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Action dismissed for delay after plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for seven-year stagnation.
At a status hearing under Rule 48.14(13), the plaintiffs sought to restore their breach of contract action to the trial list, while the defendants sought its dismissal for delay.
The action had been commenced in 2008 and was subject to multiple delays, missed timetables, and changes of counsel.
The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the nearly seven-year delay, particularly the period following an unsuccessful mediation in 2013.
As the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their onus to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, the court dismissed the action with costs.
Settlement enforced once counsel resolved all essential terms in correspondence.
The applicant sought to enforce an alleged settlement of all issues arising from competing claims to terminate and retroactively vary spousal support under a prior final order.
The court held no settlement was reached at the settlement conference itself, but found that a binding settlement was concluded through the subsequent exchange of correspondence between counsel when the remaining points of clarification were resolved.
The court held the parties were ad idem on all essential terms and that execution of formal minutes was not a precondition to contract formation.
Judgment was directed to issue in accordance with the draft final order, subject to amendments reflecting the agreed terms.
Court orders limited corporate disclosure to determine income for child support.
In a family law motion to change a prior support order, the applicant sought extensive financial disclosure from three corporations in which the respondent held shares to determine the respondent’s true income for child support purposes.
The court considered the criteria under rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules governing disclosure from non-parties.
It held that broader disclosure was warranted from the corporation wholly owned by the respondent because its assets were directly relevant to assessing his means.
However, disclosure requests concerning asset details from corporations in which the respondent held only minority interests were denied on proportionality grounds.
Partial production of corporate tax summaries and related documents was ordered with redactions.
Court lacks authority to order security for costs against summary judgment respondents.
The defendants brought a motion seeking security for costs of a pending summary judgment motion, an order compelling the plaintiffs to deliver their affidavit of documents, and an adjournment of the summary judgment motion pending compliance.
The court held that Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes security for costs of an action but does not permit security for costs against a responding party on a summary judgment motion.
The request for security for costs was therefore dismissed without prejudice to bring a future motion for security for costs of the action.
The court ordered the plaintiffs to serve their affidavit of documents within 30 days and adjourned the summary judgment motion sine die.
Given the divided success on the motion, no costs were awarded.
Costs assessed in favour of plaintiff following acceptance of settlement offer providing for costs.
The plaintiff accepted an offer to settle her wrongful dismissal and mental distress claim for $15,000 plus costs to be assessed or agreed.
The parties could not agree on costs.
The defendants argued no costs should be payable because the settlement amount fell within the Simplified Procedure threshold.
The court rejected this argument, noting the offer expressly provided for costs and the action was reasonably brought under the ordinary procedure given the complexity of the mental distress claims.
The court assessed the plaintiff's partial indemnity costs, reducing the claimed amount for unnecessary steps and disbursements, and awarded $9,716.50 in fees and $2,003.80 in disbursements, plus $500 for the costs of the assessment.
Joint custody upheld and access expanded where mother unjustifiably contrived conflict to seek sole custody.
The applicant mother sought sole custody of the parties' six-year-old child and restricted access for the respondent father, arguing that his acquired brain injury and past conduct posed safety risks.
The parties had previously executed a separation agreement providing for joint custody.
The Superior Court of Justice found no material change in circumstances to justify altering the joint custody arrangement, noting the mother had contrived conflict and unjustifiably restricted the father's access.
The court upheld joint custody, expanded the father's access schedule to alternating weekends and shared holidays, and ordered the father to repay funds he had misappropriated from the child's education account.
Court imposed e‑discovery plan where parties failed to agree on scope of Phase 2 discovery.
In a commercial dispute concerning banking facilities and losses allegedly arising from the termination of credit supporting commodity hedging, the defendant bank brought a motion seeking approval of a proposed electronic discovery plan and compelling compliance with Phase 2 documentary production.
The plaintiffs opposed the plan and argued that a prior court order already constituted the governing discovery plan.
The court held that the earlier timetable order did not satisfy the requirements of a discovery plan under Rule 29.1.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure because it lacked the necessary scope, production, and procedural details.
Applying the Sedona Canada Principles and principles of relevance and proportionality, the court determined the appropriate scope of Phase 2 electronic discovery and approved the bank’s proposed discovery plan with limited amendments.
The plaintiffs’ motion seeking related relief was dismissed.
Leave to appeal costs order refused; no error in trial judge’s discretionary costs ruling.
The moving party sought leave to appeal a costs order issued following settlement of family law proceedings involving custody, access, support, and property issues.
The trial judge had awarded costs to the other party after concluding that although success was divided, that party prevailed on the most complex and time‑consuming issues, particularly child and spousal support requiring extensive financial disclosure and expert accounting evidence.
The moving party argued the trial judge erred in fact‑finding, improperly awarded substantial indemnity costs, and created a reasonable apprehension of bias by releasing the decision before reply submissions were filed.
The court held that leave to appeal costs orders is granted only in obvious cases of error in principle or plainly wrong outcomes and found that the trial judge properly exercised discretion.
The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Application for return of benefit trust funds and damages for breach of fiduciary duty dismissed.
The applicant, a former member of the Labourers' Union, sought an order permitting him to make claims against the union's Benefit Trust or a return of his Dollar Bank Balance after being expelled for violating a dual union policy.
He also claimed the trustees breached their fiduciary duties.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant ceased to be a beneficiary upon expulsion, had no right to a distribution of the notional dollar bank account, and that the trustees did not breach their fiduciary duties by adopting or enforcing the dual union policy.
Amendment substituting real defendants for “John Doe” allowed as correction of misnomer.
The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to substitute two identified individuals carrying on business as a security automation service in place of a fictitiously named defendant, “John Doe.” The motion arose from water damage allegedly caused by a defective sprinkler head following inspection of the sprinkler system by contractors retained by a security company.
The proposed defendants argued that the amendment would improperly add parties after expiry of the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The court held the amendment constituted correction of a misnomer because the statement of claim clearly described the technicians involved in the inspection and the “litigation finger” was directed at them from the outset.
As no non‑compensable prejudice was shown and the action remained at an early stage, leave to amend was granted.