CITATION: Syed v. Syed, 2017 ONSC 2588
COURT FILE NO.: FC-16-2293
DATE: 2017/05/01
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Mashooda Syed, Applicant
AND
Ahmed Syed, Respondent
BEFORE: Madam Justice A. Doyle
COUNSEL: Michael Rankin, for the Applicant
Gregory Ste. Marie, for the Respondent
HEARD: April 4, 2017
DECISION ON A MOTION
[1] The Syeds are involved in multiple businesses worth at least several millions of dollars. The businesses own several properties which include rental units and a hotel in Ottawa.
[2] At this interim stage, the Court is being asked, among other things, to ensure that the Applicant wife and children are financially supported and that her right to an equalization payment is protected. The Respondent husband wishes a termination of the non-dissipation order so he can be free to run his businesses and he is prepared to report to the wife on a regular basis.
[3] The wife’s motion is for the following relief:
− child support retroactive to November 1, 2016;
− payment of s. 7 expenses for:
▪ Mubashir: Ashbury College fees, tuition, books and expenses of $45,000 per year and extraordinary extra-curricular activities in the amount of $2,400 per year;
▪ Samah: a retroactive payment for tuition and books for $9,000 for 2016-2017 University of Ottawa school year and ongoing Tae Kwon do expenses;
− spousal support retroactive to November 1, 2016;
− an advance of disbursements pursuant to Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (the “FLRs”): $75,000 to Macmillan LLP, $32,500 to Steve Pittman for accounting and $15,000 for expert appraisal fees;
− disclosure as per the list prepared by Steve Pittman;
− an order striking the husband’s Answer for failure to comply with financial disclosure orders;
− adding the companies as necessary parties to the proceedings (but this was not argued at the motion);
− a general non-dissipation order;
− a restraining order; and
− the appointment of a Receiver/Manager of the husband’s companies to ensure that these assets are not depleted.
[4] The husband is requesting the following:
− access to their 15-year-old son;
− the determination of spousal and child support and crediting him for payments made since separation;
− attribution of income to the wife;
− a termination of the non-dissipation order so that he will solely manage the companies; he agrees that he will not sell, convey, transfer, exchange, deplete any of the real properties without the consent of the wife or court order; in addition he would provide the wife and her solicitor a monthly report of his income and expenses including evidence of all receipts, invoices and documentation regarding the transactions; and
− an order that the parties would jointly create a video for distribution to family and friends and their community; the video would indicate that the parties are attempting to resolve the issues and that everyone should refrain from involvement.
[5] On consent, the Court orders that:
− the wife will have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home located at 1614 Proulx Drive, in Ottawa, Ontario;
− the husband will release $75,000 to his counsel and $75,000 to the wife’s counsel for the payment of legal fees. The husband is not prepared to release funds for the wife’s accountant and appraisals; and
− I will continue to case manage this matter and the parties will arrange another attendance before me for September/October 2017 through the Trial Coordinator’s Office.
Background
[6] The parties were married on March 3, 1989 and separated on October 25, 2016.
[7] They have four children of the marriage. Sana who is 26 years old is married. Manzoor, 24 years old, is employed as a barber and residing with the wife. He was taken off the payroll of the husband’s business after the separation.
[8] Samah, 23, is completing her fourth and final year at the University of Ottawa and will be graduating at the end of April 2017. She is also living with her mother. She is in Tae Kwon Do and has her 4th degree black belt. She is involved in the World championships representing Canada. The ongoing cost estimate is $360 every three months not including extra expenses.
[9] Mubashir, who is 15 years old, resides with his mother. He attends Ashbury College, a private school that costs over $25,000 per year. He participates in overseas trips of $5,000 to $7,000 per year and is involved in sports.
[10] The father’s nephew, Karamt Syed, is employed and is also residing with the wife.
[11] In 2008, the husband married a woman, Nazish Nisha, in Pakistan. He states that he divorced her in 2015. He admits to buying a property for his second wife and sending money to her and his son there. The wife alleges that he continues to be married to her as Ms. Nisha’s National Identity card indicates that her husband is Syed Ahmed.
[12] 1252020 Ontario Inc. (“125 Co.”) was incorporated in 1997 and the husband is the sole shareholder. 125 Co. owns:
− Ottawa Inn Hotel at 213-221 Montreal Road with mortgages of $2.4M including one of $1.1M with Clifton Blake, which is now overdue. The Ottawa Inn Hotel has 49 rooms that are rented out to the City of Ottawa to house refugees. It has 3 commercial tenants, a bank, a grocery store and Cash Street (a money lender);
− 256 and 258 Hannah Street is a duplex;
− 225 Deschamps Street is a five-plex; and
− 104 Marier Street is a four-plex.
[13] 2404005 Ontario Inc. (“240 Co.”) was incorporated in 2014 and the husband is the sole shareholder. 240 Co. owns 120-140 Tabor Street (now known as 120-130 St. Denis). It has 20 apartments rented to the City of Ottawa.
[14] 1838362 Ontario Inc. (“182 Co.”) was incorporated in 2011 and the husband is the sole shareholder. Both parties are officers and directors. 182 Co. manages the running of 125 Co. and 249 Co. except for the 3 commercial tenants of the Ottawa Inn Hotel.
[15] The husband is also involved in 2371544 Ontario Inc. (Cash Street). The husband’s brother Amjad Syed is the sole shareholder. Cash Street was incorporated in 2013. The husband invested $1.3 million and it is alleged that he was supposed to become 50% shareholder of the company.
[16] The wife is the shareholder of Prestige Properties Ltd., which owns 1111 Bank Street, a commercial 3-unit property. Two units are currently rented. In July 2016, the husband transferred the share to her. He says it was done so that the wife could demonstrate ownership of property in her bid to become a Senator of Canada. He says the property was supposed to be returned to him.
[17] The 339 Eastview property is owned by their son, Manzoor, and payments are made by 125 Co.
[18] The Application was issued on October 25, 2016
[19] The wife was concerned that the husband would move his assets to Pakistan and deplete their properties. In order to protect her equalization payment, the wife immediately moved for an interim non-dissipation order.
[20] On October 25, 2016, Justice Shelston made a non-dissipation order such that he prohibited the husband from dealing in any way with the properties until further order of the Court and prohibited him from proceeding with the re-financing of the private mortgage held by Clifton Blake on the Ottawa Inn property. Certificates of pending litigation were not ordered as the wife’s claim did not call into question the legal title of the real property.
[21] On October 28, 2016, on consent, Justice Sheard ordered that the three listed accounts would continue to be used as the operating accounts for the Ottawa Inn Hotel and that both parties would sign cheques on the accounts. The monthly rent of $100,000 from the City of Ottawa would continue to be deposited into the accounts and the wife would continue her role as the managing partner at the hotel and it would be “business as usual”. The order of Justice Shelston would continue.
[22] Litigation to date has centred around disclosure and management of the companies. In a letter dated November 2016, the wife requested financial information. Mr. Eapen Koshy, the corporations’ accountant was to arrange to provide them to Mr. Steve Pittman the wife’s accountant. Disclosure has not been provided as listed in Mr. Pittman’s affidavit filed.
[23] The husband was in the process of purchasing additional property on Montreal Road in Ottawa, but could not follow through as a result of the above orders. He is currently being sued with respect to the failure to proceed with the purchase and sale.
[24] As case management Judge, I made the orders set out below.
[25] On January 11, 2017, the husband was ordered to file his answer and financial statement, and the husband agreed to authorize his accountant to provide financial documents requested by Steve Pittman.
[26] On January 27, 2017, the Court ordered that:
− a motion date be set,
− parties would proceed with questioning,
− parties would file affidavits of documents,
− the husband would pay his accountant to provide documents to Mr. Pittman; and
− the husband was authorized to send someone to the matrimonial home to retrieve his financial records.
[27] At the February 27, 2017 case conference, the Court ordered on consent that the husband provide the documents requested by the wife and he would send his accountant the list of the required documents. Given the delays, the parties acknowledged that Mr. Pittman would be unable to complete his report on a timely basis as the husband had not provided the documents required by Mr. Pittman. Affidavits of documents were to be exchanged by March 13, 2017.
1. Access
Position of the parties
[28] The husband wishes to visit with his son and believes that the wife has prevented this from occurring. He alleges that she has manipulated the children so that they do not want contact with him.
[29] The wife is not opposing access but rather states that Mubashir has been affected by the litigation and should be receiving an apology from his father. The father has made no efforts to contact him. She is suggesting that access should be in accordance with Mubashir’s views and preferences.
Decision
[30] The Court must determine access in accordance with the child’s best interests pursuant to the Divorce Act, 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) (“Divorce Act”). The Court notes that s. 16(10) states that a child should have maximum contact with both parents.
[31] The Court is also guided by the factors set out s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, (“CLRA”).
[32] There is evidence that the older children have certainly sided with their mother, as they have signed affidavits outlining the alleged abuse they and their mother have suffered at the father’s hands. Certainly, the children have been brought into the litigation and it is likely that Mubashir has heard of his parents’ battle and of his siblings’ alliance with his mother.
[33] The Court acknowledges that given Mubashir’s age, his views and preferences should be considered.
[34] The Court has reviewed the emails exchanged between the parties and the community at large which discuss the litigation and the parties’ divorce. Some of the emails were copied to the children of the marriage. The children should not be embroiled in the litigation.
[35] Mushabir is a teenager and should receive nurturing and guidance from both parents. He is caught in the cross fires between his parents. He should be shielded from the parties’ litigation and acrimonious dispute. Litigation has just commenced and with the ongoing disclosure and obtaining of reports and appraisals, the litigation will be continuing for some time.
[36] The Court finds that it is Mushabir’s interests that he has contact with this father because:
− it is important that he has a relationship with his father;
− it is in best interests that he be permitted to visit with his father on a regular basis; and
− the wife has not provided any valid reason for not permitting access and she is not opposed to access.
[37] Therefore, the father is permitted to directly contact and set up visits with Mushabir. The wife will encourage Mushabir to attend visits with his father.
[38] The parties are ordered not to discuss the litigation directly or indirectly with Mushabir. The parties are ordered to refrain from copying the children in any emails pertaining to the litigation and/or the ongoing disputes between them.
2. Support
(i) Husband’s Income
Parties’ positions
[39] The wife alleges that the husband’s annual income is $700,000. She indicates that she has no income other than the $15,000 per month voluntarily provided to her by the husband since the separation.
[40] In his factum, the husband submits a number of figures, including his annual earnings of $250,000. At the motion, the husband submitted that he earns $350,000 per year.
Legal principles
[41] In determining income for the purposes of setting support, the Court is guided by ss. 15 to 20 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, S.O.R./97-175, as amended (“Guidelines”),. The analysis can also be used to determine spousal support.
[42] Section 15(1) of the Guidelines states that a spouse’s annual income is determined by the Court in accordance with sections 16 to 20.
[43] Section 16 of the Guidelines provides that subject to sections 17 to 20, a spouse’s annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading “total income” (line 150) in the T1 General Form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency, and by then making the adjustments provided for in Schedule III to the Guidelines.
[44] Pursuant to s 2(3) of the Guidelines, the Court is required to determine income based on the most current information available.
[45] Section 18 permits the Court to attribute to a party all or a portion of the pre-tax income of a corporation that is owned by the party in circumstances where the court is satisfied that the determination of the party’s income pursuant to section 16 does not fairly reflect all of the money available to the party for the payment of child support.
[46] Section 18 states:
- (1) Where a spouse is a shareholder, director or officer of a corporation and the court is of the opinion that the amount of the spouse’s annual income as determined under section 16 does not fairly reflect all the money available to the spouse for the payment of child support, the court may consider the situations described in section 17 and determine the spouse’s annual income to include
(a) all or part of the pre-tax income of the corporation, and of any corporation that is related to that corporation, for the most recent taxation year; or
(b) an amount commensurate with the services that the spouse provides to the corporation, provided that the amount does not exceed the corporation’s pre-tax income.
Adjustment to corporation’s pre-tax income
(2) In determining the pre-tax income of a corporation for the purposes of subsection (1), all amounts paid by the corporation as salaries, wages or management fees, or other payments or benefits, to or on behalf of persons with whom the corporation does not deal at arm’s length must be added to the pre-tax income, unless the spouse establishes that the payments were reasonable in the circumstances.
Decision
[47] For the reasons set out below, the Court finds that the husband’s annual income is $600,000.
1. Lack of financial disclosure and cooperation
[48] Firstly, due to the husband’s failure to provide court ordered financial disclosure; the Court does not have the benefit of an income report from Mr. Pittman. The husband has not provided an income report and has filed various previous years’ financial statements. He suggests various numbers for his annual income.
[49] Not only is it his general duty to provide timely financial disclosure in accordance with the FLR’s and Guidelines, there have been multiple orders requiring him to comply. See Justice Benotto’s comment in Roberts v. Roberts ONCA where she states that financial disclosure is automatic. “A litigant should not have to be ordered multiple times to provide financial disclosure.”
[50] In Cass v. Dyke [2004] 5095, Justice V.J. Mackinnon stated at para. 8:
It is clear that the Respondent puts his personal and business expenses through SRD Associates. He and his bookkeeper depose that all of his personal expenses are weeded out and charged back to him. If so, there is nothing wrong with this for income tax purposes. Nonetheless, it makes it more difficult to ascertain just what his income is for support purposes. Clearly, for support purposes it is up to the Respondent to demonstrate as accurately as possible just what his income is. He has an onus to make timely and complete financial disclosure so as to enable a proper determination of support issues to be made. As stated by Aitken J. in Pohlod v. Bielajew, [1998] O.J. 3345 (O.C.G.D.) at para. 10:
The obligation is not on counsel for the opposing party to try and guess what might be relevant information in a particular case and to produce a lengthy list of questions in an effort to ferret out all relevant financial information.
[51] The Court is prepared to impute income in this case as the husband has failed to be forthcoming in financial disclosure when he was under a legal obligation to do so by multiple orders regarding disclosure. His non-compliance results in the Court having to determine his income on an interim basis without the benefit of an income report.
[52] Not only has the husband failed to obey court orders, he has failed to follow the spirit and letter of the FLR’s and engage in the litigation process:
− he filed an inaccurate financial statement where he specifically indicated his income as being zero (stating that there was a note attached but no note was attached);
− in the financial statement, he discloses only 1 property in Pakistan whereas he admits to owning several properties;
− he does not disclose or acknowledge a possible interest in Cash Street although he advanced his brother $1.3M from the sale of a Pakistani property;
− he has not answered any of the undertakings made at his questioning in March, 2017; and
− in his March 2, 2017 notice of questioning, he was asked to bring his documents as per the list. He did not bring the documents or his financial statements.
[53] Determining income should not be a guessing game. The husband’s non-cooperation has resulted in him providing the Court with unhelpful submissions by stating his income is between two figures, which are $100,000 apart.
2. Documentary evidence
[54] Secondly, the following financial documents demonstrate that the husband was earning more than $350,000 per year in 2016:
− 182 Co’s profit/loss statement for the period of September 2015 to August 2016 shows a gross profit of $1,840,742.48 a net income of $813,452.80; (The husband alleges that the profit and loss statement of 182 Co. is a bookkeeping document, which has not been reviewed by the accountant. It does not allocate the net income and expenses for the other companies. Income and expenses have to be allocated under the joint management agreement before finalizing financial statements).
− the husband’s Mortgage application dated October 17, 2016 which husband’s states:
− he owns $11M worth of real estate;
− represents his annual income at $700,000; and
− he is self-employed and has been a director for 21 years. (The husband says he did not sign the document and the income represents the company’s income);
− Mr. Koshy’s interim financial statement for the six-month period ending February 29, 2016, shows the net income for the 3 companies was $319,681, which translates for the whole year the amount of approximately $640,000 per year; and
− the Personal net worth statement attached to the wife’s statement was prepared by Samah on the husband’s instructions shows: $19,300,000 value for real estate and mortgages of $5,255,000.
3. Operation of the companies
[55] While the parties were cohabiting, the wife was permitted to withdraw monies from the company based on her needs and at the end of the year it would be adjusted in the “due to/from shareholders” account. In 2016, she withdrew $320,000 from the companies for household expenses. Mr. Koshy wanted to issue a T4 slip for this. This is a substantial sum and all in pre-tax dollars.
[56] The Court notes that the companies did not fare as well in previous years. According to the financial statements filed, the total income for 2015 was $175,347.
[57] Despite the extensive timetable for filing of documents, the husband served a financial statement for the companies along with a letter from Mr. Koshy the day before the motion and attempted to introduce this material at the motion. For oral reasons given, the Court did not permit the filing of the same.
[58] See Pohlod v. Bielajew 1993 O.J. No. 3345 where Justice Aitken at para 10:
The obligation is not on counsel for the opposing party to try and guess what might be relevant information in a particular case and to produce a lengthy list of questions in an effort to ferret out all relevant financial information.
Conclusion
[59] In accordance with the Guidelines, the Court can impute income to a payor if he is a shareholder of the company and the Court can consider the income earned by the companies in determining income for support purposes.
[60] Support should be paid based on current income as per s. 3 of the Guidelines,
[61] Due to his failure to comply with the orders, Mr. Pittman could not complete the report, which would have been of some assistance to the Court in determining income at an interim stage.
[62] The best evidence at this stage of the proceedings shows that the husband’s companies did well in 2016 and their income could be anywhere from $450,000 ($320,000 taken by the wife from the companies to pay expenses plus gross up for taxes) $813,000 as per the draft profit and loss statement or $640,000 (doubling the 6 months ending February 29, 2016).
[63] On an interim basis, the Court can use the average or median of those figures in determining a fair and reasonable amount. The court finds that based on the above findings, the husband’s annual income for the purposes of determining support at this interim stage is $600,000.
(ii) Wife’s Income
Position of the parties
[64] The husband submits that the Court should impute income to the wife as the wife should be able to generate net annual rental income in the amount of $20,000 from the tenants at 1111 Bank Street.
[65] The wife indicates that she has made best efforts to rent the third apartment but due to circumstances beyond her control, she has not been able to do so.
General Principles
[66] The courts have held that the principles that apply in determining whether to impute income are the same in both child support and spousal support cases.
[67] Section 19(1) (e) of the Guidelines provides:
(1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:
(e) the spouse’s property is not reasonably utilized to generate income; and
The onus is on the party requesting the court to impute income.
Analysis
[68] The wife has a Bachelor of Arts and Communications, and was primarily a housewife during the marriage. She previously worked for Immigration Canada and she earned little remuneration outside the family business. Mr. Koshy would determine the amount that the wife and the children would declare in their tax returns.
[69] The wife has not earned income in the past few years other than whatever the companies provided her.
[70] The husband says that she should be earning an annual income of $20,000 from 1111 Bank Street. She rents one unit at $6,800 per month and another at $5,300 per month. The mortgage is $7,000 per month and other expenses are $3,000 per month. The 3rd unit has been vacant for 7 months.
[71] At this time, I am not prepared to impute income to the wife because:
− The wife has filed rental ads for the premises at 1111 Bank Street and it appears that efforts are being made to rent it.
− I accept that one tenant declared bankruptcy and there were some vacancies in the past.
− The parties have been separated for approximately 6 months. Litigation was commenced immediately and there have been multiple court appearances. The parties have been embroiled in difficult exchanges regarding the business.
[72] Hence, at this stage of the proceeding, the court is not prepared to impute income to the wife. The wife should be given sometime to find a tenant for the third unit.
Child support
[73] The court is bound by the Guidelines. Child support should be paid for the two children of the marriage until April 30, 2017 as Samah was in attendance full-time at a post-secondary education and is entitled to child support. She was at home.
[74] Therefore, for April 1, 2017, he will pay child support of $7,142 per month based on an annual income of $600,000.
[75] After May 1, 2017, Samah will have graduated and at this time, the court finds she is no longer a child of the marriage as she is no longer attending school on a full time basis.
[76] The Divorce Act, s. 1 defines “child of the marriage as
“child of the marriage means a child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time,
(a) is under the age of majority and who has not withdrawn from their charge, or
(b) is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life;
[77] There is no evidence that Samah cannot withdraw from the mother’s charge due to illness, disability or other cause at this time.
[78] Therefore, commencing May 1, 2017, child support will be paid for only Mubashir in the monthly amount of $4,593 per month.
[79] Retroactive support analysis is discussed below.
S.7 expenses
Mubashir
[80] The parties did not dispute that the expenses claimed are appropriate s. 7 expenses and that they should share in those costs.
[81] The Court finds that these expenses were part of the parties’ spending pattern during the marriage, it continues to be in the children best interests and the expenses fare within the means of the family.
[82] Starting in 2006, all of the children attended Ashbury College or Elmwood College at significant costs to the family. At the end of the motion, the husband agreed to provide $15,000 for April and pay Mubashir’s fees for Ashbury College due on May 15, 2017 in the amount of $7,900.
[83] Based on the spousal support below, he will pay 70.2% of the s.7 expense and she will pay 29.8% of the s.7 expenses.
[84] The s.7 expenses are Mubashir’s Ashbury College tuition, books and incidentals. In addition, he has $2,400 for his activities.
Samah
[85] The retroactive issue of Samah’s university expenses are reserved to the trial Judge who will have more evidence with respect to the husband’s income. The issue of Samah’s ongoing extracurricular expenses are adjourned as she is not considered a child of the marriage at this time.
Spousal Support
Entitlement
[86] The Court accepts the parties’ positions that the wife is entitled to spousal support.
[87] Section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act provides:
In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including
(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;
(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and
(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.
(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should:
(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;
(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and
(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.
[88] The Court finds that, based on the wife’s role during the marriage as a full-time homemaker, she has a compensatory claim for spousal support. In addition, she is in need of support and the marriage breakdown has caused her economic hardship. The husband has an obligation and the means to pay her support.
4. Quantum
Parties’ Positions
[89] The only issue is quantum.
[90] The wife is requesting the high end of the range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG’s) based on the length of marriage being 28 years. She should receive 61.8% of the NDI and relies on Andrew v. Andrew [1999] 32781.
[91] The husband submits that the mid-range of the SSAG’s is appropriate.
Decision
[92] Firstly, the mid-range of spousal support is not the default position. The Court must determine quantum based on the objectives and factors set out in the Divorce Act.
[93] Given the length of the marriage and the wife’s role, the wife’s entitlement is based on compensatory grounds (as well as non-compensatory grounds), the Court would be inclined to move the quantum towards the high end. However, at this interim stage, the Court’s prime concern is ensuring that the wife’s financial needs are met pending trial.
[94] The Court will also need to review the determination of the husband’s income once disclosure has been completed and undoubtedly, this will affect support payable.
[95] Therefore, the Court finds that the mid-range will meet her needs and still take into consideration her role in the marriage. It is trite to say that quantum of support will be reviewed again retroactively by the trial Judge once the full record of the husband’s income and disclosure has been completed.
[96] For the month of April 2017, the husband will pay child support in the amount of $7,142 per month for two children and $12,300 per month for spousal support.
[97] Commencing May 1, 2017, child support will be paid by the husband for one child in the amount of $4,593 based on annual income of $600,000 and spousal support in the amount $14,898 per month.
5. Retroactive
[98] The husband requests that support commence as of April 1, 2017 and the wife is claiming support should be retroactive to November 2016 when he was served with the application.
[99] Having considered the evidence at this time, the Court is not inclined to order retroactive support to November 2016. This order is a temporary relief, and further disclosure is necessary as an income report has yet to be completed. It would be premature to make a retroactive order when it would likely have to be changed once further information is available.
6. Non-Disposition Order
Husband’s position
[100] The husband alleges that he needs to carry on with his business and the non-dissipation order has negatively affected the running of the business as:
− the wife has impeded the running of the business as she has not been cooperative in signing cheques;
− he has lost 2 employees and a plumber because of the wife’s interference in the business operation, and
− a mortgage is in default and he cannot arrange refinancing.
[101] Since he is not leaving the jurisdiction, he should be permitted to run his businesses without interference and the requirement of the wife’s signature on cheques.
[102] The husband agrees to not sell the properties or increase the existing mortgages and he will provide a monthly statement of income and expenses to Mr. Pittman.
Wife’s Position
[103] The wife indicates that circumstances have shown that in order to protect her equalization payment, which will be in the range of several million dollars, the order for non-dissipation of assets should continue or a receiver/manager must be appointed.
[104] She is very concerned that the husband will leave the jurisdiction to move to Pakistan where his second wife and child reside. In fact, he had another trip to Pakistan planned for January 2017, but the husband cancelled it due to pending court appearances.
[105] In addition, his behaviour is of concern in that he had arranged to increase the mortgages resulting in very high mortgage payments and canvassed third parties to provide extensive and unneeded renovations to the properties.
Law
[106] Section 12 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”) states:
In an application under section 7 or 10, if the court considers it necessary for the protection of the other spouse’s interests under this Part, the court may make an interim or final order,
(a) restraining the depletion of a spouse’s property; and
(b) for the possession, delivering up, safekeeping and preservation of the property. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 12.
[107] In Bronfman v Bronfman 2000 22710 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 4591 Justice Sachs set out the test of granting of a preservation order at para. 18-19:
Section 12 has been used by the courts in two ways:
(a) to place an onus on a spouse who has been required to preserve assets, to account for his or her assets at the date of trial, and
(b) to restrain a person's conduct with respect to his or her property.
The purpose of s. 12 is to ensure that if the court does determine that an equalization payment is owing, there are sufficient assets available to satisfy that payment (Lasch v. Lasch (1988), 1988 4581 (ON SC), 64 O.R. (2d) 464, 13 R.F.L. (3d) 434 (H.C.J.)). While preservation orders are frequently made, the reported case law that discusses what criteria must be satisfied before they are granted is limited.
At para. 25:
In Lasch v. Lasch (1988), 1988 4581 (ON SC), 64 O.R. (2d) 464, 13 R.F.L. (3d) 434 (H.C.J.), Granger J. held that any restraining order under s. 12 should properly be restricted to specific assets, and there should be an onus on the party seeking the restraining order to show prima facie that he or she is likely to receive an equalization payment equal to the value of the specific assets. In adopting this test, Granger J. has recognized that s. 12 orders can be a form of interlocutory injunctive relief, and has articulated a standard for the demonstration of the strength of the plaintiff's case that is similar to the usual standard necessary to obtain an interim injunction. [See Note 3 at end of document]
At para. 28:
[28] In dealing with interim or interlocutory injunctions, the courts have developed a checklist of factors they consider. They are:
(a) The relative strength of the plaintiff's case;
(b) The balance of convenience (or inconvenience); and
(c) Irreparable harm.
….The weight to be placed upon the preliminary assessment of the relative strength of the plaintiff's case is a delicate matter which will vary depending upon the context and the circumstances. As the likely result at trial is clearly a relevant factor, the preliminary assessment of the merits should, as a general rule, play an important part in the process.
[108] In Taus v. Harry 2016 ONSC 219, Justice Gauthier provides a summary of the cases:
[28] The Family Law Act is a debtor-creditor statute and each spouse is free, subject to court order, to deal with his or her property as he or she sees fit. Gray v. Gray, 1990 12216 (ON SC), [1990] O.J. No. 2518, 31 R.F.L. (3d) 97 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
[29] Given the nature of the Family Law Act as a debtor-creditor statute, a party in favour of whom an equalization is due is entitled to an equalization payment in cash as opposed to an interest in an asset, such as a pension which will not be realized in cash for a number of years, Gray, supra, and which is taxable.
[30] The purpose of a s. 12 preservation order is to ensure that if an equalization payment is found to be owing there are sufficient assets available to satisfy that payment. Lasch v. Lasch (1998), 1988 4581 (ON SC), 64 O.R. (2d) 464 (H.C.).
[31] There must be some evidence to establish that an order pursuant to s. 12 of the Family Law Act is necessary for the preservation of the other party’s property in order to protect the moving party’s interest in an equalization payment. In other words, a prima facie case in favour of a preservation order must be made for such relief to be granted.
[32] A party seeking a preservation or restraining (non-dissipation) order is in a stronger position if equalization has been determined and ordered, however interim preservation and restraining (non-dissipation) orders are commonly made in family law matters to protect an equalization payment claimed. Levan v. Levan, 2006 63733 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 4599, 32 R.F.L. (6th) 359.
[33] Although such an order must be necessary to protect a party’s claim to an equalization payment and to prevent the claim from being defeated, the very high legal threshold required for the granting of a Mareva injunction is not the applicable standard. Radosavljevic v. Radosavljevic, (1986), 1986 2529 (ON SC), 57 O.R. (2d) 51 (H.C.).
[38] In Both v. Both, [2008] O.J. No. 1358, the husband had encumbered the matrimonial home, after the separation, without the knowledge or consent of the wife by placing a $2 million charge against title. In addition, he had moved assets to a corporation in which the wife held no interest, with an apparent intention of benefiting the husband’s extended family and children, and excluding the wife. The husband’s disingenuous and cavalier approach caused concern that the wife’s equalization claim was at risk.
[39] In Levan v. Levan, 2006 63733 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 4599, the amount of the equalization payment and the party to whom it was owed had already been determined: the husband owed the wife $5.3 million, and the husband had already expressed the intention of appealing the judgment. The court determined that the husband should not be free to encumber or sell assets without consent or court order, until the equalization payment had been satisfied.
[40] The case of Stokaluk v. Stokaluk, [2003] O.J. No. 3097 involved allegations of controlling and intrusive behaviour by the husband, in addition to allegations of his propensity to gamble, which would have put the wife’s equalization claim at risk, justifying an order for non-dissipation of assets against the Husband.
[109] Justice Blishen in Biddle v. Biddle 2005 CarswellOnt 731 found that the husband was transferring an interest in the company to a third party without the wife’s knowledge. She found that there was a risk that assets may be dissipated prior to the equalization payment.
Decision
[110] Therefore, the purpose of s. 12 is to ensure that there are sufficient assets available to satisfy the wife’s equalization payment. It is akin to an interlocutory injunction and hence the Court should consider the following: relative strength of the plaintiff’s case and balance of convenience.
[111] The wife has established a prima facie case that she is entitled to a substantial equalization payment. The husband does not disagree that she is entitled to a sizeable award.
[112] The question to be asked is whether there is a real risk that the applicant’s equalization claim and claim for retroactive support could be defeated if the preservation/non-dissipation order is not made. The answer is yes.
[113] The issue of running of the corporations pending trial is a serious issue as it affects the livelihood of the businesses that supports the family and represents the parties’ major assets.
[114] The Court must balance the interests of husband to maintain the viability of the companies but at the same time protect the wife’s right to realize her equalization payment. The Court must ensure that there are sufficient assets to satisfy the payment.
[115] The Court is not prepared to allow the husband to run the business in an unfettered manner. To date, he has shown complete disrespect for Court orders for disclosure.
[116] The Court questions some of the husband’s business and financial dealings. The Court is concerned with his motives. For example:
− Samah stated that the father wanted to buy 1216 Shillington Avenue and put it her name so if he goes bankrupt, this property will not be affected;
− Manzoor said he was planning to get interest only mortgages of $2,700,000 to deplete the companies and go to Pakistan;
− the husband admits to marrying another woman in Pakistan, having bought her a property of an undetermined value and sent money to her in the past;
− regarding the Clifton Blake mortgage repayment proposal, the mortgage had a maturity date of February 28, 2017 with a balance of $1,100,000, he wanted to substantially increase monthly payments;
− he wishes to complete extensive renovations on properties that he says have a value of $7,800,000 as follows: Globe construction proposal of $2,553,800 for total contract price with a 15% deposit of $383,070; and another renovation proposal of $1,351,005.40 with a deposit of $202,650.81 required.
[117] The wife alleged that his attempt to negotiate a new blanket mortgage of $1,700,000 on the Tabor Street property was evidence that he was trying to recover money and leave the jurisdiction.
[118] The husband states that for the past 3 years, he has been attempting to arrange the refinancing of the property and as of October 2016 had been able to arrange refinancing with Clifton Blake, a private lender to refinance the 3 mortgages on the Ottawa inn Hotel and raise $3.7M and refinance the mortgage on the Tabor property to raise $1.7M in conjunction with the purchase of 233-237 Montreal road. No equity was to be paid out.
[119] Since he obtained financing, he waived the conditions on the purchase of the 233-237 Montreal road property. The wife sent copies of Justice Shelston’s order to the financial parties and the financing collapses. He lost his deposit and is being sued. He says that with the existing Clifton Blake property being overdue, there is a risk of foreclosure proceedings.
[120] The husband denies that he plans to leave the jurisdiction and taking equity from the properties. Rather, he is paying down on Lines of Credit. Also, he was buying property for his daughter as he did for Mansoor. He had no intention of claiming bankruptcy.
[121] Manzoor states in his affidavit that he was employed from June 2012 to October 2016. His father was away in Pakistan for extended periods and his mother had extensive involvement with revenues and payment of suppliers. He owns a house on 339 Eastview and his father rents out the units, collects the rent and does not provide him any monies
[122] The Court will continue the non-dissipation of assets order at this time because:
i) the Court is concerned with respect to the husband’s recent activity which would result in increasing the debt of the companies by taking out significant mortgages with significant monthly payments;
ii) the Court questions his planning to borrow monies so he can undergo major renovations which are questionable and likely unnecessary; and
iii) the husband has had a pattern of providing monies to family and others and there is a risk he will continue to do so if the non-dissipation order is lifted.
[123] Having stated its concern, the Court also appreciates the husband’s need to secure the appropriate financing to deal with the overdue mortgage. The Court expects the wife to consider any reasonable proposal as she indicated she would at the motion.
[124] Regarding the terms of the non-dissipation Order, the Court finds that the terms of the non-dissipation order of Justice Sheard should continue because:
− The wife is an officer and director of 1828362 Ontario Ltd as per the minute book;
− although there is contradictory evidence regarding the extent of the wife’s involvement in the business prior to the separation (Mr. Koshy on his behalf denies this and employees have filed statements indicating her errors while her children have filed affidavits setting out her involvement), the husband’s affidavit indicates that the wife did do some work in 2013 (contrary to Mr. Koshy). The husband was away from September 17, 2016 to October 17 2016;
− I find that the wife had some involvement especially during his long absences from Canada whilst he was in Pakistan;
− the businesses are not complicated and involve the following: 182 Co., as the holding company, receives income from properties owned by 125 Co. and payment of twice per month from the City of Ottawa and income from the rent at 240 Tabor Street;
− based on the evidence before me, I found that the wife has been generally cooperative in making herself available to sign the cheques. She admits to refusing one cheque to the plumber as it seemed unusual and unsubstantiated but did sign after receiving estimates.
[125] The Court orders her to continue to cooperate.
Receiver/Manager
Parties’ position
[126] The wife submits that the Court should appoint a receiver/manager to ensure that the business operates efficiently to ensure the payment of her equalization payment. In addition, she alleges the husband has had mental health issues in the past which may affect his judgment.
[127] On the other hand, the husband argues that such an order is a draconian and expensive measure and should only be ordered in extraordinary circumstances. It could jeopardize his business. In addition, he denies he has a psychotic disorder but did previously suffer from a depressive disorder.
Legal Principles
[128] S. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. C.43 (“CJA”), provides:
In the Superior Court of Justice, an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order may be granted or a receiver or receiver and manager may be appointed by an interlocutory order, where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 101 (1); 1994, c. 12, s. 40; 1996, c. 25, s. 9 (17).
(2) An order under subsection (1) may include such terms as are considered just. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 101 (2).
[129] The appointment of a receiver can be obtained by motion under Rule 41.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 and pursuant to FLRs 1(7) those rules are imported to the family law cases.
[130] In Service v. Service 2011 ONSC 4900, Justice Lemon at para. 18 states:
The test regarding the appointment of a receiver is whether the appointment is just and convenient having regard to the nature of the property in relation to the rights of the parties. …His conduct has added to the length, expense and complexity of this litigation, and it is obviously meant to thwart Mrs. Sevices’ property and support claims. I agree that it is appropriate that a receiver be appointed at this time in light of Mr. Service’s continued failure to comply with the orders of the court. Third Generation Realty Ltd. (1991) 6 C.P.C. (3rd) 366 at para 18, Craig v. Craig, 2005 CarswellOnt 10516.
Decision
[131] The Court has made some findings against the husband, including his dealings which show that he is leveraging the equity in the properties for mortgages beyond the financial sustainability of the companies. In addition, the level of renovations and construction proposed is beyond what is required.
[132] There are no recent medical reports which suggest that the husband’s mental health is diminished to a point where he cannot run his businesses.
[133] The wife has proposed PWC as the receiver/manager. In the PWC letter dated March 20, 2017 regarding the Ottawa Inn, the scope of the services includes overseeing and approval of all receipts and expenses pertaining to the companies’ business activities and its related properties; creating and implementing an approval and payment protocol for requested expenditures, creating and implementing a control process with respect to the receipt and reporting of all revenues received, including on a cash basis.
− Senior VP/Managing director $500 per hour;
− Director/Vice president $425 per hour;
− Manager $330 per hour; and
− Senior Associate $250 per hour.
[134] It is premature to consider the appointment of a receiver/manager. It is expensive, cumbersome and not, at this juncture, necessary to protect the wife’s interests. It is an extraordinary remedy. Given the continuation of the non-dissipation order of Justice Sheard, the wife’s equalization payment is protected.
[135] The issue is adjourned and can be explored again in the event of a material change of circumstances.
Interim disbursements
Parties’ positions
[136] The wife is requesting an advance of interim disbursements to pay $35,000 for Mr. Pittman and $15,000 for independent real estate appraisals.
[137] The husband agreed to the advance of $75,000 for the legal fees but is not prepared to agree to further funds as he alleges that she does have funds available from other assets. He says she has a personal Line of Credit of $50,000 available, and $250,000 Line of Credit on the house she owns and GIC , and he alleges she has taken over the $100,000 from the corporate account.
Law
[138] Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules provides:
(12) The court may make an order that a party pay an amount of money to another party to cover part or all of the expenses of carrying on the case, including a lawyer’s fees. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 24 (12).
[139] In Stuart v. Stuart 2001 28261 (ON SC), 2001 CarswellOnt 4586 Justice Rogers articulated the rationale at para. 5:
The duty in the court to ensure a fair procedure means that both parties should be able to request and give disclosure and to tackle complex valuation issues equally. One party should not be disadvantages in the litigation by being unable to test the evidence of the other party.
[140] She also noted that: “discretion should exercised to ensure all parties can equally provide or test disclosure, make or consider offers or possibly (sic) go to trial. Simply described, the award should be made to level the playing field.”
[141] Also, stated in Stuart is the following:
An order under section 24(12) should not immunize a party from costs awards. The order is to allow the case to proceed fairly and should not be such that a party feels a license to litigate.
Certainly the proof of the necessity of interim disbursements would be critical to the successful claim. The claimant must clearly demonstrate that the disbursements are necessary and reasonable given the needs of the case and the funds available. In particular, if an expert is the subject of a requested disbursement, the claimant must demonstrate there is a clear need for the services of said expert.
The claimant must demonstrate that he or she is incapable of funding the requested amounts.
The claim or claims being advanced in the case must be meritorious as far as can be determined on the balance of probabilities at the time of the request for disbursements.
[142] When considering a motion for interim costs or disbursements, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanogan Indian Band, [2003] S.C.C. 71 (QL) must be considered. The court outlined several conditions which must be present for an interim costs order to be granted as follows:
“The party seeking the order must be impecunious to the extent that, without such an order, that party would be deprived of the opportunity to proceed with the case.”
“The claimant must establish a prima facie case of sufficient merit to warrant pursuit.”
“And there must be special circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court that the case is within the narrow class of cases where this extraordinary exercise of its powers is appropriate.”
[143] In Biddle, Justice Blishen in applying the principals and criteria that have been developed in the jurisprudence under r. 24(12), found that Mrs. Biddle would not be able to fund the valuation and investigation. She had funded her legal fees with money that she removed from the joint account and money withdrawn from the joint line of credit. She found that there were special circumstances to allow her to exercise her discretion. Justice Blishen stated:
Ms. Biddle has demonstrated a prima facie case of sufficient merit to warrant pursuit. Mr. Biddle has not been forthcoming with complete financial disclosure. He argues that the company books of account were not provided earlier due to a nervous breakdown suffered by his comptroller. What has been provided to date raises many questions. Therefore, another valuation of the business by Ms. Biddle’s accountants is required to level the playing field as to the issues before the court with respect to Mr. Biddle’s business.
Decision
[144] The Court has found that the husband’s income is $600,000 per year. The wife relies solely on his payments for herself and the children. Her current financial statement shows a deficit. Her annual expenses are shown as $165,108 and will be liable for income taxes on spousal support received.
[145] Given the husband’s number of companies, and complex financial information to decipher, the wife should be entitled to obtain accounting expertise to provide an expert opinion on the value of his companies and his income for support purposes.
[146] She does have a TFSA, GIC of $60,000 and line of credits available. In addition, she will be receiving $75,000 as an advance of interim disbursements. The Court has also ordered that she will be receiving almost $20,000 per month in child and spousal support.
[147] This is not a situation where the wife is impecunious and unable to fund her litigation at this time. By not granting her request for further disbursements, the wife will not be deprived of the opportunity to proceed with her litigation.
Restraining order/Video
Wife’s position
[148] The wife is requesting a restraining order because of his behavior throughout this litigation including:
– accusing her of outrageous conduct such as reporting that he was a terrorist to the police;
– he alleges that she is trying to have him killed;
– his disruptive behaviour with the tenants by trying to remove the tenants from the musical school;
– his abusive behaviour towards her when she attends at the place of business to sign cheques;
– he alleged that she hacked into his computer; and
– he says that she assaulted him on a weekly basis and tried to commit suicide 9 times.
Husband’s Position
[149] The husband disputes that a restraining order is necessary. He is requesting an order that the parties would jointly create a video for distribution to family and friends and their community; the video would indicate that the parties are attempting to resolve the issues and that everyone should refrain from involvement.
Law
[150] Section 46 of the Family Law Act states:
On application, the court may make an interim or final restraining order against a person described in subsection (2) if the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody. 2009, c. 11, s. 35.
Same
(2) A restraining order under subsection (1) may be made against,
(a) a spouse or former spouse of the applicant; or
(b) a person other than a spouse or former spouse of the applicant, if the person is cohabiting with the applicant or has cohabited with the applicant for any period of time. 2009, c. 11, s. 35.
Provisions of order
(3) A restraining order made under subsection (1) shall be in the form prescribed by the rules of court and may contain one or more of the following provisions, as the court considers appropriate:
Restraining the respondent, in whole or in part, from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with the applicant or any child in the applicant’s lawful custody.
Restraining the respondent from coming within a specified distance of one or more locations.
Specifying one or more exceptions to the provisions described in paragraphs 1 and 2.
Any other provision that the court considers appropriate. 2009, c. 11, s. 35.
[151] In Callon v. Callon 1999 35002 (ON SCDC), 1999 CarswellOnt 2401, the Divisional court stated that:
In our view, letters to third parties by a spouse which contain scurrilous allegations against the other spouse whether true or not, can constitute annoyance, harassment or both within the meaning of the section. The purpose of section 46 as it relates to interim orders is to permit both litigants the opportunity to conduct their litigation in as reasoned an atmosphere as may be possible.
Decision
[152] The police have been called on two occasions. The police report dated February 7, 2017 states: “no threats were made and no indication of harm towards anyone”.
[153] The husband denies the abuse. He is concerned with the involvement of the community in the parties’ outstanding issue.
[154] The children support her allegations of abuse.
[155] On November 16, 2016, she attended to sign cheques, he was screaming and grabbed her bag and shouted at her.
[156] There is conflicting evidence on the parties’ allegations. It is clear that the parties have herded the family (including their own children), family members and their community into their legal issues.
[157] There has been no serious incident since November 2016.
[158] Based on the intermingling of the parties’ lives due to the terms of the non-dissipation order, the Court is not prepared to grant a restraining order at this time. It would also cause issues as the wife will have to be in close proximity to the husband and his affairs. It will cause numerous legal issues and conflicting allegations if the wife were to call the police pursuant to a restraining order. The Court finds that a restraining order can lead to an explosive situation.
[159] Therefore, the Court will order as follows: except for business related purposes, the parties are restrained from communicating with each other or attending at the other party’s residence.
[160] The Court is declining to order the parties to create a joint video. This will only invite further discord between the parties as they will need to discuss and agree on the logistics of place, time, content, length, audience, costs, etc.
Financial Disclosure
[161] The husband did not dispute that disclosure had not been completed as per the list prepared by Mr. Pittman.
[162] The Court orders that the items set out in the letter from Mr. Pittman dated February 9, 2017 indicated in red must be provided within 45 days.
[163] In addition, the undertakings listed in tab 25 at volume 6 must be answered within 60 days.
Striking the pleadings
[164] The wife is requesting an order striking the pleadings for failure to comply with court orders regarding financial disclosure. The husband objects and is prepared to engage in the process. He has hired a senior family practitioner and is serious in proceeding with finalizing the matter.
Law
[165] Pursuant to Rule 1(8):
If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including,
(a) an order for costs;
(b) an order dismissing a claim;
(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit, or any other document filed by a party;
(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;
(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;
(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and
(g) on motion, a contempt order.
Decision
[166] The husband does not dispute that he has failed to complete financial disclosure. This has caused the wife to incur significant legal costs for court appearances, correspondence and argument at the motion.
[167] The Court would be inclined to strike his pleadings but for the fact that he has recently shown some positive steps in becoming engaged in the process by: obviating the need for the wife to argue exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, hiring a senior experienced family practitioner who has indicated to the Court that he will do his utmost to assist in providing the needed disclosure, acknowledges that his client should have prepared a more accurate financial statement, agreed to advance $75,000 to assist the wife in legal costs and did make efforts to file a completed corporate financial statement for the recent fiscal year end.
[168] Therefore, the Court will adjourn this request for relief and it can be brought back before me on a date set through the trial coordinator’s office.
Conclusion: Interim Court Order
[169] The husband may directly contact Mushabir and set up visits with him. The wife will encourage Mushabir to attend visits with his father.
[170] The parties are ordered not to discuss the litigation directly or indirectly with Mushabir. The parties are ordered to refrain from copying the children in any emails that discuss the litigation and/or the ongoing disputes between them.
[171] Commencing April 1, 2017, the husband will pay child support for two children the amount of $7,142 per month and spousal support in the amount of $12,300 per month based on annual income of $600,000 per year;
[172] Commencing May 1, 2017, the husband will pay child support for 1 child in the amount of $ 4,593 per month and spousal support in the amount of $14,898 based on an annual income of $600,000 per year.
[173] The parties will share the following s. 7 expenses (net of taxes and credits) proportion to the parties’ incomes (which includes the spousal support for the wife and deducted for the husband) for Mubashir: Ashbury College fees, tuition, books and school related expenses and extraordinary extra-curricular activities in the approximate amount of $2,400 per month. (The wife will pay 29.8% and the husband will pay 70.2%).
[174] As of May 1, 2017, the parties are required to pay their proportionate share which is 70.2% for the husband and 29.8% for the wife.
[175] Justice Sheard’s non-dissipation Order will continue.
[176] Except for business related purposes, the parties are restrained from communicating with each other or attending at the other party’s residence.
[177] Within 45 days, the husband will provide the documents listed and indicated missing (in red) in Steve Pittman’s letter dated February 9, 2017.
[178] The husband’s undertakings from Questioning listed in tab 25 at volume 6 shall be answered within 60 days.
[179] The issue of appointment of a receiver/manager is adjourned and may be brought back before me in the event of a material change of circumstances.
[180] The issues of striking of pleadings and adding the companies as to the parties to the action are adjourned.
[181] The matter will return before me for a case conference in September / October 2017 at a date to be set by the Trial Coordinator’s office.
[182] If the parties cannot agree on the issue of costs, the wife may provide her two-page written submissions along with any offers to settle and bill of costs by May 16, 2017 and the husband will provide his two pages written submissions along with any offers to settle and bill of costs by May 30, 2017. The wife may provide a 1-page reply by June 9, 2017.
Madam Justice A. Doyle
Date: 2017/05/01
CITATION: Syed v. Syed, 2017 ONSC 2588
COURT FILE NO.: FC-16-2293
DATE: 2017/05/01
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Mashooda Syed, Applicant
AND
Ahmed Syed, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice A. Doyle
COUNSEL: Michael Rankin, for the Applicant
Gregory Ste. Marie, for the Respondent
HEARD: April 4, 2017
DECISION ON MOTION
Madam Justice A. Doyle
Released: 2017/05/01