniary loss did not advance the litigation or satisfy the purposes of Rule 21.01(1)(a).

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to determine, before trial, whether legal expenses incurred for their participation in a coroner's inquest into the death of Jonathan Dew are potentially recoverable as pecuniary loss under section 61(1) of the Family Law Act.

The court found the motion was properly brought, as the relevant facts were not in dispute and the determination could shorten the trial or save costs.

Applying the "but for" test and principles from Macartney v. Islic, the court concluded that such legal expenses are indeed potentially recoverable.

The court rejected the defendants' argument that the Coroners Act provides a complete code for costs, finding no conflict with the Family Law Act in this context.

The Crown appealed an order granting the respondent state-funded counsel of choice (a Fisher order) for his first-degree murder trial.

The application judge had conditionally stayed the charge until the state negotiated compensation with the respondent's chosen counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to produce sufficient evidence to meet the narrow exceptions established in Peterman for state-funded counsel of choice.

The order was set aside, though the Crown had agreed to fund the chosen counsel regardless of the appeal's outcome.

In a negligence action arising from a fatal swing‑stage collapse during construction, a defendant moved to compel answers to numerous refusals given by the Ministry of Labour’s representative during discovery.

The Ministry argued that questions relating to inspector training, experience, workload, and inspection decisions were irrelevant because they concerned non‑justiciable core policy decisions involving allocation of governmental resources.

The court held that it was premature on a refusals motion to determine whether the inspection decisions were policy or operational, and that the pleadings alleged negligent inspection and failure to enforce safety obligations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

As a result, questions concerning the inspector’s qualifications, workload, sector plans, internal guidelines, prior incidents, and certain post‑incident changes were relevant and proportionate.

Most refusals were ordered answered, some were dismissed, and costs were awarded to the moving defendant.

The accused brought a Rowbotham application seeking a court‑ordered state-funded counsel after being denied Legal Aid.

The Crown conceded the accused had been refused Legal Aid and lacked the financial means to retain counsel, leaving only the issue of whether her right to a fair trial would be materially compromised without representation.

The accused faced charges of mischief and criminal harassment and argued the harassment charge was legally complex.

The court held the anticipated four‑hour trial was not lengthy or complex and that the accused could effectively represent herself with guidance from the court.

The application for court‑appointed counsel was dismissed.

The defendants moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the plaintiff, a former inmate who alleged severe injuries from an assault by other inmates, was ordinarily resident outside Ontario following deportation to the United States.

The court found that the plaintiff was indeed not ordinarily resident in Ontario, thereby meeting the threshold requirement of the rule.

However, the plaintiff had provided limited evidence regarding financial circumstances, and the evidentiary record concerning the merits of the negligence claim against correctional authorities remained incomplete at the early stage of proceedings.

The court held that assessing the merits required disclosure of institutional procedures and security measures primarily within the defendants’ control.

In balancing access to justice against protection of defendants from meritless claims, the court concluded that requiring security for costs at this stage would be unjust and premature.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada appealed an order requiring the production of an aircraft's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) to NAV Canada in the context of civil litigation arising from an airplane crash.

The Board argued the motion judge applied the wrong legal test under s. 28(6) of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly balanced the public interest in the proper administration of justice against the statutory privilege attached to the CVR.

The court upheld the production order, noting the CVR's high relevance and reliability, but reversed a minor order regarding a flight animation that was not properly before the motion judge.

An employee of the appellant's subsidiary was injured at work and settled a claim for $1,350,000.

The appellant sued its excess insurer for the $350,000 amount above its primary coverage.

The appellant argued the umbrella policy provided 'claims made' coverage, while the insurer argued an endorsement limited it to an 'occurrence' basis.

The trial judge found the endorsement superseded the general policy provisions and required an occurrence during the policy period.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, finding the endorsement operated as a coverage trigger rather than an exclusion, and dismissed the appeal.