Stanley J. Kershman

The applicant sought declarations that a snow removal contractor and its insurer were required to defend and indemnify it in an underlying slip-and-fall action.

The applicant had contracted with the contractor to perform snow clearing and ice control services and required the contractor to obtain liability insurance naming the applicant as an additional insured and to indemnify it for claims arising from the contractor’s operations.

After a pedestrian allegedly slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot, the contractor and insurer refused to assume the applicant’s defence.

The court held that the true nature of the underlying claim was negligence arising from snow and ice removal, which fell within the contractor’s contractual responsibilities and the insurer’s coverage.

The insurer therefore had a duty to defend the entire action and both the contractor and insurer were required to indemnify the applicant for liability attributable to the contractor.

The applicant brought contempt motions alleging that the respondent failed to comply with disclosure obligations and misled the court regarding ownership of property pledged as security for child support arrears.

The court applied the established three‑part test for civil contempt, requiring a clear and unequivocal order, deliberate breach, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Evidence showed the respondent had sold the property more than a year before representing to the court that he still owned it and agreeing to secure support payments with it.

The court found that the respondent deliberately misled the court and failed to comply with the order securing child support.

A finding of contempt was entered and a separate hearing on sanctions was scheduled.

Following the abandonment of a motion for leave to file evidence responding to a motion to strike portions of a statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The underlying action alleged defamation and abuse of public office.

The moving party argued that its motion became unnecessary after the opposing party abandoned a ground asserting the truth of the impugned statements.

The court held the motion for leave was a reasonable response to the position originally taken, but rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs as excessive.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis and reduced after review of the bill of costs.

Following a motion for spousal support and a cross‑motion regarding the release of proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home, the court determined the issue of costs.

Both parties had served Offers to Settle addressing different aspects of the dispute, but neither offer was accepted.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the court’s decision matched her offer.

The court held that the applicant was not entitled to elevated costs because she could have resolved the cross‑motion by accepting the respondent’s offer and because portions of her offer addressed relief not sought in her motion.

Costs were fixed in a reduced amount after considering the Family Law Rules.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for obstructing a peace officer.

A police officer had attended the appellant's residence to warn him about a trespass complaint and spoke to an individual who falsely identified himself.

The officer later recognized the appellant as that individual during a traffic stop and arrested him.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the identification evidence and in finding the officer was in the lawful execution of his duty when he approached the patio door of the residence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the identification evidence or the application of the implied licence to knock doctrine.

The moving party sought leave under Rule 60.07(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to issue an alias Writ of Seizure and Sale after the original writ expired without renewal.

The underlying judgment, which ordered payment exceeding $119,000 plus costs and interest, remained enforceable for twenty years.

The court considered authorities confirming that leave may be granted to issue an alias writ after expiry where the judgment remains valid.

Exercising its discretion, the court held that denying leave would unjustly deprive the judgment creditor of enforcement of its judgment.

Leave was granted to issue an alias writ effective from the date of issuance, with interest limited to the period before the expiry of the original writ.

The moving party sought termination of long‑standing spousal support and cancellation of a life insurance policy securing the support obligation following retirement and a significant reduction in income.

The responding party argued there had been no material change in circumstances and relied on the compensatory basis of support arising from her role as primary caregiver during the marriage.

The court held that the combination of retirement, reduced income, and ongoing responsibilities toward children from the moving party’s subsequent marriage constituted a material change in circumstances.

However, immediate termination of support was not appropriate given the responding party’s financial circumstances and the length of time support had been paid.

The court ordered a gradual reduction in spousal support over several years, after which support would cease, and required the insurance policy to remain in place until the support obligation ended.