Thomas R. Lederer

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision and a reconsideration decision denying her claim for accident benefits for chiropractic treatment.

She argued the adjudicator breached procedural fairness and failed to provide sufficient reasons by not explicitly referring to a medical report from her orthopedic surgeon.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that an adjudicator is not required to refer to every piece of evidence in their reasons, and the reasons provided were detailed and demonstrated a firm grasp of the evidentiary record.

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision granting the respondent tenant a rent abatement and damages for illegal entry, lockout, and harassment.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding he was a landlord rather than a roommate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's arguments raised questions of fact, not law, which cannot be appealed under s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court also declined to award costs to the successful self-represented respondent for lost wages.

The appellant lawyer appealed the revocation of his license to practice law by the Law Society Tribunal.

He had been found to have knowingly assisted clients in mortgage fraud across multiple real estate transactions.

The appellant argued that the findings of fact and credibility from an initial hearing panel, which had acquitted him of knowing assistance, should have bound the second hearing panel after a new hearing was ordered.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an order for a new hearing results in an entirely new hearing, and the second panel was not bound by the first panel's findings, which were based on an incorrect legal understanding of fraud.

The penalty of license revocation was upheld.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a single judge.

The single judge had dismissed her motion to extend the time to appeal a finding that her family law claims were statute-barred.

The panel found no error in the single judge's conclusion that the date of separation was res judicata and that the limitation period under s. 7(3) of the Family Law Act had expired.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of an interim order made by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario restricting her practice pending an investigation into her issuance of COVID-19 vaccine exemptions.

The applicant challenged a specific term requiring her to consent to the College accessing her OHIP billing records to monitor compliance.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding that the College had sufficient evidence of risk to patients and the public, and that the OHIP monitoring term was a reasonable measure to ensure compliance with the practice restrictions.

The appellant insurer appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that refused to deduct the respondent's $120,000 long-term disability settlement from her statutory income replacement benefits.

The insurer argued the settlement represented double recovery for income loss.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the adjudicator's finding that the lump-sum settlement resolved multiple claims, including extracontractual damages, and could not be strictly allocated as an income replacement benefit under section 7(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing its application to evict the tenant and recover damages for a fire.

The Board found the fire was caused by a discarded cigarette butt from elsewhere, not by the tenant, which the Divisional Court held was an unappealable finding of fact.

Although the tenant breached the lease by failing to maintain liability insurance, the Board granted relief from eviction under s. 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court found no reason to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal Paragraph 22 of the order of Perell J. dated February 11, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and directed the parties to arrange a case conference regarding the conduct of the appeal.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award that reinstated a grievor who had been discharged for fraudulent misconduct, substituting a ten-day suspension.

The arbitrator found the employer engaged in discriminatory treatment because other employees who committed similar misconduct received significantly lighter penalties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator reasonably shifted the evidentiary onus to the employer after the union established a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline, and reasonably concluded the penalty was appropriate.

The applicants abandoned their motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Toronto Local Appeal Body regarding minor variances.

The self-represented respondents sought costs for the abandoned motion under Rule 37.09(3).

The court recognized that self-represented parties may be entitled to costs for work that would ordinarily be done by a lawyer, but found the respondents' claims of $10,000 and $2,000 to be overstated.

The court awarded costs of $2,000 to one respondent and $400 to the other, representing a proportionate amount for their efforts.

The defendant appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment.

The defendant argued that the dispute resolution clause in the construction contract extinguished the plaintiff's right to bring a court action because the plaintiff failed to deliver a Notice of Dispute within 15 days of the defendant's decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial as to whether the defendant satisfied the condition precedent of 'consultation and co-operation' before rendering its decision, which would trigger the 15-day deadline.

The appellant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating her tenancy and ordering her eviction for seriously impairing the safety of another person during a physical altercation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's challenges to the Board's evaluation of the evidence were questions of fact, not law.

The Court also held that the Board made no error of law in its analysis under section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act, as it properly considered the circumstances of both parties before exercising its discretion to grant and briefly postpone the eviction.

The applicant, a person with disabilities, had used specialized transit services unconditionally for 8 years.

The respondent reviewed his eligibility and changed it to conditional, requiring him to use conventional transit for part of his trip accompanied by a personal care assistant at his own expense.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court found the decision unreasonable as it erected a barrier rather than removing one, contrary to the purpose of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act.

The decision was quashed and the applicant's unconditional eligibility was restored.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

In the absence of costs submissions from the responding parties, costs were fixed in the amount of $2,500 payable within 30 days.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order removing them as trustees of a family trust and replacing them with a bank.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, holding that an order removing a trustee is a final order, not an interlocutory one.

Therefore, any appeal of the order must be brought to the Court of Appeal, not the Divisional Court.

The tenants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating their tenancy to allow the landlord's mother to move into the property.

The tenants challenged the Board's finding that the landlords required the unit in good faith for the mother's residential occupation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding of good faith and intended full-time occupancy were findings of fact, and the appeal raised no extricable question of law as required by s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The appellant, a statutory third party, appealed a motions judge's order refusing leave to serve and file a jury notice on behalf of the defendants, despite the plaintiff's consent.

The motions judge had cited pandemic-related court backlogs as the reason for refusal.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred in law by failing to articulate the applicable test, failing to consider the overall context including companion actions with existing jury notices, and failing to consider whether the jury notice would actually cause delay.

Leave was granted to file the jury notice.

The appellants appealed an order determining the terms of a shotgun buy/sell agreement reached to settle oppression claims.

They argued the application judge erred by refusing to include a term requiring the corporation to indemnify one of the appellants for personal tax liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the application judge's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of such an agreement and that the proposed term was not commercially reasonable.

York University and York University Development Corporation (YUDC) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision denying their request for reconsideration of an order requiring the production of certain records.

The applicants argued the Adjudicator erred in finding the records were under the control of York University pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and in her approach to the reconsideration threshold.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Adjudicator reasonably applied the two-part control test from National Defence and reasonably placed the onus on the applicants to establish grounds for reconsideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) denying her claim for psychotraumatic disability arising from a 1998 workplace injury.

The WSIAT had found that her depression manifested more than five years after the injury and that the accident was not a significant contributing factor.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding that the WSIAT's decisions were justified, transparent, and intelligible.