Staniszewski v. McCartney, 2026 ONSC 1658

CITATION: Staniszewski v. McCartney, 2026 ONSC 1658

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00035299-0000

DATE: 20260327

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MARTA STANISZEWSKI

Applicant

– and –

DAVID MCCARTNEY

Respondent

In person

HEARD: September 22, 23,24 and 25, 2025

Reasons for judgment

1. P. RAMSAY, J.

Overview... 2

Respondent’s failure to attend at the trial.. 3

Issues to be determined. 4

Parenting Order 4

The child’s primary residence should remain with the applicant 4

Should the applicant have discretion regarding the respondent’s parenting time?. 5

Section 24(3)(a) - Child’s needs, age, and stage of development 8

Section 24(3)(b) - Nature and strength of relationship. 8

Section 24(3)(c) of the CLRA – Willingness to support relationship, etc. 9

Section 24(3)(d) - History of care of the child. 10

Section 24(3)(e) -Child’s views and preferences. 11

Section 24(3)(g) -Plans for the child’s care. 12

Section 24(3)(h) -Ability and willingness of parties to care for and meet the needs of the child. 12

Section 24(3)(i)- Ability and willingness of parties to communicate and cooperate. 13

Section 24(3)(j) - Family violence. 14

Conclusion re: parenting. 14

Imputation of income. 15

Retroactive child support 19

Life insurance -security for support 20

Section 7. 21

Non-disparaging order.. 21

Non-Molestation Order.. 22

Miscellaneous issue raised by applicant.. 22

Disposition.. 22

Costs. 25

Overview

The trial in this family law proceeding took place in the absence of the respondent father, who declined to participate, though he had notice of the trial.

The applicant commenced an application on March 30, 2023, for various relief under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 and Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 including support for herself and the parties’ child, decision-making responsibility, a restraining/non-harassment order and guardianship over the child’s property.

The parties were never married. They started cohabiting on March 1, 2016, and separated on November 5, 2021. After separation, they continued to reside under the same roof until April 1, 2022. They have one child, a son, L.M, age 9, born [xxx].

In her opening, the applicant stated that the case was about decision-making responsibility and parenting time for the parties’ son. She indicated that she was seeking sole decision-making responsibility and restricted communication through the AppClose App. In my view, the issue of decision making has been finally resolved between the parties. However, the question of the manner of communication between the parties may be dealt with incidental to the parenting order.

The applicant mother asserts that the respondent refuses to take responsibility for their son, refuses to exercise his parenting time, and refuses to pay the appropriate child support and section 7 expenses.

Various orders have been made on a temporary basis for child support, parenting time for the respondent and decision-making responsibility. In the weeks leading up to the trial, the parties resolved on a final basis, the question of decision-making responsibility for L.M., and control and possession of his important documents. Pursuant to the endorsement of Diamond J. dated September 10, 2025, following a trial management conference, the parties have already agreed that the applicant would have sole decision-making responsibility over their son’s welfare including, health, education, health care, culture, religion and extra-curricular activities and be in charge of holding, maintaining and renewing all of their son’s important documents.

During the trial and in her closing submissions, the applicant asserted that the issues to be determined were their son’s primary residence, the applicant’s discretion over parenting time, imputing income to the respondent, retroactive and ongoing child support, the respondent’s contribution to their son’s section 7 expenses, and a non-molestation order. The applicant further submitted that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the respondent because of his lack of financial disclosure. In her Closing Submissions, the applicant requested security for the child support payments.

Respondent’s failure to attend at the trial

The respondent father did not participate at the trial. He was aware of the trial date having participated at the Trial Management Conference weeks earlier. The trial date was set by Justice Kraft on February 14, 2025, at a Settlement Conference where both parties represented themselves. Both parties represented themselves at the Trial Management Conference before Justice Diamond in September 2025, which took place less than two weeks before the trial.

The applicant stated that there was no communication between them. She stated that the respondent threatened that he would not show or participate. At my direction, the registrar telephoned the respondent. The respondent advised him that he was out of the province and would not be appearing. In the result, the trial proceeded in his absence.

In my view, this is not an “uncontested trial”, but rather a trial which proceeded in the absence of the respondent. An “uncontested trial” is defined in r. 2(1) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 as “a trial at which only the party making the claim provides evidence and submissions.”

While the applicant queried the need for a trial because the trial was “uncontested”, in my view, this was not an “uncontested” trial, as she suggested. An uncontested trial may result from a respondent’s failure to deliver an Answer within the timeframe under r. 10(1) of the Family Law Rules, “[t]he consequences set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of subrule 1 (8.4) apply” pursuant to r. 10(5). One such consequence is the ability of the applicant to obtain an order to proceed to an uncontested trial of the case.

This matter was not listed as an uncontested trial because the respondent delivered an Answer to defend against the claims advanced by the applicant; nor was there any order of the court directing an uncontested trial because the respondent’s answer was struck, which resulted in an order under r.1(8.4) for an uncontested trial. Evidence on an uncontested trial is generally by way of affidavit, in the appropriate forms identified under subrule 23(22) of the Family Law Rules.

In this case, the respondent chose not to attend at the trial. Unlike the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, the Family Law Rules do not expressly address a situation where a party does not attend trial. Under 52.01(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, where a party fails to attend at trial, the court has the discretion to proceed with the trial in the absence of the party.

A court has inherent jurisdiction to control its own process: Marché D'Alimentation Denis Thériault Ltée v. Giant Tiger Stores Limited, 2007 ONCA 695, 87 O.R. (3d) 660, at para. 24. The jurisprudence also establishes that a trial judge has discretion to proceed with a trial where a party fails to attend at the trial or to participate: see, Limironi Inc. v. Susin, 1992 CarswellOnt 2766 (Ont. C.A.); Baradaran v. 6325955 Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 1564, 83 C.P.C. (8th) 65. Given the respondent’s failure to attend at trial at the appointed time, I directed that the trial proceed in the absence of the respondent, who had been aware of the trial date for over six months.

Issues to be determined

The issues to be determined are as follows:

i. Should the child’s primary residence remain with the applicant?

ii. Should the applicant have discretion regarding the respondent’s parenting time?

iii. Should income be imputed to the respondent?

iv. Is the applicant entitled to receive retroactive child support?

v. What is the quantum of ongoing child support?

vi. Section 7 expenses.

vii. Should the court make a no-contact order?

viii. Should there be security for child support.

Parenting Order

The child’s primary residence should remain with the applicant

The applicant asks that L.M.’s primary residence remain with her. I see no reason that the status quo should change. L.M.’s primary residence has been with the applicant. By virtue of the temporary order of Des Rosiers J. dated April 5, 2024, L.M.s primary residence was with the applicant.

The applicant testified that in the past three years, the respondent has missed most of his parenting time despite being afforded parenting time under three separate court orders. She says this causes chaos, and turbulence, and endangers L.M because he does not show up. She believes that it is a form of exerting control. Whatever the reason, there is overwhelming evidence before the court which shows that the respondent has not always exercised good judgment when his son is in his care, or is supposed to be in his care.

In resolving parenting time and primary residence disputes, emphasis must be placed on the critical importance of bonding, attachment, and stability in the lives of young children: Barnes v. Parks (2001), 2001 24146 (ON CA), 141 O.A.C. 362 (C.A.). I am satisfied that it is in the best interest of L.M. to maintain the status quo to ensure stability. I see no basis to vary the order of Des Rosiers J. making L.M.’s primary residence with the applicant, save for making the order a final one.

Should the applicant have discretion regarding the respondent’s parenting time?

The applicant asks that any parenting time between L.M. and the respondent be at her discretion. She says that the respondent has repeatedly communicated that he is out of his son’s life, has placed their son’s safety at risk by not picking up on his parenting time, by deducting amounts from child support for “lost wages”, or for other reasons related to her conduct. She says that although the respondent has parenting time under three separate court orders he does not abide by the schedule. She testified that he comes and goes as he pleases without considering the impact on their son. She asks that the parenting time be at her discretion when the respondent “communicates with her directly”.

As the parties were never married, the relevant legislation is the Children’s Law Reform Act. Section 24 (1) of the Act, mandates that the court must only consider the best interests of the child in accordance with that section of the statute in making a parenting order or contact order. The child’s best interests are not merely “paramount” – they are the only consideration in this analysis: Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, at para. 28; Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 641, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 392.

For the reasons below, subject to the conditions which I outline below, the applicant shall have discretion with respect to the respondent’s parenting time with L.M.

It is well established that the right of a child to visit with a non-custodial parent and to know and maintain or form an attachment to the non-custodial parent is a fundamental right and should only be forfeited in the most extreme and unusual circumstances: Jafari v. Dadar, 1992 8642 (ON CA), [1996] 42 R.F.L. (3d) 349 (N.B.Q.B). The party who seeks to reduce normal access is required to provide a justification for taking such a position. The greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction: Ferreira v Ferreira, 2015 ONSC 3602, at para. 31.

The applicant’s condition to the respondent having parenting time with their son is that the respondent should communicate with her, and make plans when he wants to see L.M. She claims that she has never said “No”, to him. On the record before me, leaving the respondent’s parenting time to the applicant may attract more conflict and pit L.M. against each parent, exactly what the applicant says that she is trying to avoid. It is unfortunate that the respondent did not participate in the trial. In his pleadings and in his form 35.1, the respondent indicates that the applicant has been mentally and verbally abusive throughout their cohabitation and after their separation. However, the evidence also shows that the respondent has been willing or unable to adhere to any parenting schedule and has not sought to put his son’s interest above his own by taking advantage of the parenting schedules. Undoubtedly, this would be a cause of great stress and anxiety for his son who is now only nine years old.

While pleadings are not evidence, I note that in his Answer, the respondent pleads that he blocked the applicant “on all communication apps because of her mental and verbal abuse of me (apart from Our Family Wizard).” At trial, the applicant testified that the respondent has repeatedly blocked her from all communications “on and off” for three years. Shortly after the separation, she was completely blocked, and they communicated through her father. The extent of the rift between the parties is even more profound. Although they are the parents of a young boy, the applicant testified that she has not spoken to the respondent or seen him in four years.

The applicant has filed numerous emails at this trial to show the respondent’s conduct and behaviour towards her and their son in relation to his parenting time. I have addressed the emails more fully below but must note that they show a narrative which supports an entrenched and bitter conflict between the parties which may also be playing a role in the respondent’s willingness to exercise his parenting time. The applicant says that she moved into the respondent’s area so that the respondent could have more parenting time with L.M. There is no evidence of course from the respondent as to how this move was perceived. The applicant says that the respondent’s personal plans are the issue as is his need for control.

I must therefore consider what is in the best interest of L.M., and not his parents. I am mindful that in some of the emails, the respondent has expressed the view that he will be out of L. M’s life if he must deal with the applicant. I am also mindful of the fact that the respondent says that L.M. loves his father. At common law, and as mandated by statute, the best interests test is the only test to be applied. Parental rights, interests, and preferences play no role in this determination: Young v. Young, 1993 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 35-36, 44, 57, 117.

L.M. is now nine years old. There are three temporary orders of Sugunasiri J. dated July 26, 2023, Des Rosiers J., dated April 5, 2024, and Kraft J. dated February 14, 2025, all of which have created instability for their son, and have left the applicant scrambling at the last minute to arrange alternative childcare. The applicant testified that under the order of Kraft J., the respondent agreed to parenting time on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, but after the hearing ended, he resiled from the agreement. She testified that from August (2024) to January (2025), the respondent only saw his son four times. On the evidence before the court, the respondent barely saw his son in the months leading up to the trial. He has not attempted to see his son, and by his last written communication with the applicant, appeared to have washed his hands of any further relationship with his son because the applicant is in his life.

Children should have maximum contact with both parents if it is consistent with the child’s best interests: Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27; Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517. The maximum contact principle is only significant to the extent that it is in the child’s best interests; The maximum contact principle does not mean equal parenting time: Rigillo v. Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 647, 31 R.F.L. (8th) 361, at para. 13; Knapp v. Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305, 155 O.R. (3d) 721. In Barendrengt, the Supreme Court of Canada noted the principle was better referred to as the “parenting time factor” and must not be used to detract from the child‑centric nature of the court’s inquiry.

While the evidence of the applicant is unchallenged, because of the respondent’s decision not to participate in the trial, the evidence suggest that the respondent takes less of a “child-centric” approach to parenting.

While his son apparently looks forward to seeing him, the respondent disappoints him by not showing up when he is supposed to, leaves him alone at bus shelters, haves him ring the applicant’s doorbell when she is not there, repeatedly involves his son in the conflict between the parties, and repeatedly threatens to be out of his life. Under s. 24(2), the court must consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. Section 24(3) enumerates several factors for the court to consider in determining the best interests of the child. The caselaw establishes that the factors are not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather, it calls for the court to take a holistic look at the children, their needs, and the people around them: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480, 55 R.F.L. (8th) 442, at para. 47; McIntosh v Baker, 2022 ONSC 4235, at para. 15.

On the evidence, he has not spent very much parenting time with his father since the parties separated. The applicant submits that the respondent has not exercised his parenting time consistently over the past three years, often disappearing for weeks or months at a time. She points to the fact that in August 2024, the respondent abandoned two weeks of his parenting time; between October 2024 to January 2025, the respondent saw his son only four times; since May 2025 to the time of the trial, the respondent had only exercised two weeks of his parenting time (in July and August). She testified that the applicant does not pick up their son, which she says is a means to hurt her.

The applicant testified that the respondent did not pick up L.M. at the bus stop on three separate occasions. She says that she has had to arrange for and pay for after school care because of the respondent’s failure to comply with his parenting obligations. Her evidence that the respondent uses her parents as a babysitter and backup if he has plans, of course, is unchallenged at the trial. As noted by Karakatsanis J. in Barendregt, “if other factors show that it would not be in the child’s best interests, the court can and should restrict contact”: see also Gordon, at paras. 24, 49.

The applicant testified that she was in a meeting at work, when she received a text from a neighbour that there was no one at the school bus stop to pick up L.M. She testified that this occurred on three occasions. One of those incidents occurred in October 2024. L.M. was only seven years old at the time.

The applicant’s neighbour testified at the trial. She stated that she was picking up her daughter at the bus stop when she noticed that L.M. was there, but no one was there to pick him up. She contacted the applicant at work who relayed to her that the respondent was to pick him up. She says the applicant gave her the respondent’s contact information, and after calling and texting, she was able to reach him. She says the respondent told her that he would not come to get his son. The neighbour testified that the applicant was going to leave work to get L.M., but she herself picked L.M. up and brought him home with her daughter. She says that it happened several times, and that she never saw the respondent again at the bus stop.

Presumably, L.M. had a strong bond and attachment with his father while they lived under the same roof. The applicant’s evidence at this trial confirms that L.M. loves his father. However, she argues that the respondent has effectively abandoned his parenting responsibilities, has indicated that he no longer wants to be involved in his son’s life, and has threatened to move to Ireland with their son.

Section 24(3)(a) - Child’s needs, age, and stage of development

Under s. 24(3)(a) of the CLRA, the court may consider the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability. The factors set out in the CLRA are not exhaustive, and the court must take a holistic approach.

She testified that L.M. is a good child but has had some behavioural issues since the separation, which she says has gotten worse. She says he has become defiant. He was also being bullied at school and is being drawn into the conflict between his parents. She says he is the youngest child in his class, and must catch up, hence the reason for the tutoring. He is in a new school, which he likes, and has friends, and has made progress.

The applicant says that her son is obsessed with her to the point where he is “too clingy”. She is considering therapy for mental health care because she is not sure of the reason. She believes his father has created a fear of abandonment. The applicant testified that there are numerous times when the respondent has stated that he will be out of his son’s life, that he is not picking him up, and that he would disappear. She says that he will say that he will not show up to pick up his son, but then he does show up, and sometimes he does not, and his son does not know whether he is coming or going either.

The applicant also says that the respondent communicates directly with their son to schedule parenting time, and, in the result, their son feels that he is caught in the middle, which creates conflict. She says that the respondent will not communicate with her directly.

While the court only has the applicant’s account, I accept her evidence that the separation has had an impact on L.M. While she cites examples of behavioural issues which she partly attributes to the fact that he witnesses the way the respondent treats her, I am more concerned about the fact that there is corroborating evidence from her neighbour, that the respondent father has failed, not once, but possibly on several occasions, to pick up his young son from the school bus stop.

Section 24(3)(b) - Nature and strength of relationship

Under s. 24(3)(b) of the CLRA, the court may consider the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life.

The only evidence before the court is that of the applicant. She says she has been the primary caregiver to L.M since the parties separated.

Both parents lived together under the same roof for much of L.M.’s young life. He has a strong attachment and bond to his mother. Since separation, parenting time has been primarily with the applicant mother. However, she testified that L.M. loves his father. She says that she encourages the relationship but says that she does not know what the relationship is like now. She conceded that the respondent was “a good dad before we separated”, and says that is the reason she wanted him to continue to be involved in their son’s life. She even moved closer to the respondent so that their relationship would flourish. She says that she wants the respondent to be more involved, commit to a schedule, and to stop creating chaos in their life.

Section 24(3)(c) of the CLRA – Willingness to support relationship, etc.

One of the factors that the court must consider in determining the child’s best interest is each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent. The applicant has demonstrated that she is prepared and willing to support and maintain L.M.’s relationship with his father. The respondent, however, appears to have taken the position that he is prepared to exit his son’s life if he must deal with the applicant. He has not challenged the authenticity of the emails exchanged between the parties, some of which were made exhibits at the trial. In fact, emails filed at this trial show the respondent has decided to renounce his parental obligations, refusing even to engage with the applicant, and refusing to pick him up for any parenting visits. The applicant says that she has never said no to the respondent to have parenting time.

The applicant testified that she moved four minutes away from the respondent. She says that she has always encouraged a relationship between her son and his father.

On the evidence before the court, the respondent has done things to undermine L.M.’s relationship with the applicant mother. He has involved their son in scheduling the parenting time, have placed their son in what she called “fragile” and “inappropriate” situations, including harassing her; having their son dropped off and press the buzzer when he knows she is not home; and involved their son in the conflict.

Aside from repeatedly not exercising his parenting time, the respondent has refused to take care of their son when she was having surgery, has blocked her communications when their son had a medical emergency, and has repeatedly threatened to be out of their son’s life.

The jurisprudence acknowledges that conflict between parents is a source of stress for children. In Graham v. Bruto, 2007 4867 (ON SC), at para. 65, aff’d 2008 ONCA 260, Backhouse J. noted that exposure to conflict is the “single most damaging factor for children in the face of divorce”, a proposition that has been repeatedly endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal: see, Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 392; Wreggitt v. Belanger, 2001 20827 (ON CA), [2001] 23 R.F.L. (5th) 457 (Ont. C.A), at para. 20. In the result, while there is no other evidence, aside from that of the applicant, about the parties’ behaviour towards each other in the face of the separation, and the impact on their son, I find her evidence to be credible.

Throughout her testimony, the applicant sought to introduce what she contends were exchanges of emails between her and the respondent regarding parenting time with their son, and other matters. The emails were admitted into evidence only to show that the statements contained in them were made, and not as proof of the truth of the statements. The respondent did not participate in the trial and did not challenge the authenticity of the emails contained in the applicant’s Exhibit Book. However, there was no evidence before the court to indicate that the respondent had accepted the truth of the contents of the emails which he is said to have authored.

As for the emails and communications in writing, essentially out of court statements by the applicant, sent by her to her father, to the respondent or to others, I ruled that such statements would not be admissible to prove the truth of the content. They are presumptively inadmissible because they had no probative value. They were, however, helpful to the court as part of the narrative and background. Prior consistent statements to prove that the maker of the statement is telling the truth are presumptively inadmissible, because they tend to be self-serving statements: R. v. Morin, 2024 ONCA 562, at para. 20; R. v. Khan, 2017 ONCA 114, 136 O.R. (3d) 520, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 139. The Supreme Court of Canada noted that a prior consistent statement cannot corroborate in-court testimony, because it comes from the same source as the testimony and is not independent proof. Moreover, repetition does not “enhance the value or truth of the testimony”: R. v. Ellard, 2009 SCC 27, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 19, at para. 31.

There are several exceptions to the rule, and one such exception is to admit prior consistent statements as pure narrative evidence, and narrative as circumstantial evidence: R. v. Khan, at para. 29, citing Paciocco, D.M."The Perils and Potential of Prior Consistent Statements: Let's Get It Right" (2013), 17 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 181, at p. 182. It is merely an aid in understanding the case as a whole: Khan, at para. 30; R. v. F. (J.E.) (1993), 1993 3384 (ON CA), 16 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A). As pure narrative, I give no weight to the statements, which are simply tendered as background: see, Khan, at para. 30; R. v. F. (J.E.). In this case, there are emails from the respondent, in response to conduct or statements she has made which include the following.

For example, in an email sent on February 20, 2025, he wrote to the applicant stating, in part: “I am out of [L.M’s] life. I will not be picking him up any day moving forward. Take this to court. In another email dated February 28, 2025, the respondent sent an email to the respondent to indicate: “If [L.M] is with you, I will not be taking part in his life. I’ve made peace with this.” These are just a few of the communications extracted from AppClose in which the respondent wrote that he would be out of his son’s life. He later wrote that he would be deleting the app.

Section 24(3)(d) - History of care of the child

Under s. 24(3)(d) of the CLRA, the court may consider the history of care of the child in making a parenting order. The applicant has been the primary caregiver and has made decisions with respect to L.M. since separation, and for much of his young life, for the most part.

The applicant has been L.M.’s primary caregiver. The parties separated when he was five years old but lived under the same roof until he was six years old. Since the respondent did not participate in the trial, the only admissible evidence before the court from him regarding parenting is a Form 35.1 sworn in 2023 when L.M. was six years old. The form was not updated. It contemplated joint decision-making, which has been eclipsed by the parties resolving that issue in September 2025 in favour of the applicant having sole decision-making responsibility.

There is very little evidence of the respondent’s involvement in the care of L.M. before and after the separation. If the evidence of the applicant were accepted, while he was a good father when they were together, I can infer that there has been a dramatic change. The respondent fails to comply with court sanctioned parenting orders. The applicant says that she cannot make plans for her life in advance, and she is doing full time parenting. She says that the respondent only saw his son for four times the previous year (2024).

The applicant testified that in 2024, the respondent did not pick up his son from the school bus stop on three separate occasions, which resulted in a neighbour picking him up, the applicant having to leave work on those occasions, and necessitated police involvement. The applicant testified that because of the respondent’s refusal to pick up their son, she had to make alternative arrangements for after school cares. A starting point to assess a child’s best interests when making a parenting order is to ensure that the child will be physically and emotionally safe, yet the respondent, by his conduct, has, from the evidence, repeatedly exposed his son to conflict and physical danger, at a very young age because of the entrenched conflict between the parties.

Caring for one’s child also requires that parents provide financial support. The applicant asserts that the respondent has not complied with support orders, choosing when to send support, or unilaterally deducting amounts for bad behaviour. The documentary evidence corroborates the applicant’s testimony that despite court orders which established the quantum of temporary child support, the respondent has ignored the amount ordered and has unilaterally deducted amounts from child support. The applicant calls it financial abuse. I agree.

From April 2023, the respondent has repeatedly deducted from the child support amounts for such things as “loss of earnings”; he made deductions “for basis clothes” for his son; “for a long weekend”; and “for not picking up [L.M]”. The applicant testified that in 2025, the respondent only paid two months of child support.

Section 24(3)(e) -Child’s views and preferences

The views and preferences of the child is one of the factors that the court may consider when determining the best interest of the child and is now statutorily enshrined. As noted by the Court of Appeal in M.A.A. v. D.E.M.E., 2020 ONCA 486, 152 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 46:

Canada has adopted the Conventions of the Rights of the Child, effectively guaranteeing that their views will be heard. A determination of a child’s best interest – which is engaged in all child-related matters – must incorporate the child’s view.

L.M. was approaching his ninth birthday at the time of the trial. His views and preferences are not before the court, but it can be gleaned from the applicant’s evidence that he likes to spend time with his father and is excited to visit him. As she stated, L.M. loves his father. It is therefore in his best interest that his relationship with his father be preserved and nurtured despite the obvious animosity between his parents.

Section 24(3)(g) -Plans for the child’s care

The applicant has been L.M.’s primary caregiver since the separation. L.M. resides with her. Her ability to make the decisions about L.M.’s welfare has now been formalized by an agreement between the parties. She is employed full time for a global engineering firm. At times, her job requires her to work 50 hours a week. She works on major projects and at times has deadlines, but she says she has made L.M.’s needs a priority. She has had to make alternative arrangements for childcare when the respondent has not followed through on his parenting responsibilities. Her parents have assisted, in the past.

The respondent’s plan of care is outdated and does not address L.M.’s current circumstances. The respondent’s plan of care noted that L.M. would attend school and day care when required, that his primary residence would be with the applicant, and that he would have “regular time with my extended family and close friends”. Nothing in the form sheds light on the relationship between father and son nor the other individuals who would be assisting him with childcare.

The applicant testified that she has had two surgeries three months apart. She says that despite the fact that it was the respondent’s parenting time, and he had agreed to take their son, he did not spend his parenting time with his son. She says that even on his parenting day when he was aware that she was undergoing surgery, he dropped their son off at her mom’s place to go to a concert, and her mother also had had a procedure that day. Her evidence is that she resorted to arranging alternative childcare because of the respondent’s failure to pick up his son on his parenting time, when she had to work late. The applicant provided corroborating evidence of the alternative arrangements she has made because of the respondent’s refusal to exercise his right to have parenting time with his son.

Section 24(3)(h) -Ability and willingness of parties to care for and meet the needs of the child

The applicant has demonstrated that she is able to care for and meet L.M.’s needs. She has enrolled him in various activities, got him a tutor, because he was falling behind in school because he was younger than most of the kids in his class. She recognized that he did not have friends in his other school and was being bullied and was falling behind. She has identified that he developed behavioural issues after the separation, and though there has been improvement, has stated that she will explore therapeutic support for his mental health.

On the other hand, there is no evidence before the court that the respondent has any insight about the impact the missed scheduled parenting time has on his son. The applicant testified that L.M. loves his father and will take whatever he will get from him. She says that she has been fighting for L.M. to have more time with the respondent. I agree with the applicant that the respondent has come and gone as he pleases. He did not respect any of the court ordered schedules. In the summer of 2024, the orders of Sugunasiri J. and Des Rosiers J. granted him parenting time during the summer. The respondent only notified the applicant five days before his parenting schedule was to start that he would not take part because of work.

The applicant contends that the respondent refuses to participate in their son’s medical care. She says the respondent does not take their son to his medical or dental appointment, refuses to purchase puffers for their son’s asthma, and blocked her from communication, leaving her to deal with an emergency involving their son on her own. She testified that in breach of the order of Sugunasiri J., the respondent removed L.M. from his health benefits plan.

The respondent has also not supported activities to improve his son’s education and well being. He did not support his son getting a tutor when he was falling behind his classmates. Despite court orders, he has not paid his share of section 7 expenses, or paid child support regularly or, even when he does, generally in the amount ordered by the court.

Section 24(3)(i)- Ability and willingness of parties to communicate and cooperate

The parties are unable to communicate and cooperate with each other. The applicant submits that the respondents lack of communication makes it difficult to co-parent. She says that the respondent has repeatedly blocked her from direct contact, and she has had to handle situations on her own. She asserts that when they do communicate, the communications are often hostile and abusive.

The communications on AppClose indicates that in the past, both have resorted to name calling escalating the dispute at hand between them. The applicant says at times she would communicate with the respondent and did not know whether she was blocked or not because she would not receive any response. The applicant says that the respondent has deleted the AppClose App that Justice Kraft made him download while they were in the courtroom.

In my view, the applicant has shown that she is ready and willing to communicate and co-operate with the respondent. She testified that regardless of the conflict between them, she has encouraged and will still encourage the respondent to be a part of his son’s life.

Based on the applicant’s evidence, the respondent’s failure to adhere to the parenting consequences impact’s her work. She is obliged to work late a few days a week. Her employer’s clients are international. Her plans to promote a book in the summer of 2024 was creating stress for her and L.M., because of the respondent’s failure to comply with the parenting schedule. She says she had to book a camp for L.M.

Section 24(3)(j) - Family violence

During her testimony, the applicant repeatedly referred to aspects of the respondent’s conduct as a means of exerting control. The applicant has not alleged that there has been family violence. However, she asserts that the respondent has sent her harassing, defamatory and abusive communications which she says demonstrate a consistent pattern of molestation, harassment, annoyance, and coercive control.

Family violence is one of the factors which the court must consider when making a parenting order. It is defined under s. 18(1) of the CLRA as follows:

“family violence” means any conduct by a family member towards another family member that is violent or threatening, that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, or that causes the other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person, and, in the case of a child, includes direct or indirect exposure to such conduct;

Under subsection 18(2), the conduct need not constitute a criminal offence and includes harassment and psychological abuse. As noted by the Supreme Court, family violence allegations are notoriously difficult to prove: Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 SCR 517, at paras. 144, 145, 183, 186. In my view, the communications between the parties fall short of constituting “family violence”. However, they demonstrate the high conflict between the parties, the lack of respect for decisions made about their son, and the willingness of both, to resort to threats and name calling.

Both parties have engaged in name calling; however, the respondent has at times, resorted to calling the applicant the most despicable epithets that a woman can be called, a woman who is the mother of his child. The applicant testified that she believes something is wrong with the respondent, and that he is delusional or is trying to punish her. While that question cannot be answered on the record, at a minimum, I was left with the impression that the respondent would benefit from a parenting course and anger management.

Conclusion re: parenting

In my view, leaving the respondent’s parenting time solely to the discretion of the applicant on the condition that the respondent communicate directly with her when they cannot even communicate since they separate in 2021, and, by her own admission have not spoken to each other in at least four years, will impact L.M.’s ability to have parenting time with the respondent and may attract more conflict between the parties. However, there are alternatives available for the parties to communicate about parenting without direct communications. Based on the emails and AppClose communications, the respondent appears to have abandoned his parental duties including fostering and maintaining a relationship with his son by adhering to the parenting schedules ordered by a few judges. I must consider though that the right to have parenting time with his father is the fundamental right of L.M., and not that of his parents.

However, there are methods of communicating which will require the respondent to opt in – that is the communication applications which exist for this very situation. L.M. deserves to have certainty and stability in his life.

I am satisfied that the applicant has shown a willingness to encourage and nurture the relationship between L.M. and his father and will continue to do so. On the other hand, the respondent has shown a steadfast disinterest in nurturing the relationship with his son – despite three court orders giving him parenting time and has repeatedly flouted orders made for child support. There are no guarantees that he will abide by any further order for parenting time. He has not abided by any of the three-court ordered parenting schedules in the past few years.

The respondent cannot be counted on to comply with a parenting schedule, and to break the cycle of expectation, disappointment, and turbulence which ensues from his refusal to adhere to the parenting schedule.

Imputation of income

The applicant asks that the court impute income to the respondent of $171,000 on the basis that he is employed and is principal of a company, but has unreasonably deducted expenses. She asks that the court draw an adverse inference from the fact that the respondent has not provided any financial disclosure beyond 2023.

The applicant submits that the court should impute income to the respondent on the basis that he has acted in bad faith throughout the proceedings because of his failure to provide for their son financially. She says she has no tax returns for 2023 and 2024 from the respondent, and she is unsure where he works. She says she does not know if the respondent has received a raise or not.

I am prepared to impute an income of $171,701 to the respondent for the reasons below.

Parties have an ongoing obligation to support their children. The Ontario Court of Appeal has noted that the imputation of income is one method whereby the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children: Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 2002 41868 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (C.A.), at para. 32.

A party requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, 248 O.A.C. 168, at para. 28; Banning v. Bobrowski, [2007] O.J. No. 3927, at para. 10. As Justice Myers stated in de Pimentel v. Rodriguez, 2024 ONSC 2844, 2 R.F.L. (9th) 109, “[i]ncome imputation must not be arbitrary. It is an inference that must be grounded in admissible evidence adduced in the proceeding”: at para. 18.

The amount of income to be imputed to a payor must be supported by the evidence and consistent with the objective of establishing “fair support based on the means of the parents in an objective manner that reduces conflict, ensures consistency and encourages resolution”: Bak v. Dobell, 2007 ONCA 304, 86 O.R. (3d) 196, at para. 36; Korman v. Korman, 2015 ONCA 578, 126 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 51; see also, Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 41868 (ON CA), [2002] 61 O.R. (3d) 711, at para. 44. In support of her claim for imputed income, the applicant filed the respondent’s personal income tax return for 2022, DLM Inc. for the year ending December 31, 2022, and the respondent’s Form 13.1 Financial Statement (Property and Support Claims) sworn May 30, 2023. The applicant testified that the only way the respondent’s documents (which includes the financial statements for DLM Ltd.) would have come to her was as part of the respondent’s sworn financial statement.

The applicant testified that at the time of the trial, the respondent was 41 years old. She says that he is a licensed master electrician, and while employed had a “side hustle”, business which is incorporated. The applicant says she helped the respondent set up the company. She says she helped him set up his website and handled the administrative aspect of the business when they were together. Her evidence is that he was in good health.

The respondent is the principal of a closely held corporation, DLM Electrical, which was incorporated in 2016.

In 2022, he had income from employment in the amount of $82,631. He also had a business, DLM Incorporated. The applicant testified that the respondent was the sole share holder, officer and director. DLM had income of $100,000 for the year ending in 2022. The applicant does not believe this is the true income earned by the company because the respondent received cash as part of his business. She says that the year that the parties separated, the respondent had a big job for $100,000.

The applicant relied on an income statement for the corporation for its 2021 to 2022 year, which showed that the business made $100,000, but had supplies of $67,000. She also challenges the amount of the expenses for the business including the $67,000 for supplies, and the tripling of expenses related to his vehicle, and doubling of expenses for insurance in a year. She believes the respondent also wrote off personal expenses. She says that there is no explanation as to what "supplies" means, and notes that no receipts were provided. She urges the court to claw back the entire amount for supplies. She argues that the respondent writes off personal expenses to increase the expenses for the business. The applicant argues that the numbers to not make sense and she “would have loved to question….here” at the trial, but of course, the respondent did not participate in the trial.

The respondent swore a financial statement on May 30, 2023 in which he stated that at the time, he was employed with Ozz Electric and had a monthly employment income of $7,163.08, before deductions, and was also self-employed with DLM Electric, with a monthly gross income of $5,000, or $3,500 net income, for a total annual income of $127,956.96. The respondent stated that his income from all sources in the preceding year was $128,000. The respondent has not indicated that he is no longer employed or that he still owns his business.

The respondent’s T1 General for the 2022 tax year shows T4 income of $85,957.07. The personal tax return does not report the income from self-employment noted in the respondent’s financial statement filed in these proceedings. The respondent has not provided any corporate tax returns or updated financial and tax documents for DLM Electric Inc.

Generally, the court is required to use parent’s line 150 income reported on the payor’s T1 General for the purposes of determining child support: see, s. 16 of the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97. However, s.18(1) of the Guidelines provides that where a parent is a shareholder, director, or officer of a corporation, the court may include their pre-tax income in the calculation of the income available for support purposes if the court determines that the amount of the parent’s annual income as determined under section 16 does not fairly reflect all the money available to the parent for the payment of child support (see also, Mason v. Mason, 2016 ONCA 725, 132 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 120).

In determining income for support purposes, in addition to the line 150 income, the court may consider a spouse’s pre-tax corporate income. The applicant sought to introduce, as evidence, an income statement from DLM Electric Inc., which shows a total income for 2022 of $100,634 and $81,502 for 2021. The applicant noted that in 2022, DLM deducted $87,571 in expenses and reported only $11,279 in profit.

In 2022, the most significant expense to the business was supplies in the amount of $67,201 and similarly, in 2021, supplies were its most significant expense in the amount of $57,339. The applicant delivered a request for information which went unanswered by the respondent.

Aside from the significant expenses, the statement indicates that in 2022, the corporation had retained earnings of $24,297 in the corporation in 2022 and total shareholders’ equity of $24,297 that year. In my view, because the respondent is the sole shareholder and director of DLM, he controls the business; he controls any amount that stays in the business as retained earnings; he controls whether any amount is paid out to himself as the shareholder – in 2022, the statement that there was $9,000.00 “due to shareholder”. I therefore find that his income reported on his T1 General and his line 150 income do not fairly reflect all the income available to him for the payment of child support.

The applicant says that the amount claimed by the respondent’s vehicle expenses are excessive and unreasonable; she noted the expenses more than doubled from the previous year, increasing from $2,876 to $6,409. She also challenges the amount for meals and entertainment which she says tripled from the previous year, from $1,122 to $3,131.

The applicant has asked that the court impute income to the respondent father in the amount of $171,701 based on previous income earned and his failure to provide financial disclosure. She asserts that the respondent has not provided any financial disclosure since 2022, and only limited disclosure in 2022. The applicant submits that the respondent has missed all trial deadlines, has not delivered a sworn financial statement in over three years, has not responded to the Request to Admit, and has not submitted an Opening Statement or an Exhibit Book. In his Endorsement, Justice Diamond noted that the respondent had missed the deadlines contained in the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form to deliver his Trial Record, Trial Exhibits and any other documents being relied upon at trial. She asks that the court draw an adverse inference against the respondent regarding his income and financial circumstances, and she asked that the court make any necessary orders to ensure a fair and just outcome.

I am satisfied that the respondent has presented an evidentiary basis for the court to conclude that income should be imputed to the respondent in the amount of $171,701.00. The court should draw an adverse inference against the respondent for his failure to comply with his disclosure obligations as provided for in s. 21 of the Guidelines and impute income: see: Gray v. Rizzi, 2016 ONCA 494, 87 R.F.L. (7th) 272; Smith v. Pellegrini, 2008 46927 (ON SC); Maimone v. Maimone, 2009 25981 (ON SC). The applicant says she served a Request for Information dated October 23, 2024, which included a request for personal and corporate financial disclosure. She followed up with the request for disclosure by email. The respondent did not provide the requested information.

Clause 19 (1) (f) of the Guidelines gives the court a broad discretion to impute income where a party fails to disclose all relevant income information to the other party as required pursuant to the Guidelines, the relevant Family Law legislation, caselaw, court rules, or to the Canada Revenue Agency as required pursuant to the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.): see: M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207.

The Ontario Court of Appeal has repeatedly stated that the most basic obligation in family law proceedings is financial disclosure: Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450, 65 R.F.L. (7th) 6, at para. 11; Manchanda v. Thethi, 2016 ONCA 909, 84 R.F.L. (7th) 374 at para. 13, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 29. The requirement to disclose is immediate and ongoing: Roberts, at para. 12. The Ontario Family Law Rules now include an automatic order under r. 8.0.1 for disclosure. The automatic order includes the timeline for service of financial documents.

Despite the decades of jurisprudence on disclosure, the rules of court, and the applicant’s request for information, the respondent only provided a financial statement in 2023, shortly after the proceedings were commenced. He has not provided corporate tax returns, updated financial statements, or evidence to support the expenses in his 2022 financial statement. I am mindful that the respondent did not challenge the authenticity of the document, and the statements are evidence of what was reported for in his 2022 financial statements. They are, however, the financial statements of the company that the respondent wholly controls. Aside from the lack of financial disclosure, the respondent did not participate in the trial to permit the applicant to cross examine him on his financial statement. Just like any other witness, I presume that his evidence would not be helpful to him and draw an adverse inference.

A party’s failure to present relevant evidence to support their position may result in an adverse inference. This includes disclosure not made or a necessary witness not called to testify: see, Levesque v. Comeau et al., 1970 4 (SCC), [1970] S.C.R. 1010; Parris v. Laidley, 2012 ONCA 755. The best evidence rules mandate that documents relevant to an issue are produced: Marchese v. Marchese, 2017 ONSC 6815, at para. 23.

In this case, there are several reasons, any one of which on their own, would permit the court to draw an adverse inference that the financial disclosure about DLM would not be helpful to the respondent including: the respondent’s failure to make adequate financial disclosure; the respondent’s failure to respond to the applicant’s request for information; the respondent’s failure to provide disclosure or any evidence to support numbers in the limited financial disclosure made by way of DLM’s financial statement, or his failure to participate in the trial, the latter without any excuse or explanation.

The imputation of income must be established on an evidentiary basis: Drygala, at para. 44; Heard v. Heard, 2014 ONCA 196, 317 O.A.C. 45, at paras. 33-35. The amount selected must be grounded in the evidence: Drygala, at para. 44. In the result, I would include, in the respondent’s 2022 income the $9,000 due to shareholder, the retained earnings of $24,297, because there is no explanation from him as to any business reason for the amount to be retained; and, $50,000 which was written off as expenses for supplies, because there is no explanation as to why these expenses would not be passed on to the customer, and no supporting documentation to show that the corporation absorbed these expenses.

I also agree with the applicant regarding the deductions related to meals and entertainment. While I would have discounted the amount entirely, I note that she is prepared to allocate half of the claimed amount, or $1,500 to this item. However, while the applicant also challenges the amounts written off for expenses such as his vehicle and insurance, I am not prepared to discount these items as reasonable business expenses, without more.

The onus shifts to the other party to satisfy the court as to their income level and that income should not be imputed: Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663, 15 R.F.L. (7th) 344, at para. 57; McKenna v McKenna, 2015 ONSC 3309, 62 R.F.L. (7th) 429, at para. 144. In this case, the respondent did not participate in the trial and therefore there is no evidence to rebut or refute the imputation of income: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, 65 R.F.L. (6th) 17, at para. 28; Tahir v. Khan, 2021 ONCJ 1, 51 R.F.L. (8th) 231, at paras. 38, 40; E.D. v. J.S., 2020 ONSC 1474, at paras. 164-165; Abumatar v. Hamda, 2021 ONSC 2165, at para. 28, aff’d 2022 ONSC 3530 (Div. Ct.).

Retroactive child support

The parties separated in November 2021. The applicant seeks retroactive child support from April 2022, the date that the parties stopped living under the same roof. By virtue of the temporary order of Des Rosiers J., the respondent was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $804 a month based on his income from employment of approximately $86,000. The applicant seeks retroactive child support in the amount of $40,061.22 from April 2022 until September 2025, on the basis of an imputed income of $171,701.

Retroactive child support is a debt; by default, there is no reason why it should not be awarded unless there are strong reasons not to do so: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, [2020] 2 SCR 763, at paras. 25, 132. Retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations: Michel, at para. 25. I am satisfied that this is a case where retroactive child support ought to be made. As the applicant argued, the respondent’s lack of financial disclosure prevented her from determining what the respondent’s financial obligations were. He had full knowledge of those obligations.

I note that the amount would be based on Table child support. The respondent’s imputed income is over $150,000. Where a payor’s income is over $150,000 a year, s. 4 of the Guidelines permits the court to choose one of two options which includes, the amount determined under s. 3 of the Guidelines. Section 3. (1)(a) of the Guidelines, which is rebuttable, presumes that the amount of an order for the child support will be based on the table amount. There is a presumption in favour of using the child support guideline table amount and the onus of showing that this approach is inappropriate is on the party so claiming: Lewi v. Lewi, 2006 15446 (ON CA), [2006] 80 O.R. 321 (C.A.), citing Francis v. Baker, 1999 659 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250. Since the respondent has not participated to challenge the table amount, and having regard to the real possibility that his income may in fact be higher than imputed, I find that using the table amount is appropriate in the circumstances.

As for ongoing child support, the applicant is seeking child support in the amount of $1,455 from October 1, 2025, based on an imputed income of $171,701. For the reasons stated above, I find that the amount is appropriate.

Life insurance -security for support

In her Closing Submissions, the applicant stated that security for child support in the amount of $500,000 is required. She relies on the decision of Katz v. Katz, 2014 ONCA 606, 377 D.L.R. (4th) 264.

In her application, the applicant sought an order that the respondent maintain a life insurance policy with a face value of $300,000.

For the reasons below, I am not inclined to grant the order.

The applicant argues that under s. 34(1)(i) and (k) of the Family Law Act, the court has jurisdiction to order a payor parent to designate a child or the other parent as an irrevocable beneficiary of a life insurance policy to secure support obligations. Indeed, under s. 34(1) (i) the court may require that a party “who has a policy of life insurance as defined under the Insurance Act designate the other spouse or a child as the beneficiary irrevocably”. Section 34(1)(k) gives the court authority to secure payment under the support order, “by a charge on property or otherwise”.

Where a support order is made, the court may guarantee payments to be made in the event of the payor's death by requiring the payor to purchase and maintain life insurance for a specified beneficiary while the support order is in effect and to provide directions regarding the extent to which the payment of the insurance proceeds will satisfy the support obligation: Laczko v. Laczko (1999), 1999 14998 (ON SC), 176 D.L.R. (4th) 507 (Ont. S.C), at pp. 511-512; Katz, at paras. 70 and 73.

Where there is no life insurance policy in place, the court must exercise caution in requiring the payor spouse to purchase insurance: Katz, at para. 74. There is no evidence before me that the respondent has life insurance. In this case, there is no evidence before the court of the father's insurability. There is no evidence before me of the costs of the insurance or the total amount of insurance that would be required to secure the respondent father’s support obligations. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Katz, there are several factors which the court should consider when no insurance is in place.

Finally, there is no evidence before the court of the total amount of support likely to be payable over the duration of the support award, and by how much the insurance would decline over time. As noted by the Court of Appeal, the amount of insurance to be maintained should decline over time as the total amount of support payable over the duration of the award diminishes.

Section 7

The applicant asks that the court make an order for arrears of section 7 expenses for day camps, tutoring, babysitting expenses incurred because the respondent has refused to show up. She also asks that the parties continue to share the section 7 expenses on a 50/50 basis.

The applicant has filed a substantial amount of receipts to support the s.7 expenses. However, much of the expenses are already subject to court orders but the respondent has not contributed his share. At the time of the trial, the respondent owed $8,396.95 by virtue of orders made by Sugunasiri J. dated July 26, 2023, and Des Rosiers J. dated April 5, 2024.

What the applicant is truly seeking is enforcement of the previous orders for section 7 expenses. In my view, because section 7 expenses are child support, the section 7 arrears of $8,396.95 should be subject to enforcement through the Family Responsibility Office.

The applicant also seeks one hundred percent reimbursement for the childcare expenses incurred in 2024 and 2025 because the respondent did not show up for his parenting time. In my view, this request is reasonable.

The respondent shall pay $3,974.30, which shall be enforceable as support, for the following childcare expenses:

(a) 100% of YMCA After School Child Care (2024-2025) - $3,080.00

(b) 100% of Babysitting Fees (2024) - $640

(c) 100% of Spartan Gymnastics August 2024- $254.30 Total is $3,080 + $640 + $254.30

The respondent shall reimburse the applicant for fifty percent of L.M.’s dental appointment, in the amount of $122.10. The applicant shall furnish the respondent with proof that the claim is the net balance after any available coverage or credits.

The applicant asks that the parties continue to pay section 7 expenses on a 50/50 basis. Under s. 7(2) of the Guidelines, the amount of an expense set out in s. 7(1) for a child’s education, childcare, among other things, are to be shared by the parents in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense the contribution, if any, from the child. The court must consider any subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits relating to the expense, and any eligibility to claim a subsidy, benefit or income tax deduction or credit: s. 7(3).

From the date of the judgment, the parties shall pay their proportionate share of all s. 7 expenses. The applicant shall furnish the respondent with receipts for the section 7 expenses claimed.

Non-disparaging order

The parties no longer have a relationship in which they can communicate directly with each other. Yet, they are parents of a young boy, and by the applicant’s own admission, their son loves his father. There is evidence before the court from the applicant herself, that she disclosed to others (YMCA), that she was “badmouthing” the respondent to the YMCA which prompted his response that he would not be picking up his son from school.

Under s. 28(1)(c)(ii), the court may make an order, incidental to a parenting order, prohibiting either party from engaging in a myriad of conduct in the presence of the child.

Non-Molestation Order

The applicant asks for a non-molestation order. The applicant says there has been no physical threats but says the respondent engages in verbal and emotional abuse. Having reviewed some of the graphic, profane and disturbing communications from the respondent to the applicant, I must agree that the communications are abusive.

I am not inclined to grant a restraining order under s. 46(1) of the Family Law Act because although offensive, and abusive, there is no evidence before me that the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for her safety or for L.M.’s safety. Section 28 of the Children's Law Reform Act contains a similar, but narrower, provision. The test set out in subsection 46(1) of the Family Law Act and subsection 35(1) of the Children's Law Reform Act is whether the applicant "has reasonable grounds to fear for her personal safety or the safety of any child in her lawful care."

However, I am making a restraining/no contact order under s. 35 of the Children's Law Reform Act prohibiting the respondent from contacting or communicating, directly or indirectly, with the applicant, except via AppClose or similar applications, where such communications are to be limited to exchanging information regarding the health, education, and general well being of L.M. and to facilitate the respondent’s parenting time. The order will be in effect for a period of two years, subject to any other order of the court.

Miscellaneous issue raised by applicant

At the commencement of trial, the applicant raised the issue of Justice Diamond’s order not being taken, out. I note that Justice Diamond’s endorsement indicated that: “If the parties wish to codify the terms of their partial settlement agreement, they may forward a draft consent Order to my attention for review and signature care of my assistant”. “The Family Law Rules contain a procedure for settling the terms of the order, including where parties are representing themselves, as is the case here.

Since neither party has a licensed representative, in accordance with subrule 25(11) of the Family Law Rules, a clerk may prepare the order flowing from Diamond J.’s endorsement if the applicant requires a formal order.

Disposition

For the reasons above, I make the following final orders:

i. Effective immediately, and on a final basis, the primary residence of L.M., born [xxx] will be with the applicant.

ii. The applicant shall have the discretion to schedule any parenting time with the respondent, subject to the following terms:

a) The applicant shall not unreasonably withhold affording the respondent parenting time, such time, if requested, being no less than the schedule previously in place, at the request of the respondent: Tuesday and Thursday from 3:45 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. and every second weekend from Friday at 3:45 p.m. to Sunday at 8:30 p.m. to the respondent, as well as Friday, to be agreed upon by the parties. The parties are at liberty to agree to any additional parenting time, on notice to the applicant.

b) The respondent shall give the applicant at least ten (10) days notice if he wishes to exercise parenting time with his son.

c) Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, in writing in advance, the exchanges shall take place at school.

d) If the child is not in school the parties shall agree, in advance in writing, at least three days beforehand, to the location and time of the transition.

e) Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, in writing in advance, the parent with the child shall be responsible for dropping him off at the end of the parenting time at a location agreed to by the parties.

f) Unless the parties agree to use a third party, which may include a family member, to facilitate their communication regarding the respondent’s parenting time, the default will be that the parties must communicate through AppClose, My Family Wizard or other similar applications.

g) Subject to the restraining/no contact order below, unless the parties agree on another method of contacting each other in the event of a medical emergency concerning the child, they shall do so by phone.

h) The respondent shall have liberal virtual parenting time with L.M. which shall be facilitated by the applicant. The applicant shall not remain in the room during the respondent’s virtual parenting time.

i) If requested by the respondent, the applicant shall provide information regarding L.M.’s health, education, or other information relating to his wellbeing, to the respondent, and shall not unreasonably withhold her consent for third parties to release copies of documents in their possession to the respondent related to the education, health or wellbeing of L.M.

iii. The respondent shall pay retroactive child support in the amount of $40,061.22 from April 2022 until September 2025, on the basis of an imputed income of $171,701.

iv. The respondent shall pay the applicant Table child support in the amount of $1,455 from October 1, 2025, based on an imputed income of $171,701.

v. The respondent’s arrears of section 7 expenses in the amount of $8,396.95 shall be enforceable as support payments.

vi. The respondent shall pay $3,974.30 for childcare expenses, which shall be enforceable as support.

vii. The respondent shall reimburse the applicant for fifty percent of L.M.’s dentist appointment in the amount of $122.10, within 30 days of receiving confirmation and proof from the applicant of the net balance. Any amount outstanding after the 30 days once proof is provided is enforceable as child support.

viii. Effective March 27, 2026, and thereafter, the parties shall pay their proportionate share of L.M.’s s. 7 expenses, so long as he is entitled to support based on the statute and the jurisprudence, based and in accordance with their respective incomes.

ix. For as long as L.M. remains a child entitled to support based on the statute and the jurisprudenc, each party must provide updated income disclosure to the other party each year no later than July 30 in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines, and the amount of child support payable by either party shall be adjusted in accordance with the updated information.

x. Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed. A support deduction order will be issued.

xi. The parties shall provide to each other and the Director of the Family Responsibility Office notification of any change in address or employment, including full particulars about the change, within ten (10) days of the change taking place.

xii. Pursuant to ss. 20 and 35 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the respondent shall not communicate with the applicant, except through an intermediary that the parties have agreed upon, in advance, or communicate directly or indirectly with the applicant, except via AppClose, Our Family Wizard, or similar applications, such communications to be limited to exchanging information about L.M.’s well being and parenting visits.

xiii. Neither party shall disparage or speak negatively about the other parent to L.M. or in his presence, nor shall they encourage individuals responsible for his care to do so.

xiv. Approval of the draft judgment by the respondent is dispensed with if the applicant prepares the order for signing. The applicant shall advise the court within five days of the date of this judgment if she intends to prepare the draft judgment. If she fails to do so, the clerk shall prepare the draft judgment for signing within 15 days of the date of this judgment.

Costs

The applicant has indicated in her Closing Submissions that she is seeking costs.

Since she is self-represented, she must provide evidence that she spent time above and beyond what a represented litigant would spend on their case, did work normally performed by a lawyer, and had to give up some other remunerative activity (eg. work/employment): Girao v. Cunningham, 2021 ONCA 18, 13 C.C.L.I. (6th) 1, at para 9; Fong v. Chan, (1999) 1999 2052 (ON CA), 46 O.R. (3d) 330 (C.A.). If she has been assisted during the proceedings by a lawyer, she must file any supporting dockets or a computer-generated summary together with her Costs Submissions, any offers to settle, and to the extent that it is required, affidavit evidence dealing with evidence of forgoing remunerative activity.

Costs submissions, exclusive of the affidavit, and any offer to settle or Bill of Costs, is limited to three pages, double spaced, and shall be forwarded to the Trial Co-ordinator within 30 days of the release of this judgement. The documents must also be served on the respondent.

The respondent shall have 30 days after the deadline for the applicant to serve her Costs Submissions to deliver any response

There shall be no reply costs submissions.

A. P. RAMSAY, J.

Released: March 27, 2026

Appendix A

Section 7 arrears under Order of Sugunasiri dated July 26, 2023 and Des Rosiers Order dated April 5, 2024:

CST Education Savings fund

Half (50%) of the CST Education Savings fund (the full amount being $200.00 per month): each parent shall contribute $100.00 per month on the first day of every month;

The amount owed by the respondent is calculated as:

(a) 2022 (August - December), $100 x 5 months = $500. The respondent paid $0 and so the

outstanding amount is $500.00.

(b) 2023 (January - December), $100 x 12 months = $1,200. The respondent paid $500, and the outstanding amount is $700.00.

(c) 2024 (January - December), $100 x 12 months = $1,200. The respondent paid $300 and

the outstanding amount is $900.00

(d) 2025 (January - September), $100 x 9 months = $900.00. The respondent paid $0.00 and the outstanding amount is $900.00.

Total owed by respondent= $500.00 + $700.00 + $900.00 + $900.00= $3,000.00

Extracurricular activities and tutoring

Half (50%) of the expenses for swimming lessons, jiujitsu lessons and tutoring expenses.

(a) 2022 (August - December), the Respondent's half of all extra curricular activities is

$1,702.73. The respondent paid $1,237.24. The outstanding amount is $465.49.

(b) 2023 (January - December), the Respondent's half of all extra curricular activities is

$1,386.67. The Respondent paid $1,307.35. The outstanding amount is $79.32.

(c) 2024 (January - December), the Respondent's half of all extra curricular activities is

$2,169.30. The Respondent paid $0.00. The outstanding amount is $2,169.30.

(d) 2025, (January - September), the Respondent's half of all extra curricular activities is

$2,682.85. The Respondent paid $0.00. The outstanding amount is $2,682.85.

Total = $465.49 + $79.32 + $2,169.30+ $2,682.85= $5,396.95

CITATION: Staniszewski v. McCartney, 2026 ONSC 1658

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00035299-0000

DATE: 20260327

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MARTA STANISZEWSKI

Applicant

– and –

DAVID MCCARTNEY

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

A. P. RAMSAY, J.

Released: March 27, 2026