Scott N. Latimer

This decision provides supplementary reasons for dismissing a s. 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in a sexual assault case.

The court analyzed three periods of delay, attributing some to defence and characterizing significant portions as institutional delay due to persistent physical and technological failures at the Burlington courthouse (HVAC failure, malfunctioning CCTV equipment).

Despite these systemic issues, the total delay of 16 months, 2 weeks, fell below the 18-month Jordan presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, and the defence's decision not to utilize an earlier trial date contributed to the overall timeline.

The Regional Municipality of Halton appealed a lower court decision that found a restaurant owner not guilty of violating the Health Protection and Promotion Act for improper food temperature.

The central issue was whether the offence was one of strict or absolute liability, and if the due diligence defence was correctly applied.

The court affirmed the lower court's finding that the offence was one of strict liability, not absolute liability, and upheld the finding that the restaurant owner had exercised due diligence in addressing the refrigerator malfunction.

The appeal was dismissed.

S.B. pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, involving over 40,000 images and 600 videos.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less one day incarceration.

The court considered the severity of the offence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for child sexual abuse offences.

However, the court also gave significant weight to a Gladue report detailing the offender's background, including intergenerational trauma from his father's abuse in a provincially run school and the offender's own childhood abuse and neglect.

The judge found "exceptional circumstances" due to the offender's reduced moral blameworthiness and demonstrated rehabilitative efforts, including Indigenous-centered counselling and adult education.

Consequently, the court imposed a two-year less one-day conditional sentence, emphasizing the importance of supporting rehabilitation and avoiding the risk of undermining progress through incarceration.

During a criminal trial for an Over 80 charge, the Crown sought to admit an utterance made by the accused.

The court conducted a blended trial/voluntariness/Charter application.

Justice Latimer ruled that the Crown failed to prove the utterance voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to a deficient and largely inaudible audio recording of the interaction between the police officer and the accused in the breath room.

The court emphasized the Crown's burden to establish a sufficient record for voluntariness.

As a result of this ruling, the Crown advised they could not otherwise prove the charge, leading to its dismissal.

This ruling concerns a Crown application under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for the complainant in a sexual assault trial to provide evidence via closed-circuit TV (CCTV).

The complainant, SS, an 18-year-old, expressed fear of testifying in the courtroom with the accused (M.Z.) due to anxiety and past anxiety attacks, believing it would inhibit her ability to provide a full and candid account.

The court found that credible hearsay evidence from a VWAP caseworker was admissible for this procedural motion.

Applying the "facilitate" standard, which is less stringent than "necessary," and considering factors like the nature of the offence (sexual assault), the relationship between the witness and accused (position of trust), and society's interest in encouraging reporting, the court granted the application for CCTV testimony.

Jared Gould pleaded guilty to three counts of child luring and one count of inviting a person under 16 to touch themselves sexually.

The court addressed a constitutional challenge to the one-year mandatory minimum sentence for luring, finding it inoperative based on recent Superior Court decisions.

The Crown sought an 18-month jail sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences, particularly in light of R. v. Friesen and R. v. Rafiq, determined that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the repetitive nature of the conduct, the number of victims, and the fact that the offences occurred while the offender was on probation for a related sexual offence.

An 18-month jail sentence was imposed, along with a two-year probation order and various prohibitions.

This decision addresses a s. 11(b) Charter application to stay impaired driving charges due to unreasonable delay.

The court found 566 days (18.6 months) of net delay, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials established in R. v. Jordan.

The delay was attributed to issues with primary disclosure (cells video) and systemic court unavailability, including the closure of a courthouse due to structural issues, which was deemed not an exceptional circumstance.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the accused's refusal to waive his right to an in-person trial constituted defence delay, finding that a remote trial was not functionally feasible.

Consequently, the charges were stayed.

The appellant, Andrew McNally, appealed his conviction for driving with a handheld communication device under the Highway Traffic Act.

He argued the trial Justice of the Peace misapplied the burden of proof or reached an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to adequately address the exemption under s. 14(1) of Regulation 366/09, which places the burden on the defendant to prove the exemption on a balance of probabilities.

As the trial judge's reasons did not clearly indicate whether this exemption was considered or how the conflicting evidence regarding the purpose of touching the device (GPS vs. answering a call) was weighed, the finding of guilt could not be upheld.

A new trial was ordered.

Victoria Saunders appealed three speeding tickets, arguing her decision to pay the fines was uninformed because she was unaware of the associated demerit points, which led to her driver's license suspension.

The court considered whether her waiver of Charter rights was fully informed.

It found that information about demerit points was reasonably available to her through the tickets and court website.

The court also held that demerit points are administrative sanctions, not part of the judicial sentence, and thus not information required for a valid waiver of Charter rights when pleading guilty to a regulatory offence.

Her appeals were dismissed.

This ruling addresses a constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme for introducing defence-held records in criminal trials, specifically under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, a young person charged with sexual assault, argued that the definition of "record" was overly broad and that the disclosure and complainant participation requirements violated their ss. 7 and 11(d) Charter rights.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, determining that electronic communications between the accused and complainant (unless containing s. 276(1) content) and material already disclosed by the Crown with complainant consent are not "records" for s. 278.92 purposes.

The court also clarified that the complainant's participatory rights at s. 278.94 hearings are limited to making submissions, without cross-examination or adducing evidence.

This criminal case involved a motion to exclude evidence obtained by police during an impaired driving investigation.

The accused was investigated on his private driveway without a warrant.

The court examined whether the police had lawful authority for the detention, specifically considering if a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed, as the statutory authority under the Highway Traffic Act for random sobriety checks does not extend to private property.

Applying the Debot factors for assessing tip reliability (compelling, credible, corroborated) and the Chehil standard for reasonable suspicion, the court found the unsourced and uncorroborated tip insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.

Consequently, a Charter violation occurred, and the breath samples and observations made on private property were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, consistent with the principles in R. v. McColman.

C.P. pleaded guilty to criminal harassment, extortion, and distributing an intimate image without consent, stemming from a scheme to sexually harass and extort a 17-year-old girl.

The offender threatened to release intimate images, then distributed one, and later made further demands with threats including the victim's home address.

The Crown sought a jail sentence of 15-18 months, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized the principles of general deterrence and denunciation due to the grave and sustained nature of the offences, despite the offender being a first-time youthful offender with rehabilitative potential.

A total sentence of twelve months in jail was imposed, with concurrent sentences for the other counts, along with probation and a weapons prohibition.

The Crown brought an omnibus application in an in-person criminal trial seeking orders to permit two civilian witnesses to testify remotely under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code and for the prosecutor to participate remotely under section 715.25(2) of the Code.

The court granted the applications, finding that the Crown had met its onus, considering the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the witnesses' health and fear of the accused, and the capacity for remote testimony to ensure a fair and efficient proceeding.

The applicant sought a reference hearing under section 74 of the Firearms Act regarding the legislative reclassification of his rifle as a prohibited firearm.

The court addressed the preliminary jurisdictional question, determining whether a provincial court has the authority to review a statutory change impacting a class of individuals, as opposed to an individualized decision by a public official.

The application was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, as the court held that its powers under section 74 are limited to reviewing specific discretionary decisions by public officials, not legislative decisions made by Parliament.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, possession of marijuana, and failing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired driving based on observations of slurred speech, glassy red-rimmed eyes, odour of alcohol, and the circumstances of a vehicle collision.

The Charter application was dismissed.

At trial, the accused was acquitted of failing to provide a breath sample because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure was intentional.

The court found sufficient doubt regarding the accused's mens rea, particularly given his offers to provide alternative forms of testing.

The accused was convicted of possession of marijuana and acquitted of impaired driving.

The offender pleaded guilty to 11 Criminal Code offences involving the sexual abuse of children and the creation and possession of child pornography.

The offences included four counts of making child pornography, four counts of making child pornography available, two counts of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of sexual interference.

The offender abused five identifiable children, including his own biological daughter and his girlfriend's daughters, all under the age of 10.

He also possessed 1,868 images and 95 videos of child pornography across multiple devices, with many depicting severe abuse of very young children.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9 years and 3 months, with ancillary orders including DNA collection, lifetime SOIRA registration, lifetime weapons prohibition, and a 20-year Section 161 order.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery with a disguise arising from a February 18, 2018 incident at a Petro Canada gas bar.

The accused, in his mid-40s with an extensive criminal history dominated by penitentiary time, entered the gas bar with his hood up and a knife, demanding cash from the clerk.

After obtaining the money, the accused was seen by the clerk who photographed the vehicle.

The accused threatened to kill the clerk.

The accused was arrested that evening, cooperated with police, and demonstrated remorse.

The court imposed a sentence of five years and six months, comprising 48 months for robbery plus 6 months consecutive for the disguise, with 195 days of pretrial custody credited at 1.5 times.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court statements made by a four-year-old child alleging child abuse.

The statements were hearsay and presumptively inadmissible.

The defence challenged whether threshold reliability had been established, arguing the statements were inconsistent, lacked a promise to tell the truth, and had never been subject to cross-examination.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and found the statements substantively reliable based on the circumstances in which they were made, the open-ended questioning, the identity of the recipients as trusted individuals, the temporal proximity to the alleged assault, and corroborating physical evidence.

The court admitted all of the child's utterances, including inconsistent statements, for trial.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual interference involving a 12-year-old daughter and her similarly aged friend.

The Crown sought 3 to 3.5 years in penitentiary; the defence sought 15 months in a reformatory.

The court imposed a total sentence of 27 months jail (24 months for the daughter, 3 months consecutive for the friend), finding that denunciation, general deterrence, and separation from society must take precedence over rehabilitation in child sexual abuse cases.

The sentence reflects the serious breach of trust, the nature of the sexual conduct, and the early guilty plea.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was stopped for a traffic violation, subjected to an approved screening device test, arrested for driving over 80, and provided breath samples.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the breath demand based on a faint odour of alcohol from the vehicle, the applicant's admission of earlier drinking, and confirmation of the odour from the applicant's mouth.

The court further found that the officer complied with the informational component of section 10(b) by reading the pre-printed rights, and that the applicant did not exercise his right to counsel until requesting duty counsel at the police station, at which point the police properly implemented that request.

The Charter application was dismissed.