Superior Court of Justice

The defendant brought a pre-trial motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for non-pecuniary general damages and healthcare expenses arising from a motor vehicle accident, on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to adduce the evidence required by s. 4.3(1) to (5) of O. Reg. 461/96 to establish the statutory threshold of permanent serious impairment.

The court found that no single medical report, nor the totality of the medical records proffered, satisfied the regulation's requirements for qualified physician evidence addressing the nature, permanence, and importance of the alleged impairment.

The motion was granted and the claims for non-pecuniary general damages and healthcare expenses were struck.

The appellants, trustees of an estate and related corporations, appealed and sought to set aside an arbitral award granting the respondent $275,000 as an oppression remedy and ordering occupation rent.

The respondent, a 94-year-old widow, had been pushed out of the family business by her late husband and the trustees.

The court dismissed the application to set aside the award, finding no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness under s. 46 of the Arbitration Act.

The court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator made no palpable and overriding error in finding oppression and that the equitable remedy awarded was entitled to significant deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of stolen property and driving while prohibited, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on video surveillance and police identification evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly conducted an independent assessment of the video evidence and did not merely adopt the police officer's opinion.

The court also admitted fresh evidence but concluded that trial counsel's strategic decision not to call the appellant to testify did not constitute ineffective assistance or cause a miscarriage of justice.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's construction lien action for delay, return its security, and alternatively for security for costs.

The court declined to dismiss the action for delay, accepting the plaintiff's explanation and commitment to proceed, and therefore refused to discharge the lien.

However, the court ordered the plaintiff to post $190,000 in security for costs due to evidence of financial instability.

Notably, the court discovered the plaintiff's counsel had used artificial intelligence to generate a factum containing fake case citations and failing to comply with Rule 4.06.1, leading the court to disregard the factum and reserve the right to impose further sanctions in costs.

The applicants sought the sale of three multi-residential properties owned as tenants in common with the respondents, and an equal division of the proceeds.

The respondents brought a cross-application seeking an unequal division of proceeds based on an alleged settlement agreement negotiated by family members.

The court granted the applications for sale and dismissed the cross-application, finding that the family members who negotiated the alleged settlement lacked ostensible authority to bind the applicants, and that no final agreement had actually been reached.

The properties were ordered to be sold with proceeds divided equally.

The applicant, who was awarded $2.39 million in damages in a civil sexual assault trial against the deceased, brought a motion for a Preservation Order to prevent the respondent Estate Trustee from depleting the estate's assets to fund an appeal of the civil judgment.

The respondent argued the estate funds were not a specific fund and that she was entitled to use them to defend the estate.

The court found the estate funds constituted a specific fund and that the respondent was in a conflict of interest as the sole beneficiary.

The court granted the Preservation Order but permitted the estate to fund the appeal up to a maximum of $25,000.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion to have the applicant declared a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent relied on the applicant's history of filing police complaints, a dismissed application to set aside a separation agreement, and a dormant Small Claims Court action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant had not persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, as the family law claims were resolved and the Small Claims action was not duplicative.

However, the court cautioned the applicant about her out-of-court conduct and declined to award her costs despite her success on the motion, noting her unreasonable behaviour in ignoring a previous costs order.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add the defendant's professional liability insurer as a defendant.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that his claim and another client's claim against the defendant constituted separate claims under the insurance policy, thereby maximizing available coverage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment was impossible of success because the coverage issue could not be determined until the underlying actions were finally decided, as previously held in a related application.

The plaintiffs moved for a status hearing to extend the time to set the action down for trial, while the defendant sought to dismiss the action for delay.

The action arose from a 2015 aircraft crash involving the plaintiff and the late defendant.

The court found that the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, citing the conduct of former defence counsel, the plaintiff's incarceration, the COVID-19 pandemic, and changes in plaintiff's counsel.

Although the defendant died during the litigation, the court held that the resulting prejudice was already present when the defendant previously consented to a timetable extending the set-down deadline.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, extended the time to set the action down, and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The applicant sought to appoint an interim succeeding estate trustee for her late father's estate.

The current estate trustee, the applicant's mother, had experienced a significant mental decline, was hospitalized under a Form 2, and had depleted trust assets while failing to meet obligations such as filing tax returns.

Relying on its parens patriae jurisdiction, the court suspended the current trustee's authority and appointed the applicant's half-sister as the interim succeeding estate trustee without requiring a bond, to protect the applicant's interests and prevent further loss to the trust.

A township sought a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from depositing fill on their property without a permit under the municipal fill by-law.

The respondents brought a counterapplication seeking a declaration that the by-law was invalid, or alternatively that they had complied with the permit requirements and a fill permit should issue.

The court found the by-law valid but held that the township acted ultra vires by requiring the applicant to verify aviation safety standards that fall within exclusive federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

The court ordered the township to forthwith issue the fill permit and dismissed the township's injunction application.

The plaintiffs hired the defendants for cottage interior finishing and landscaping, paying a $542,400 deposit specifically to pre-purchase and store armour stone.

The defendants failed to purchase the stone and concealed this fact from the plaintiffs.

Upon discovering the truth, the plaintiffs terminated the contract and sued for the return of the unearned funds.

The court found the defendants liable for fundamental breach of contract, breach of a Quistclose trust, and breach of the duty of honest performance.

The individual defendant was held personally liable for knowingly participating in the breach of trust, and the plaintiffs were awarded $474,819.97 in damages.

The plaintiffs in three related proposed class actions sought leave to proceed under the Securities Act, certification under the Class Proceedings Act for settlement purposes, and approval of a Notice of Settlement Approval Hearing.

The actions alleged misrepresentations by a cannabis company regarding its facility expansion.

The court found the certification criteria were met for settlement purposes, granted leave to proceed under the Securities Act, and approved the form and dissemination plan for the settlement notice.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment arising from the defendants' failure to close on the purchase of a residential property for $1,900,000.

The defendants admitted the breach but argued the matter was not suitable for summary judgment and that the plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, holding that the plaintiffs acted reasonably in reselling the property and in settling a downstream claim from the vendors of a second property the plaintiffs could not close on due to the defendants' breach.

Summary judgment was granted for $556,535.41, comprising the difference in sale price, carrying costs, the forfeited deposit on the second property, and the settlement amount paid to the second vendor.

A stay of enforcement pending the third-party action was denied.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to correct the misnomer of several John Doe defendants, identifying them as specific treating physicians and a wound care provider (ParaMed).

The underlying action involved allegations of medical malpractice relating to the development and failure to treat the deceased's bedsores at various care facilities.

The proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing it was an attempt to add parties after the expiry of the strict two-year limitation period under the Trustee Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the pleadings were drafted with sufficient particularity such that the 'litigation finger' pointed squarely at the proposed defendants, and that a properly informed defendant would have recognized they were the target of the allegations.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the proposed defendants.

The applicants brought an application seeking relief against Seker for fraudulently misappropriating USD $1,122,833.28 by posing as a legitimate bank and providing fraudulent account details.

The applicants also sought disclosure and payment orders against Iberbanco, the money service business through which the funds were diverted.

The court found that Seker engaged in civil fraud and ordered it to pay the misappropriated funds.

The court also ordered Iberbanco to return bank fees, pay certain funds to the applicants, pay disputed funds into court pursuant to Rule 45.02, and comply with a previous disclosure order, rejecting Iberbanco's argument that disclosure was prohibited by the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

The applicants challenged the respondent Humane Society's Board of Directors' decision to move to a closed membership model and their refusal to recognize over 100 new members who joined via an online portal.

The court found that the Board acted in bad faith by arbitrarily refusing to approve the new memberships to prevent them from voting against the new by-law.

Furthermore, the court interpreted the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, concluding that the by-law amendments affecting membership transfers, notice, and proxy voting required a two-thirds special majority, not a simple majority.

The by-law was declared void and a new members' meeting was ordered.

Following a summary judgment motion regarding a defaulted home purchase, the parties could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff had claimed $887,915 in damages but recovered only $10,000, with the claim for carrying costs proceeding to trial.

The court found that the defendants were entirely successful on the carrying costs issue and successful overall on the motion.

The court awarded the defendants their costs on a partial indemnity scale, directing them to submit a revised bill of costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and the result of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.

He alleged that his counsel forced him to sign a damaging affidavit for a s. 276 application and improperly advised him about the trial judge's potential bias.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, including text messages and counselling records.

The court concluded that the appellant failed to establish professional incompetence or a miscarriage of justice.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b), arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action in contract, negligence, or negligent misrepresentation, and that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants, operating under an unregistered business name, defectively designed and installed a geothermal energy system.

The court held that the plaintiff properly pleaded a contract based on a proposal document and that the negligence claims were viable.

The court also found it was not plain and obvious that the limitation period had expired, as the plaintiff pleaded it discovered the damage within the two-year period.

The motion was dismissed.