COURT FILE NO.: FC-12-182-2 DATE: 2018/07/25

W A R N I N G The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file: This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, and is subject to one or more of subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87. – (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. – The court may make an order, … . . (c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that . . . publication of the report . . . would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

(8) Prohibition: identifying child. – No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a family proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Idem: order re adult. – The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142. – (3) Idem. – A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT, S.o. 2017, chapter 14 Schedule 1

AND IN THE MATTER OF D.G.

BETWEEN:

The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa Applicant -and- M.G. (Mother) -and- S.G. (Father) Respondents

Allison Reed, counsel for the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa Mother, Self-Represented Selim James Levy, counsel for the father

HEARD: July 20, 2018

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

[1] This is a motion by the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa (Society) for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (the “FLRs”) requesting an Order under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, (CYFSA) as set out below.

[2] The issues are the following:

(1) Is there a genuine issue requiring trial for the following issues:

− Should the Court make a finding that the child, N.G. born ---- 2009, (8 years old) is in need of protection pursuant to s. 74(2) (b)(i), 74(2)(b)(ii) and 74(2)(h) of the CYFSA due to emotional and physical harm due to mother’s mental health issues and substance abuse?

− Should the child be placed in the sole legal custody of the father pursuant to s. 102 of the CYFSA as this is the least intrusive of possible dispositions and is in the child’s best interests?

− Should the Court issue an order that access between the child and the mother will be at the discretion of the father pursuant to s. 104 CYFSA as this is in the child’s best interests?

[3] The father consents to the motion.

[4] The mother represented herself and did not file responding materials to the motion. She contests the motion as she submits that the father has issues with alcohol, mental health and parenting. She is requesting that the Society wait until she completes her next treatment program in several months and then the Society should return the child to her.

[5] Before the Court makes a finding in need of protection, the Court must make the statutory findings pursuant to s. 90(2) of the CYFSA. I have relied on the mother’s affidavit dated July 20, 2018 which dealt only with the facts for the statutory findings. I make the following findings:

− D.G. was born on …..2009 in Ottawa, Ontario;

− The parents are M.G. and S.G.;

− At the time of the commencement of these proceedings, the child ordinarily resided in Ottawa, Ontario; and

− The child is not First Nations, Inuk or Métis. The mother also states that “We have Aboriginal ancestry but do not usually identify as aboriginal and are not associated with a band at present.”

[6] For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion.

Litigation History

[7] The Society has had previous involvement with the family since August 2011 due to the mother’s substance abuse issues. At that time and over the course of the Society’s involvement with the family, the Society has attempted to work voluntarily with the mother.

[8] The child was removed from the mother in January 2012 as she was intoxicated while in a caregiving role.

[9] In March 2012, the Court granted an interim Supervision Order to the father and it became final in July 2013.

[10] In 2014, the parties embarked on a mediation process and agreed to a joint custody arrangement whereby the child would spend time equally with both parents.

[11] On October 7, 2014, Justice Labrosse terminated the Supervision Order and granted an Order of joint custody to both parents. The Society closed their file.

[12] On January 11, 2016, the mother called the Society as she had relapsed and was binge drinking and she was not sure she could stop drinking before the child came home from his father’s home.

[13] The mother sought treatment and on consent, the child was placed with the father for nine months.

[14] In September 2016, the parties returned to a 50/50 arrangement.

[15] There was an additional relapse in January 2017 and the child was placed with the father.

[16] A Protection Application was commenced in March 2017 where the Society requested a six month Supervision Order to the father. On June 21, 2017, Justice Shelston granted a Temporary Supervision Order to the father.

[17] The amended Protection Application dated April 5, 2018, which is the current application before the Court, requests a custody Order to the father. According to the Society, the mother’s situation has not improved and hence the Society is not planning to return the child to her. Since the child has been with his father, the mother has been inconsistent with her visits stating at times that she is too unwell to attend. The Society requests that access to the mother be at the father’s discretion as he will be protective and ensure that the mother is sober and emotionally stable during visits.

Legal Principles

[18] In a summary judgment motion, Rule 16 of the FLRs requires the moving party to provide evidence that shows that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. The responding parties must provide their evidence that there is an issue. The onus is on the moving party.

[19] The Society bears the onus to establish on a balance of probabilities that there is no genuine issue that would require a trial.

[20] Provided the Society makes a prima facie case that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial then the evidentiary onus shifts to the respondent to provide evidence of specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Ultimately, the burden of persuasion remains upon the Society.

[21] In Prete v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1993), 110 D.L.R. (4th) 94, 16 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. was refused, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that no genuine issue for trial meant “no chance of success”, and “plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed.”

[22] It has been held that a court must proceed with caution on a motion for summary judgment in a child protection case and cases have referred to phrases such as, “no chance of success”, “the outcome is a forgone conclusion”, or is “plain and obvious”, or where there is “no realistic possibility of an outcome other than that sought by the moving party” in describing the approach to be taken: See Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. B.W.B. et al, 2015 ONSC 7621 at paras. 84 and 85.

[23] Ultimately, the guiding principles are summarized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 at para. 49:

49 There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.

Is there a genuine issue requiring a trial for the court the Court to make a finding that the child, N.G. born ---- 2009, (8 years old) is in need of protection pursuant to s. 74(2) (b)(i), 74(2)(b)(ii) and 74(2)(h) of the CYFSA due to the emotional and physical harm due to mother’s mental health issues and substance abuse?

[24] The Court has considered the following evidence:

− Affidavit from Angela Dean dated March 27, 2017 filed at the time the child was brought to a place of safety and in support of an application for a Supervision Order to the father;

− the mother’s Answer and Plan of care filed May 1, 2017;

− Angela Dean’s affidavit dated June 14, 2017;

− Kassandra Neill’s affidavit dated June 15, 2017;

− Affidavit from the father’s counsel’s legal assistant;

− Mother’s affidavit dated June 19, 2017;

− Affidavit of Valery Vinet dated October 24, 2017 in support of a motion for a Family Court Clinic Assessment;

− Affidavit of Kassandra Neill dated October 25, 2017 providing an update;

− Family Court Clinic Assessment (FCCA) dated January 26, 2018;

− Father’s Answer and Plan of care filed June 21, 2017;

− Affidavit of Valery Vinet dated April 25, 2018 in support of the amended application requesting an Order that the child be placed in the sole custody of the father;

− Affidavit of Valery Vinet dated June 15, 2018 in support of the Society’s motion for summary judgment; and

− Father’s affidavit sworn June 21, 2018 responding to the motion for summary judgment.

[25] Section 74(2) of CYFSA reads as follows:

A child is in need of protection where,

(a) the child has suffered physical harm, inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,

(i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or

(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;

(b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,

(i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or

(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;

(c) the child has been sexually abused or sexually exploited, by the person having charge of the child or by another person where the person having charge of the child knows or should know of the possibility of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation and fails to protect the child;

(d) there is a risk that the child is likely to be sexually abused or sexually exploited as described in clause (c);

(e) the child requires treatment to cure, prevent or alleviate physical harm or suffering and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide the treatment or access to the treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to the treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 and the parent is a substitute decision-maker for the child, the parent refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to the treatment on the child’s behalf;

(f) the child has suffered emotional harm, demonstrated by serious,

(i) anxiety,

(ii) depression,

(iii) withdrawal,

(iv) self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or

(v) delayed development,

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the emotional harm suffered by the child results from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child;

(g) the child has suffered emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to the treatment to remedy or alleviate the harm;

(h) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child;

(i) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) and that the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to treatment to prevent the harm;

(j) the child suffers from a mental, emotional or developmental condition that, if not remedied, could seriously impair the child’s development and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide treatment or access to treatment, or where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to the treatment to remedy or alleviate the condition;

(k) the child’s parent has died or is unavailable to exercise custodial rights over the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care and custody, or the child is in a residential placement and the parent refuses or is unable or unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody;

(l) the child is younger than 12 and has killed or seriously injured another person or caused serious damage to another person’s property, services or treatment are necessary to prevent a recurrence and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to treatment;

(m) the child is younger than 12 and has on more than one occasion injured another person or caused loss or damage to another person’s property, with the encouragement of the person having charge of the child or because of that person’s failure or inability to supervise the child adequately;

(n) the child’s parent is unable to care for the child and the child is brought before the court with the parent’s consent and, where the child is 12 or older, with the child’s consent, for the matter to be dealt with under this Part; or

(o) the child is 16 or 17 and a prescribed circumstance or condition exists.

[26] The Court relies on the following evidence:

− The mother admits in her affidavit of June 19, 2017 that she had a relapse and has addiction issues;

− The mother admits in her affidavit of June 19, 2017 that she has an issue with alcohol and that in the past she has “used while N.G. is in my care.”

− Between January and March 2016, she was in active addiction treatment and was sober for seven months following her return from a treatment program in April 2016. She transitioned back to 50/50 with the father in July 2016. She called the father to tell him that she had relapsed while the child was in the father’s care. She also called the Society.

− She continuously reported to the Society that: the father had addiction issues; he used physical force against the child; and he had angry emotional outbursts. The child complains to her about what his father does. Mother is very stressed that the child is not being cared for by the father and is subjected to abuse.

− On the other hand, as recently as June 11, 2018, the mother told the Society worker: “I know I’m not well enough for him to come home right this second.”

− The mother admits and it is a fact that she has been in and out of treatment programs;

− The mother is unable to control her drinking and admits to drinking while in a caregiving role;

− She has shown erratic behaviour when dealing with the Society workers such as sending a flood of emails in a short period of time; and

− As reported by Dr. Wood and discussed further below, her personality difficulties and disorders impact on her ability to parent;

− She has experienced suicidal ideation, psychotic symptoms and dissociative identity symptoms; and

− If she continues to abuse alcohol she may develop a psychotic disorder.

[27] This has placed the child at risk and has occurred on several occasions.

[28] The mother has taken some steps over the years. Notably, the mother has made some strides and attended multiple programs as laid out in her affidavit of June 19, 2017 but she has not been able to sustain any period of time of sobriety to allow her to care for the child. The recent affidavit dated June 15, 2018 of Ms. Vinet states that the mother reported the following:

− She completed the Ottawa Addictions Access and Referral Service assessment in February 2018;

− She has worked with her counselor to determine her options;

− She was on a waiting list for a treatment program in Brockville;

− That she has been regularly attending AA and NA meetings since February 2018;

− She has been attending an outpatient support group twice a week at Amethyst centre for the past five to six weeks;

− She attended a Serenity Renewal recovery workshop in May 2018 and engaged in a family communication program there but did not continue as she felt it was difficult for her;

− She attended one session of Dialectical Behaviour Therapy at Serenity Renewal and has other sessions booked; and

− She would not respond to the worker’s question as to when she last drank alcohol.

[29] Given the history of the mother’s addiction issues and mental health issues, the child continues to be at risk of physically and emotionally and a finding in need of protection is warranted based on the evidence before me.

[30] Based on the above, the Court finds that the child cannot be adequately protected while in her care and there is no genuine issue requiring a trial in this matter. There is substantial evidence before the Court that the child is in need of protection under s. 74(2) (i) (ii)and (h) due to the mother’s substance issues and mental health issues.

Is there a genuine issue requiring a trial to determine whether the child should be placed in the sole legal custody of the father pursuant to s. 102 of the CYFSA as this is the least intrusive of possible dispositions and is in the child’s best interests?

[31] Section 101 of the CYFSA provides the Court with a list of orders that the Court may make where the Court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a Court Order is necessary to protect the chid in the future. In addition, s. 102 states that the Court may instead of making an Order under s. 101(1) where it would be in a child’s best interests make a custody Order under s. 102. Such a custody order is deemed to be a final order under s. 35 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

[32] Section 101 (3) of the CYFSA mandates that the Court consider the less disruptive alternative. That is preferred. With that statement, there is a direction that the Court ensure that it does not make an order removing the child from the care of the person who had charge of the child before the Society’s intervention unless the Court is satisfied that there are no alternatives that are less disruptive.

[33] In addition, when considering the disposition, the court must consider the child’s best interests as set out in s. 74(3):

S.74(3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including,

(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,

(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,

(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

[34] The child has now been with the father since March 2017 and there has been little progress made by the mother. Her visits continue to be supervised and she is not in a position to be with the child on an unsupervised basis.

[35] She admits to not being ready to have the child home at this time and wished the Court to adjourn the motion for summary judgment in order for her to attend another program for which she is on a waiting list. The motion for an adjournment was denied as the Court found that the matter had been ongoing for over one year which is beyond the timelines set out in the CYFSA.

[36] The mother has not put forward any viable plan for the Court to consider as an alternative to the Society’s plan. She has not put her “best foot forward” nor provided specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as required under Rule 16 (4.1.) of the FLRs.

[37] Certainly, an Order for custody is one of the least intrusive disposition as the child will be with a parent. Here, the father was one of the persons having charge of the child before Society intervention. I find that this is the least disruptive for the child.

[38] Based on the evidence before me, including the affidavits and the FCCA which I will discuss below, there is no genuine issue requiring trial. The evidence is substantive, cogent and compelling that the child should be in the custody of his father.

[39] The FCCA dated January 26, 2018 prepared by Dr. Floyd Wood made the following findings and recommendations:

− The child should be viewed as a special needs child “due to the significant behaviour issues that appear to be primarily present at school”;

− The school reports a “drastic improvement” during the current school year, and Dr. Wood states that this is possibly because of the more consistent and stable home environment as he is not exposed to as much adult information and parental conflict while in his father’s home;

− The child worries about the mother especially when she cancelled visits for several months;

− There are concerns regarding ADHD and he recommends an assessment if behaviours persist or worsen;

− The child has a healthy attachment to both parents but is aware of the acrimony between his parents;

− He experiences loyalty conflicts and is protective and anxious towards his mother while appearing to present exaggerated or skewed information about his father;

− The child has been exposed to adult information especially from his mother and has been placed in a parentified role when with his mother;

− This has caused unnecessary stress and anxiety;

− Findings of intense parental conflict;

− Mother has a serious alcohol and substance abuse issues;

− Mother presents with a “severe Alcohol Use Disorder that seemed associated with both psychotic and dissociative identity (multiple personality) symptoms”;

− The mother has a history of being diagnosed with a Major Depressive Disorder and Pre-Menstrual Dysphoric Disorder, and has experienced an Adjustment Disorder;

− She has a history of behavioural difficulties suggestive of Borderline Personality Disorder;

− The Mother experienced a traumatic and chaotic childhood where she experienced abandonment and disrupted attachment which prevented her from forming a secure base and emotional development;

− Her personality difficulties and disorders impact directly on her parenting ability and her ability to have good relationships with others.

− The mother had a relapsing-remitting course with regards to her alcohol use, where she has been involved in multiple intensive rehabilitation programs and counselling with varying levels of success, including remaining sober for two years;

− Due to a recent relapse she was unable to attend at the Family Court clinic due to alcohol abuse and was experiencing mental health symptoms such as suicidal ideation, psychotic symptoms and dissociative identity symptoms.

− At p. 58, Dr. Wood states the following “While the FCC remains rather pessimistic in regards to M.G.’s long-term stability, particularly given the recent information suggesting continued alcohol use and leaving the stabilization house, we also opine that M.G. could be a positive influence on D.G….”

− She is at risk of developing a psychotic disorder if she were to continue abusing alcohol due to her genetic risk and her propensity to develop psychotic symptoms while under the influence;

− Nevertheless, she has been able to pursue education and find work;

− The current period of abstinence will not last without active ongoing involvement and effective psychological or psychiatric intervention and ongoing support of addictions programming. She needs to access mental health resources to address her underlying issues contributing to her addictions issues and interpersonal difficulties;

− The father shows no evidence of any psychotic or major psychiatric illness but may be prone to depressive symptoms due to longstanding self-esteem issues stemming from childhood experiences and having to deal with the mother;

− He can have occasional emotional outbursts as suggested by his psychological testing results;

− There is no evidence of the mother’s allegation that the father abused alcohol or is abusive towards the child;

− The child does say that the father yells at the home when he misbehaves or does not listen but the FCCA could not be certain of the frequency or intensity; and

− The FCCA suggested the father may wish to pursue a parenting program.

[40] The child requires stability and consistency and the updated affidavit of Ms. Vinet confirms that the child has shown improvement in his behaviour at school. The school has noticed a positive change in his behaviour. In addition, the child has been shielded from the intense parental conflict to which he has been subjected in the past.

[41] The child has been with the father substantially since the parties’ separation on either 50/50 basis or full time.

[42] The Court accepts the FCCA recommendation that the child remains with his father where he has stability, nurturance and predictability with limited exposure to adult information. In the various possibilities of dispositions, this Order is one of the least intrusive and would provide him with permanence.

[43] The Court is required to consider the child’s views and wishes. No legal representation under s. 78, but his views and preferences are before the court through the FCCA and the Court must consider them in accordance with s. 94(11) of the CYFSA. On p. 57 of FCCA, the doctor noted that the child “did not want to answer any direct questions regarding parental preference while also wanting to provide fair answers regarding both parents”. According to Dr. Wood, the child has loyalty issues regarding his parents.

Is there a genuine issue that would require a trial to determine whether the Court issue an order that access between the child and the mother will be at the discretion of the father pursuant to s. 104 CYFSA as access to the mother is in the child’s best interests?

[44] Section 104 of the CYFSA deals with access in a general sense and permits the court to order access if it is in the child’s best interests.

[45] However, more specifically, s. 105 (2) deals with access after a custody order is made under s. 102. It reads:

(2) If a custody order is made under section 102 removing a child from the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part, the court shall make an order for access by the person unless the court is satisfied that continued contact will not be in the child’s best interests.

[46] I find that continued contact between the child and the mother is in the child’s best interests. The child should have regular contact with his mother as:

− there is a strong bond between mother and child;

− the child has an emotional attachment with his mother;

− the child wishes contact with his mother; and

− her supervised visits with the child are generally positive.

[47] The continued contact between the child and his mother is in his best interests. It is supported by Dr. Wood in his FCCA where he states at p. 58 that the mother could be a positive influence on the child “and play a larger role in his care if she is consistently child-focussed (e.g. consistent and supportive during her access visits) while also following through with her substance abuse and mental health programming and maintaining sobriety.”

[48] Unfortunately, due to the struggles the mother has had with her mental health issues and alcohol abuse, she has not been consistent with her visits. For example, there was only one access visit between August and December 2017.

[49] The Court accepts that the father is well placed as the child’s legal custodial parent to be protective of the child and ensure that his contact with his mother will be when she is sober and emotionally stable. He will ensure that third party supervision continue as long as it is required.

[50] Also, the mother has in the past embarked on a verbal campaign to discredit the father thereby undermining his parenting and adding to the child’s anxiety and confusion. As the FCCA sets out he has been plagued with loyalty issues surrounding his parents and he struggles with loyalty to both parents whom he loves. He also feels sad for his mother and her challenges and loves her and wants to protect her. He worries that she may become ill.

[51] As stated in the FCCA, this type of negative talk is not beneficial to this young child.

[52] Therefore, the Court accepts the FCCA recommendation that the mother have supervised visits due to the messaging the mother conveys to the child regarding the father.

[53] There is no genuine issue requiring a trial on this issue. The evidence supports that at this stage, the child’s visits with his mother should be supervised. This will ensure that the communication with his mother is monitored thereby protecting him from behaviour which would cause him anxiety.

[54] As stated in the FCCA, access will need to be monitored and evolve and hopefully expand as the mother completes her programs, maintains sobriety and through counselling obtains insight into her behaviour and its impact on the child. The mother genuinely believes that the father is not a good parent for a number of reasons which, in her mind, supports her constant complaints to the Society and vocalizing these concerns to the child

[55] The evidence before me does not support her allegations. The father admits to drinking beer but there is no evidence that he drinks excessively to the point that it affects his parenting of the child. The FCCA speaks of his mental health and speaks of his low self-esteem and its impact on his behaviour but the FCCA also discusses how he is dealing with this and some depressive symptoms as a result of his situation and relationship with the mother.

[56] In fact, the evidence indicates that the child’s conduct at school has improved and his disruptive behaviour has diminished.

[57] In addition, the Court finds that the Father has been supportive of access to mother and completed his application in spring 2018 for the Supervised Access Program. In addition, the Society has approved the mother’s sister, N.C. as a third party who could supervise visits.

[58] The Court is satisfied that the father will take all steps to ensure that the mother has regular contact with the child and the mother should from her end do what is necessary to ensure regularity in her contact with the child. It is very important and in his best interests that the child not have long intervals with no access to his mother.

[59] Therefore, there is no genuine issue for trial on the subject of access.

[60] Finally, the father requests an Order to obtain a passport for the child and travel with him without the mother’s consent. I find that it is in the child’s best interests to be able to travel with his father who is his legal guardian without a risk of the father engaging in conflict with the mother over these issues. Therefore, this request is granted subject to the father providing an itinerary and contact information for any travel outside Canada.

[61] In conclusion, the motion for summary judgment is granted. As discussed above, I have been able, on the material before me to make the necessary findings of fact and apply the law to the facts.

[62] I also find that the summary judgment is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result in this matter. A trial is not required as there are no genuine issues and this motion is certainly a fair, proportionate and efficient procedure to determine the child protection issues of this child. In accordance with subrule 2(3) of the FLRs, the Court must deal with cases justly which includes ensuring that the process is fair to all parties, that time and expense are saved, and dealing with the case in a way that is appropriate to its importance and complexity. Finally, the rule speaks of giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases. The just result is that the child has finality and permanency promptly without the delay of a trial. This is in the child’s best interests.

[63] Accordingly, a final Order will issue as follows:

(1) a finding that the child, D.G. born ---- is in need of protection under ss. 74 of the CYFSA;

(2) an Order placing the child, D.G. in the custody of the father, S.G. under s. 102 of the CYFSA;

(3) an Order that access to the mother, M.G. shall be at the discretion of the father which, at this time, may include access at the supervised access centre or supervised by a third party approved in advance by the Society; and

(4) the father is permitted to apply for a passport for the child and travel with the child without the consent of the mother subject to the father providing an itinerary and contact information for any travel outside Canada.

Justice A. Doyle

Date: July 25, 2018

COURT FILE NO.: FC-12-182-2 DATE: 2018/07/25 This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, and is subject to one or more of subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT, S.o. 2017, chapter 14 Schedule 1 BETWEEN: The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa Applicant – and – M.G. (Mother) - and - S.G. (Father) Respondents ENDORSEMENT Justice A. Doyle Released: July 25, 2018