Superior Court of Justice

The plaintiff and defendant each brought motions to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from examinations for discovery in a construction contract dispute.

The court ordered the defendant to provide particulars of its damages claim, finding its previous answers insufficient.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding the plaintiff had either answered the undertakings or made best efforts to locate the requested documents.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant father sought a stay pending appeal of retroactive child support and costs orders, reinstatement of his suspended driver's licence, and a refraining order against further federal enforcement measures.

The court held that the appeal met the low serious-issue threshold in relation to the application of retroactive support principles and the departure from the presumptive three-year period, but the interests of justice did not favour a stay because the balance of convenience, clean hands, and delay all weighed against the moving party.

Relief under the support-enforcement scheme was also denied because the moving party had not satisfied the statutory conditions for driver's licence reinstatement or for preventing a federal licence denial application.

The court nonetheless directed that monies paid to the Director in excess of the prior unstayed costs order and any costs ordered on the motion be held pending disposition of the appeal.

In an uncontested family law trial, the applicant mother sought sole decision-making responsibility, primary residence, child support, and section 7 expenses.

The respondent father failed to file an answer or financial statement and did not appear.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence, finding it in the children's best interests given the father's inconsistent involvement.

The court imputed an annual income of $35,000 to the father due to his failure to disclose financial information and intentional under-employment, ordering him to pay $532 per month in child support and $423 per month for section 7 expenses.

The mother was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $8,913.44.

The moving party sought declarations and procedural orders requiring the applicant's constructive trust claims concerning real property to proceed as separate civil claims rather than within the Family Court proceeding.

The court held that the forum issue had already been determined in an earlier endorsement and could not be relitigated, invoking principles against duplicity and res judicata.

The court also relied on s. 21.8(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, which requires matters within Family Court jurisdiction to be commenced, heard, and determined there.

The requested relief was denied, with costs submissions to follow.

During a trial for second degree murder, the Crown brought a motion to question its own witness in chief about an affidavit she filed in an unrelated criminal matter, in which she recanted allegations against her son-in-law.

The Crown sought to preemptively address an anticipated attack on the witness's credibility.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the collateral fact rule did not prohibit the questioning, the evidence was more prejudicial than probative as it was unrelated to the facts in dispute and would unduly distract the jury.

This was a costs endorsement following the plaintiff's complete success in resisting a motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court held the respondent plaintiff was entitled to costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting the action had been trial ready since 2019 and subsequent delay was not attributable to the plaintiff.

After reviewing the parties' bills of costs, hourly rates, and time dockets, and treating the matter as one of average complexity requiring considerable care and organization, the court fixed costs at $18,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court also remarked that the motion's costs could have been avoided had the matter proceeded to trial.

The accused stood trial on a charge of sexual interference alleged against his young daughter, arising from incidents said to have occurred in a bedroom, a bathroom, and a car.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court disbelieved the accused's evidence and found that it did not raise a reasonable doubt, while assessing the child complainant's evidence in accordance with the principles governing the testimony of children.

Material inconsistencies in the complainant's account of the car incident, together with the accused's evidence on that issue, left the court with a reasonable doubt as to that allegation.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the bedroom and bathroom incidents credible and reliable, treating her incremental disclosure as consistent with the recognized dynamics of child sexual abuse rather than embellishment.

The court was satisfied that the Crown proved the essential elements of sexual interference beyond a reasonable doubt in respect of those two incidents.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicant, a figure skating coach, sought leave to appeal an arbitration decision that found the Universal Code of Conduct to Prevent and Address Maltreatment in Sport (UCCMS) applied retroactively to his historical conduct from 2005.

The arbitrator had determined that the UCCMS was designed to protect the sporting public rather than punish past behaviour, thus falling under the protection of the public exception to the presumption against retroactivity.

The Superior Court of Justice granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the arbitrator's application of the exception or his interpretation of the contractual consent signed by the applicant.

The maternal grandparents brought a motion to be added as parties to a family law proceeding to seek a contact order with their grandchildren.

The applicant father opposed the motion, while the respondent mother consented.

The court reviewed the test for adding parties under Rule 7 of the Family Law Rules and concluded that the grandparents should be added as parties solely for the purpose of pursuing their claim for a contact order, but not to participate generally in the parents' broader parenting dispute.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm and a prohibited device.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's youth, lack of adult record, the impact of anti-Black racism, his successful music career, and his role as a father.

The court also noted he had spent 33 months on strict house arrest bail.

Finding these to be exceptional circumstances that significantly reduced his moral blameworthiness, the court imposed a conditional sentence of 23 months and 21 days, followed by two years of probation.

The offender was convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and break and enter after fleeing police and hiding a defaced handgun with an overcapacity magazine on an elderly woman's balcony.

The court weighed the offender's serious youth record, which included a conviction for first-degree murder, against mitigating factors including his difficult background as a racialized offender under the Morris framework.

A global sentence of 7 years was imposed, reduced by 900 days of Summers credit and 500 days of Duncan/Marshall credit for exceptionally harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, leaving 3 years, 1 month, and 29 days to serve.

The applicant mother sought orders for primary residence, parenting time discretion, imputed income, retroactive and ongoing child support, and a no-contact order following the parties' separation.

The respondent father failed to attend the trial.

The court granted the applicant primary residence and discretion over parenting time, subject to conditions, due to the respondent's inconsistent exercise of parenting time and failure to communicate.

Income of $171,701 was imputed to the respondent due to his failure to provide financial disclosure regarding his incorporated business.

The court ordered retroactive and ongoing child support based on the imputed income, enforced section 7 arrears, and granted a no-contact order under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicants sought adverse possession of a 16-acre parcel lying within adjoining owners' registered boundaries, relying on a fence line, historical cattle pasturing, and seasonal hunting use between 1955 and 1965.

Applying the adverse possession framework under s. 5(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act, the court found open, notorious, and continuous use during the relevant ten-year period, but held the claim failed because the applicants did not prove the use was adverse to the title holder or establish a shared mutual mistake about the boundary.

The court also rejected the submission that a payment under the respondents' title insurance policy affected the merits of the possessory title analysis.

The application was dismissed, the cross-application was granted, the respondents were declared to hold absolute title without restriction, and the applicants were ordered to remove their chattels from the disputed lands at their own cost.

The applicant, an adult under disability, sought approval of a $7,000 all-inclusive settlement for Statutory Accident Benefits arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court approved the settlement as reasonable given the minor nature of the injuries.

However, the court found the proposed 30% contingency fee excessive for an accident benefits claim and reduced the legal fees to $1,150.

The court also exercised its discretion to order the net recovery paid directly to the applicant's mother and litigation guardian, rather than into court, to avoid further depleting the small settlement.

The plaintiffs, a congregation that broke away from the British Methodist Episcopal Church ("BMEC") and a new incorporated church, brought a motion seeking an order conveying title to a historic 1866 church property — established by freed slaves who arrived via the Underground Railroad — to the trustees of the new church.

They also sought to add the Director of Titles as a party on the basis that the BMEC had filed a fraudulent Application to Change Name on the land titles register, and argued the BMEC's proprietary claim was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court dismissed the motion to convey title, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish by evidence or legal principle that they were the present-day successors of the original Bethel Congregation trustees, and that the BMEC Act, 1913 conclusively vested the property in the BMEC.

The court further held that a vesting order application is not an action to "recover" land within the meaning of the Real Property Limitations Act, and that the BMEC's unregistered statutory interest was not extinguished.

The Application to Change Name was found not to be a fraudulent instrument but was ordered deleted from the register as made in error through an incorrect process.

The moving parties, defendants in the action, brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' counsel, Stikeman Elliott LLP, alleging the firm obtained access to their privileged communications with their former lawyers.

The privileged documents were produced in a related arbitration after the arbitral tribunal found a deemed waiver of privilege by another defendant.

The court found that the moving parties held a joint privilege over the documents, which could not be unilaterally waived.

Applying the three-stage test from Celanese, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' counsel obtained access to the privileged documents, failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and that disqualification of counsel was the only appropriate remedy to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The offender pleaded guilty to facilitating terrorist activity, instructing terrorist activity, and promoting hatred.

Over a decade, he was a leader in a neo-Nazi militant accelerationist group, creating propaganda videos and manifestos that incited violence against identifiable groups and inspired several real-world attacks.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the gravity of terrorism offences designed to result in indiscriminate killing.

The offender was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, less 48 months of pre-sentence credit.

The court declined to order delayed parole eligibility, finding the offender's prospects for rehabilitation in the penitentiary system warranted standard parole rules.

The applicant father sought the return of a young child to California under the Hague Convention after the respondent mother remained in Ontario and disobeyed multiple California custody and access orders.

The court held that California had primary jurisdiction, the father never acquiesced to permanent relocation, and proceedings had been commenced within the Article 12 period through the earlier California petition.

The respondent failed to prove a pending refugee claim despite court-ordered disclosure, leading to an adverse inference that any such claim had been abandoned or failed.

The court rejected grave-risk allegations as not credible or reliable and found California fully capable of protecting the child and the respondent if necessary.

The child was ordered returned immediately to California and Ontario was declared to lack jurisdiction over custody and parenting issues.

The applicant mother brought a motion for updated child support, section 7 expenses, and a restraining order against the respondent father.

The court found that the father's income had significantly increased and ordered child support based on his 2024 income of $95,591.

The court also granted a temporary restraining order, finding a pattern of ongoing domestic violence, harassment, and disregard for court orders, including recent criminal convictions for failing to comply with probation.

The deceased designated one of her two sons as the sole beneficiary of two segregated fund policies.

Following her intestate death, the other son claimed entitlement to half the proceeds, arguing the designated beneficiary promised to share them and held them on a resulting trust for the estate.

The court found insufficient corroborated evidence of a binding promise to share the proceeds.

Applying Mak (Estate) v. Mak, the court held that the presumption of resulting trust does not apply to beneficiary designations under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The proceeds were ordered paid out of court to the designated beneficiary.