William M. LeMay

The moving party father sought unsupervised overnight access to his six-year-old son, while the responding party mother brought a cross-motion for retroactive child support.

The court dismissed the mother's claim for retroactive support due to a lack of evidence regarding the father's income.

Regarding access, the court found that the mother was actively interfering with the father-son relationship and moving the goalposts for access.

The court ordered a staged access schedule, beginning with visits supervised by the paternal grandmother, and directed the parties to attend counselling.

On an interim motion within a motion to change a final parenting order, the moving party sought interim sole custody, reduced access for the other parent, and increased child support.

The court declined to alter the existing joint custody order on an interim basis, emphasizing that a final order was already in place and the evidentiary record was contradictory and incomplete.

The Office of the Children’s Lawyer report recommending sole custody to the moving party was not given determinative weight because it had not been tested through cross‑examination.

The court maintained the existing custody and access arrangements pending trial but increased child support modestly due to changes in parenting time and circumstances.

Following a long‑delayed family law application commenced more than twelve years after separation, the court determined claims for equalization, retroactive child support, spousal support, and disposition of the matrimonial home.

The court held the equalization claim was statute‑barred under the Family Law Act limitation period.

Applying the framework from DBS v. SRG, the court awarded retroactive child support back to 2008 when the payor unilaterally altered mortgage payments that had formed part of an informal support arrangement.

The court rejected claims for spousal support under both compensatory and needs‑based models, finding no career disadvantage or unmet need and emphasizing the long passage of time since separation.

The matrimonial home was ordered to be appraised and either bought out or sold, with adjustments for child support arrears and funds withdrawn from home equity.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought a ruling that the accused's videotaped statement to police was voluntary and admissible for cross-examination.

The accused brought a cross-application to exclude the statement, alleging breaches of his section 7 right to silence and section 10(b) right to counsel.

The court applied the Oickle test and found the statement voluntary, noting no threats, inducements, oppression, or police trickery that would overbear the accused's operating mind.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding that police persuasion did not violate section 7 and that the police did not denigrate counsel or violate section 10(b).

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial default judgment after the defendants were noted in default in a dispute arising from a failed property management investment venture.

The plaintiffs sought declarations that the defendants held several properties in trust and requested punitive damages.

The court held that a purchase money resulting trust arose for three properties where the plaintiffs directly advanced funds for the purchase but did not take legal title.

For two additional properties, the court found that the elements of unjust enrichment were satisfied and imposed a constructive trust.

The court declined to award punitive damages, finding the defendants’ misconduct did not reach the threshold of malicious and high‑handed conduct required for such damages.

The appellant police officer appealed a trial decision finding him liable for battery and awarding general and punitive damages to the respondent driver following a traffic stop.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of battery and the award of general damages, concluding that the officer's push, combined with verbal abuse, constituted offensive contact and was not protected by section 25 of the Criminal Code.

However, the court set aside the punitive damages award, finding that the officer's conduct, while inappropriate, was a spontaneous single event that did not warrant punitive damages.

The applicant sought enforcement in Ontario of a commission issued by a New Jersey court requiring a non‑party witness to produce documents and attend for a deposition relating to corporate farm assets relevant to U.S. divorce proceedings.

The respondents resisted on the basis that the request was intrusive, unnecessary, and contrary to privacy interests.

Applying the criteria for enforcing foreign commissions, including relevance, necessity, specificity, and comity, the court held that most of the requested documentary production and questioning should be enforced.

However, several areas of questioning were refused or restricted as speculative or overly intrusive.

Enforcement was conditioned on confidentiality undertakings equivalent to Ontario’s deemed undertaking rule and limits were imposed on the scope, location, and timing of the deposition.

In an ongoing governance dispute concerning a Gurdwara, the case management judge issued directions regarding multiple related proceedings.

The court granted the current board of directors leave to commence an action against former directors for costs previously paid to a law firm, and permitted a third-party claim against the law firm.

The court also stayed a related small claims action and a costs assessment proceeding pending a peremptory case management conference to determine how all related matters should be adjudicated.

In a case management endorsement concerning governance disputes over a Gurdwara, the court granted leave for the corporation to commence an action against former directors for costs paid to a law firm, and for the former directors to bring a third-party claim against the law firm.

The court also stayed related small claims and costs assessment proceedings pending a further case management conference to determine whether the court should assume case management responsibility over all related matters.

Following a successful civil action, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered whether the judgment obtained exceeded the settlement offer once prejudgment interest was calculated.

The plaintiff argued that the court should exercise its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act to increase the prejudgment interest rate above the statutory presumption of 0.5%.

The court declined to do so, finding no compelling reason to depart from the statutory rate and noting potential prejudice to the defendant.

Because the judgment plus interest did not exceed the settlement offer, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Members of a religious community incorporated under the Corporations Act disputed control of the corporation administering their temple.

After a consent order established a three-person board, the applicants sought recognition of two additional directors allegedly appointed by the community's spiritual leader and invalidation of steps taken by the existing board.

The court held that the evidence of the alleged appointments was inadmissible and unreliable hearsay, and in any event the consent order circumscribed any authority to appoint additional directors pending an annual members meeting.

The application was dismissed, and the matter was directed into case management with related proceedings.

The plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant medical equipment manufacturer, sought unpaid commissions for a $2.3 million sale to the Iraqi Ministry of Health.

The defendant argued that commissions for Iraqi sales were discretionary and attempted to unilaterally impose a new, less favorable commission structure just before the deal closed.

The court found that a binding contract existed entitling the plaintiff to a 7% commission on the gross margin of the sale.

Alternatively, the court held the plaintiff would be entitled to the same amount under quantum meruit.

The plaintiff was awarded $86,291.64 in unpaid commissions.

The defendant mortgagor defaulted on a second mortgage and brought a motion to set aside the mortgage, arguing it was an unconscionable transaction and charged a criminal rate of interest.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to enforce the mortgage and power of sale.

The court dismissed the mortgagor's claims regarding unconscionability and criminal interest, finding the legal fees for enforcement did not count towards the interest rate calculation.

However, the court found that several administrative fees and an 'interest bonus' charged by the mortgagee were impermissible penalties under section 8 of the Interest Act.

The court ordered the mortgagor to pay $110,000 into court to discharge the mortgage, failing which the mortgagee would be granted summary judgment.

The father brought a motion to change a final consent order for joint custody, seeking sole custody of the two children.

He argued that the mother had resiled from the dispute resolution mechanism in their agreement and failed to cooperate with counselling for their child.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz test and found no material change in circumstances, as the high-conflict nature of the relationship was foreseen when the consent order was made.

The motion was dismissed, but the court provided strict directions on interpreting the dispute resolution mechanism and ordered the parties to proceed with counselling.

Following an undefended trial, the successful plaintiff sought costs and two clarifications to the judgment.

The court corrected the prejudgment interest rate from four per cent to two per cent and directed that the judgment reflect that one defendant was known by two names.

On costs, the court held that the full claim was justified despite exceeding the damages recovered, given the reasonableness of the disbursements, the need to retain a handwriting expert, the defendants' failure to acknowledge the facts, the plaintiff's 2006 offer to settle, and delay attributable to the defendant.

Full claimed costs were awarded, payable within seven days.

On a motion to change a prior final family order, the court found a material change in circumstances for both children under s. 17 of the Divorce Act.

The evidence established serious communication failures, repeated breaches of court orders, interference with the mother’s relationship with one child, and denial or minimization by the father of the other child’s ADHD and treatment needs.

Joint custody was rejected under the governing communication principles, sole custody of both children was granted to the mother, and the father was subjected to a temporary no-contact regime outside counselling pending review.

The father’s claim for retroactive and immediate child support adjustment was refused for lack of entitlement and insufficient financial evidence.

Following a trial and costs endorsement in a family law matter, the applicant submitted that the court made calculation errors regarding Net Family Property and support arrears.

The respondent's counsel also requested that the final order be signed immediately.

The court dismissed the applicant's challenges to the Net Family Property and most of the arrears calculations, finding no errors, but requested further submissions on one alleged payment of $3,858.

The court also directed the respondent to serve the request for the order on the applicant and provided a timeline for the applicant to raise any concerns before the order is signed.

Following a five-day family law trial where the respondent was entirely successful, both parties sought costs.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs of $38,551.38, relying on a settlement offer that was significantly more favourable to the applicant than the trial judgment.

The court found that while the offer expired one day before trial and did not trigger the strict consequences of Rule 18(14), it remained a significant factor under Rule 24.

The court awarded the respondent $30,000 in costs, approaching full indemnity, after deducting fees for senior counsel's passive attendance at trial.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside an ex parte order that required him to apply for a Certificate of Appointment as Estate Trustee for his late father's estate.

The responding party, a foreign judgment creditor, had obtained the ex parte order to facilitate the enforcement of a $44 million US judgment against the estate.

The court found that while the responding party had made adequate disclosure on the ex parte motion, it lacked standing to seek an order for assistance under the Rules of Civil Procedure because it did not yet have a crystallized, domesticated judgment in Ontario.

The ex parte order was therefore set aside.

The applicant brought an application to enforce a settlement agreement for the transfer of shares in a company holding Tim Hortons franchise licenses.

The respondent estate trustee refused to sign the closing documents, arguing her former solicitor lacked authority to agree to the $10,000 purchase price and that essential terms were missing.

The court found that the solicitor had apparent authority to negotiate the agreement and that a binding contract was formed.

The court declined to set aside the agreement, noting the $10,000 price was commercially reasonable given the franchisor's valuation of the business and outstanding debts.

The application was granted and the respondent was ordered to execute the transfer.