William J. Sammon

The appellant, a consultant who submitted a bid for a government standing offer, was investigated and charged with bid-rigging after a government contract manager reported similarities between his bid and another.

The charges were later stayed.

The appellant sued the government and the contract manager for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and defamation, seeking $2,000,000 in damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the government's answers to bidders were accurate and not misleading, and that the contract manager's statements to investigators were protected by qualified privilege without malice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a recreational hockey game when the defendant delivered a blindside hit to his head.

The plaintiff suffered a concussion, broken teeth, and facial cuts, leading to long-term cognitive and functional limitations that impacted his ability to work as a personal trainer.

The defendant argued the collision was accidental and that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent due to his choice of facial protection and chronic cannabis use.

The court found the defendant fully liable, concluding the hit was intentional or reckless and outside the bounds of fair play.

The court awarded the plaintiff $702,551 in damages, including general damages and past and future income loss.

The plaintiff, Drew Casterton, sued the defendant, Gordon MacIsaac, for injuries sustained during a recreational hockey game collision.

The court found MacIsaac liable for intentionally or recklessly causing a blindside hit to Casterton's face, which was deemed outside the bounds of fair play.

The defence of contributory negligence, based on Casterton's choice of a half-visor and alleged cannabis impairment, was rejected.

Casterton was awarded general damages, past income loss, and future income loss, totaling $702,551, but punitive damages were not granted.

Following a three-week trial where the plaintiff's action for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and defamation was dismissed, the successful defendants sought costs of over $523,000.

The defendants relied on an offer to settle for $100,000.

The court found that the defendants' fees were disproportionate and that the federal government had failed to meet its document production obligations, which unnecessarily lengthened the trial.

Balancing the defendants' success and offer to settle against their improper conduct regarding document disclosure, the court fixed costs at $100,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff sued for damages totalling approximately two million dollars, alleging negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and defamation against the Attorney General of Canada and a contract manager, Paul Piché.

The claims arose from the plaintiff's participation in a 2007 Request for Standing Offer (RFSO) where his bid was largely prepared by a competitor, leading to a bid-rigging investigation and charges (later stayed).

The plaintiff argued that negligent answers to RFSO questions induced his actions and that Piché's statements to the Competition Bureau were defamatory.

The court dismissed all claims, finding no duty of care owed by the defendants to provide legal advice on the Competition Act, no negligent misrepresentation or breach of standard of care, and no malice in the defamation claim.

The court also determined that the plaintiff's reliance was unreasonable and that his alleged damages were unproven and too remote, largely attributable to his own contributory negligence.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case served a Notice of Discontinuance against two defendants.

Despite this, the defendants insisted on proceeding with a previously scheduled summary judgment motion to dismiss the action, seemingly to leverage higher costs.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to approve the Notice of Discontinuance nunc pro tunc.

The court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, finding the defendants' summary judgment motion to be vexatious, unnecessary, and an abuse of process.

The summary judgment motion was permanently stayed, and the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs of $15,305.

The plaintiff sued the estate of a deceased priest and the Archdiocese for historical sexual assault.

The plaintiff's claim against the estate was dismissed due to the two-year limitation period in the Trustee Act.

The estate then brought a motion to dismiss the Archdiocese's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity, arguing it was also barred by the Trustee Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002 governs claims for contribution and indemnity and prevails over the Trustee Act limitation period, allowing the crossclaim to proceed.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision to certify four additional common issues in two related class actions brought by former employees regarding the distribution of a pension plan surplus.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the viability of the cause of action under s. 8(10) of the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, finding it was not plain and obvious that the employer-administrator was not in a conflict of interest.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to amend the class definition in one of the actions to remove restrictive and vague language.

The appellant was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a leased vehicle.

The appellant sued the driver, the lessees, the legal owner (Daimler Financial), and the beneficial owner (Chrysler).

The motion judge found that Chrysler was an owner under the Highway Traffic Act and vicariously liable, but that both Chrysler and Daimler Financial were lessors under the Insurance Act and entitled to a $1 million cap on liability.

The motion judge also dismissed the appellant's claim that the driver was an unnamed insured under Daimler Financial's excess policy and dismissed the negligent entrustment claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld all of the motion judge's findings, dismissing both the appeal and the cross-appeal.

The respondents' family members were killed in a motor vehicle collision caused by a driver fleeing a high-speed pursuit by the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service.

The respondents sued the police service and the governments of Ontario, Quebec, and Canada, alleging vicarious liability and direct negligence.

The governments appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motions and the granting of the respondents' motion to amend their pleadings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that the quadripartite policing agreement did not create a relationship sufficiently close to impose vicarious liability on the provinces, and that the governments owed no private law duty of care to the deceased based on a 1991 audit report.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order certifying common issues in a class proceeding regarding a pension plan surplus.

The plaintiffs, former employees who took the commuted value of their pensions, alleged a beneficial interest in the surplus and conflicts of interest by the defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b), finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification order because established case law holds that members who transfer out their commuted value have no rights to an ongoing plan's surplus.

The court also found the issues to be of broad importance to pension plan administrators.

In this pension class proceeding arising from a workforce downsizing, the plaintiffs moved to add common issues alleging the administrator-employer operated under a material conflict of interest while making and implementing surplus-related decisions affecting departing plan members.

The court held the amended theory under ss. 8(10) and 8(11) of the Pension Benefits Standards Act disclosed a viable cause of action and was not defeated by the defendants' argument that members of an ongoing plan had no proprietary right in actuarial surplus.

The proposed conflict issues were common to the certified class, would materially advance the litigation, and did not turn primarily on individualized reliance analysis at the certification stage.

The motion was granted, with directions to file a corrected amended statement of claim and an updated litigation plan.

In a certified class proceeding concerning allegedly unsafe solarium models, the plaintiff brought a motion to settle the certification order and notice to class members, obtain security for publication costs, and address unpaid cost awards.

The defendant cross-moved to amend the class definition, remove the representative plaintiff, decertify the action, and require fuller disclosure of counsel’s fee arrangement.

The court held that the class definition previously approved by the Divisional Court remained appropriate and rejected the defendant’s attempt to narrow it to current users of the solariums.

The representative plaintiff remained a valid class member despite no longer residing in the home where the solarium had been installed.

The court dismissed the defendant’s motions, ordered the defendant to pay $7,000 into counsel’s trust account for notice publication costs, and approved the certification order and class notice with a minor amendment concerning disclosure of the retainer agreement.

The appellant, who sustained a severe traumatic brain injury, appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying her request for pre-approved funding for in-patient rehabilitative services at an Alberta facility.

The facility was not licensed as a hospital and did not accept public funding.

The appellant argued the denial breached her rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that section 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the government to fund out-of-province medical treatments, and that the denial was based on the facility's licensing status, not the appellant's disability, thus not engaging section 15.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a registrar’s dismissal order after the action was dismissed for failure to meet a timetable deadline under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the missed deadline resulted from an inadvertent diarizing error and that the motion was brought promptly with no prejudice to the defendant, warranting revival of the action.

A related motion sought production of an accident reconstruction report prepared for the plaintiff’s insurer.

The court held the report was not protected by litigation privilege and that Rule 31.06(3) imposed a high threshold for withholding expert opinions.

The plaintiffs were ordered to produce the report, while the defendants were permitted to pursue underlying source materials from the expert or insurer if relevant.

Following the dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal in a class proceeding, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful party sought full indemnity costs including significant hours for factum preparation, while the opposing party provided its own cost outline for comparison.

The court applied the usual rule that costs follow the event and assessed costs on a partial indemnity basis at 55% of a reasonable full indemnity bill.

Considering the excessive but understandable factum preparation, the court fixed costs payable by the defendant to the plaintiff at $7,000.

Following a successful application declaring a contingency fee agreement void and ordering repayment of funds, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $22,000.

The court held that costs awards must reflect a fair and reasonable contribution rather than an exact reimbursement of actual legal fees and considered the expectations of the unsuccessful party under r. 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding the claimed hourly rate, allocation of discovery time, and counsel fee for a half‑day motion excessive, the court reduced the award and fixed costs at $10,000 plus HST.

The applicant sought a declaration that a contingency fee agreement with her former lawyer was unenforceable because it permitted the lawyer to charge a percentage on costs recovered through settlement.

The agreement calculated the lawyer’s contingency fee on the entire settlement amount, including costs and disbursements, without obtaining prior judicial approval as required by s. 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act.

The court held that including costs in a contingency fee agreement without judicial approval constitutes a fundamental breach of the statutory scheme.

Because the agreement contravened s. 28.1(8) and was not approved as required by s. 28.1(9), it was unenforceable.

The lawyer was ordered to repay the portion of the fee calculated on costs, while the broader question of fee reasonableness was left to the trial judge in the related tort action.

Following a trial in a personal injury action, the court addressed the issue of costs after written submissions.

The successful plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs alleging litigation misconduct by the defendants, including failure to produce an important engineering drawing and challenging the plaintiff’s credibility.

The defendants argued costs should be reduced due to delay and duplication arising from the plaintiff changing counsel multiple times and periods of self‑representation.

The court held that neither party’s conduct justified substantial indemnity costs and emphasized the principle that cost awards must be fair and reasonable rather than matching actual legal fees.

Partial indemnity costs of $200,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements were awarded to the plaintiff, apportioned in accordance with the liability findings.

The plaintiff brought a negligence action against a municipality and road construction contractors after tripping on a height differential at a crosswalk during an ongoing road reconstruction project.

The court found that the unfinished roadway created a tripping hazard amounting to a condition of non-repair under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The defendants failed to install temporary ramping or provide adequate warning of the vertical gap between the roadway and depressed curb.

The court rejected allegations of contributory negligence and held that all defendants were occupiers responsible for site safety under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

Liability was apportioned 50% to the paving contractor and 25% each to the municipality and general contractor, and damages were awarded for general damages, income loss, future care, and expenses.