CITATION: AMBRIA (OTONABEE) LIMITED v. SHAW et al, 2026 ONSC 694
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE:
AMBRIA (OTONABEE) LIMITED
Plaintiff
AND:
RYAN IMRAN SHAW and TREFFINA SHAW
Defendants
BEFORE:
Parghi J.
COUNSEL:
Michael Doyle and Victoria Pileggi, for the Plaintiff
William McLennan, for the Defendants
HEARD:
February 3, 2026 (in writing)
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
1By Endorsement dated November 21, 2025, I ruled on a summary judgment motion in this matter. The parties were unable to resolve costs between them. I accordingly requested costs submissions from each of them. I have now reviewed those submissions and issue this Costs Endorsement.
2In exercising my discretion to fix costs under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, I may consider the factors enumerated in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. Those factors include the result achieved, the amounts claimed and recovered, the complexity and importance of the issues in the proceeding, the principle of indemnity, the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, and any other matter relevant to costs.
3In Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc., 2022 ONCA 587, at para. 60, the Court of Appeal for Ontario restated the general principles to be applied when courts exercise their discretion to award costs. The Court held that, when assessing costs, a court is to undertake a critical examination of the relevant factors, as applied to the costs claimed, and then “step back and consider the result produced and question whether, in all the circumstances, the result is fair and reasonable”.
4Considering the result achieved and the amounts claimed and recovered, I find that the Shaws were successful overall and are entitled to their costs. I note the following:
a) Prior to the motion, the Shaws admitted that they had defaulted on the home purchase and forfeited the $140,000 deposit as a result. Those issues were therefore not before me on the motion and I made no findings in respect of them. Ambria’s claim that the motion “result[ed]” in an “uncontested finding” that the Shaws defaulted and forfeited the deposit is therefore incorrect.
b) The first issue before me on the motion was whether the Shaws owed $674,900 in damages for loss of bargain, as Ambria asserted. I held that they did not. I found that Ambria had failed to mitigate and prove its damages, and I awarded Ambria nominal damages of $10,000, which amount was offset by the deposits. While Ambria was successful in establishing an entitlement to damages for loss of bargain, I awarded Ambria only 1.5% of the damages amount it sought. It is a stretch to call this an outright victory, as Ambria appears to do.
c) The second issue before me was whether the Shaws owed $213,014.68 in damages arising from the carrying costs, increased construction costs, remarketing costs, and “administrative fees” allegedly flowing from their default. I held that Ambria had not proved those damages and did not grant summary judgment for the amount sought. Ambria, perplexingly, claims that neither party was successful on this issue because the issue will now have to be determined at trial. That is incorrect. Ambria was entirely unsuccessful in its motion for summary judgment on the claim for carrying costs. The Shaws were entirely successful.
d) Overall, Ambria claimed $887,915 and recovered $10,000, or 1.1% of the amount it claimed. I am unable to accept Ambria’s claim that, in these circumstances, success on the motion was divided. It was not. The overall outcome of the motion was very much in the Shaws’ favour, and it is that consideration, rather than the proportion of individual issues on which each party succeeded or failed, that is to guide my decision making on costs (Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 ONCA 787, at para. 6).
5I note that the Shaws served a Rule 49 offer to settle the action on May 8, 2025. That offer would have seen them forfeit the deposit and pay more in damages to Ambria than Ambria was ultimately awarded to Ambria on this motion. However, it is difficult to gauge whether the offer will beat whatever amount Ambria ultimately recovers, given that the claim for carrying costs will be proceeding to trial. The Shaws make persuasive arguments on the likelihood of Ambria recovering enough at trial to beat their offer, but I am not in a position to weigh Ambria’s chances of success at trial. In the circumstances, I do not factor in the Rule 49 in my decision on costs.
6Finally, the fees incurred by the Shaws are in themselves reasonable and would certainly have been within the reasonable contemplation of Ambria. The defendants’ overall costs, in terms of counsel’s hourly rates and time spent, are reasonable. Their written materials and oral submissions were helpful to the court. They did not engage in any conduct that needlessly lengthened the proceedings; to the contrary, their admission that they breached the contract and that the deposits were rightly forfeited made the motion more streamlined and efficient. Additionally, the Shaws’ costs on the motion are significantly less than those of Ambria, and therefore would have been in the reasonable contemplation of Ambria.
7The Shaws seek $19,540 in costs on the motion on a substantial indemnity basis, together with disbursements of $1,276.54, inclusive of taxes. I see no basis on which to grant costs on an elevated scale. However, for the reasons outlined above, I find that it is appropriate for the Shaws to be awarded their costs on the motion on a partial indemnity scale, together with the amount sought in disbursements. That result is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.
8The Shaws’ costs submissions and accompanying Bill of Costs do not enable me to determine exactly what their partial indemnity costs on the motion are. The Shaws are instructed to provide a revised Bill of Costs that provides a breakdown of those costs, after which a further brief costs endorsement will be issued.
______________________________ Parghi J.
Date: February 4, 2026