SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-00049528-000

DATE: 20260328

RE: DAVID DI CECCO, Appellant

AND:

JANET JANSEN, Respondent

BEFORE: The Honourable Mr. Justice M.D. Faieta

COUNSEL: Mercedes Ibghi, for the Appellant

Self-represented Respondent

Sobika Sadacharam, for the Director, Family Responsibility Office

HEARD: March 19, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

[1] In 2003, a final Order, on consent of the parties, was issued that required the appellant father to pay $700 per month in child support, as well as $305 per month towards daycare and other expenses, to the respondent mother for their four-year-old son (“2003 Order”). The 2003 Order was based on the appellant’s imputed income of $89,100.

[2] In June 2019, the respondent mother filed a motion with the Ontario Court of Justice to change the 2003 Order to increase child support based on an imputed annual income of $250,000 starting on December 1, 2018. The appellant filed a response to this motion to change asking the court to terminate child support. At that time, their son was 19 years old and attending college.

[3] On September 23, 2021, the respondent mother amended her motion to change to claim: (a) retroactive child support in accordance with the appellant father’s income or imputed income from August 2003 to August 2021; and (b) retroactive section 7 expenses proportional to each party’s income from August 2003 to August 2021.

[4] On September 27, 2021, the appellant father’s motion to terminate child support was granted effective June 1, 2021.

[5] On April 9, 2025, the appellant father was ordered by Justice Sherr to pay retroactive child support in the amount of $889,811 to the respondent (“2025 Support Order”): See Jansen v. DiCecco, 2025 ONCJ 189. On May 8, 2025, the appellant father was also ordered to pay costs of $100,000.00 to the respondent (“2025 Costs Order”): See Jansen v. DiCecco, 2025 ONCJ 256, 16 R.F.L. (9th) 99. Earlier in that proceeding, on October 5, 2023, the appellant father was also ordered by Justice Sherr to pay costs of $5,000 to the respondent (“2023 Costs Order”). The appellant has not made any payment towards any of these three orders.

[6] On April 24, 2025, the Director registered a writ of seizure and sale against the appellant’s home.

[7] On May 8, 2025, pursuant to s. 48(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”) the appellant filed a notice of appeal in respect of the 2025 Support Order and the 2025 Costs Order. The appellant did not file a notice of appeal in respect of the 2023 Costs Order.

[8] According to a Statement of Arrears prepared by the Director, Family Responsibility Office, as of March 13, 2026, the appellant owes $1,020,495.46, inclusive of the 2023 Costs Order and the 2025 Costs Order, to the respondent.

[9] The Director has taken several enforcement actions.

[10] On December 15, 2025, the Director issued a First Notice to Suspend Driver’s Licence, under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 31 (“FRSAEA”), for being in default of the above Orders. The notice stated that, by January 24, 2026, the appellant had to either pay the arrears, enter into a payment arrangement with the Director or obtain a Refraining Order. Although he acknowledged receipt of the First Notice, the appellant father took none of the three steps before the deadline. As a result, the appellant’s driver’s licence was suspended on January 29, 2026.

[11] On January 19, 2026, the Director issued a Notice of Intention to Make a Federal Licence Denial Application (“the Federal Notice”) under the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 4 (2nd Supp.) (“FOAEAA”). The Federal Notice notified the appellant father that, by February 28, 2026, he would have to take one of the following two steps: (1) pay $1,020,095.46; or (2) enter into a payment arrangement with the Director.

[12] On February 4, 2026, the appellant proposed to pay $500 per month towards his arrears. The Director sought the payment of $14,000 per month towards his arrears.

[13] This motion for a stay was filed on February 12, 2026.

[14] The appeal is scheduled to be heard on April 30, 2026.

[15] The appellant seeks the following orders:

(a) An Order for the stay of the 2025 Support Order and 2025 Costs Order, pending final determination of the Appeal.

(b) An Order that the Director direct the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to reinstate the appellant’s driver's licence.

(c) An Order that the Director refrain from directing the Department of Justice Canada to suspend the appellant’s passport.

(d) An Order that the Director refrain from taking any further enforcement measures against the appellant pending final determination of the Appeal.

ISSUE #1: SHOULD THE 2025 SUPPORT ORDER AND THE 2025 COSTS ORDER BE STAYED PENDING THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL?

[16] The appellant appeals the 2025 Support Order and the 2025 Costs Order to this Court pursuant to s. 48 of the FLA.

[17] Subrules 38(5) to (45) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (“FLR”), apply to an appeal from an order of the Ontario Court of Justice to the Superior Court of Justice under section 48 of the FLA: FLR, r. 38(4). The service of a notice of appeal does not stay a support order or an order that enforces a support order: FLR, at r. 38(33), (34). An order may be stayed on any conditions that the court considers appropriate: FLR, at r. 38(35). To obtain a stay pending the appeal of a support order, the appellant must show that there is a serious question to be tried, that the appellant would suffer irreparable harm if a stay were refused, and that the balance of convenience favours a stay: Tauber v. Tauber, 1999 2192 (ON CA), [1999] 43 O.R. (3d) 53 (C.A.). The above factors are not prerequisites. A court may also consider whether there are any applicable equitable discretionary considerations such as clean hands or laches: Arar v. Arar, 2022 ONSC 7293, 83 R.F.L. (8th) 141, at para. 15. Ultimately, whether a stay should be granted turns on whether granting a stay is in the interests of justice: Miner-Tremblay v. Rintoul, 2025 ONCA 784, at para. 8.

[18] If an order is stayed, no steps may be taken under the order or for its enforcement, except: (a) by order of the Superior Court of Justice; or (b) as provided in rr. (39) and (40): FLR, r. 38(38). A stay does not prevent the settling or signing of the order: FLR, at r. 38(39). A stay does not prevent the issue of a writ of seizure and sale or the filing of the writ in a sheriff’s office or land registry office, but no instruction or direction to enforce the writ shall be given to a sheriff while the stay remains in effect: FLR, at r. 38(40).

Is there a Serious Issue to be Determined on Appeal?

[19] The general rule is that the court shall “... undertake a preliminary investigation of the merits to decide whether the applicant demonstrates a “serious question to be tried”, in the sense that the application is neither frivolous nor vexatious”: R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 196, at para. 12.

[20] In making this assessment, it is essential to remember that the standard of review depends on the nature of alleged error made by a trial judge. As noted by Justice Copeland in One York Street Inc. v. 2360083 Ontario Limited, 2026 ONCA 176, at paras. 65-66:

Questions of law are reviewable on a standard of correctness. Questions of fact are reviewable on a standard of palpable and overriding error. Questions of mixed fact and law lie along a spectrum… Applying a legal standard to a set of facts involves a question of mixed fact and law… For questions of mixed fact and law, an appellate court must determine which standard of review applies.

Where an error in respect of a question of mixed fact and law can be attributed to the application of an incorrect legal standard, a failure to consider a required element of the applicable legal test, or a similar error in principle, this amounts to an error of law and is reviewable on a correctness standard… However, where a legal principle is not readily extricable, then the matter is one of mixed fact and law and should not be overturned absent palpable and overriding error.

[21] The appellant states in his Amended Notice of Appeal that the trial judge erred in:

(a) “The legal and factual foundation relied upon for determining the material change in circumstances and then deviating from the presumptive three-year limit on retroactive child support awards”; and

(b) “The methodology, legal and factual basis applied in imputing income to the appellant and calculating the quantum of retroactive child support.”

[22] These grounds are amplified in the appellant’s Factum. I find that the appellant has met the low threshold of raising a “serious question to be tried” at least in respect of the application of Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 3, and the departure from the presumptive three-year retroactive period for retroactive support awards.

Will the Moving Parties Suffer Irreparable Harm if the Stay if Not Granted?

[23] Irreparable harm is characterized by the nature and not the magnitude of harm. It is harm which cannot be quantified in monetary terms or cannot be cured because, typically, one party cannot collect damages from the other: Ahmed v. Abdelmoaein, 2025 ONCA 618, 20 R.F.L. (9th) 44, at para. 34. While absolute certainty is not required to establish irreparable harm, the evidence must be clear, go far beyond speculation, and satisfy the balance of probabilities: Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada, 2022 ONSC 7284, at para. 17.

[24] The appellant submits that:

(a) There it is highly unlikely that the respondent would be able to reimburse him if he were to pay her the amounts owed under the 2025 Support Order and the 2025 Costs Order given that she is unemployed, in respect of disability benefits and carrying a substantial debt from having incurred legal fees.

(b) The appellant’s driver’s licence has been suspended since January 29, 2026. If a stay is granted, then his driver’s licence would no longer be suspended. He states that the suspension of his driver’s licence prevents him from earning a livelihood as a truck driver.

[25] The respondent submits that granting a stay would undermine the purpose of a support order and the FLR which excludes the automatic staying of support orders on appeal.

Does the Balance of Convenience Favour Granting a Stay?

[47] The balance of convenience test requires the court to determine which party will suffer the greater harm from granting or refusing a stay: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, at pp. 348-49. The risk of destroying a court-ordered transaction weighs against granting a stay pending appeal: Re Torstar Corporation and Nordstar Capital LP, 2020 ONSC 4679, at para. 65.

[26] The appellant’s concern regarding the respondent’s ability to repay is addressed by ordering that the Director hold the monies received from the appellant in respect of the 2025 Support Order and 2025 Costs Order pending the disposition of the appeal and further order of this court pursuant to s. 56(2) of the FRSAEA.

[27] I find that the balance of convenience does not favour the granting of a stay.

Clean Hands

[28] I also find that the appellant does not come to court for this motion with clean hands for the following reasons.

[29] First, despite having been found by Justice Sherr to have a net worth of $7 million, the appellant has not paid a penny towards the 2023 Costs Order, the 2025 Support Order, or the 2025 Costs Order.

[30] Second, the appellant has not explained his failure to pay the 2023 Cost Order. This order was neither appealed nor stayed. When confronted with this issue on this motion, counsel for appellant stated that the appellant would pay the 2023 Costs Order.

[31] Third, I have real concerns about the truthfulness of the appellant’s financial statement dated February 12, 2026 that was presented on this motion. The appellant states that he has $87,692.16 in annual income as an employee with 1001056850 Ontario Limited (“100 Ontario”), annual expenses of $96,724.08 and no debt, which is remarkable given that his expenses are greater than his income. The appellant states that he has about $1.26 million in assets comprised of his home and a bank account with a balance of almost $2,000. The respondent notes that the statement of pay that accompanied the appellant’s financial statement shows that 100 Ontario has the same address as the appellant’s home shown in his financial statement. 100 Ontario is not shown as an asset on the appellant’s financial statement. The respondent submits that 100 Ontario is a company owned or controlled by the appellant.

[32] The respondent further notes that in the appellant’s proposal to the Director dated January 20, 2026, the appellant included 100 Ontario’s telephone number which the respondent states is the same telephone number for Greenside Gardens. The respondent submits that the appellant also owns or controls Greenside Gardens. The appellant states that Greenside Gardens is multi-generational family business that was “passed down” to him by his father. Greenside Gardens is not shown as an asset on the appellant’s financial statement. In addition, after having had the opportunity to hear his evidence at trial, Justice Sherr found that the appellant was neither a credible nor a reliable witness. Justice Sherr found, at para. 47, that the appellant’s evidence was “... one of the most egregious cases of financial deception this court has seen in many years.”

Laches

[33] A motion for a stay may be dismissed when there has been an inordinate delay in seeking a stay: Bickram v. Bickram, 2015 ONSC 705, at paras. 47-48. This motion for a stay was filed 10 months after the 2025 Support Order was granted and nine months after the 2025 Costs Order was granted. The appellant did not provide any explanation for this delay.

Conclusion

[34] I find that the interests of justice do not support granting a stay of the 2025 Support Order and the 2025 Costs Order.

ISSUE #2: SHOULD THE APPELLANT FATHER’S DRIVER’S LICENCE BE REINSTATED?

[35] Part V of the FRSAEA is a complete statutory code which outlines the process for suspending a driver’s licence due to the non-payment of support.

[36] Under s. 34 of the FRSAEA, the Director may serve notice on a payor of its intention to suspend the payor’s driver’s license if the payor does not undertake one of the following actions within the 30 day period referred to in the first notice:

(a) make an arrangement satisfactory to the Director for complying with the support order and for paying the arrears owing under the support order;

(b) obtain an order to refrain under subsection 35 (1) and file the order in the Director’s office; or

(c) pay all arrears owing under the support order.

[37] Under s. 37(1) of the FRSAEA, the Director may direct the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a payor’s driver’s licence if, within the 30-day period referred to in the first notice, the payor does not take one of the steps described in s. 34(1) of the FRSAEA.

[38] Under s. 38(1) of the FRSAEA, the Director shall direct the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to reinstate a driver’s licence if:

(a) the payor pays all the arrears owing under the support order;

(b) the payor is complying with the terms of the arrangement made with the Director in response to the first notice;

(c) the payor is complying with the terms of an order to refrain that has not expired;

(d) the support order has been changed and the payor is complying with the terms of the changed support order, including the terms of any order under clause 35 (14) (b) that relates to the support order;

(d.1) the payor makes an arrangement satisfactory to the Director for complying with the support order and for paying the arrears owing under the support order; or

(e) the support order is withdrawn under section 16.

[39] In order to have his drivers’ licence reinstated the appellant must satisfy one of the provisions of s. 38(1) of the FRSAEA: Adubofuor v. Ontario (Family Responsibility Office), 2001 24013 (ON CA), [2001] 53 OR (3d) 171 (C.A.), at para. 14. The appellant has not done so. Accordingly, the appellant’s motion to reinstate his driver’s licence is dismissed.

ISSUE #3: SHOULD A REFRAINING ORDER BE MADE FOR FUTURE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT MEASURES, INCLUDING THE SUSPENSION OF THE APPELLANT FATHER’S PASSPORT?

[40] Under the FOAEAA, the Director may apply to the Minister of Justice, on notice to the debtor, requesting that no new schedule licences, such as a passport, be issued to the debtor, that all schedule licences held by the debtor be suspended, and that schedule licences held by the debtor not be renewed: at ss. 67(1).

[41] The Director’s application must include a statement that the debtor has been notified that “a licence denial application will not be made if the debtor enters into a payment plan that is acceptable to the provincial enforcement service or satisfies the provincial enforcement service that the debtor is unable to pay the amount in arrears and that the making of the application is not reasonable in the circumstances”: at s. 67(3)(c)(iv). If it is determined that the debtor is the holder of a schedule licence, then the Minister shall suspend the scheduled licence and refuse to renew it. Similarly, the Minister shall refuse to issue a schedule licence to the debtor: at ss. 69(2), 70.

[42] In order to obtain an order that prevents the Director from making an application under section 67 of the FOAEAA, a defaulting payor must, in accordance with s. 67(3)(c)(iv), show that it has either: (1) entered into a payment plan acceptable to the Director; or, (2) it has satisfied the Director that it is unable to pay the arrears and that the making of the application is unreasonable in the circumstances: McLarty v. Ontario (Family Responsibility Office), 2001 24029 (ON CA), [2001] 53 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), at para. 29; Ryckman v. Camick, 2020 ONSC 5429, at para. 30.

[43] In this case, the appellant has not entered into a payment plan with the Director, nor is the Director satisfied that the appellant is unable to pay the arrears. Accordingly, the appellant’s motion for a refraining order under the FOAEAA is dismissed.

ORDER

[44] Order to go as follows:

(a) This motion for a stay of the 2025 Support Order and the 2025 Costs Order is dismissed.

(b) Any monies paid by the appellant to the Director, in excess of whatever amount is owed under the 2023 Costs Order and any order for costs issued on this motion if any, shall be held by the Director pending the disposition of the appeal of the 2025 Support Order and the 2025 Costs order and further order of this court.

(c) The motion for the reinstatement of the appellant’s driver’s licence is dismissed.

(d) The motion for a refraining order under the FOAEAA is dismissed.

(e) Any party who seeks their costs of this motion shall deliver their costs submissions by April 2, 2026. Responding costs submissions shall be delivered by April 7, 2026. Costs submissions shall be no more than three pages long, exclusive of an outline of costs and any offers to settle. Costs submissions shall be sent to my assistant at kevin.wailoo@ontario.ca.

Mr. Justice M.D. Faieta

Date: March 28, 2026