Farren v. Walters et al., 2026 ONSC 692

Court File and Parties

CITATION: Farren v. Walters et al., 2026 ONSC 692

Court File No.: CV-25-00750143-00ES Date: 20260204 Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Jessica June Elizabeth Farren And: Uleta Angella Walters, et al.

Before: J.T. Akbarali J.

Counsel: Laura Cardiff, for the applicant Taya Mikado, for the Non-Party Tameka Stewart-Walters No one appearing for the respondents

Heard: February 4, 2026

Endorsement

Overview

1On this application, I am asked to make an order appointing an interim succeeding estate trustee with a will.

Background

2The deceased, Michael James Farren, died on January 30, 2019, with a will. He was survived by his daughter, the applicant Jennifer Farren, and his common law spouse, Uleta Angella Walters, who is Jennifer Farren’s mother.

3The named executor declined to act. The alternate executor obtained a certificate of estate trustee with a will on November 12, 2019.

4Mr. Farren’s estate had a value of approximately $618,000 on his death. Under its terms, gifts were made to certain charities, and the residue of the estate was placed into a trust for the applicant. The will names the estate trustee as the trustee of the testamentary trust.

5Under the terms of the testamentary trust, the applicant is entitled to certain monthly amounts (which, until she turned 21 were to be paid to her mother, Ms. Walters), and at certain points prior to her 35th birthday, certain portions of the capital are to be paid out to her. The trustee also has the discretion to encroach on capital for the applicant’s support, maintenance, education and advancement in life.

6I note in passing that the will contemplated another trust for the applicant’s benefit, with the same terms, in respect of an insurance policy benefit, but the benefit was only $2,000 and the trust was never settled; rather, the $2000 was paid out to the applicant.

7Ms. Walters brought a claim for dependent’s relief and negotiated a settlement. Thereafter, the estate trustee was subsequently discharged and the respondent, Ms. Walters, was appointed to act in his place, as succeeding estate trustee and therefore, as succeeding trustee of the testamentary trust.

8The applicant deposes that recently, Ms. Walters has experienced a mental decline. Ms. Walters has experienced psychosis in the past related to schizophrenia, for which she requires regular medication. According to the applicant, Ms. Walters has stopped taking her medication. She has withdrawn from social and career activities and is exhibiting erratic and paranoid behaviour. She stopped pursuing a nursing program, stopped going to church, and stopped interacting with her family, with whom she has historically been very close.

9The applicant deposes that Ms. Walters has added padlocks to the doors in the house. She has begun shredding paperwork because she is concerned about people stealing her information. She makes paper mâché out of the shredded paper.

10The applicant also deposes that Ms. Walters has left her job and appears to have little to no source of income. At the same time, she is spending lavishly. She has also stopped paying many of her bills.

11Ms. Walters has been taking estate funds which she previously used to fund the applicant’s car insurance. She stopped making the insurance payments; the applicant is now paying the premiums on her own. Although the estate funds are not being used for the applicant’s insurance any longer, Ms. Walters has continued to remove the funds monthly.

12Ms. Walters is also failing to meet other obligations as estate trustee, such as filing tax returns for the estate.

13Ms. Walters has borrowed funds from the estate, although it appears that she has not honoured the repayment agreements she reached with the applicant and has likely not kept proper records of the repayments that have been made.

14When Ms. Walters took over as succeeding estate trustee in November 2021, there was approximately $443,407.98 in the estate accounts. Now there is only $244,763.00 remaining, which is a significant depletion of the assets considering the terms of the trust. There is no evidence in the record of material capital encroachments for the applicant’s benefit.

15In April 2025, the applicant and her siblings were able to obtain a Form 2 for Ms. Walters. She was released from hospital after 72 hours.

16On February 1, 2026, Ms. Walters was again taken to hospital under a Form 2, where, as of the time of the hearing of this motion, she remains. The applicant deposes that staff at the hospital have indicated they hope to keep Ms. Walters in hospital and have her become compliant with treatment. The goal is to return her home when she is capable of managing her own treatment.

17I am advised that, as part of the hospital admissions process, Ms. Walters’s capacity to manage property may be assessed. If she is found to be incapable, a certificate of incapacity will be issued.

18In the meantime, the trust and the estate are at risk.

19On this application, the applicant originally sought to have her half-sister, Tameka Stewart-Walters act as succeeding estate trustee, and therefore succeeding trustee of the trust. Ms. Stewart-Walters has consented to do so. Ms. Stewart-Walters has had independent legal advice. She is in her late 30s, holds a managerial job in a retail environment and is attending university. She has a history of assisting the applicant and understands her financial needs and situation. The applicant consents to her acting as succeeding estate trustee without the necessity of posting a bond.

20After Ms. Walters was served with the application, she consented to being removed as succeeding estate trustee, and as succeeding trustee of the trust. Her consent is in the record.

21However, given Ms. Walters’s recent hospitalization, the applicant no longer seeks a final judgment at this juncture. As she fairly notes, Ms. Walters is unable to appear, her capacity is in question, and her interests are not represented. The validity of her consent to the order is also in question given M. Walters’ current status.

22The applicant seeks to have Ms. Stewart-Walters appointed as an interim succeeding estate trustee, and therefore as interim succeeding trustee to ensure that there is no gap in the administration of the trust. The applicant requires regular payments from the trust to meet her living expenses. In addition, a gap in the administration of the trust risks loss to the trust as a result of the ongoing accrual of penalties and interest due to the late filing penalties in respect of the unfiled tax returns.

Analysis

23In my view, I have the authority to make the order the applicant seeks arising out of the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction. That jurisdiction was summarized by Sanfilippo J. in Patton v. Mindle et al, (June 21, 2023), Toronto, CV-23-00698587 (S.C.J.) as follows:

In N. v. F., 2021 ONCA 614, at para. 96, the Court of Appeal explained that the parens patriae jurisdiction is “founded on necessity, namely the need to act for the protection of those who cannot care of themselves.” In E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, 1986 36 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388, at paras. 74-75, the Supreme Court stated that the “categories under which the [parens patriae] jurisdiction can be exercised are never closed”, that the jurisdiction is broad, and can be invoked where “a necessity arises to protect a person who cannot protect himself.”

24In Patton, Sanfilippo J. dealt with a situation where an estate trustee died after having consented to her replacement as estate trustee. The deceased estate trustee’s estate had not been properly constituted when the motion to appoint a succeeding estate trustee was returned. In the result, Sanfilippo J. appointed the intended succeeding estate trustee on an interim basis, relying on r. 10.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. However, he noted that had r. 10.02 not been available, he would have relied on the court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to do so because it would have been necessary to appoint an interim succeeding trustee to protect the health of the beneficiary of the trust who otherwise would not have the financial ability to protect himself.

25Here, I am satisfied that the appointment of an interim succeeding estate trustee is necessary to protect the applicant’s interest, which she cannot protect herself. She requires the regular payments to which she is entitled under the trust to meet her living expenses. Her personal security and shelter are at risk if the trust goes unadministered.

26Moreover, the risk of loss to the trust due to the penalties and interest accruing as a result of unfiled tax returns can only be avoided or mitigated if the trust can be administered. Failing to appoint an interim succeeding estate trustee would risk defeating the intentions of the testator, who is not able to act to ensure that the measures he put in place for the support of his child in the event of his death are safeguarded.

27Given the apparent current state of Ms. Walters’ health, I am not prepared to remove her as succeeding estate trustee and succeeding trustee at this stage; she ought to be entitled to participate in that process, either directly or through a litigation guardian, once there is clarity around her status. However, invoking my parens patriae jurisdiction, I will suspend her authority to act in her capacity as succeeding estate trustee pending the return of this application.

28I am satisfied that Ms. Stewart-Walters is an appropriate interim succeeding estate trustee. She is in a close relationship with the applicant; she is able and willing to act; she is a responsible adult; she is familiar with the applicant’s needs and financial circumstances; and the applicant consents to her acting as interim succeeding estate trustee. The applicant also consents to Ms. Stewart-Walters acting without posting a bond. The applicant is an adult who has already experienced loss of trust funds meant for her benefit at the hands of a loved one. The applicant’s interests are the only ones at stake. Given her consent to dispensing with a bond (which would further deplete the assets of the trust), I am prepared to dispense with the requirement that security be posted.

Service

29I note that this application has been served on the contingent beneficiaries (all charities) named in the deceased’s will, except for one, which no longer exists. The applicant thus seeks an order dispensing with service on the charity that has ceased to exist. That order is granted.

Costs

30Finally, the applicant and Ms. Stewart-Walters seek their costs to date of this application from the estate. It is correct that neither should be out of pocket for their costs associated with this application, and neither wishes to seek their costs from Ms. Walters. I am prepared to grant the costs sought.

31Order to go in accordance with the draft I have signed.

32The parties shall return this matter for a final hearing at an appropriate time, once Ms. Walters’ status is clarified.

J.T. Akbarali J.