Susan J. Woodley

The plaintiffs brought an action against the municipality, which included claims of malicious prosecution, misfeasance/abuse of public office, and damages related to the municipality's Fill By-Law.

The municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss all remaining claims.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial for any of the plaintiffs' claims.

Specifically, the court found that the municipality had reasonable and probable cause to initiate and continue Provincial Offences Act proceedings, did not act with malice, and did not act in bad faith in enacting or enforcing the Fill By-Law, including its fee provisions (which were previously found ultra vires but did not give rise to damages due to the plaintiffs' failure to complete permit applications).

The applicant, an inmate, sought a writ of habeas corpus to be transferred from Warkworth Institution back to Beaver Creek Institution or a similar open-concept medium-security facility.

He argued that his involuntary transfer from Beaver Creek to Warkworth, based on alleged improper conclusions about an "inappropriate relationship" and lack of specific documentation, constituted an unlawful restriction of his liberty.

The court found that the transfer between two medium-security institutions, despite differences in their living environments (open-concept vs. structured), did not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty, but rather a loss of privileges.

The application for habeas corpus was dismissed.

This action arose from a fatal motor vehicle accident involving a tractor and a passenger van.

The main action settled, leaving a third-party claim by the defendants (tractor operator and owner) against the Township of Cramahe for contribution and indemnity.

The defendants alleged the Township was negligent and breached its statutory duty by failing to maintain Telephone Road in a reasonable state of repair, specifically by not painting a centerline.

The court found that the absence of a centerline constituted a state of non-repair, as it was required by the Ontario Traffic Manual guidelines.

However, the court ultimately dismissed the third-party claim, finding that the defendants failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that 'but for' the absence of the centerline, the accident would not have occurred.

The court concluded that the driver of the van either never identified the tractor as a hazard or did not have sufficient time to react, and the centerline would have made no difference.

The applicant sought to lift a Writ of Execution filed by the respondent's former lawyers (Farrell & Boyle, represented by Elissa Boyle) against the respondent Meagan McKenney's interest in the matrimonial home.

The applicant argued the writ was an invalid encumbrance under s. 21(1) of the Family Law Act because he, as the spouse, did not consent to its filing.

The court found that Farrell & Boyle, having ceased to represent Ms. McKenney, were acting at arm's length when they obtained the judgment and filed the writ.

Consequently, the writ was not considered an encumbrance within the meaning of s. 21(1) of the Act, and spousal consent was not required.

The court also determined that Farrell & Boyle's interest, secured by the writ, had priority over the applicant's interest, which had not vested prior to the writ's filing.

The applicant's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant, Reaad Ferose, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in his blood, arguing that the trial judge erred in not excluding breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter despite multiple Charter breaches (ss. 8, 9, and 10(b)).

The trial judge had found breaches related to unlawful demand for breath samples (s. 8), arbitrary detention (s. 9), delayed right to counsel, and failure to properly implement the right to choose counsel (s. 10(b)).

However, the trial judge concluded that the impact of these breaches was minimal and admitted the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, particularly regarding the minimal impact of breath sample-related breaches as per R. v. Jennings, and the s. 10(b) breaches given the absence of demonstrated prejudice.

The Respondent, Roger Bryce, brought a motion to change a final order, seeking to reduce child support and the proportionate division of s. 7 expenses.

The Applicant, Sharlene Lawrence-Bryce, in her amended response, sought sole custody of the children, costs, and dismissal of Roger's motion.

The court found a material change in circumstances for both child support (due to Roger's income fluctuations) and custody (due to the parties' chronic inability to cooperate and Roger's vindictive behaviour).

The court adjusted child support retroactively and prospectively, varied s. 7 expenses to a 50/50 split, and awarded Sharlene sole custody, finding it to be in the children's best interests given Roger's conduct.

The accused was charged with possession of explosive substances and unsafe storage of firearms after police executed a public safety warrant at his residence.

The police stopped the accused away from his home, psychologically detained him without providing right to counsel, and conscripted him to physically assist in the search of his own residence where he handled and identified the seized items.

The court found multiple, serious Charter breaches including arbitrary detention, denial of right to counsel, violation of the right to silence, and unreasonable search and seizure.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the physical evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Laura and Reynold, former cohabitants for 24 years, separated in 2009.

Laura sought retroactive child support adjustments, spousal support commencing July 2016, and a CPP split.

Reynold denied the claims, sought imputation of income to Laura for underemployment, and repayment of alleged overpaid support.

The court found Laura entitled to indefinite spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory bases, rejecting Reynold's claims of inability to pay due to new family obligations.

The court imputed income to Laura for unreasonably deducted real estate expenses for spousal support calculation but found her not intentionally underemployed.

The claim for retroactive child support adjustment was dismissed as largely resolved, and the CPP split claim was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction without consent.

Reynold was ordered to designate Laura as beneficiary of his life insurance to secure spousal support.

The accused, Zachariah Piva, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, LB, alleged non-consensual sexual activity, while the accused maintained it was consensual.

A third witness, KA, provided inconsistent testimony regarding consent.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of all witnesses, applying the R. v. W. (D.) test.

The court found that the Crown did not prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the complainant's subjective lack of consent, due to inconsistencies in her testimony and the corroborating evidence from the third witness and the accused.

The accused was acquitted.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for partition and sale, the respondent sought costs.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, finding that the applicant made unfounded allegations of dishonest acts against the respondent.

The court also noted the aggressive nature of the motion and the significant power imbalance between the parties.

Costs were fixed at $20,987.66.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought pre-trial applications challenging the constitutional validity of a search warrant executed at their residence.

The warrant was based primarily on information from a confidential informant.

As part of the Garofoli procedure, the accused sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant on various alleged misstatements, omissions, and unsubstantiated claims.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on limited grounds, including the affiant's failure to maintain a proper investigative file, a specific reference to a police occurrence report, and the basis for the night entry request.

Leave was denied for the remaining proposed areas of cross-examination as they were deemed irrelevant or unlikely to elicit testimony discrediting the preconditions for the warrant's issuance.

The applicant brought a motion for the partition and sale of a property registered in the respondent's name, claiming a 50% beneficial interest pursuant to a Trust Agreement.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the property was her family home and the applicant had breached the agreement by failing to pay expenses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant sought equitable relief with unclean hands and that crucial facts regarding the validity and interpretation of the Trust Agreement required a full trial with viva voce evidence.

The appellant, Roumen Marinov, appealed his convictions for operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable," the trial judge's assessment of the testifying officer's note-taking and credibility, and whether the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof for the impaired driving conviction.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable," his assessment of the officer's evidence despite note-taking issues, or his application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for impaired driving, which was implicitly demonstrated throughout the judgment.

Bradley Evaschuk was found guilty by a jury on nine counts, including fraud over $5,000, attempt fraud over $5,000, and uttering forged documents.

The fraudulent activities involved submitting 23 false health benefit claims with 300 forged invoices to the City of Toronto's employee benefit plan, resulting in a loss of $23,130.15.

The fraud occurred over several years, partly while Evaschuk was on bail for other charges.

The Crown sought a 16-month custodial sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of 18-24 months.

The court considered the availability of a conditional sentence, noting the indictment straddled two sentencing regimes.

Emphasizing general and specific deterrence and denunciation due to the breach of trust, sophistication, and duration of the fraud, the court imposed a global custodial sentence of six months, followed by 36 months of probation with conditions, and a restitution order of $13,130.15.

The applicant sought to reopen the evidence of a family law trial, which had concluded over a year prior, to introduce an affidavit sworn by the respondent in an unrelated family law matter.

The applicant argued this new evidence proved the respondent deliberately misled the court regarding property ownership and his ability to work.

The court applied the two-prong test for admitting new evidence, requiring reasonable diligence and a probable change in result.

The court found no deliberate misleading or fraud and determined that the new evidence, which largely concerned collateral facts, would not have changed the trial's outcome.

The motion to reopen the evidence was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking an order for the return of the child from Cobourg to Oshawa and to prevent future changes to the child's residence without consent or court order.

The applicant mother had moved with the child to Cobourg due to family expansion, health issues during pregnancy, and affordability of housing.

The court found a material change in circumstances and, applying the best interests of the child test, determined there were compelling reasons to allow the interim move to Cobourg.

The respondent's motion was dismissed.

The Plaintiffs sought leave under Rule 39.02(2) to file a supplementary affidavit in response to the Defendants' reliance on the Limitations Act and tolling provisions, which the Plaintiffs claimed were raised unexpectedly after cross-examination.

The court granted leave, finding that the Plaintiffs were genuinely unaware of the disputed matters and that the strategic advocacy of the Defendants did not outweigh the principle of liberal construction of the Rules to achieve a just determination on the merits.

The applicant father brought a motion for contempt against the respondent mother for failing to comply with access and counselling provisions of a prior consent order.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion seeking sole custody, flexible access based on the child's wishes, and restrictions on the father's communications.

The court found the mother in contempt, ruling that her permissiveness empowered the child to disregard the order, and that a parent has a positive obligation to ensure compliance.

The mother's requests for sole custody and flexible access were denied, as they would curtail the father-child relationship.

However, some communication restrictions on the father were granted, with amendments, and made mutual where appropriate.

The mother was ordered to purge her contempt.

The Applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after partially succeeding in an application to close a travelled path.

The Respondent argued for divided success and no costs, or partial indemnity.

The court found success was divided, but the application was necessary for both parties to determine their rights.

The court declined substantial indemnity, finding no exceptional circumstances, and awarded partial indemnity costs to the Applicant, fixed at $7,798.92 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The Plaintiffs sought costs after successfully obtaining partial summary judgment, which found a municipal by-law's fee schedule for fill material to be ultra vires.

The Defendant argued for no costs due to divided success or a reduction in quantum.

The court found that success was not divided, as the Plaintiffs succeeded in striking down the fee structure, and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, after reviewing and deducting certain legal fees and disbursements.