Shaun M. O'Brien

The court dismissed John Cipolla’s appeal from a Small Claims Court order refusing to recognize a decision of the Alliance of Indigenous Nations (AIN) Tribunal.

The court found the appeal to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as the AIN Tribunal is not a recognized legal entity and there was no plausible basis for its decisions to be recognized by the court.

The court also rejected arguments based on international law and Indigenous rights, finding no statutory or legal authority for the AIN Tribunal’s recognition.

The Respondent father moved to set aside Minutes of Settlement (MOS), arguing the Applicant mother fundamentally breached them by commencing a new defamation proceeding in Iran the day after signing the MOS, which was intended to consolidate all litigation.

The Applicant mother cross-moved to enforce the MOS and for the Ontario court to assume jurisdiction over parenting issues.

The court found that the Applicant's failure to disclose and refusal to withdraw the Iranian defamation claim constituted a fundamental breach of the MOS, as the agreement's core purpose was to terminate all multi-jurisdictional litigation arising from the marriage breakdown in favour of an alternative dispute resolution process in Ontario.

The court set aside the MOS, dismissed the Applicant's cross-motion, and declined to address the question of jurisdiction at that stage.

The applicants, comprising raw milk producers and consumers, challenged federal and provincial prohibitions on the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk, alleging violations of their freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the applicants' belief in raw milk's health benefits did not constitute a profound moral dimension for freedom of conscience, the religious interference was trivial and insubstantial, and the equality claim lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court further held that even if Charter violations were established, they would be justified under section 1 due to the compelling public health objective of preventing milk-borne illnesses, which pasteurization effectively mitigates.

The Landlord (1617887 Ontario Ltd.) brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a crossclaim by the Estate of Greg Campbell.

The crossclaim alleged the Landlord was liable for the plaintiff's injuries due to failing to ensure the tenant tavern (Jessie's Café Bar & Grill) had adequate insurance and for failing to manage/supervise the premises, after the plaintiff was struck by a vehicle driven by Greg Campbell following intoxication at the tavern.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the Landlord did not owe a duty of care to manage or supervise the tavern, nor to ensure the tavern had public liability insurance, as there was no proximity or causal connection.

The motion for summary judgment was allowed, and the crossclaim against the Landlord was dismissed.

The plaintiff's claim against the Landlord was also dismissed as they had agreed to release the Landlord.

The plaintiff, Voula Kardaras, sought long-term disability benefits from Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada due to major depressive disorder.

Sun Life discontinued benefits after Kardaras began a gradual return to work, asserting she was capable of full-time employment.

The court found Kardaras was entitled to "own occupation" benefits for approximately one year after discontinuation, as she was incapable of performing the essential duties of her occupation more than three days per week.

However, she was not entitled to "any occupation" benefits as her part-time work was reasonably commensurate in status and reward.

The court also awarded Kardaras $10,000 in mental distress damages due to Sun Life's breach of the duty of good faith in its handling of her claim.

The court, on its own initiative, considered dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's statement of claim and additional submissions failed to set out a discernable cause of action against the named defendants.

Allegations related to employment, bullying, racism, and a toxic workplace in a unionized context were found to fall outside the court's jurisdiction, belonging instead to the Ontario Labour Relations Board or the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.

Furthermore, the plaintiff sought systemic remedies and an investigation, which are not within the court's jurisdiction.

Consequently, the action was dismissed against all defendants.

The defendant insurer, State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of an unidentified vehicle's involvement in a motorcycle accident to trigger coverage under either the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage Endorsement or the standard O.A.P. 1 minimum limits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial on both coverage bases.

It held that physical evidence (motorcycle damage and a leg laceration) could constitute "other material evidence" under OPCF 44R, leaving its corroborative weight for a jury.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's credibility, despite some inconsistencies in statements, was not suitable for determination on a written record, thus precluding summary judgment under O.A.P. 1.

The defendant, John Hancock, brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action, arguing that a forum selection clause in the parties' agreement required the plaintiff, Infinite Media, to bring its claim in Boston, Massachusetts.

Infinite Media contended the clause mandated claims be brought in Ontario, specifically in the responding party's city or county within Ontario.

The court interpreted the clause holistically, considering the agreement's wording and factual matrix, and found that all claims were intended to be brought in Ontario, in the responding party's city or county.

The motion to dismiss or stay was dismissed.

The applicants sought a declaration that new condominium rules prohibiting transient or hotel-like use of units were invalid, arguing inconsistency with declarations allowing no minimum lease term.

The respondents contended the rules were consistent with provisions requiring units to be used as private, single-family residences.

The court found the respondents' interpretation reasonable, upholding the new rules, and granted the respondents' cross-application for compliance.

The plaintiff, Fadia Mohammad, sought summary judgment for payment of a life insurance death benefit following the death of her husband, Mahmoud Mohammad.

The defendant insurer, Manulife, denied the claim, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation by the deceased regarding his immigration status (by providing a Social Insurance Number, SIN) and his criminal past (non-disclosure) on the application form.

The court found that providing a SIN did not constitute a misrepresentation of immigration status.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no duty to disclose immigration status or criminal history because the insurer's application form did not ask questions to elicit this information, implying these facts were not material.

Even if material, the non-disclosure was not fraudulent.

The court emphasized that an insurer's failure to inquire about specific facts may indicate those facts are not material, and relying on non-disclosure in such circumstances can be contrary to the insurer's good faith duty.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the defendant's motion was dismissed.

The defendant, Alan Eugeni, a former pilot for Air Georgian Limited, brought a motion to dismiss a defamation claim under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

Air Georgian's claim stemmed from a self-published book by Eugeni, his website, and comments quoted in a Financial Post article, primarily focusing on the book.

The court found that Eugeni's expression related to a matter of public interest (aviation safety).

While Air Georgian demonstrated substantial merit to its defamation claim and Eugeni conceded he had no valid defence for the purpose of the motion, the court ultimately concluded that the harm suffered by Air Georgian was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting Eugeni's expression.

The book had limited sales (247 copies), and broader public concerns about Air Georgian's safety were already present in widely circulated media and government reports.

The court noted a significant power imbalance and indicia of a SLAPP suit, leading to the dismissal of Air Georgian's claim.

The applicants sought to transfer an application from the Mining and Lands Tribunal to the Superior Court of Justice under s. 107 of the Mining Act, arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over patented mining claims and issues of private property and civil rights.

The respondent contended the Tribunal had exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.

The court found that the Tribunal had at least concurrent jurisdiction, particularly regarding expenditures under s. 181 of the Mining Act, and that the issues fell squarely within the Tribunal's expertise.

The court dismissed the application to transfer the proceeding, emphasizing the Tribunal's specialized knowledge and efficient procedures for such matters.

The Plaintiffs, judgment creditors of 798839 Ontario Limited ("39"), brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that 39 held a valid and subsisting interest in mining claims under a 1988 option agreement with Great Lakes Nickel Limited ("GLN").

The Plaintiffs argued that 39 had acquired an 80% interest or, alternatively, a 60% interest, despite only expending approximately $1.6 million of the required $2 million.

The court, interpreting the plain wording of the option agreement, found that 39 was required to invest the full $2 million to acquire an 80% interest, failing which the option terminated and 39 acquired no interest.

The court dismissed the Plaintiffs' motion, granting summary judgment in favour of GLN on this issue, while declining to address other issues like limitations due to the partial nature of the summary judgment.

The plaintiff suffered injuries at a pub when another patron, allegedly intoxicated, fell on him.

The plaintiff sued the pub operators and the landlord, 2320152 Ontario Inc. The landlord brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was not an 'occupier' under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the landlord, operating under a 'completely carefree net lease' with limited involvement in the pub's operation, did not meet the definition of an occupier.

The action against the landlord was dismissed.

The Plaintiff sought summary judgment to enforce an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property, claiming breach and seeking specific performance.

The Defendant sought summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing no agreement was reached.

The court found that the parties never had a meeting of the minds (consensus ad idem) regarding an essential term, the "renovation clause," which was ambiguous and had different interpretations by each party.

Consequently, no valid contract was formed.

The Plaintiff's motion was dismissed, the action was dismissed, and the deposit was ordered to be returned to the Plaintiff.

The court also hypothetically addressed specific performance, finding the property unique.

The Law Society of Ontario applied under s. 49.13 of the Law Society Act for an order to disclose confidential financial records of Rasik Behari Mehta to the Ontario Securities Commission's Joint Serious Offences Team (JSOT) for an investigation into alleged frauds by David Singh.

The court considered whether the s. 49.13(2) restrictions on disclosure applied, finding that the financial records were not "oral or written statements" and were not subject to solicitor-client privilege.

Applying a three-part test from Deloitte & Touche LLP, the court balanced the public interest in disclosure against confidentiality concerns, concluding that the public interest in investigating and prosecuting serious fraud outweighed any remaining confidentiality issues.

The application was granted.

The defendant, Corus Entertainment Inc., brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff, a former employee, claimed Corus breached a retirement agreement by reducing monthly Supplementary Executive Retirement Plan (SERP) payments.

The court found that the jurisprudence regarding limitation periods for periodic payments was unsettled and fact-dependent, making it not "plain and obvious" that the plaintiff's claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The motion to strike was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicant, a unit owner, brought an application under the oppression remedy of the Condominium Act, 1998, alleging the condominium corporation acted oppressively, unfairly prejudicially, and unfairly disregarding her interests regarding a building-wide Kitec plumbing replacement project.

The applicant refused to participate in the project or allow inspection, claiming her unit had copper piping, which contradicted prior information.

The condominium corporation insisted on verifying the safety of the plumbing, eventually conducting pressure testing through its own contractors after the applicant failed to provide satisfactory documentation or access.

The court dismissed the application, finding the corporation acted reasonably to ensure property safety and did not breach the applicant's reasonable expectations.

The defendants appealed a Master's order that granted the plaintiff leave to file additional evidence and conduct further examinations under Rule 39.02(2) and 39.03, pending the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved claims against a deceased's estate, requiring corroborating evidence under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The Master found that the need for corroboration became apparent after cross-examinations and applied a contextual approach, limiting the additional evidence and allowing the defendants to respond.

The Superior Court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of the test under *First Capital Realty Inc. v. Centrecorp Management Services Ltd*.

The court emphasized deference to the Master's expertise in discovery matters and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the plaintiff.