Adriana Doyle

The applicant brought an interim motion for spousal and child support.

The court found the applicant to be intentionally unemployed and imputed an income of $15,000 per year to her.

The respondent's income was determined to be $121,000 per year.

Given the shared parenting arrangement, the court ordered the set-off amount of $1,478 per month for child support.

Spousal support was ordered at $1,695 per month to equalize the parties' net disposable incomes.

The issue of retroactive support was reserved for the trial judge.

The respondent brought a motion seeking to be declared a "special party" under Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules and to have a litigation guardian appointed due to alleged mental incapacity preventing her participation in trial.

The applicant opposed, arguing the respondent had not met the onus of demonstrating incapacity and that such an appointment would deprive him of a fair trial.

The court found that while the medical evidence indicated significant stress and mental health issues, it did not conclusively establish that the respondent was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decisions or instruct counsel.

The motion was dismissed, but adjourned to allow the respondent to submit further evidence regarding her capacity.

Following a motion where the applicant successfully obtained child support based on the respondent's full income, the court determined costs.

The self-represented applicant sought $2,730.

The court allowed reasonable disbursements for printing, parking, process serving, and mileage, totaling $632.

However, because the applicant failed to accept a reasonable post-decision offer of $1,000 from the respondent, the court deducted $100 to partially reimburse the respondent's legal expenses for preparing costs submissions, resulting in a final award of $532.

The applicant brought a motion for a declaration of contempt against the respondent for failing to comply with two prior court orders.

The orders concerned the child's habitual residence in Ottawa and the applicant's regular access rights, which the respondent had allegedly violated by moving to Sudbury with the child and denying visits.

The respondent argued that the Ottawa court lacked jurisdiction and that the orders were under appeal.

The court found that the orders were clear and binding, and the respondent's disobedience was deliberate and voluntary.

Applying the criminal standard of proof, the court declared the respondent guilty of contempt and scheduled a separate hearing to determine the penalty, allowing the respondent an opportunity to purge the contempt. interesting_citations_summary: > This decision underscores the principle that court orders, once issued by a court with jurisdiction, are binding and must be obeyed until set aside or varied, even if a party disputes jurisdiction or appeals the order.

It reiterates the high standard of proof ("beyond a reasonable doubt") required for a finding of contempt and emphasizes that contempt is a serious remedy to be used sparingly, particularly in family law cases involving children's best interests.

The court also clarifies the two-stage process for contempt proceedings (liability then penalty) to allow for purging of contempt, citing College of Optometrists of Ontario v. SHS Optical Ltd. and Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation. final_judgement: > The respondent, Julie Caron, was found guilty of contempt of court for deliberately and voluntarily disobeying prior orders regarding the child's return to Ottawa and the applicant's access rights.

A separate hearing was scheduled to determine the penalty, allowing the respondent an opportunity to purge the contempt. winning_degree_applicant: 1 winning_degree_respondent: 5 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2017 decision_number: 4093 file_number: "FC-16-2462" source: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017oncs4093/2017oncs4093.html" keywords: - contempt of court - family law - child custody - access rights - jurisdiction - habitual residence - enforcement of orders - collateral attack - parens patriae areas_of_law: - Family Law - Civil Procedure cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Règles en matière de droit de la famille, Règl. de l'Ont. 114/99" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/reglement/990114" - title: "Loi portant réforme du droit de l’enfance, L.R.O. 1990, c.

C.12" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/loi/90c12" - title: "Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires, L.R.O. 1990, c.

C.43" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/loi/90c43" - title: "Règles de procédure civile, R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/reglement/900194" case_law: - title: "Fisher v. Fisher" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2003/2003onsc2119/2003onsc2119.html" - title: "K. (M.M.) v. M. (P.R.), 2000 CarswellOnt 2186" url: null - title: "Prescott Russell Services for Children and Adults, 2006 ONCA 21037" url: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/on/onca/doc/2006/2006onca21037/2006onca21037.html" - title: "884772 Ontario Ltd. (c.o.b.

Team Consultants) v. SHL Systemhouse Inc., [1993] O.J. No. 1488" url: null - title: "Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. C.B., [2003] O.J. No. 1451" url: null - title: "Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. D.S." url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2001/2001onsc28152/2001onsc28152.html" - title: "L.J. v. G.B., [2000] O.J. No. 3030" url: null - title: "Melville v. Beauregard, [1996] O.J. No. 1085" url: null - title: "Garley v. Gabai-Maiato, 2006 ONCJ 28" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2006/2006oncj28/2006oncj28.html" - title: "Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation, 2014 ONCA 574" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2014/2014onca574/2014onca574.html" - title: "Sussex Group Ltd. v. 3933938 Canada Inc. (c.o.b.

Global Export Consulting) (2003), 124 A.C.W.S. (3d) 274 (Ont.

S.C.)" url: null - title: "R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333" url: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1993/1993csc44/1993csc44.html" - title: "Wilson v. The Queen, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594" url: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1983/1983csc35/1983csc35.html" - title: "B.C. (A.G.) v. Mount Currie Indian Band (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 129 (S.C.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/1991/1991bcsc892/1991bcsc892.html" - title: "R. v. Pastro (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 485 (Sask.

C.A.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skca/doc/1988/1988skca214/1988skca214.html" - title: "R. v. Meltzer, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1764" url: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1989/1989csc68/1989csc68.html" - title: "R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421" url: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1990/1990csc52/1990csc52.html" - title: "Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892" url: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1990/1990csc26/1990csc26.html" - title: "Dovigi v. Razi, 2012 ONCA 361" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2012/2012onca361/2012onca361.html" - title: "E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388" url: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1986/1986csc36/1986csc36.html" - title: "College of Optometrists of Ontario v. SHS Optical Ltd. (c.o.b.

Great Glasses), 2008 ONCA 685, 93 O.R. (3d) 139" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2008/2008onca685/2008onca685.html" - title: "Echostar Communications Corp. v. Rodgers, 2010 ONSC 2164" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2010/2010onsc2164/2010onsc2164.html" - title: "R. v. B.E.S.T. Plating Shoppe Ltd. and Siapas (1987)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1987/1987onca4056/1987onca4056.html" --- # Court File and Parties **RÉFÉRENCE :** Perrier c.

Caron, 2017 ONCS 4093 **NUMÉRO DE DOSSIER DU GREFFE :** FC-16-2462 **DATE :** 2017/06/30 **COUR SUPÉRIEURE DE JUSTICE – ONTARIO** **RENVOI :** Benoît Perrier, Requérant **ET** Julie Caron, Intimée **DEVANT :** Justice A. Doyle **AVOCATS :** Julie Guindon, pour le requérant André Bluteau, pour l’intimée **ENTENDU LE :** 8 juin 2017 --- # INSCRIPTION [1] Il s’agit d’une motion apportée par le requérant, Benoît Perrier, (le père), pour une déclaration que l’intimée est coupable d’outrage de l’ordonnance du juge Beaudoin en date du 8 décembre 2016 et l’ordonnance de juge Shelston en date du 12 janvier 2017. [2] Il allègue que l’intimée (la mère) a toujours refusé de ramener l’enfant à Ottawa conformément à l’ordonnance du juge Beaudoin. Également, elle ne veut pas permettre au père d’avoir des droits de visite réguliers.

Le juge Beaudoin lui a accordé un horaire de visites par semaine partagées entre les deux parents: sur une base de deux jours, deux jours, trois jours.

Le juge Shelston a rejeté la demande de l’intimée d’annuler l’ordonnance du juge Beaudoin et modifier les visites du père. [3] L’intimée n’a pas déposé un affidavit d’explication ou de défense.

Sa position est que la cour d’Ottawa n’a pas la compétence dans cette cause et c’est pourquoi les ordonnances de cette cour ne sont pas en vigueur.

Ainsi, l’ordonnance du juge Shelston fait l’objet d’un appel. # Les faits [4] Les parties ont commencé à se fréquenter en juillet 2013.

Selon le requérant, ils ont cohabité dans la résidence du requérant à Gatineau, Québec à partir du mois de juin 2015.

Ils se sont séparés le 29 août 2016.

Selon l’intimée, ils ont vécu ensemble pour un mois avant la naissance de l’enfant et un autre mois après la naissance, de la fin juillet jusqu'à la fin août.

Elle soumet qu’elle a habité avec sa sœur à Kanata, Ontario, une banlieue d’Ottawa.

Elle allègue que le requérant boit trop et qu’il est abusif. [5] Il y a un enfant de cette union, Jayden, né le 23 mai 2016.

Depuis la séparation, l’enfant vit toujours avec l’intimée. [6] À la fin d’octobre 2016, la mère a quitté la juridiction d’Ottawa pour aller vivre à Sudbury, sans aviser le requérant de son intention.

Elle a un nouvel emploi comme infirmière avec Community Care Access Centre. [7] Le père n’a pas des visites depuis son départ.

L’intimée a invité le père pour des visites surpervisées à Sudbury. # La procédure [8] Il y a deux requêtes. [9] Le 1er novembre 2016, l’intimée a commencé une requête dès son arrivée à Sudbury.

Le requérant fût signifié le 1er décembre 2016. [10] Le 16 novembre 2016, le requérant a commencé une requête à Ottawa.

Le 17 novembre 2016, Madame la Protonotaire Champagne a entendu une motion sans préavis du requérant pour le retour de l’enfant. [11] Il demandait une ordonnance déclarant que la juridiction est la municipalité d’Ottawa-Carleton, une ordonnance visant à suspendre la requête entamée par la requérante à la cour de justice de l’Ontario à Sudbury, et une ordonnance obligeant l’intimée à ramener l’enfant dans la juridiction d’Ottawa immédiatement.

Madame la Protonotaire Champagne a ordonné que le requérant signifie les documents à l’avocat de l’intimée. [12] Le 1er décembre 2016, Madame la Protonotaire Fortier a jugé que la motion était urgente et a fixé une date pour la motion. [13] Le 8 décembre, le juge Beaudoin a octroyé l’ordonnance suivante : * il y a une déclaration que selon la règle 5 et l’article 22(2) de la [Loi portant réforme du droit de l’enfance](https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/loi/90c12) que la résidence habituelle de l’enfant est à Ottawa; * la requête de l’intimée entamée à la cour de justice de l’Ontario à Sudbury est suspendue; * l’intimée doit revenir immédiatement dans la juridiction d’Ottawa avec l’enfant; * la garde provisoire de l’enfant est accordée aux deux parents; * le père aura le droit de voir l’enfant sur un horaire de 2 jours, 2 jour, 3 jours; et * la force policière de la juridiction appropriée est autorisée à intervenir pour exécuter l’ordonnance s’il y a lieu. [14] La mère était à la motion, mais elle n’était pas représentée.

Elle a eu l’avis le jour avant et elle soumet que son avocat n’a pas été signifié conforment l’ordonnance de Madame la Protonotaire Champagne. [15] Le 20 décembre 2016, j’ai accordé l’ordonnance suivante: * un ajournement de la motion jusqu’au 12 janvier, 2017; * entretemps – l’ordonnance du juge Beaudoin est mise en sursis selon l’article 106 de la [Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires](https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/loi/90c43) car l’avocat de l’intimée n’a pas été signifié avec les documents et il n’était pas devant le juge Beaudoin; * j’ai accordé les visites au père le 28 et 29 décembre 2016 et le 4 et 5 janvier 2017 de 10 heures jusqu'à 16 heures dans la maison de son grand-père paternel; et * chaque partie a le droit d’interroger l’autre partie pour deux heures avant la motion. [16] La mère n’a pas accordé les visites en décembre à cause des conditions de la route et pour la visite en janvier 2017, l’enfant était malade et le médecin a recommandé qu’il ne voyage pas. [17] Le 12 janvier 2017, le juge Shelston a rejeté la motion visant à annuler l’ordonnance du juge Beaudoin et a changé les visites du père comme suit: le père aura le droit d’avoir des visites avec son enfant chaque mardi et jeudi de 16h00 à 19h00 commençant le 31 janvier 2017 et chaque deuxième weekend le samedi 10h00 à 16h00 et dimanche de 10h00 à 16h00 commençant le 4 février 2017. [18] L’intimée a interjeté appel de l’ordonnance du juge Shelston. [19] Le 23 janvier 2017, lors de la première audience, Madame la juge de Sousa a fixé une date pour une conférence relative à la cause pour le 15 mars 2017. [20] Le 15 mars 2017, à la conférence relative à la cause, Madame la Protonotaire Champagne a fixé une date pour une motion, le 8 juin 2017, pour l’outrage et les dates pour déposer les documents. [21] Entretemps, puisque l’ordonnance est en appel, la requête de l’intimée a été remise au 17 octobre 2017 à 9h30 par la cour de justice de l’Ontario à Sudbury, « pending outcome of appeal ».

La cour de Sudbury croit que l’ordonnance du juge Beaudoin est en appel, alors qu’il s’agit de l’ordonnance du juge Shelston. # La Loi [22] La règle 31 des [Règles en matière de droit de la famille, Règl. de l'Ont. 114/99](https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/reglement/990114) (les «Règles en matière de droit de la famille») prévoit: > 31 (1) Une ordonnance, autre qu’une ordonnance de paiement, peut être exécutée par une motion pour outrage présentée dans la cause dans laquelle l’ordonnance a été rendue, même si une autre peine peut être imposée. > > (5) S’il déclare une personne coupable d’outrage à son égard, le tribunal peut ordonner qu’elle : > > a) soit emprisonnée pour toute période et à toutes conditions jugées équitables; > > b) paie une amende appropriée; > > c) verse une somme à une partie à titre de pénalité; > > d) fasse toute autre chose que le tribunal juge appropriée; > > e) ne fasse pas ce que le tribunal lui défend de faire; > > f) paie les dépens que fixe le tribunal; > > g) observe toute autre ordonnance. [23] L’outrage est un remède très sérieux et donc, la Cour ne doit pas l’accorder à la légère. [Fisher v. Fisher](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2003/2003onsc2119/2003onsc2119.html), [2003] O.J. No. 976 (S.C.J.).

Le juge Chadwick a dit: > [11] Contempt of court is the big stick of civil litigation.

It should be used sparingly and only in the clearest cut of cases.

There are other procedures available to enforce orders; other than a contempt motion.

To use contempt motions to enforce minor but annoying breaches of a code of conduct, takes away and waters-down the effectiveness of the contempt procedure.

Contempt should be reserved for those serious breaches, which justify serious consequences. [24] C’est une audience quasi-criminel et la Cour doit respecter la norme criminelle de preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable. [25] Dans la décision K. (M.M.) v. M. (P.R.) 2000 CarswellOnt 2186, la juge Wilson a dit à paragraphe 44 : > Particularly in the family law context, a civil contempt order is a potent remedy, and should be used sparingly, only after all other solutions have failed.

It is a principle that a court should exercise particular restraint in using its powers of contempt in access-denial cases, due to concerns about the best interests of the child.

In order to protect the best interests of the child, additional remedies aimed at ensuring future compliance and compensating for past denials of access are available where wrongful access-denial is proven on the civil standard of proof.

For instance, compensatory access and compensation for expenses related to enforcement are immediate remedies available when denial of access has been proven. [26] Une déclaration d’outrage est une mesure de dernier recours et il faut donc faire preuve de prudence pour établir une déclaration d’outrage dans les procédures en droit de la famille. ([Prescott Russell Services for Children and Adults, 2006 ONCA 21037](https://www.canlii.org/fr/on/onca/doc/2006/2006onca21037/2006onca21037.html)).

Les critères sont cités au para. 27: > Les critères qui s'appliquent à une conclusion de culpabilité d'outrage au tribunal sont bien établis.

Un test à trois volets s'impose.

D'abord, l'ordonnance qui n'a pas été respectée doit énoncer clairement et sans équivoque ce qui doit être fait ou ne doit pas être fait.

Deuxièmement, la partie qui désobéit à l'ordonnance doit le faire de façon délibérée et volontaire.

Troisièmement, la preuve doit établir l'outrage hors de tout doute raisonnable.

C'est clair que tout doute doit être résolu en faveur de la personne ou de l'entité alléguée d'avoir violé l'ordonnance.

Voir 884772 Ontario Ltd. (c.o.b.

Team Consultants) v. SHL Systemhouse Inc., [1993] O.J. No. 1488, 41 A.C.W.S. (3d) 505 (Gen. Div.), au para. 18 ; Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. C.B., [2003] O.J. No. 1451, 121 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1043 (S.C.J.) ; [Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. D.S. (2001)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2001/2001onsc28152/2001onsc28152.html), O.J. No. 4585, 22 R.F.L. (5th) 14 (S.C.J.); L.J. v. G.B., [2000] O.J. No. 3030 (S.C.J.) ; Melville v. Beauregard, [1996] O.J. No. 1085, 62 A.C.W.S. (3d) 127 (Gen. Div), au para. 13 . [page 679] [27] À moins qu’une motion pour outrage puisse satisfaire aux trois étapes, la motion doit être rejetée. [28] Dans [Garley v. Gabai-Maiato, 2006 ONCJ 28](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2006/2006oncj28/2006oncj28.html), au para.14: > It has long been a fundamental rule that a court order, made by a court having jurisdiction to make it, stands and is binding and conclusive until it is set aside on appeal or lawfully quashed.

See Manis v. Manis , supra .

It is not open to the applicant to claim he should be excused from the performance of his obligations because of difficulty that he encountered but did not assert directly by seeking a stay of judgment or diligently pursuing an appeal.

To permit the applicant to decide whether or not to obey a court order depending on whether he perceives it appropriate or convenient, is to permit an improper collateral attack on a valid and binding judgment of the court.

See Manis v. Manis , supra , at paragraph [23]. # Analyse ## (1) L'ordonnance doit énoncer clairement et sans équivoque ce qui doit être ou ne doit pas être fait [29] L’Ordonnance doit être claire et pas sujet à diverses interprétations. [30] Premièrement, l’intimée soumet que la Cour ne peut trouver d’outrage d’une ordonnance si le tribunal qui a rendu la première décision n’avait pas compétence pour la rendre.

Elle fait entendre qu’elle n’a pas besoin de se soumettre à l’autorité de la présente Cour et par ce fait même elle n’a pas à respecter aucune ordonnance provenant de la Cour d’Ottawa en raison de son manque de compétence. [31] Elle a indiqué dans ses documents déposés à Sudbury qu’elle vivait à Sudbury depuis le 1er novembre 2015. [32] Le requérant soumet que la juridiction de cette cause a été déclarée par le juge Beaudoin le 8 décembre 2016, qu’il n’existe aucune ordonnance déclarant autrement et l’ordonnance n’est pas suspendue. [33] Les deux ordonnances sont claires.

Le juge Beaudoin a statué que la mère doit retourner avec l’enfant et le père peut avoir des visites. [34] Le juge Shelston a rejeté la motion de l’intimée visant l’annulation de l’ordonnance.

Donc, l’ordonnance du juge Beaudoin est en vigueur. [35] Les tribunaux ont refusé de permettre aux parties d’attaquer la validité d’une ordonnance. [36] Dans [Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation, 2014 ONCA 574](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2014/2014onca574/2014onca574.html) au para. 39 > In any event, relying on authorities such as Sussex Group Ltd. v. 3933938 Canada Inc. (c.o.b.

Global Export Consulting) (2003), 124 A.C.W.S. (3d) 274 (Ont.

S.C.) (“Sussex”) , Miller, and [Garley v. Gabai-Maiato, 2006 ONCJ 28](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2006/2006oncj28/2006oncj28.html), the motion judge held that in circumstances in which the underlying order is considered “ineffective”, the appropriate course of action is not disobedience.

The appropriate course of action is either to move for directions as soon as the problem becomes apparent, as the motion judge had expressly invited the parties to do, or appeal [37] Dans [R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333](https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1993/1993csc44/1993csc44.html) : > At first blush, the order cannot be appealed as part of the respondent's acquittal without violating the rule against collateral attack.

This rule holds that "a court order, made by a court having jurisdiction to make it" may not be attacked "in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation, or nullification of the order or judgment" ([Wilson v. The Queen, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594](https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1983/1983csc35/1983csc35.html), per McIntyre J., at p. 599).

The lack of jurisdiction which would oust the rule against collateral attack would be a lack of capacity in the court to make the type of order in question, such as a provincial court without the power to issue injunctions.

However, where a judge, sitting as a member of a court having the capacity to make the relevant type of order, erroneously exercises that jurisdiction, the rule against collateral attack applies.

See, e.g., [B.C. (A.G.) v. Mount Currie Indian Band (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 129 (S.C.)](https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/1991/1991bcsc892/1991bcsc892.html), at p. 141 , and [R. v. Pastro (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 485 (Sask.

C.A.)](https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skca/doc/1988/1988skca214/1988skca214.html), at pp. 498-99 , per Bayda C.J.S. Such an order is binding and conclusive until set aside on appeal. > > The rule against collateral attack has been re-affirmed by this Court on numerous occasions, such as in [R. v. Meltzer, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1764](https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1989/1989csc68/1989csc68.html), [R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421](https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1990/1990csc52/1990csc52.html), and [Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892](https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1990/1990csc26/1990csc26.html), per McLachlin J. at p. 973, citing R. J. Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance (1983). [38] Le juge Beaudoin a la compétence d’émettre une ordonnance de juridiction et ordonner que la mère retourne à Ottawa avec l’enfant. [39] Deuxièmement, il y a la question à savoir si le juge Beaudoin a la compétence de suspendre la requête de Sudbury. [40] Normalement, une requête est suspendue selon le para. 106 de la [Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires](https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/loi/90c43) ou le père peut déposer une motion à Sudbury pour une ordonnance auprès de la cour de justice selon la règle 21.01(3) des [Règles de procédure civile, R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194](https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/reglement/900194). [41] Les règlements de procédure civile et les Règles en matière de droit de la famille, prévoient que la cour supérieure peut octroyer une ordonnance qui est juste. [42] Aussi, la cour d’appel a défini la doctrine de parens patriae comme suit: “the power of the court to act in the stead of a parent for the protection of a child” et doit être utilisé lorsque nécessaire. [Dovigi v. Razi, 2012 ONCA 361](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2012/2012onca361/2012onca361.html), au para. 21. [43] La Cour Suprême dans [E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388](https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/1986/1986csc36/1986csc36.html) à la page 426, a confirmé que la compétence de parens patriae est: "founded on necessity, namely the need to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves. [44] Néanmoins, même si le juge Beaudoin ne peut pas suspendre la requête de Sudbury, il a la compétence de décider la juridiction et ordonner le retour de l’enfant. [45] Donc, les ordonnances des juges Beaudoin et Shelston sont en vigueur jusqu’à la date où un tribunal les mettra de côté ou qu’il y ait une modification ou un sursis est imposé.

L’intimée n’a pas déposée une motion pour un sursis. [46] L’ordonnance ordonnant à la mère de retourner l’enfant à Ottawa et accorder les visites au père est de la compétence de Juge Beaudoin et Shelston.

Les ordonnances sont claires. ## (2) La partie qui désobéit à l'ordonnance doit le faire de façon délibérée et volontaire. [47] La mère n’a pas déposé d’affidavits ou de document pour cette motion.

Elle n’a pas expliqué sa raison pour ne pas avoir respecté les ordonnances des juges Beaudoin et Shelston, sauf qu’ils n’ont pas la compétence. [48] Elle n’a pas retourné l’enfant à Ottawa ou accorder les visites au père conformément aux ordonnances. [49] Son avocat soumet qu’elle n’est pas obligée de respecter une ordonnance lorsque la cour n’a pas la compétence et puisque l’ordonnance du juge Shelston est en appel. [50] Dans ces affidavits antérieurs, l’intimée alléguait que la cour de Sudbury a compétence, elle est établie là avec son emploi, elle a fui le père qui est abusif et boit beaucoup. [51] Elle parle des meilleurs intérêts de l’enfant et ses droits de déménager.

Elle parle de mobilité et le droit de déménager à Sudbury. [52] Il s’agit d’une autre question sur la compétence de la cour d’Ottawa.

Jusqu’à ce que la cour change les ordonnances, les parties doivent respecter les ordonnances. [53] L’outrage est un remède très sérieux. [54] Le tribunal trouve que la mère a désobéi aux ordonnances des juges Beaudoin et Shelston de façon délibérée et volontaire.

Elle n’a pas fourni d’explication sauf que son avocat a soumis que la cour d’Ottawa n’a pas la compétence. ## (3) La preuve doit établir l'outrage hors de tout doute raisonnable [55] La Cour trouve que la preuve établie l’outrage hors de tout doute raisonnable.

La mère admet que l’enfant reste avec elle à Sudbury.

Elle admet qu’elle n’a pas amené l’enfant à Ottawa pour les visites avec le père.

Elle a offert des visites supervisées à Sudbury.

Encore après signification de cette motion, l’intimée refuse toujours de ramener l’enfant dans la juridiction d’Ottawa et de permettre au père d’avoir des droits de visite réguliers conformément à ce qui a été ordonné. [56] Le requérant n’a pas pu exercer ses droits de visites depuis le 2 octobre 2016, soit depuis l’enlèvement de l’enfant par l’intimée qui a quitté Ottawa pour s’établir à Sudbury à l’insu du requérant. # La Peine [57] Normalement, l’outrage est une procédure à deux stages: - un – la déclaration d’outrage et puis une audience pour déterminer la peine. [College of Optometrists of Ontario v. SHS Optical Ltd. (c.o.b.

Great Glasses), 2008 ONCA 685](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2008/2008onca685/2008onca685.html), 93 O.R. (3d) 139 at paras. 73-75, per Watt J.A.; [Echostar Communications Corp. v. Rodgers, 2010 ONSC 2164](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2010/2010onsc2164/2010onsc2164.html), at paras. 34-36. [58] Si une déclaration d’outrage est rendue, le tribunal peut ajourner la cause pour permettre à la personne de purger l’outrage et de se préparer pour la peine.

Si une personne purge l’outrage c’est peut être une circonstance atténuante pour la peine. [Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 145, 2014 ONCA 574](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2014/2014onca574/2014onca574.html) la Cour d’appel a dit: > There is good reason to bifurcate contempt hearings.

As in criminal prosecutions, in contempt hearings, liability and penalty are discrete issues.

In a hearing in which liability and penalty are dealt with together, there is a risk that evidence relevant, material and admissible to liability, will be improperly applied to penalty or vice versa. [R. v. B.E.S.T. Plating Shoppe Ltd. and Siapas (1987)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1987/1987onca4056/1987onca4056.html). [59] La cour trouve que l’intimée est coupable d’outrage au tribunal.

Pour la détermination de la peine, la cour demande que les parties fixent une date de comparution devant moi avec le bureau de la coordinatrice.

Le temps de permette à l’intimée une occasion de purger son outrage. --- Madame la juge A. Doyle Date : 2017/06/30

The applicant, charged with possession of child pornography, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The motion raised three specific areas for cross-examination: delayed report to justice, a "Branton error" in the search warrant's language, and an incorrect date in the ITO regarding the initial complaint.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on the "Branton error" and the incorrect date, finding these issues could discredit the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

Leave was denied for the delayed report to justice, as it occurred after the warrant's issuance and did not bear on the pre-conditions for authorization.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following motions brought by both parties in a family law matter.

The Court found the applicant, Mrs. Syed, to be the successful party on major issues, including the imputation of the respondent Mr. Syed's income at $600,000 per annum and the determination of child and spousal support.

While there was divided success on some minor issues, and Mr. Syed made some concessions, his unreasonable behaviour regarding financial disclosure significantly impacted the costs incurred by Mrs. Syed.

The Court declined to award full-recovery costs, finding Mr. Syed's conduct did not meet the high threshold for bad faith, but awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

This endorsement on costs followed a motion to change child support brought by the Applicant, Dmitri Alexander Akimov.

The court found divided success on the substantive issues, with some child support adjustments granted and others denied.

Despite the divided success, the Respondent, Oxsana Makhnatch, was awarded costs of $750.

The court considered the Family Law Rules, the Respondent's genuine offer to settle, and the Applicant's disregard for his financial responsibilities, including substantial arrears and failure to prioritize child support payments. interesting_citations_summary: > The decision applies Family Law Rule 24, which presumes costs for the successful party, and Rule 18, allowing consideration of any written offer to settle.

It reinforces the three fundamental purposes of cost rules, as established in *Fong v. Chan* and *Serra v. Serra*: indemnification, promoting settlement, and controlling litigant behaviour.

The court emphasizes that even with divided success, a party's unreasonableness in litigation, particularly regarding financial obligations and failure to engage in settlement, can justify a costs award against them. final_judgement: The Respondent, Oxsana Makhnatch, is awarded costs in the amount of $750. winning_degree_applicant: 4 winning_degree_respondent: 2 judge_bias_applicant: 1 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2017 decision_number: 3528 file_number: "FC-12-1754" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc3528/2017onsc3528.html" cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/990114" case_law: - title: "Fong v. Chan" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1999/1999canlii2052/1999canlii2052.html" - title: "Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2009/2009onca395/2009onca395.html" keywords: - Costs - Family Law Rules - Child support - Motion to change - Offers to settle - Divided success - Litigant conduct areas_of_law: - Family Law - Civil Procedure --- # Court File and Parties **COURT FILE NO.:** FC-12-1754 **DATE:** 2017/06/08 **SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO** **RE:** Dmitri Alexander Akimov, Applicant **AND** Oxsana Makhnatch, Respondent **BEFORE:** Justice A. Doyle **COUNSEL:** Evgeny Kozlov, Counsel, for the Applicant Halia Anna Michalko, Counsel, for the Respondent **HEARD:** In writing --- # Endorsement on Costs [1] On a motion to change brought by the Applicant, Dmitri Alexander Akimov, the Court ordered the following: * there would be no child support adjustment for the years 2014 and 2015; * commencing July l, 2017, Mr. Akimov will pay the arrears accumulated in 2014 and 2015 at $200 per month; * child support was adjusted for the year 2016, and he was ordered to pay $75.95 per month; * commencing January 1, 2017, Mr. Akimov will pay $341.57 based on his annual income of $38,480; and * Mr. Akimov will pay the outstanding s. 7 arrears as per Justice Robertson’s Order set at $1,750 to be enforced through Family Responsibility Office (FRO). [2] If the parties were not able to agree on the issue of costs, they were to provide written submissions by prescribed timelines.

The Court is prepared to consider the Applicant’s submissions even though they were late in filing as the Court accepts that the Applicant was preoccupied with his studies. [3] Having considered the parties’ written costs’ submissions, the [Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/990114) (the “FLRs”), offer to settle, and bill of costs, the Respondent, Oxsana Makhnatch, is awarded costs in the amount of $750. ## Applicant’s Position [4] The Applicant (the moving party), Dmitri Alexander Akimov, submits that there has been divided success and hence each party should bear their own costs. [5] He submits that the motion was necessary to review the child support arrears and to set ongoing support based on his income.

He was partially successful in reducing child support for 2016 as he was studying that year and ongoing child support was based on his actual 2017 income.

He was not successful in varying child support for 2014 and 2015 and s. 7 expense arrears. [6] The Court did not grant Ms. Makhnatch’s motion regarding disclosure, 2013 arrears and compliance with the terms of an interim order. ## Respondent’s Position [7] Ms. Makhnatch submits that Mr. Akimov was unsuccessful on the majority of the issues.

She served an offer to settle contained in a letter dated April 11, 2016 which provided for the following: * That Mr. Akimov provide financial disclosure; * An adjustment of child support payable for 2015 based on his 2015 income; * Mr. Akimov provide information to the FRO in order that it could garnish outstanding child support arrears; * Mr. Akimov would pay $2,250 payment for s. 7 arrears; * Child support would be binding on the estate; * He would comply with the interim Order of Kershman J; and * A variation of access. ## Legal Principles [8] FLR 24 states that there is a presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs. [9] The cost rules are designed to the fundamental purposes: (1) indemnifying successful litigants for the cost of litigation; (2) to promote and encourage settlement; and (3) to control behaviour by discouraging frivolous suits if the defences lack merit. [Fong v. Chan](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1999/1999canlii2052/1999canlii2052.html), [1999] O.J. No. 4600 and confirmed in [Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2009/2009onca395/2009onca395.html). [10] Rule 18 deals with the cost consequences of failure to accept offer, and allows the Court discretion to take into account any written offer to settle. ## Analysis [11] The Court finds that the major issue was the retroactive amount of child support.

As stated above, the father was not successful in changing child support for 2014 and 2015 but was successful in changing child support for 2016.

On the other hand, the mother was not successful in enforcing an interim order which was superseded by the final order. [12] I have considered the factors set out in Rule 24(11).

The issues were not complex but were important to both parties.

The child has the right to child support to meet his financial needs. [13] Ms. Mahnatch alleges that Mr. Akimov was unreasonable in not honouring his obligation to pay s. 7 expenses.

Rather than paying child support, he took a trip to Florida, attended a NHL game, hosted an expensive wedding and visited Disney World. [14] The Court finds that the father did show disregard to his financial responsibility to child support obligations. [15] The lawyers’ rates and the time spent on the motion, in light of the various issues and case law were reasonable. [16] I find that there was divided success. [17] However, Ms. Makhnatch’s offer was a genuine effort to resolve the matter.

Even though it did not meet the criteria of a Rule 18 (14) offer, pursuant to Rule 18(16) the Court can consider any written offer to settle.

Even though Ms. Makhnatch did not obtain an order more favourable than the final order, there was a genuine effort to resolve issues.

In fact, she was successful on the issue of support payable in 2015 as she was prepared to decrease the amount payable based on the amount earned.

The Court did not decrease support owed in 2015. [18] On the other hand, the father did not send any offers nor did he respond to the offer. [19] As per Rule 24(6) if success in a step in a case is divided, the Court may apportion costs as appropriate. [20] As discussed in *Serra*, one of the objectives of costs is to encourage settlement and parties should make efforts to do so.

In addition, parties are expected to be reasonable in the litigation.

Here, Mr. Akimov was in substantial arrears and did not prioritize his child support payments. [21] Therefore, Ms. Makhnatch is entitled to costs in the amount of $750. --- Madam Justice A. Doyle Date: 2017-06-08

The applicant mother sought a retroactive adjustment of child support and s. 7 expenses, and an increase in life insurance as security, following a significant increase in the respondent father's income.

The respondent father requested that his income be capped at $150,000 for child support purposes, arguing that the table amount would constitute a wealth transfer and that the child's needs had not changed.

The court found that the father failed to rebut the presumption that the table amounts were appropriate, given his increased income and the mother's strained financial situation.

The court ordered the father to pay increased child support retroactively and share s. 7 expenses proportionally, but dismissed the mother's request to increase life insurance and her claim for soccer expenses incurred without agreement.

The applicant sought costs after successfully defending against the respondent's motion to terminate child and spousal support and succeeding on her own motion.

The respondent argued he was unemployed due to medical reasons and could not pay.

The court found the respondent was intentionally underemployed, having failed to provide sufficient medical evidence or proof of job loss, and deemed his conduct unreasonable.

The court awarded the applicant $2,500 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis to cover her legal consulting fees.

This is a costs endorsement following an eight-day family law trial.

Both the applicant (father) and respondent (mother) sought costs, but the court found there was "divided success" on the main issues of custody and parenting arrangements.

Neither party obtained an order more favourable than their Rule 18(14) offers to settle.

The court also noted issues with vague offers and the failure to deal with costs at each step of the litigation as per Rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules.

Ultimately, the court ordered no costs, with each party bearing their own costs for the trial, case conference, and settlement conference.

The respondent father moved to set aside a default final order obtained by the applicant mother, which granted her sole custody, supervised access to the father, and ordered child and spousal support.

The father argued he was unable to attend the hearing due to language barriers, delays in obtaining inter-provincial legal aid, and his assigned lawyer's non-attendance.

The court applied Rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules, finding the father's reasons satisfactory.

The final order was set aside, and the issues of jurisdiction, custody, and access were adjourned for a full hearing.

The applicant father sought to retroactively adjust child support and rescind arrears, arguing his income had changed.

The respondent mother disputed the changes and opposed the rescission of arrears, seeking the table amount of child support.

The court found the father was intentionally underemployed in 2014 and 2015, imputing income based on his prior agreement, and therefore denied retroactive adjustment for those years.

For 2016, the court found the father was underemployed due to pursuing education and training, allowing a downward adjustment for that period.

Ongoing child support was set based on his current income.

The father was ordered to pay accumulated arrears for 2014 and 2015, as well as outstanding Section 7 arrears.

The applicant sought to vary a prior order by terminating child support, adjusting child and spousal support retroactively, and increasing ongoing spousal support.

The respondent sought to impute income to the applicant and opposed increased spousal support.

The court found no material change of circumstances to justify a variation beyond the agreed-upon annual review.

It denied the imputation of income to the applicant, adjusted child and spousal support retroactively for 2015, and set ongoing spousal support at $702 per month.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for health care premium payments and maintained the existing life insurance security for spousal support.

The applicant wife brought a motion for interim child and spousal support, interim disbursements, a restraining order, and the appointment of a receiver/manager for the respondent husband's companies.

The husband sought to terminate an existing non-dissipation order and requested access to their 15-year-old son.

Due to the husband's failure to provide financial disclosure, the court imputed his income at $600,000 per year and ordered interim child and spousal support accordingly.

The court continued the non-dissipation order to protect the wife's equalization claim but declined to appoint a receiver/manager or grant a restraining order.

The wife's request for interim disbursements was denied as she was not impecunious.

The applicant filed two motions: one for a declaration of contempt against the respondent for non-compliance with orders, and another to modify supervised access arrangements for their child, Figaro, and to compel the respondent to provide information about the child.

The contempt motion was dismissed due to improper service.

For the second motion, the court, considering the child's best interests and expert recommendations, ordered weekly supervised visits for the applicant in Ottawa with a social worker, and directed the respondent to provide school, activity, and health information about the child.

The court declined to modify the existing supervised access order to allow visits at the applicant's home, emphasizing the need for supervised contact until the upcoming trial and noting the history of jurisdictional changes by the applicant.

L'intimé (père) a déposé une motion pour modifier une ordonnance finale en annulant la pension alimentaire pour enfant à compter de mars 2016 et en mettant fin à la pension alimentaire pour conjoint en février 2017, invoquant une perte d'emploi due à la maladie et un déménagement en Algérie.

La requérante (mère) s'est opposée, arguant qu'il n'y avait pas eu de changement important de circonstances, et a demandé le maintien de la pension alimentaire pour enfant, la prolongation de la pension alimentaire pour conjoint jusqu'en janvier 2018, et la permission de voyager avec l'enfant en Algérie avec le passeport algérien de l'enfant.

Le tribunal a conclu que le père était intentionnellement sous-employé, lui a attribué un revenu, a rejeté sa motion de modification de la pension alimentaire, a confirmé la fin de la pension alimentaire pour conjoint en janvier 2018, et a accordé les demandes de la mère concernant le voyage et le passeport algérien de l'enfant.

The Applicant father sought joint custody, equal parenting time, and a change in child support.

The Respondent mother sought sole custody, reduced access, table child support, sharing of s. 7 expenses, reimbursement of Child Tax Credit and daycare costs, and a restraining order.

The court found a material change in circumstances, awarded joint custody to both parents, and maintained the existing parenting schedule (not equal time for father, not reduced for mother).

The father was ordered to pay table child support and a proportionate share of s. 7 expenses, and to reimburse the mother for half of a Child Tax Credit payment and agreed daycare/coin costs.

The mother's request for a restraining order was dismissed due to insufficient evidence of fear for safety.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2013 final order, seeking joint custody and a 50/50 parenting schedule for her 7-year-old daughter, H.M.C. The respondent father opposed, arguing no material change in circumstances and that contact was not in the child's best interests.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the mother's demonstrated progress in counselling, stable parenting of her other children, and cooperation with the Children's Aid Society (CAS).

While denying joint custody, the court ordered gradual supervised access for the mother through the Supervised Access Program, emphasizing the child's best interests, the need for professional guidance during reintegration, and the importance of sibling contact.

The applicant mother unilaterally removed the children from the matrimonial home and took them to a shelter, alleging abuse.

The respondent father brought an urgent motion for interim parenting orders.

The court granted the father exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, ordered equal week-on/week-off parenting time, and appointed a psychologist to conduct an assessment under s. 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act, with the father paying initially.

The court also ordered interim child support of $1,000 per month from the father to the mother and struck inadmissible evidence from both parties' affidavits, including unsworn letters, hearsay summaries, and references to settlement discussions.

The court addressed the parties' inability to agree on an expert to prepare a Voice of the Child (VOC) Report for their 14-year-old son, Kent, as previously ordered.

After considering submissions from both the applicant mother and respondent father, the court appointed Janet Claridge, a neutral third-party expert, to prepare the VOC report.

The decision emphasized the importance of expert neutrality, rejecting candidates with prior involvement in the family's case due to potential bias.

The parties were ordered to equally share the costs of the report.