Andrew Anthony Furgiuele

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, contrary to sections 271 and 151(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's lack of embellishment as a credibility factor, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reference to the complainant being a careful and cautious witness was a proper credibility assessment, and that the reasons, though brief, adequately explained the trial judge's findings when read in context and as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a fatal stabbing at a gathering.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting he acted to protect himself and a vulnerable woman from an angry group.

The trial judge instructed the jury to assess the reasonableness of the appellant's response separately for each victim, fragmenting the evidence into isolated incidents.

The jury also asked whether a group could constitute "force" under the self-defence analysis, and the trial judge's response suggested that a group alone could not constitute force without specific action.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions inadequately equipped the jury to evaluate the appellant's self-defence claim by failing to address the group dynamic as a unified threat and by artificially compartmentalizing the evidence.

The appellant, Richard Pereira, was convicted of second degree murder in the death of Kathryn Horne.

At trial, the defence conceded that Pereira killed Horne, but argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal reviewed whether the trial judge erred in applying the NCR test, in analyzing post-offence conduct, and in considering expert evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no error in the trial judge’s approach to the NCR defence, the use of post-offence conduct, or the treatment of expert evidence.

The decision concerns a mortgage fraud prosecution.

The accused, Ananthie Alex, was charged with conspiracy to utter forged documents and with knowingly making a false statement in writing to obtain credit.

The court found that Alex conspired with Hans Lauro to obtain a mortgage in the name of Lauro’s mother using falsified income information, but acquitted her on the count of knowingly making a false statement in writing, citing insufficient evidence that a false document was actually submitted to the lender.

The judgment provides a detailed review of the co-conspirator’s exception to the hearsay rule and the Carter test for admissibility of evidence in conspiracy cases.

The appellant, K.R., was convicted of obstructing justice in relation to her niece, J.D.R., after attempting to cover up sexual assaults committed by her co-accused, D.V. The trial judge allowed the Crown to amend the information to conform to the evidence, and convicted K.R. on the amended charge.

On appeal, K.R. argued that the amendment caused irreparable prejudice and that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainants’ credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the amendment or the credibility assessment.

Paramedics Christopher Marchant and Steven Snively were convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to a shooting victim.

They appealed their convictions, arguing a flawed analytical approach, insufficient/contradictory reasons, and misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The Crown sought leave to appeal their 18-month conditional sentences, requesting custodial terms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeals and the Crown's sentence appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings that the paramedics' actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of care and that the conditional sentences were fit.

L.F. pleaded guilty to five counts of historical offences: indecently assaulting four young females between 1977-1983, and assaulting a young male in 1992-1993, while in positions of trust as an elementary teacher and librarian.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court considered the significant gravity of the offences, the profound harm to the victims as detailed in their victim impact statements, and the offender's breach of trust.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age (75), lack of prior criminal record, genuine remorse, and a guilty plea that spared the victims from testifying about traumatic historical events.

The court determined that a conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by three years of probation, would adequately meet the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, given the unique circumstances of the case.

Ancillary orders included a weapons prohibition, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance.

The appellant, a taxi driver, appealed convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a 9-year-old child.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding the assailant's smoking and coffee-drinking habits, which the defence argued were central to identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and that the details were peripheral to the complainant's core, credible, and reliable testimony.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to lack of submissions.

The applicant, Terry Lynn Bardwell, sought bail pending appeal of her conviction and sentence for drug trafficking and carrying a concealed weapon.

She had previously pleaded guilty and received a conditional sentence, which was later terminated due to breaches, leading to her incarceration.

The court applied the test for bail pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, the applicant failed to satisfy the court that she would surrender into custody or that her detention was not necessary in the public interest, given her history of breaching the conditional sentence terms while living with her proposed surety.

The application for release pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of drug trafficking and firearm offences, appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of a motion to re-open a Garofoli application, arguing the wrong test was applied and the affiant officer's credibility was in question.

The sentence appeal argued the judge "jumped" the Crown's position without notice and misapprehended his criminal record, leading to an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that while the trial judge applied the wrong test for summary dismissal, the motion was substantively heard on its merits.

The court also found that the sentencing errors did not impact the sentence, which was fit given the gravity of the offences, the appellant's high-level role in a commercial drug operation, and his extensive criminal record.

The appellant, D.M., appealed a five-year custodial sentence for sexual exploitation and sexual interference of his daughter.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the sentencing judge allegedly erred by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, mischaracterized a forensic psychiatric report regarding insight, and imposed an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, her interpretation of the forensic report, or the fitness of the sentence, which was within the appropriate range for such offences.

This criminal trial concerned an allegation of common assault against Robert Bender, an elementary school teacher, involving a student with autism spectrum disorder.

The Crown alleged that Mr. Bender used excessive force when he grabbed the student's wrist and pulled him away from another student who was approaching aggressively.

The defence invoked section 43 of the Criminal Code, arguing the force was justified as corrective.

The court assessed witness credibility, finding one Crown witness unreliable and accepting another's account of the events.

Applying the principles from Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth & the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found that Mr. Bender's actions were by way of correction, not motivated by anger or frustration, and that the student was capable of benefiting from such correction.

The force used was deemed minor, transitory, trifling, and reasonable given the immediate need to prevent harm to another child.

Consequently, the court found the Crown had not proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed the charge.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of a Schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by treating proximity and the appellant’s customary use of the bedroom where the drugs were found as a proxy for possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge carefully reviewed the evidence and provided clear reasons for concluding possession was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rejecting other possibilities as unreasonable.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, A.S., appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed for multiple sexual and child pornography offences involving her minor children.

The appeal raised two arguments: that the sentencing judge failed to consider the appellant’s future treatability at the designation stage (a "Boutilier error") and erred by not considering a less restrictive sentencing option.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge had properly applied the principles from R. v. Boutilier, deeply engaged with the psychiatric evidence regarding treatability and intractability, and correctly concluded that a lesser sentence would not adequately protect the public given the appellant's lifelong risk and the unlikelihood of rehabilitation within a determinate period.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that she misapprehended evidence regarding the opportunity to commit the offence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons sufficient, noting that credibility assessments are complex and that the judge clearly rejected the defence's evidence after a full review of the complainant's testimony.

The court reiterated that incomplete transcripts do not automatically lead to a new trial unless there is a serious possibility of error or deprivation of appeal grounds.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Lorne Clement, appealed his sexual assault conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The grounds included counsel's failure to ensure the appellant reviewed his police statement, failure to review potentially exculpatory evidence from a witness (R.D.), and failure to order witness statement transcripts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even assuming factual shortcomings in counsel's performance, the appellant failed to establish prejudice.

The court reasoned that the appellant's own admissions to police regarding intoxication were pivotal to the trial judge's rejection of his testimony, and the witness's evidence was not clearly exculpatory.

The defendant, Jason Lusted, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after a preliminary inquiry into a second-degree murder charge.

The victim, Earl Clapp, died after being dragged under Lusted's vehicle during an attempted trailer theft.

The court considered aggravating factors, including Lusted's extensive criminal record, history of dangerous driving, and high moral blameworthiness, alongside mitigating factors such as a difficult childhood and drug addiction.

The judge imposed an 18-year prison sentence, with deductions for pre-trial custody (Summers and Duncan credits), resulting in an additional 14 years to serve.

The Crown applied under s. 683(5) of the Criminal Code to suspend two conditional sentence orders (CSOs) imposed on the respondents, who were convicted of failing to provide necessaries of life.

The Crown argued that serving the CSOs before the appeal hearing would prejudice its sentence appeal, which sought penitentiary sentences.

The respondents opposed, arguing the Crown had not shown merit and that suspension was not in the interests of justice.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the "interests of justice" did not favour suspending the CSOs, noting that re-incarceration after a sentence is served is not inevitable and that the impact of served house arrest conditions could be considered on appeal.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court determined the total delay was 19 months and 19 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found the delay was primarily attributable to the Crown's failure to provide timely and complete disclosure, despite diligent efforts by the defence.

Even if the delay fell below the ceiling, the court found it unreasonable given the defence's proactive steps and the Crown's apathy.

The application was granted, and the charges were stayed.

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed an error of law by discounting the accused's credibility on the basis that his evidence was "tailored" to fit Crown disclosure or evidence heard in court.

The court reiterated that such an inference is impermissible as it turns constitutional rights against the accused.

The error was deemed prominent in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which was the central issue.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.