Adriana Doyle

The accused, J.P., was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a five-year-old complainant.

The case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused being found naked in bed with the complainant whose shorts and underwear were down, inculpatory statements by the accused, and DNA evidence.

The court found the mother's evidence unreliable due to inconsistencies and emotional state, and the expert DNA evidence inconclusive regarding the source and timing of semen.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to inconsistencies.

However, considering the evidence as a whole, the court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt, leading to dismissal of all charges.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography after police seized computers containing 9,888 images and 105 videos, including depictions of violence and infants.

The Crown sought 18 to 24 months' incarceration, while the defence requested a conditional sentence, citing the offender's mental health issues, including PTSD and depression, and his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, noting the serious nature and size of the collection.

The court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed 15 months' incarceration followed by three years' probation, along with DNA and sex offender registry orders.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following an interim order that expanded the applicant father's access to his daughter.

The father sought costs on a full indemnity basis, arguing the mother was unreasonable regarding access and caused delays.

The mother argued for divided success, noting the final order was more aligned with her offer regarding the timing of overnight visits.

The court found divided success but determined the father was more successful overall in obtaining meaningful access.

Applying principles of costs, including partial indemnification, encouraging settlement, and discouraging inappropriate behaviour, the court ordered the mother to pay the father $1000 in costs within nine months, considering the importance of the case, the reasonableness of the parties' behaviour, and the proportionality of the award.

The Appellant, Graham Blair, appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal raised five grounds, primarily challenging the trial judge's findings on reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand, the onus of proof for a Charter s. 9 breach, the consistency of factual findings regarding police officers, and the sufficiency of evidence for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal principles, including the onus on the accused to prove a Charter breach, the objective and subjective test for reasonable and probable grounds, and the standard of "slight impairment" for impaired driving convictions based on the totality of circumstantial evidence.

The accused, Dennis James Edgar, was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking while serving a penitentiary term.

The fentanyl was found concealed in a blanket in a dry cell where he was confined.

The Crown relied on prison procedures and expert testimony regarding drug distribution in institutions.

The defence argued that crucial evidence, including CCTV footage and testimony from officers responsible for dry cell preparation, was missing, creating reasonable doubt about the accused's knowledge of the fentanyl.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of the fentanyl, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The applicant sought to set aside paragraphs 4 and 5 of a final order related to property division and mortgage payments, arguing that she believed the matter had settled and was unaware of the uncontested hearing.

The court applied the factors for setting aside default judgments, finding the applicant's non-attendance plausible due to a perceived settlement and the respondent's lack of candour regarding prior agreements.

The motion was granted in part, setting aside the pension division and mortgage payment reimbursement, but not the special expenses.

The applicant's pleadings were reinstated, and the matter was listed for trial.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (Society) brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child, D.G., was in need of protection due to the mother's mental health and substance abuse issues, and for an order granting sole legal custody to the father with discretionary access for the mother.

The father consented to the motion, while the mother, self-represented, opposed it, arguing the father also had issues and requesting an adjournment to complete a treatment program.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court determined that the child was in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, placed the child in the sole legal custody of the father as the least intrusive disposition, and ordered that the mother's access be at the father's discretion, to be supervised, given her ongoing struggles and inconsistent visits.

The court also permitted the father to obtain a passport for the child and travel without the mother's consent, subject to providing an itinerary.

The parties sought costs following a series of interim motions dealing with custody, access, child and spousal support, and other issues.

The applicant mother sought up to $48,506 in costs, while the respondent father sought up to $35,846.

The court found the mother was largely successful on the main issues, including obtaining interim sole custody and imputing income to the father, though the father had some success on minor issues.

Noting unreasonable behavior by both parties, a lack of offers to settle, and excessive time claimed by the mother's counsel, the court awarded the mother costs fixed at $8,000.

In a child protection application, the Children's Aid Society sought to admit out-of-court statements made by two children to child protection workers and a forensic psychiatrist.

The mother opposed the admission of some statements, arguing the children should testify.

Following a voir dire, the court found that the necessity requirement was met because testifying would likely cause the children stress and harm.

The court assessed the threshold reliability of the statements, admitting several for the children's state of mind and some for the truth of their contents, while excluding others that lacked sufficient detail or reliability.

The appellants, plaintiffs in a proposed class action alleging price-fixing in the foreign exchange market, obtained an ex parte subpoena in the United States under 28 U.S.C. 1782 against a non-party, Bloomberg.

The respondents successfully moved before the case management judge for an order requiring the appellants to obtain authorization under the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure before taking any steps to enforce the subpoena.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellants' appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly held that the appellants could not use the U.S. process to circumvent Ontario's strict rules on pre-certification discovery of non-parties, and that the appellants had failed to make full and fair disclosure to the U.S. court.

The appellant brought a motion to consolidate his motion for reconsideration of a security for costs order with his appeal and judicial review, and to dispense with certain appeal materials.

The court declined to consolidate the proceedings, finding that doing so would render the security for costs order moot and defeat the purpose of Rule 61.06.

The court also found the request to dispense with appeal books premature, but granted an extension for the respondents to file their materials for the reconsideration motion.

On consent, the court stayed the security for costs order and the underlying defamation proceedings pending the exhaustion of appeals.

The applicant, a former probationary professor, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her discrimination and reprisal application against the university.

The Tribunal had found her application was filed outside the one-year limitation period, calculating the time from the date she was denied tenure rather than her final day of employment or the denial of her grievance.

The Tribunal also dismissed her reprisal claim and denied her request to amend the application.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable, finding that the denial of tenure was the triggering event and that there was no evidence of an intention to retaliate by the university.

The City of Toronto sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding it had discriminated against the respondent.

The respondent was subjected to a racial slur by another customer at a court services office.

While most City staff responded promptly and appropriately, the Tribunal found discrimination based on one clerk's inadequate response.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review and quashed the Tribunal's decision, holding that it was unreasonable to find a poisoned environment and fix corporate responsibility on the City based on the inconsequential conduct of a single non-supervisory employee when the overall response was appropriate.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment for deficiencies arising from the power of sale of four mortgaged properties after the defendants defaulted.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, alleging an oral agreement and equitable estoppel permitted them to pay mortgage debts from construction draws and defer payments indefinitely.

The court found no evidence of an oral agreement or equitable estoppel, noting the plaintiffs enforced their strict rights under the written mortgage terms.

The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the defendants' counterclaim was dismissed.

The accused, charged with possession of child pornography, brought a Garofoli application to quash a search warrant and a Charter motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2).

The accused argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained errors and omissions, the warrant contained a "Branton error" (outdated form), the police failed to report to a justice as soon as practicable under s. 489.1(1) of the Criminal Code, and subscriber information was obtained without a warrant contrary to R. v. Spencer.

The court upheld the warrant on the Garofoli application after excising and amplifying the ITO.

On the Charter motion, the court found s. 8 breaches regarding the Branton error, the failure to report, and the Spencer issue.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion was dismissed.

The parties sought costs following an interim order for child and spousal support.

The applicant claimed costs of $9,453.59, while the respondent claimed costs for multiple appearances.

The court considered the offers to settle and the conduct of the parties, noting the respondent's unreasonable delay in disclosing his income and the unreasonableness of a term in his offer to settle regarding imputed income.

Ultimately, the court declined to award costs to either party.

The moving party in a family law dispute sought to be declared a special party and have a litigation guardian appointed due to severe depression and anxiety.

She also sought to seal her counsel's affidavit to protect solicitor-client privilege.

The responding party opposed the motion, seeking an independent medical examination, the unsealing of the affidavit, the questioning of the moving party's psychologist, and further disclosure regarding a long-term disability claim.

The court granted the special party declaration and appointed the litigation guardian, finding the moving party incapable of instructing counsel.

The court sealed the counsel's affidavit, denied the medical examination, permitted limited questioning of the psychologist, and ordered partial disclosure of the disability claim.

The applicant brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to maintain his rent-geared-to-income housing subsidy pending the outcome of his application for judicial review.

The respondent municipality had terminated the subsidy because the applicant failed to report changes to his income within the required 30-day period.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as his fears of eviction were speculative and any financial loss could be compensated in damages.

The balance of convenience favoured the municipality, which had a long waiting list for social housing.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to maintain his rent-geared-to-income subsidy pending the hearing of his application for judicial review.

The respondent municipality had terminated the subsidy because the applicant failed to report changes in his income.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as his fears of eviction were speculative and financial losses could be compensated.

The balance of convenience favoured the municipality, which had a long waiting list for subsidized housing.

The motion was dismissed.

Following a trial decision, the court held a hearing to determine the retroactive spousal and child support owed by the applicant for the years 2012 to 2015.

The primary issue was calculating the parties' respective incomes, which was complicated by a family trust that allocated capital gains and interest income.

After reviewing expert accounting reports on the tax treatment of the trust distributions, the court determined the parties' incomes for each year, calculated the support payable to achieve a 60% net disposable income ratio for the respondent, and ordered the applicant to pay $68,141.63 in retroactive support arrears.