Tamarin M. Dunnet

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from the laying of the Information to the anticipated trial date was approximately three years, nine months, and eighteen days.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court analyzed the length of delay, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

Much of the delay was attributed to neutral intake periods, inherent time requirements of the case, or institutional delay within acceptable limits.

The court found minimal prejudice to the accused and concluded that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the delay.

The accused pleaded guilty to two masked robberies of retail stores in which imitation firearms were brandished and cash and property were stolen.

Although no physical injuries occurred, victims experienced emotional and financial harm.

The Crown sought a three‑year custodial sentence, while the defence requested time served.

The court considered the seriousness of robbery offences and the importance of deterrence but also noted the accused’s youth, guilty plea, remorse, family support, and rehabilitative prospects.

Given that the accused had already spent approximately two and one‑half years in pre‑trial custody, the court concluded that a sentence of time served appropriately addressed the principles of sentencing.

The accused, charged with armed robbery, challenged the admissibility of his statements to police, alleging violations of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and arguing the statements were involuntary.

The accused made an utterance before speaking to duty counsel and later provided a written statement off-camera after expressing discomfort with the video recording.

The Superior Court of Justice found no s. 10(b) breach, as the police provided a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel and the utterance was spontaneous.

The court also held the statements were voluntary, finding no oppressive conduct or improper inducements, and concluded the written procedure was a sufficient substitute for a video recording.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a telewarrant at his residence.

The court found that the police officer who swore the information to obtain the warrant was negligent and breached his duty to provide full and frank disclosure, including relying on non-existent surveillance and failing to disclose discrepancies in the confidential informant's information.

After excising the erroneous information and amplifying the record, the court concluded the remaining information was insufficient to establish reasonable grounds for the warrant, resulting in a s. 8 breach.

Applying s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, finding the officer's conduct reckless and that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Following an encounter in apartment building elevators and hallways, the accused was tried on charges of robbery, aggravated sexual assault by wounding, aggravated assault by wounding, and forcible confinement.

The court held the taking of the complainant's phone did not involve more than incidental contact and therefore did not amount to robbery, but did constitute theft.

Applying the objective sexual-assault analysis, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the stairwell interaction established a sexual or carnal context, and it rejected the aggravated sexual assault charge.

The facial bite injuries did not amount to wounding in law, but supported a conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown also failed to prove forcible confinement beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of failing to provide the necessaries of life to her young children after feeding them a highly restricted raw vegan diet that resulted in severe malnutrition, osteopenia, and rickets.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the children, the breach of parental trust, and the life‑threatening nature of the harm.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, participation in parenting and nutrition programs, and psychological evidence indicating low risk of reoffending.

Applying the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence for offences involving child victims under the Criminal Code, the court determined that a custodial sentence was warranted but could be served conditionally in the community.

A six‑month conditional sentence with strict conditions and three years’ probation was imposed.

The accused was convicted after trial of multiple child pornography offences including possession, making child pornography available, and accessing child pornography through a peer‑to‑peer file‑sharing network.

Police investigators directly connected to the accused’s computer through the LimeWire/Gnutella network and downloaded files while the accused’s system was actively downloading and sharing illicit material.

A search of the accused’s residence revealed thousands of images and videos stored on a computer tower, laptop, and disks accumulated over several years.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as the dominant sentencing objectives for internet‑based child pornography offences, particularly where the offender disseminates material to others online.

Considering the scale of the collection, the dissemination of files, and the lack of remorse or evidence of treatment prospects, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence with concurrent terms and ancillary orders.

Criminal trial concerning child pornography offences arising from peer to peer LimeWire activity, forensic examination of seized computer equipment, and storage of files on compact disks.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework, rejected the accused’s explanations involving hackers, viruses, and unauthorized access, and found beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed, accessed, and made child pornography available through the shared folder of his file sharing program.

The court accepted expert evidence linking the monitored IP address and GUID to the seized laptop and inferentially found deliberate downloading and movement of files to disks.

On the making count, however, the court adopted the reasoning that copying pre-existing child pornography onto disks for personal collection did not constitute “making” under s. 163.1(2).

During a criminal trial for multiple child pornography offences, the Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert in Internet-based child pornography investigations and peer‑to‑peer file sharing networks.

The defence objected on the basis that the officer’s role in the investigation created an appearance of bias and partiality.

Applying the expert evidence framework in Mohan and the gatekeeping analysis discussed in Abbey and Van Bree, the court conducted a cost‑benefit assessment of the proposed opinion evidence.

The court held that the witness’s expertise, reliability, and the necessity of the evidence to understand LimeWire peer‑to‑peer technology outweighed any potential prejudice arising from his investigative role.

The officer was therefore permitted to testify as an expert on the operation of peer‑to‑peer file sharing systems.

On an application in a child pornography prosecution, the accused sought exclusion of statements made during the execution of a residential search warrant, during booking, and in a later videotaped interview, as well as exclusion of CDs, DVDs, and derivative data.

The court held the warrant was not overly broad and validly authorized seizure of computer media, including CDs and DVDs, in the circumstances of an internet file-sharing investigation.

However, the police breached s. 10(b) by eliciting a statement about CDs without properly implementing the right to counsel, by failing to hold off during booking after the accused said he did not wish to speak to a lawyer “at the moment,” and by failing to provide a further opportunity to consult counsel when the accused’s jeopardy materially increased at the videotaped interview.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court excluded those statements but admitted the initial spontaneous utterance and the physical media evidence.

Sentencing decision for possession of a restricted firearm together with readily accessible ammunition.

Police executed a search warrant at an apartment where the accused attempted to discard a handgun through a window; numerous rounds of ammunition and a magazine were also discovered in the residence.

Although the court previously found a breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights relating to the search warrant, the evidence was admitted under the framework in R. v. Grant.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in firearms offences, particularly where the accused possessed a handgun and large quantities of ammunition in a residence with young children while subject to a prohibition order.

Considering both mitigating factors and significant aggravating features, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

The applicant sought exclusion of a firearm, ammunition, and related evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms following the execution of a search warrant.

The court found the warrant was issued without sufficient information to establish reasonable and probable grounds, resulting in a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the firearm was discarded from a window during execution of the warrant, which the court held constituted abandonment with only a tenuous causal connection to the Charter breach.

Although the later warrantless seizure of ammunition from a suitcase violated s. 8, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a collision with a municipal employee on a public skating rink.

The plaintiff pleaded that the employee skated backwards into him, while the defendants pleaded that the employee stopped suddenly.

The trial judge found the employee negligent for stopping suddenly, but later set aside his own judgment because the plaintiff had not pleaded the sudden stop.

On appeal, the Divisional Court restored the original judgment, holding that the defendants were not prejudiced as they had raised the sudden stop in their own statement of defence.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal from a decision refusing certification of a proposed class proceeding, the respondent sought costs of the appeal.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs, agreeing with the motions judge that the case involved a novel question of law regarding the interpretation of s. 347 of the Criminal Code and was a matter of public interest.

The court found that in these circumstances, the appellant should not be penalized with costs despite being unsuccessful.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a motion to certify a class proceeding against the respondent bank.

The proposed class action alleged that the respondent received interest on cash advances at a criminal rate, in violation of s. 347(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and sought restitutionary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's findings that the restitutionary claims did not raise common issues and that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure for resolving the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award which held that the employer was obligated under the collective agreement to pay the newly introduced Ontario Health Premium on behalf of its employees.

The Divisional Court applied the patently unreasonable standard of review, following recent Ontario Court of Appeal jurisprudence, and found the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement to be logical and reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Toronto Police Services Board applied for judicial review of an arbitration award that ordered compensation to a police officer whose promotion was deferred due to pending disciplinary charges that were later withdrawn.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement, which balanced the employer's right to defer promotion with the officer's right to be made whole upon exoneration, was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant developer sought judicial review of the Minister's ongoing planning process under the Ontario Planning Development Act, 1994, alleging improper limitations on the investigation stage and lack of meaningful public participation.

The Divisional Court quashed the application as premature, holding that judicial review should generally await the conclusion of administrative proceedings.

The court found no exceptional circumstances justifying intervention before the planning process was complete.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding their claims for water leak repairs under a statutory warranty.

The court previously dismissed the appeal but issued this supplementary endorsement to address remaining issues regarding the interpretation of settlement releases, a side letter, and estoppel.

The court held that the releases constituted the entire agreement and that the side letter did not bind the warranty program.

Furthermore, the appellants were estopped from relying on the side letter against the program because the program had reasonably relied on the releases to its detriment by relinquishing security.

The appeal on the remaining issues was dismissed with costs.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario sought judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of evaluation scores awarded to consulting engineering firms bidding on highway construction projects.

The applicants argued the scores were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation and application of the exemptions were reasonable and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm from disclosure.