Alan D. Cooper

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 mL following a motor vehicle collision on June 23, 2011.

The Crown relied on breath samples showing readings of 170 and 160 mg/100 mL, officer observations of impairment, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence challenged the timing of the accident and the reliability of impairment indicators.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the exact time of the accident, preventing reliance on the statutory presumption.

The court also found conflicting evidence regarding impairment, with some officers and the victim not observing signs of impairment despite high blood alcohol readings.

The court rejected a purely scientific definition of impairment in favour of traditional legal indicators.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The appellant appealed her conviction for careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The conviction was entered in her absence after she failed to appear for trial on February 3, 2013.

The appellant challenged the Certificate of Offence on the ground that it was deficient in failing to specify the municipality where the offence occurred, stating only "Wyecroft Rd., E. of Burloak Drive." The court held that under section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act, a certificate must be complete and regular on its face for a conviction to be entered in the defendant's absence.

The omission of the municipality constituted a fatal defect, and the conviction was quashed.

The accused was charged with five offences arising from two separate incidents: prowling and voyeurism on March 17, 2011, and breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence on March 20, 2010.

The defence raised the issue of non-insane automatism due to sleepwalking, supported by expert psychiatric evidence regarding the effects of the medication Zopiclone.

The court found the accused guilty of prowling on March 17, 2011, but not criminally responsible for the offences on March 20, 2010, due to mental disorder automatism.

The court applied the holistic approach established in R. v. Stone, considering the continuing danger to the public and the medical evidence regarding the accused's condition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown's case relied on a roadside screening device test that registered a fail, and subsequent breath analysis readings of 150 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the validity of the screening device demand under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the officer making the demand lacked the requisite subjective belief to form reasonable suspicion.

The court found that the officer's evidence was internally contradictory and unreliable, and that he had no reliable subjective basis for making the screening device demand.

The court concluded that the screening device test constituted an unreasonable search in violation of section 8 of the Charter, and excluded all evidence obtained as a result under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority appealed the sentencing decision imposed on the respondents for contravening the Conservation Authorities Act by undertaking unauthorized development in a designated erosion hazard zone.

The respondents had applied for permission to construct a lakeside addition to their property in Burlington, which was denied.

Despite the denial and subsequent stop work orders, they proceeded with construction and completed the addition.

The trial judge imposed fines of $5,000 each and a probation order requiring seawall reconstruction, but did not order removal of the unauthorized structure.

The appellate court found the sentence demonstrably unfit and allowed the appeal, setting aside the fines and imposing an order for removal of the lakeside addition at the respondents' expense.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, and sought exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The central issue was whether the police provided the accused with a reasonable opportunity to consult with his counsel of choice.

The court found that the officer told the accused the breath samples would be taken regardless of whether his chosen lawyer called back, and that the accused had no choice but to speak to duty counsel.

The court found this constituted a serious breach of section 10(b) of the Charter and excluded the blood-alcohol readings, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, and observations by both a civilian witness and police officers.

The accused testified that he was fatigued rather than impaired.

The court found the Crown's evidence of impairment overwhelming and rejected the accused's testimony.

The accused also brought a Charter application alleging a breach of section 7 rights due to audio-visual surveillance of his cell, including while using the toilet without his knowledge.

The court dismissed the Charter application, distinguishing the case from R. v. Mok on the basis that the police evidence did not establish a systemic practice with the same characteristics.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving.