Alan D. Cooper

The defendant was charged with trafficking cocaine, possessing cocaine, possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possessing cash obtained through criminal activity.

The defendant elected trial in Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown relied on surveillance evidence and a search warrant executed at the defendant's residence.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 regarding the validity of the search warrant and the arrest.

The court found the Information to Obtain was full, fair, and frank, the police observations were consistent with drug trafficking, and the warrantless entries into the common areas of the residential building were authorized by property management.

The Charter application was dismissed and the defendant was found guilty on all four counts.

The accused was convicted after trial of two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, two counts of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, two counts of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and one count of possession of Canadian currency exceeding five thousand dollars obtained by crime.

A search warrant executed at his residence revealed significant quantities of hard drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence of 8 years, with the fentanyl charges being consecutive and other charges concurrent, reflecting the serious dangers posed by fentanyl trafficking and the opioid crisis affecting Canadian communities.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol in excess of the legal limit following observations of erratic driving on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The Crown sought to rely on breathalyzer readings of 190 and 180 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on the grounds of alleged breaches of the right to counsel under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, and also argued that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the accused was properly informed of her right to counsel, including the right to free legal aid duty counsel, both at the roadside and at the police station.

The judge rejected the accused's version of events and found that the officer complied with the spirit of the Prosper warning by indicating that breath testing would be delayed to allow for a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The judge concluded that the accused provided an informed, clear, and unequivocal waiver of her right to counsel and that there was no breach of the Charter.

The breath samples were found to have been taken within a reasonable timeframe.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically, failed a roadside screening device test, and provided breath samples showing 140 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath samples on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9.

The court found no breach regarding the screening device calibration or the vehicle inventory search, but acknowledged a breach of section 9 regarding the accused's continued detention.

However, the court admitted the breath evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On the merits, the court found the accused guilty of operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit but acquitted on the impaired driving charge, finding insufficient evidence of actual impairment.

The defendant was charged with trafficking cocaine following surveillance by Halton Regional Police.

Officers observed the defendant meet with another individual in a rural area, during which the other person reached his hands into the defendant's vehicle.

Cocaine was subsequently found in the other person's vehicle and cash was found in the defendant's possession.

The defendant argued the evidence was circumstantial and that an innocent explanation existed—that the two men were lost and discussing directions.

The court found that the inference of guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence and convicted the defendant.

Appeal of a conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a fatal workplace accident at a steel processing plant.

The defendant was convicted on one count of failing to provide information, instruction and supervision to a worker, and acquitted on two other counts.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in failing to consider the worker's negligence in assessing whether the Crown had proven the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt, and also erred in failing to consider the defence expert's evidence.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, finding either that the actus reus had not been established or, alternatively, that the defendant had proven due diligence.

The accused was charged with committing an indecent act by exposing his genitals and masturbating in a public place on a highway in the presence of a minor, and with criminal harassment by repeatedly following the minor and causing her to fear for her safety.

The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence relating to a subsequent incident on Highway 401.

The court admitted the similar fact evidence and convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused subsequently brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the total delay of 17 months and 5 days (after deducting defence delay) fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court proceedings.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

She was found asleep in the driver's seat with the key in the ignition.

After failing a roadside screening device test, she was arrested and provided with duty counsel.

However, when asked by the breath technician if she was satisfied with the legal advice received, she indicated she was not satisfied and did not understand the advice.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter because the accused was not informed of her right to a second consultation with counsel.

The breath readings and statements were excluded under section 24(2), resulting in a not guilty verdict.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 130 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The arresting officer transported the accused to a detachment in Port Credit rather than attempting to arrange testing at closer Halton Police Service stations.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tests were taken as soon as practicable and therefore could not rely on the presumption of identity.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving on the Queen Elizabeth Way on September 17, 2014.

A police officer observed the accused driving a silver Audi at 140 km/h in a 100 km/h zone, making multiple unsafe lane changes without signalling, causing other vehicles to brake, and accelerating to speeds exceeding 160 km/h while weaving between lanes and the HOV lane.

The accused fled when the officer activated emergency lights, cutting off a tractor-trailer in the process.

The court found both the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving established beyond a reasonable doubt, applying the marked departure standard from R. v. Roy.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in such quantity that the concentration in his blood exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence launched a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 regarding the validity of the approved screening device and the timing of the breath demand.

The court found that the officer had a reasonable subjective and objective belief that the screening device was properly calibrated and in working order, and that the breath demand was made as soon as practicable.

All Charter applications were dismissed and the defendant was convicted.

The accused was found sleeping in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot early in the morning.

He had a blood-alcohol level of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown charged him with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The defence established that the accused had planned to sleep at a friend's residence but was locked out when the friend passed out.

The court found that the presumption of care or control was rebutted on a balance of probabilities and that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused presented a realistic risk of danger in the particular circumstances.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with speeding, failing to surrender his driver's licence for inspection contrary to section 33(3) of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, and obstructing a peace officer in the execution of his duty contrary to section 129 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant refused to produce his driver's licence and claimed he was under no contract with the officer.

The court found that the officer failed to comply with the "alternative identification requirement" established in R. v. Plummer, which requires that an officer must make a specific request for identification other than a driver's licence before arresting a person for failing to produce it.

Since no such request was made, the officer was not engaged in the lawful execution of his duty, and the defendant could not be convicted of obstructing a peace officer.

The defendant was acquitted of the first two charges but found guilty of speeding.

The applicants were charged with dangerous driving on April 14, 2013, and brought a motion to stay the proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The information was sworn on May 9, 2013, with the first trial date set for May 30, 2014 (over one year later).

An adjournment was granted on April 11, 2014, because a Crown witness needed to be in England.

The second trial date was set for November 28, 2014.

However, on the trial date, the Crown advised that it would not be calling the witness whose unavailability had prompted the adjournment.

The court found that the delay exceeded the Morin guidelines of 8-10 months for provincial courts and that the adjournment was unnecessary.

The charges were stayed.

The appellant appealed her sentence for careless driving resulting in the death of a pedestrian.

The trial judge imposed a 20-day intermittent jail sentence and a 24-month driving suspension.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in principle by sentencing the appellant based on facts not admitted or proven, specifically that she was using a hand-held device at the time of the collision.

The appellant had only admitted to holding the device, not using it.

The appeal court allowed the appeal and substituted a $2,000 fine and 18-month driving suspension.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a sample of his breath into an approved screening device following a RIDE program stop outside a licensed bar.

The Crown alleged the defendant deliberately failed to provide an adequate breath sample during six tests conducted over approximately six minutes.

The defendant testified he was attempting to comply but may have had difficulty with the mechanics of the test due to his habit of chewing gum and keeping his tongue still.

The court found that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant formed a clear intention to refuse or fail to provide a sample, and acquitted him.

The accused was charged with breaking and entering a dwelling house in Burlington with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The Crown's case relied primarily on eyewitness identification by the homeowner's son, who observed the intruder inside his bedroom and later identified the accused's vehicle.

The defence argued the identification was unreliable, particularly given the witness's observation of an accent that the accused did not possess.

The court found the witness credible and concluded the accused was the intruder, determining that the accused had likely modulated his voice to disguise it.

The presence of power tools in the accused's vehicle corroborated the theft of tools from the property.

The accused was stopped for using a cell phone while driving.

During the stop, the officer detected a strong odour of burnt marijuana and arrested the accused for possession of a controlled substance.

The accused was subsequently arrested for impaired driving based on the odour of alcohol detected when being released from the police cruiser.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for possession of marijuana based solely on the odour of burnt marijuana.

The court determined there was a breach of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the blood-alcohol readings under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charge.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and unlawful entry into a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The complainant, a 17-year-old, was heavily intoxicated at a party when the accused returned to her residence and engaged in sexual activity with her while she was incapacitated.

The court rejected the accused's defence that the complainant consented, finding that she was too intoxicated to consent and that the accused was aware of her incapacity.

The court also found that the accused unlawfully entered the dwelling with intent to commit the sexual assault.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood following two driving incidents on October 1, 2010.

The Crown established that the accused drove erratically on Highway 6 and Highway 5, causing a motor vehicle collision.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 270 and 260 mg per 100 mL.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the arrest, detention, and destruction of surveillance recordings.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on both charges based on eyewitness identification, observations of impaired driving, and breath test evidence.