Scott Latimer

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the combined operation of subsections 172.1(3) and 172.1(4).

Subsection (3) creates a presumption that a representation of being underage constitutes proof of the accused's belief in that age, rebuttable only by evidence to the contrary.

Subsection (4) provides that honest belief in legal age is not a defence unless the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the person's age.

The applicant argued these provisions violated section 7 (fundamental justice) and section 11(d) (presumption of innocence) of the Charter.

The court found the presumption in subsection (3) unconstitutional as applied in concert with subsection (4), as it could compel conviction despite reasonable doubt about the accused's belief.

The accused was charged under s. 243 of the Criminal Code with disposing of the dead body of a child with intent to conceal its delivery.

The remains of a 36-week fetus were found in a bag on a balcony.

The forensic pathologist could not exclude the possibility that the fetus died in utero due to a self-induced abortion.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of s. 243 in a previous appeal of this case, the court found that the Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child was likely to have been born alive, as the law does not apply to miscarriages or abortions.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant sought judicial interim release while charged with accessory after the fact to murder.

The Crown conceded that detention was not justified on the primary or secondary grounds but argued for detention on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court assessed the strength of the Crown’s case, the gravity of the offence, the circumstances of the alleged conduct, and the potential sentence.

While the underlying murder was serious, the applicant’s alleged role was limited and he eventually assisted police in locating the body.

Considering the proposed release plan with multiple sureties and the lengthy pre-trial custody already served, the court held that detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence and ordered release with strict conditions.

The accused was charged with robbery, using an imitation firearm during the robbery, and possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown relied primarily on the testimony of an accomplice who had already pleaded guilty in youth court.

The trial judge found significant inconsistencies between the accomplice’s testimony and that of the complainant, as well as concerns regarding identification evidence and the absence of stolen items in the accused’s residence.

These credibility and evidentiary deficiencies raised reasonable doubt as to the accused’s participation in the alleged robbery and firearm offence.

However, expert evidence and the circumstances of seizure established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed cannabis packaged for trafficking.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle after driving while exhausted, striking a median, and running red lights.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, failed to explain conflicting evidence, and improperly relied on a police statement not in evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusory findings and failure to explain the mens rea analysis precluded effective appellate review.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting police investigative narrative evidence and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on his alibi, infringing his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal held that the investigative narrative evidence was properly admitted in reply because the defence had attacked the integrity of the police investigation.

The Court also found that while some of the Crown's cross-examination and jury address regarding the appellant's right to silence and false alibi were problematic, the trial judge's instructions adequately protected the appellant's fair trial rights.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man, was convicted of manslaughter by a jury in the District of Kenora.

He appealed his conviction on the basis that the jury roll from which his petit jury was selected was unrepresentative, as it systematically under-represented Aboriginal on-reserve residents.

The Court of Appeal found that the state failed to make reasonable efforts to address known, long-standing problems with the delivery and return rates of jury questionnaires on reserves.

This failure violated the appellant's rights under sections 11(d) and 11(f) of the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence that the complainant had previously made and recanted two other allegations of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not engage s. 276 of the Criminal Code as it did not involve sexual activity.

The court found the evidence was relevant to the complainant's credibility and was not barred by the collateral fact rule, as the recantations were allegedly made in the same conversation where the complainant reported the assault by the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the photo lineup identification should have been given no weight because the complainant was shown a grainy video of the scene months prior, and the lineup only contained six photos.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to these considerations and carefully weighed the relevant factors in concluding the case was made out beyond a reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first degree murder and kidnapping, arguing that the Crown and police engaged in improper jury vetting.

The Crown had requested police to conduct extensive background checks on prospective jurors, including traffic violations and police contacts, and to provide comments on their suitability.

This information was used by the Crown in exercising peremptory challenges but was not disclosed to the defence.

The Court of Appeal found that the extent of the jury vetting, the violation of privacy legislation and Crown policy, and the failure to disclose the information disrupted the balance in the jury selection process.

This created an appearance of unfairness amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing a man in his garage.

At trial, the appellant argued self-defence, claiming the deceased was a loan shark who had threatened him.

The trial judge instructed the jury that while there is no obligation to retreat from one's own property, the failure to retreat is a factor to consider in assessing self-defence.

The Court of Appeal held this instruction was an error, as a person is not required to retreat from their own home in the face of an attack.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a foster parent, was convicted of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and sexual interference against his foster child.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, particularly regarding his erectile dysfunction, the complainant's inconsistent statements, the improbability of the allegations, and the rejection of his own testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings.

The appellant appealed his fraud convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by finding it irrelevant that he did not act fraudulently in 18 other cases and by noting without evidence that this was a common pattern in fraud cases.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's comment on common practice was not relied upon and was common sense.

The court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's intention in the 18 other cases did not speak to his intention in the 16 charged cases, as there was ample other evidence of mens rea.

The appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of fraud, forgery, and uttering forged documents after deceiving an elderly investor into providing a mortgage loan.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated, and appealed his 22-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the delay was not unreasonable.

However, the Court admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant had secured the outstanding restitution amount.

Based on this fresh evidence, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and reduced the sentence to 16 months' incarceration.

The appellant, who suffered from a severe mental illness, was found marginally fit to stand trial and subsequently pleaded guilty to several offences, including common nuisance.

The trial judge entered findings of guilt and later found the appellant not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) without conducting a plea inquiry.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the guilty pleas, findings of guilt, and NCRMD verdicts, holding that the trial judge's failure to conduct a plea inquiry vitiated the pleas given the appellant's mental state and lack of understanding of the consequences.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences arising from two home invasions involving the collection of drug debts, during which one victim was beaten and another was shot.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on unsavoury witnesses and flawed eyewitness identification, and lacked authority to convict him of aggravated assault on an unparticularized attempted murder charge.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider his Aboriginal status under Gladue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, amending the indictment to include the means of the assault to uphold the aggravated assault conviction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence remained fit despite the trial judge's failure to expressly apply s. 718.2(e).

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing a man in a bar.

At trial, he claimed self-defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation, admitting evidence of the victim's peaceful disposition, and making various errors in the jury charge, including the instruction on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the subjective element of provocation, as the appellant's own testimony indicated he acted out of self-preservation rather than sudden passion.

The court also found no reversible errors in the jury charge or evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal regarding the 14-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender on bail, killed a police officer while fleeing arrest in a stolen vehicle.

He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a 10-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was unfit and the sentencing judge erred in her findings of fact, admission of a video tribute, and application of sentencing principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit given the paramountcy of denunciation and deterrence in these circumstances.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in characterizing the delay caused by the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure, failed to consider inferred prejudice, and incorrectly treated a stay of proceedings as an extraordinary remedy.

The Court concluded that the 35-month delay, largely attributable to the Crown and institutional delay, was unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant, a chronic bank robber, committed nine 'note pass' bank robberies while unlawfully at large on a temporary absence pass.

He was serving the remaining nine years of a previous 12-year sentence.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14-year sentence consecutive to the remaining nine years, resulting in a global sentence of 23 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the 14-year sentence was appropriate on its own, the global sentence of 23 years violated the totality principle and was unduly long and harsh.

The sentence was varied to 11 years concurrent, to be served consecutively to the remaining nine years, resulting in a global sentence of 20 years.