ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: Raj v. Seroya, 2026 ONSC 1875

COURT FILE NO: FS-25-00000176-0000

DATE: 2026 03 27

B E T W E E N:

MANDEEP RAJ

R. Murthi and S. Sandhu, for the Plaintiff

• and -

JYOTI SEROYA

G. Mackintosh, for the Defendant

HEARD: February 12, 20, and 23, 2026

ruling on Hague Application

McGee J.

Result

1. On November 4, 2025, the Applicant Mr. Mandeep Raj, (“the father”) issued this Application seeking the return of the parties’ son, “A”, to California, USA pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35 (the “Convention.”)

2. This Application is the second consideration of the jurisdiction in which the parties’ parenting dispute should be decided. On December 20, 2024, the Superior Court of California ordered that California is the forum with primary jurisdiction. In lengthy and careful reasons, the court required the mother to facilitate the father’s parenting time in California commencing February 8, 2025, from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. every Tuesday and Thursday and on alternate weekends from Saturday at 10 a.m. to Sunday at 6 p.m.

3. The Respondent, Ms. Jyoti Seroya (“the mother”) has ignored that order and all subsequent orders of the Superior Court of California. The mother asserts through each of her counsels, one retained in California, and one retained in Ontario, that she will only obey a Canadian order.

4. Attached to these reasons are the Superior Court of California’s decisions of December 20, 2024 (Schedule A) and May 13, 2025 (Schedule B) and January 6, 2026 (Schedule C.) The latter awards the parents joint legal custody (decision-making responsibility) and awards physical custody of their son to the father with detailed visitation terms for the mother when the child returns. The father is required to make financial provision for the mother, to assist her in finding employment, to assist with childcare costs and Medicare and to expedite any further court processes in California.

5. A review of those three decisions - which ought to be read with these reasons - suggests that the State of California deferred custody enforcement until January of this year (2026) because the mother advised the California Superior Court that she had made an application to the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (“CIRB”) for refugee protection.

6. In this Ontario proceeding before the Superior Court of Justice, the mother has failed to provide any evidence of having proceeded with an application for refugee protection, in breach of a court order to provide disclosure on its status. She has ignored two Requests for Information from the father to provide details regarding her refugee application. Because the CIRB process is confidential, there is no other manner in which the father can obtain information as to the status of her claim.

7. The California Court now awaits the result of this Ontario application to move forward. For the reasons set out below, I confirm that California is the jurisdiction in which this parenting dispute is to be determined, and I order that “A” be forthwith returned to Tuolumne County, California in accordance with the order signed this day.

Reasons for Decision

Brief Factual Background

8. The parties are the parents of “A”, born December [redacted] 2022 in California. Under California law, each parent receives custodial rights upon being named as a parent in a child’s Statement of Live Birth. It is agreed that the father is the biological parent of “A” and that he has custodial rights in the State of California.

9. “A” is a citizen of the United States.

10. Many of the early relationship facts between the parents are in dispute and are irrelevant to these reasons. It is not disputed that the father has lived in the United States for over 35 years, the last 25 years in Sonora California. His parents joined his residence in 1999 after his father retired.

11. The mother is also a resident of the United States. She moved to California from Florida in February of 2022 after the breakdown of a prior relationship. The parties began dating in March of 2022. They are not married.

12. The mother lived at an apartment leased by the father from August 2022 until either February or April of 2023. Thereafter, she resided with the father in his Sonoma home with the paternal grandparents.

13. On July 28, 2023, the parties and their son travelled to Ontario to spend time with the extended maternal family who reside in Mississauga, Ontario. The mother was reluctant to return to California after the planned one-month visit so it was agreed that she would stay for a longer period. The father returned to California where he operates a busy liquor store and manages several rental properties.

14. On November 23, 2023, the father flew to Ontario to assist the mother on her return trip to California. After her return, the mother took steps to renew her Indian passport. The evidence shows that she stated under oath within that application that her permanent residence was California, U.S.A.

15. The maternal grandmother came to California to assist the mother in December 2023. There was friction in the household. At the same time, the maternal family learned that one of the mother’s three sisters in Ontario was seriously, potentially terminally ill.

16. On January 30, 2024, the mother and maternal grandmother travelled to the grandmother’s home in Mississauga, Ontario. They took “A” with them. The father was supportive of the trip and had no reason to believe that as before, he would join them in Ontario at some point and that he, the mother and “A” would return together to their home in California. The father booked and paid for the mother and maternal grandmother’s flights and drove them to the airport. He purchased one-way tickets to achieve cost savings in the same manner as he had for the July and November 2023 flights.

17. The mother’s sister died in late March or early April of 2024. The father was not permitted to attend the funeral.

18. It is agreed that it was one of the mother’s surviving sisters who told the father over the telephone shortly after the funeral that the mother was not returning to California. It is disputed whether the sister told the father that the mother intended to remain in Ontario permanently, or only until the paternal grandparents moved out of their home.

19. It is agreed that a WhatsApp message dated April 28, 2024, from the mother to the father reads:

“Send all my clothes, all my shoes, sandals and my costume jewelry, which is in the bedroom, in the washroom, and in the drawer in the room downstairs, to my mom’s address in Canada. Also send my black file that has Cheeku’s (familiar name for “A”) documents. Message me after sending. Send me all of Cheeku’s stuff as well.”

On April 30, 2024, the father responded:

“When I am free, I will send the belongings but tell me what you have thought regarding sharing time of my son “A” with me whether it should be fixed through mutual agreement or through the court let me know that as well.”

20. After a period of no response, the father retained counsel. On June 7, 2024, he issued a Petition in the Superior Court of California, County of Tuolumne under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

The Petition before the Superior Court of California

21. On July 25, 2024, Justice Streger of the Superior Court of California conducted a hearing called an Order to Show Cause (OSC) on the father’s Motion for custody and visitation of “A”, and his immediate return to Tuolumne County. An OSC is a procedural tool used in California courts to require a party to provide legally sufficient reasons for or against a specific action. It is a formal notice that the court is looking for an explanation before it decides on a specific legal request or an enforcement.

22. The father and his attorney appeared in person on July 25, 2024. The mother appeared by Zoom. The father pressed for “A’s” immediate return, advising that he had not seen him since January of 2024. The endorsement records that the mother advised the court that she had just received the father’s Petition, that she was in Ontario temporarily for a family emergency and that she required an adjournment to retain an attorney.

23. Justice Steger’s Minutes dated July 25, 2024 (an endorsement in Ontario) records the following:

a. The parties agreed that California had jurisdiction that the venue for the proceeding was Tuolumne County and that Justice Streger would act as the Judge Pro Tem for the case.

b. Parentage was confirmed, and upon the court reminding the mother that the father had, at a minimum, visitation rights, the mother confirmed that “Canada is temporary.”

c. The parties each confirmed their email addresses for future communications with the court and the mother was informed that she must file a Response to the Petition.

A finding was made that: “1) Mother intends to bring child to California, and 2) Parties confirm parentage.” The OSC was adjourned to September 25, 2024.

24. On September 25, 2025, Justice Steger ordered:

At the prior hearing on July 24, 2024, respondent advised this Court that: 1) petitioner herein is the biological father of the minor child, 2) she would be returning to Tuolumne County with the minor child very soon, and 3) she would be retaining an attorney. Since return of the child would resolve petitioner’s TECO, this Court took the matter under submission, expecting to learn in due course that the child was back and that the parties had resolved their difference(s). That has apparently not occurred. An evidentiary hearing is not required to determine this Court’s jurisdiction and, assuming jurisdiction exists, proper order for the custody and parenting time of the minor child (to include travel restrictions and abduction orders). Both parties are ordered to appear in person at the upcoming hearing.

25. On October 7, 2024, Mr. Hal B. Channell made a declaration to the court that he was representing the mother as her attorney and that he was in the process of seeking instructions from the mother.

26. Attached to the declaration was a seven-page, single-line, small-font statement from the mother signed by her on October 3, 2024. The statement concentrates on countering the father’s claim for custody, emphasizing that it is the mother who is the better parent and who has been the primary caregiver throughout. The statement makes no mention of relocating “A” to Ontario.

27. Specifically, the statement sets out a lengthy and detailed history of the parties’ relationship, “A’s” birth, her family’s experience with the father, incidents of poor conduct and domestic violence by the father (including alcoholism and child neglect), and her commitment to providing the best positive future for their son. The statement confirms that the mother will move back to the US “eventually” and that her mother will live with her to assist with “A’s” care when she is working.

28. The Evidentiary Hearing for Jurisdiction was scheduled to be heard on October 17, 2024. The father was present with his counsel. Mr. Channell was present, appearing on behalf of the mother.

29. Mr. Channell asked for an adjournment citing his client’s language barrier, his confusion over whether his client had started a proceeding in Ontario and his need to do more research. Counsel for the father reminded the court that “A” had not seen his father for nine months and again pressed for the child’s immediate return. Justice Streger permitted the adjournment, set a timetable for the exchange and filing of materials, including opening statements and exhibits. The date of December 5, 2024, at 1:30 p.m. was set for the “Court Trial: Short Cause. Evidentiary Hearing/Jurisdiction.”

30. On December 5, 2024, the father and his counsel were again present, as was the mother’s counsel who is noted as appearing on her behalf. The father was called as a witness, cross-examined and redirected. Four exhibits were tendered. The October 3, 2024 letter was tendered as the mother’s evidence. Closing submissions were received. Thereafter the decision was taken under submission (referred to in Canada as “under reserve.”)

31. A revised order after hearing (referred to in Canada as Reasons for Decision) was released on December 20, 2024, (attached as Schedule A.) The reasons are lengthy and comprehensive. Justice Steger placed significant weight on the mother’s October 3, 2024, statement. In his reasons he draws attention to the following evidence tendered on behalf of the mother within her statement.

a. “We are moving back to the US (me, my mother and “A”)

b. “I plan to move back to the US eventually”

c. “My family lives in Canada, and I still want to live in the US”

d. ‘I will soon start applying for jobs in the US.”

32. At page 4, lines 21 and 22, Justice Steger notes the mother’s “disproportionate focus on allegations of the father’s unfitness to serve in the role of parent – which is arguably immaterial to the jurisdiction question.” He then goes on to set out the state-child relationship in California, the applicable law and the fact that parents are granted custodial rights upon the birth of their child.

33. Justice Steger found that: A) the mother attorned to the jurisdiction of California on July 25, 2024, and even if she did not, B) California has jurisdiction because the father issued and served his Petition within six months of A’s departure from California irrespective of whether the departure date was January 30, 2024 (when the mother states that she intended to separate and that she did so with the father’s knowledge and consent) or April 28, 2024 (when the father states that he learned for the first time that the mother did not intent to return.) Six months is the period under California law in which a left-behind parent must act to preserve jurisdiction.

34. Justice Steger’s analysis does not end there. He goes on to review the provisions dealing with habitual residence within the Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (“the CLRA”) calling out the mother’s duplicity in attempting to build a status quo in Ontario while telling his court that she intended to return to California. In doing so, Justice Steger reasons that the time accrued in Ontario could give Ontario jurisdiction but for Article 7 of the Convention, concluding that:

“Since the father did not acquiesce in a new residence for A, or sit on his rights for over a year, jurisdiction under the Hague Convention rests primarily and exclusively with California as long as father had, and [was] using, his legally recognized parenting rights when mother decided she would remain in Ontario.”

35. I draw the reader’s attention to lines 3 to 27 on page 9 of Justice Steger’s December 20, 2024, reasons, in which he corrects the mother’s mistaken view that only the Canadian court (i.e. the jurisdiction to which the child has been taken or in which the child has been wrongfully retained) can undertake the Hague Analysis.

36. I concur with Justice Steger’s conclusion that “[a]lthough “A” was not “located” in California when the father’s petition was filed, pursuant to the Hague convention the child is deemed to have been here by proxy due to father’s prima facie showing of wrongful retention.”

37. Justice Steger determined that California had jurisdiction because A was conceived, born and raised in California, each of the parents was a permanent resident of the US before the mother took A to Canada, the father had pursued the return of the child within weeks of the wrongful retention and the mother had sworn under oath that she intended to return to California with the child in due course.

38. The court then made temporary orders, commencing February 8, 2025, that:

a. the parent shall share joint legal custody, and

b. Joint physical custody until such time as the mother proves her allegations under the California Family Code

c. The father’s parenting time shall be limited to the stated scheduled given his absence from A’s life, and

d. The father shall not smoke or consume any intoxicating substances within 6 hours of his parenting time.

39. The mother was expected to immediately comply with the California Order to facilitate the stated parenting time six weeks hence. She did not. Instead, she sought a reconsideration of Justice Steger’s decision, seeking more time and a new hearing date to address the start of the father’s parenting time. She cited logistical limitations in returning to California.

40. In her request for reconsideration and following receipt of the reconsideration decision, the mother did not contest jurisdiction.

41. The reconsideration was granted, and a review date was scheduled for February 27, 2025, at 10:30 a.m. The mother was required to attend in person.

42. She did not attend.

43. Her counsel, Mr. Channell told the court that the mother would not participate in the reconsideration because she had applied for refugee status in Canada.

44. On May 13, 2025, Justice Streger released an Order After Initial Hearings on Petitioner’s Contempt Filings, writing at lines 16 to 21 on page 8 that:

Unbeknownst to this Court, mother’s request for additional time was pretextual. Mother had no intention of returning to California with the child. Instead, mother used the extra time to complete a [Canadian] Basis of Claim (BOC) Form to support an application for refugee protection…Mother completed/submitted the BOC Form to the Immigration and Refugee Board and received on [January 10, 2025] a refugee protection Claimant Document (RPCD) for both her and “A”. Because her BOC Form contained the minimal showing needed to receive a review, Mother and child became eligible for health-care coverage.

45. Justice Steger noted that the making of a refugee application had not prevented the mother from attending the reconsideration proceeding by Zoom. He treated the reconsideration as abandoned.

No Refugee Application in Evidence

46. I pause my reasons here to record that the mother has tendered no evidence of a Refugee Application within this Ontario Superior Court of Justice proceeding. Although referenced by Justice Steger in his reasons, it appears that neither were any CIRB documents filed in the California proceeding. The Court simply accepted the mother’s information that she had made a refugee protection application.

47. The mother was required to provide disclosure. Because refugee applications are personal and do not involve a spouse (unless he is also an applicant) the father has had no ability to independently learn of the status of the mother’s refugee protection application.

48. This Hague Application has been actively case-managed over five attendances. On November 14, 2025, Justice Shaw endorsed that by November 27, 2025, the mother was required to provide disclosure of her refugee application which she asserted was before the CIRB.

49. When no disclosure was forthcoming, the father served the mother with a Request for Information (Form 20), on November 25, 2025, specifically asking for disclosure of the BOC, a copy of all documents filed, any minister/CBSA disclosure served, process notices such as a hearing notice, scheduling letter, any interim endorsements/directions and decisions.

50. The mother provided no documentation for the November 27, 2025, attendance, advising Justice Shaw that she was in the process of contacting the Board. Out of an abundance of caution, the father served a second Form 20 on December 3, 2025, further requesting proof of the existence of a claim before the Board. This trial was heard on February 12, 13 and 20, 2026 with closing submissions received during the week of February 23rd. The mother has never provided any of the Information sought.

51. In the absence of any disclosure of the refugee claim, or documentation that a hearing date has been set, I draw an adverse inference that the mother’s refugee application has been abandoned or has failed.

Father’s Petition for Contempt

52. The father issued a petition for contempt when the mother failed to return A to California pursuant to Justice Steger’s Order. The mother was personally served with the contempt proceeding on April 8, 2025. A series of court attendances and decisions followed:

• April 24, 2025:

An implementation plan was discussed in which the California State Department would become involved to secure the return of the child. The plan did not proceed because the State department was concerned that the mother had made a refugee application in Canada.

• May 8, 2025:

The father and his counsel were present, as were the mother’s two lawyers; Mr. Channell and Ms. Macintosh (at that time retained in the Ontario proceedings.) Counsels advised that there was an Ontario court proceeding scheduled for May 29, 2025. Upon Ms. Macintosh confirming that nothing prevented the father from visiting “A” in Ontario, the balance of the attendance focussed on setting terms for a visitation.

• May 13, 2025 - Order After Initial Hearings on Petitioner’s Contempt Filings (see Schedule II):

Justice Steger set out the mother’s position that she will not comply with a custody order unless it issues from a Canadian court and information given to him that Ontario is moving forward with proceedings despite this Court’s primary jurisdiction. This statement was not true because the mother had not advised the Ontario Court of Justice that the California court had already rendered a decision.

• Costs Award:

On May 13, 2025, Justice Streger ordered costs of $500 to be paid by the mother for her non-attendance on two prior occasions. He made a further costs award against the mother of $900 for her actions in frustrating the process.

• Finding of Contempt: Justice Steger made a comprehensive review of the law of contempt in the May 13, 2025, decision, setting out the elements to be proven, the available sanctions and the purposes of a contempt award. Ultimately, for the reasons set out he exercised restraint and did not make a finding. Instead, he warned of sanctions should the mother continue to disobey the California Superior Court orders and fail to attend court.

• Order for Visitation: Justice Steger ordered that:

“The father may travel to Ontario for a week, enjoy parenting time with “A” every day for up to four hours (2 in the morning, 2 in the late afternoon), and may submit to this Court the costs associated with that trip for possible re-allocation to mother. If mother refuses to follow this order and/or cooperate with father’s parenting time in Ontario, this court will certainly consider different option.”

53. On May 22, 2025, the father’s counsel advised the mother’s counsel by email that the father would travel to Ontario for his visitation week on May 26, 2025. Counsel asked for her proposed timing of visits that “would work for” the mother, as well as a place of exchange and contact information for the third party who would facilitate the exchange.

54. A follow-up email was sent on May 26, 2025, at 10:51 a.m. in which counsel writes, “[o]ur client is in Toronto to see the children as per the US Court order dated May 13, 2025. Please advise your client’s position regarding the facilitating the exchange as per our email dated May 22, 2025. Our client is excited and eager to meet the child.”

55. The father waited three days in Toronto with no response. On May 29, 2025, at 8:47 a.m., his counsel received the following email from Ms. Macintosh:

Dear Mr. Sandu,

My client is seeking a restraining order. She is terrified of your client. Your client has stated that he will kill the baby and my client. We do not recognize any order from outside Canada.

There Has Been No Parenting Time

56. “A” did not see his father at anytime during the week of May 26, 2025, or any time thereafter until February 20, 2026, when I required the mother to provide brief parenting time in a public location at the conclusion of the court day, prior to the father’s return to California.

57. The mother agreed to the visit on two conditions: that the father not feed the child, and that her two sisters supervise the visit.

58. The visit was disastrous.

59. It took place at a mall in a busy food centre. “A” arrived with his aunts and was told that the father was his uncle (which the sisters explained during their testimony was a term of respect, intended to make the child comfortable). “A” cried throughout the visit. One sister held the child while the other videotaped the child crying so that the court would have evidence of their safety concerns. They asked me to compare the picture of “A” crying to a picture of him prior to the visit in which he was smiling and content.

60. It is uncontested that the father sat quietly throughout the hour, afraid of causing a scene in a public place. He was grateful to see “A” and asked the sisters to stay for the full hour. He took a few pictures of his son.

61. When the agreed hour was up, unbeknownst to the father, the sisters took “A” to the Emergency Department of the local Hospital so they could gather further evidence of the child’s distress when he was with his father.

California Hearings of June 5, 2025, October 9, 2025, and December 18, 2025

62. On June 5, 2025, the father and his counsel again appeared before the California Court. The mother did not attend, but was represented by her counsel, Mr. Channell. Justice Steger was advised that the father had been denied visitation in Ontario and that subsequent emails to the mother’s Ontario counsel were answered with the same refrain: no orders from outside of Canada would be obeyed.

63. On September 15, 2025, the father issued an OSC and filed an Affidavit for Contempt, as had been contemplated in the May 13, 2025, reasons should the mother continue to breach the December 20, 2024, order. His Affidavits set out that all attempts to visit had been thwarted and the costs of $900 were unpaid. A hearing date was set for October 9, 2025.

64. On October 9, 2025, the mother’s counsel sought and received an adjournment to December 2, 2025. Each party had provided written submissions in advance of December 2, 2025, on which date Justice Streger endorsed his understanding that Justice Yee of the Ontario OCJ was proceeding that month with a hearing on jurisdiction, and “specifically, whether the child has acquired habitual resident status in Canada.”

65. He goes on to voice his frustration that “[t]his court has already observed that said residency cannot be habitual if based on mother’s wrongful retention absent full refugee status, which the child does not have.” He observes that a conference with Justice Yee would be most helpful. A conference did not occur.

66. Justice Streger ordered the mother to attend on the return date of December 18, 2025 by Zoom and ideally in-person. She was permitted to have her sister Dolly present to assist with translation and her Ontario counsel was also welcome to attend.

67. On December 18, 2025, the mother appeared by Zoom with her counsel and asked for a further adjournment, which request was denied. The father’s motion for contempt and the return of “A” to California was fully argued and the decision was reserved. I note in his subsequent reasons that the mother made another misrepresentation in the course of that argument. She stated that she had filed a restraining order against the father in Canada, but that it was stayed due to the California proceedings. That was not true. The mother had plead a restraining order in the Ontario Court of Justice Application, but one had never been granted.

January 6, 2026 - Order Granting Father’s request for Temporary Custody and Visitation with Conditions for an Immediate Return of the Child to California

68. Justice Steger released his written decision on January 6, 2026. His reasons for decision can be found at Schedule III and provide in summary:

a. That “A’s” habitual residence is the United States and that there is a risk that the mother will take the child out of California without the other party’s permission.

b. A joint legal custody award to the parties with detailed terms for specific areas of decision making

c. An award of sole physical custody of “A” to the father with detailed visitation to the mother when the child returns to California.

d. Provision that the “mother shall turn over the child to father or the father’s designee in Canada for immediate return to California. With father’s express written consent, mother may travel with the child and father (or his designee) to California for the sole purpose of reducing child’s stress. If mother and father agree to this, father shall cover the cost of mother’s roundtrip airfare and three days of hotel accommodations.

e. Terms for communication, notice of relocation, childcare, cancelled visitations, non-disparagement of the other parent or discussion of court proceedings, and a ban on the consumption of alcohol and non-prescribed medication within 6 hours of being in a care-giving role.

As well as a Child Abduction Prevention Order pursuant to the Hague Convention:

f. Justice Streger finds that there is a risk that the mother will take “A” without permission as a result of her past breaches of custody and visitation orders, the fact that she does not have strong ties to California, has done things such as wrongfully retaining the child in another country without the father’s consent, has a history of not cooperating with the father and has family/emotional ties to another country.

g. As a result of those findings, the mother is to have supervised parenting time to be paid for by the father. The mother is not permitted to take “A” more than 25 miles without the father’s approval and can travel with “A” outside of California. The mother is prohibited from applying for a passport for “A” or any other vital document. She was required to turn over any existing passport or vital documents to the father or his designate immediately

h. A parallel enforcement order was made through the Child Abduction Unit of the Office of the District Attorney.

69. The reasons extensively review the father’s claims before the court, the litigation history, the basis for a finding of jurisdiction and conclude by setting out the reasons for Justice Steger’s parenting and return orders.

70. In the course of his reasons Justice Steger rejects the mother’s procedural objection that she had not been provided with an interpreter for the prior attendance (none of which she attended except for July 25, 2024.)¹

71. Below are six salient portions of Justice Steger’s January 6, 2026 reasons. (Emphasis and bolding as in original text.)

72. On September 15, 2025, the father filed his third motion seeking return of the child from Canada. Despite giving mother every opportunity to avoid this death knell, mother has spent the last year ignoring lesser court orders and intentionally interfering with the rights of the father and child. Father has now established a legal basis for the seismic order he seeks. (Lines 26-28 page 1)

73. It was reasonably understood at the [May 13, 2025) hearing that if father went to Canada, he could see the child. Mother was given a similar compliance warning: If mother refuses to follow this order and/or cooperate with father’s parenting time in Ontario, this Court will certainly consider different options.”

On May 25, 2025, father travelled to Canada to see his child but when he landed he was greeted with the following email form Attorney Macintosh “My client is seeking a restraining order. She is terrified of your client. Your client has stated that he will kill the baby and my client. We do not recognize any order from outside Canada.”

Huh?

Had Attorney Macintosh said anything close to this during her Zoom time with this court on May 8, 2025, perhaps father would not have incurred the financial burden of flying to Canada in the hopes of seeing his child.

Had Attorney Macintosh said anything close to this during her Zoom time with this court on May 8, 2025, perhaps this court might have developed a different strategy for father’s visits – such as in the presence of a professional supervisor or inside a secured facility (like a courthouse.)

…This was an ambush, plain and simple. (lines 10-28, page 3)

3. The child was a permanent resident of California for the entirely of his life prior to being wrongfully withheld in Canada on April 28, 2024 [Footnote reads ‘Under the Hague Convention, wrongful retention occurs not when the child leaves home, but rather when the custodial parent clearly communicates to the noncustodial parent that the child will not be coming back. See Monasky v Tagliere (2020) 589 US 68. 71-79: Palencia v Perez, 921 F.3d 1333. 1342-1343; Blackledge v Blackledge 866 F.3d 169, 179; Walker v Walker, 701 F.3d 1110, 1118. It is not material that father allowed the child to be in Canada for three months prior thereto, since mother promised to return with the child after her period of mourning. ] Father filed this action for parental rights just six weeks later, on June 7, 2024 – so California never lost home state status. [Line 16-19 page 7]

4. By accepting jurisdiction in July of 2024, conducting a trial in December of 2024 and issuing written decisions in December of 2024 and May 2025, this court had already exercised primary jurisdiction and issued legally enforceable custody and visitation orders involving the child….Ontario has acknowledged California’s first-in-time status, and presumed priority jurisdiction, but declined to voluntarily abate mother’s family law case….Mother is forum shopping plain and simple. (Lines 6 to 9 and 18 to 20 page 8).

5. Although mother has made some rather scandalous accusations between herself and the father in some of her papers filed in Canada, there has not yet been any evidentiary hearing to this court’s knowledge in which those allegations have been proven – and no proof of risk to the child. Moreover, this Court is more than qualified to hear the evidence and to put in place whatever protections would be warranted. (Lines 22-26, page 10).

6. As a reminder, this court stopped short of the “knee-jerk” reaction to order the child returned to California because 1) children are not Amazon packages to be tossed about in the back of a box truck for their parent’s whim, and 2) there is a high likelihood that this child would experience significant (albeit temporary) distress if separated from the only family he knows – even if his limited exposure to father is the result of mother’s wrongful activity. Courts must not punish the child for one parent’s transgressions. However, there comes a time and place when one parent’s transgressions transcend the role of parent, obligating a court to potentially expose the child to temporary distress in exchange for the greater good. That time has come.

Mother’s Application before the Ontario Court of Justice

72. In January or February of 2025, the mother issued an Application in the Brampton Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ); a provincial court located in Brampton in the Regional Municipality of Peel.

73. In certain areas of Ontario there continue to operate two levels of court with family law jurisdiction: provincial court and superior (federal) court. This case is one more example of the additional cost and delay engendered by duplicative parenting jurisdictions.

74. In her OCJ Application the mother sought sole decision-making responsibility, that “A’s habitual residence be found to be in Mississauga and that a restraining Order prevent the father from contact with her or their son. The mother did not include in her Application the fact that California had already made a finding of jurisdiction on December 20, 2024.

75. The father alerted the California Court when he was served with the Ontario Application. He retained Ontario counsel who attempted to correct multiple misrepresentations made by the mother within her OCJ Application, but primarily, that California had not yet determined jurisdiction.

76. In a letter dated November 2, 2025, Mr. Channell had written directly to Justice Yee, stating that his “sole focus and argument have been limited strictly to the issue of jurisdiction. My position throughout has been that the threshold question to be resolved is which country properly holds jurisdiction to determine matters related to the child’s custody, safety, and welfare.” He cites his lack of familiarity with Canadian law and his client’s retainer of Ms. Macintosh in December 2024, writing:

Under Ms. Mackintosh’s guidance, Ms. Seroya applied for Refugee Protection status in Canada. Her application was accepted by Canadian authorities. The US Court is now awaiting clarification of proceedings in Canada, recognizing that the Canadian process will influence the final determination of jurisdiction.

77. By November 2, 2025, Justice Steger was deliberating his decision based on all the evidence to date, which included no information on a refugee application.

78. More alarmingly, Mr. Channell’s November 2, 2025 letter concludes with the following false statement:

I advise the court that my representation of Ms. Seroya in the United States was confined solely to the issue of jurisdiction and that there is no California order setting out jurisdiction. Lastly, all steps taken by Ms. Seroya have been consistent with protecting her child’s best interested while pursuing lawful remedies in Canada. (underlining added)

79. Justice Steger comments on this misrepresentation in his January 6, 2026, decision at lines 9 to 15, page 21. He writes:

In addition, mother has authorized Attorney Macintosh to appear in these proceedings, who gave false inferences to this court on May 8, 2025, about mother’s willingness to cooperate with father’s visit in Canada. Mother has also authorized Attorney Channell to offer misleading information in a letter to Justice Yee about the absence of jurisdictional rulings from this court. While the court historically treads lightly on such things, mother’s direct and indirect transgressions in this court lead inexorably to the conclusion that mother has demonstrated so far, a lack of good character for someone expected to co-parent.

80. The father filed a 14B motion (a chambers motion heard in writing) and on December 5, 2025, Justice Yee made an endorsement acknowledging that California had already decided jurisdiction and that the father had started a Superior (this) Court Application under the Hague Convention for which timelines and a case management justice had already been assigned. On consent the parties agreed to a stay of the OCJ proceeding to avoid duplication.

Ontario Superior Court of Justice (“OSJ”) Application

81. This Superior Court Application for the return of a child wrongfully retained pursuant to section 46(5) of the CLRA was issued and served on November 4, 2025. Within the Application the father seeks the immediate return of “A” to California pursuant to the Convention, a declaration that Ontario lacks jurisdiction under the CLRA and a stay of the OCJ Application.

82. The mother has never filed an Answer to this SCJ Application. Although she is in default, this expedited Trial proceeded on the basis that the orders sought were opposed and that the mother was permitted full participatory rights.

83. Section 46(5) of the CLRA permits a party to make an application to an Ontario court in pursuance of a right or an obligation under the Convention.

84. Ontario is a province within Canada, which is a contracting signatory to the Convention. As such, Ontario is required to protect children from the effects of a wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure a child’s prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access.

The Hague Convention

85. The Convention is a multilateral Treaty designed to protect children under the age of sixteen from abduction. The term abduction can refer to a wrongful removal or a wrongly retention across international borders, that is, a child being moved to another jurisdiction in breach of custodial rights held by a person (here the father) or institution (such as a child protection agency) under the laws of that state.

86. The Hague Convention does not operate if the left behind parent acquiesced to the child’s removal or retention, or if the left-behind parent had no custodial rights at the time of the removal or retention.

87. During this Trial, the mother seized on a narrative that the father acquiesced to “A’s” removal to Ontario when he purchased the tickets for their departure to Ontario in January of 2024. I reject this fabrication. The evidence is clear that neither parent considered himself or herself separated in January of 2024, and both anticipated the mother’s return to California. It is only in hindsight that the mother and her family attempt this recharacterization.

88. I find that the father has never acquiesced to “A’s” removal from his home in California. Moreover, I agree with Justice Steger that even if January 30, 2024, was the date of separation/removal, the father issued a Petition for “A’s return within six months pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The difference in dates matters only as to whether this was a wrongful removal on January 30, 2023, or if “A” was wrongfully retained after April 28, 2024.

89. Working on the principle that custody disputes should be settled in the child's home country, the Hague Convention, once invoked, functions as a civil legal mechanism to ensure the prompt return of children to their country of habitual residence for the resolution of custody disputes.

90. The Hague Convention does not determine custody, or as statutorily framed in Canada, decision-making or parenting schedule disputes. It only determines where the parenting issues in dispute are to be determined. In this manner, it achieves its objects set out in Article 1 of the Convention: to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in a country that is not the children’s habitual residence, and to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in other Contracting States.

A Finding Pursuant to the Hague Convention May be Unnecessary

91. There has been much confusion in this proceeding that has been caused by the mother’s conviction that Ontario has the right to determine the parenting issues as a de nova determination. She points to “A” now being resident in Ontario longer than he lived in California and champions the benefits to him of growing up in his maternal, multigenerational home where he can be protected from contact with his father.

92. I am now able to cut through this confusion with the realization that the California State Department was prepared to secure “A’s” return in April 2025 but for the mother’s assertion that she had made a refugee application in Canada. This fact was not apparent during the Trial that I heard in February 2026.

93. There is no evidence of a refugee application. On this basis alone, “A” must be returned to his father’s care forthwith. If the mother is not prepared to facilitate his return, State and Federal Authorities must be activated.

94. The mother is living in Canada on a visitor’s visa which in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, is reasonably presumed to be expired. Neither she nor “A” have any citizenship status in Canada. There is an Order of the Superior Court of California that the child is to be returned to California and placed in the physical care of the father.

95. As an aside, I question whether in custody proceedings there is or should be some mechanism to share information between a foreign court, this court and/or the CIRB when a left behind country has deferred enforcement of a domestic return Order pending the result of a refugee application. Here, California has deferred enforcement out of respect for the CIRB. Could there not be some mutual obligation to confirm when a refugee proceeding has been determined? The situation is ripe for mischief when the only person who has knowledge of the status of a refugee claim has a litigation advantage in not disclosing that status.

Exceptions Under the Hague Convention

96. If I am wrong in a view that no further order is required, I will turn now to the father’s claim for the return of “A” to California pursuant to the Hague Convention, and the mother’s opposition. Her position can be summarized on three bases.

i. That the father acquiesced to “A’s” permanent relocation to Ontario. I find this to be patently untrue, and no further reasons need be provided.

ii. That “A” ought to remain in Ontario because more than a year has passed since his removal from California/retention in Ontario, and

iii. That “A” faces a grave risk of physical or psychological harm should he be returned to California.

97. I begin with an overview. I have earlier set out the objects of the Hague Convention as can be read in its Article 1. Article 3 proscribes when a removal or retention of a child is considered to be wrongful:

Article 3

The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where:

a. it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

b. at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.

The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph: a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.

98. There is no question that the father was exercising his rights of custody at the time of “A’s” removal/retention. He did so by operation of law in the State of California. As earlier stated, California law grants custodial rights to a person registered as a parent at the time of the child’s birth.

99. Article 12 of the Hague Convention requires the immediate return of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained as set out in Article 3, if less than a year has elapsed between the time of removal and retention and the commencement of the judicial proceedings for the return of the child. That provision is subject to the exceptions set out in Article 13.

Article 13

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that:

a. the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or

b. there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.

the judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. I need not deal with this exception given “A’s” age.

The One Year Period in Article 12 was met on June 7, 2024

100. The mother argues that this Application, issued on November 4, 2025, is more than a year after “A’s” removal from California on January 30, 2024, and therefore, the father can no longer seek the return of “A” to California.

101. As set out above, a return order made pursuant to the Convention is not a custody determination. It is simply an order that restores the status quo which existed before the wrongful removal or retention. Here, the status quo was restored by the mother’s participation in the Petition before the Superior Court of California. She raised no objection to their jurisdiction until after she was ordered to return “A” to California. Since that time, she has attempted to defeat the California Court by seeking a different order in a different country, on a different record.

102. I find that the father did commence proceedings pursuant to Article 12 within a year of the wrongful removal/retention when he issued his petition on June 4, 2024.

103. Much of counsel’s submissions focussed on this point, so I will add that the court of the left-behind country may choose not to order the child back pending a final determination of the parenting dispute, as was the case in I.K. v. D.N.2024 BCSC 1748 without losing jurisdiction. In I.K. v. D.N. the leaving mother was not required to return the child until the parenting dispute in the left behind country was determined.

104. The court took this approach to provide stability to the child during the determination, and in recognition that the mother was fully participating in its court process and was not in breach of any of its orders. In turn, the mother accepted that she might have to return the child at the completion of the proceeding and was prepared to do so.

Grave Risk to the Child

105. Immediately after receiving the December 20, 2025, order, the mother sought a reconsideration. But instead of participating in that reconsideration, she used the respite period to make a refugee application. Shortly thereafter, she issued an Application before the OCJ without telling the Ontario court about the decision of the California court.

106. Meanwhile, the California Court waited for more information on the mother’s refugee application, which was never provided. The mother sought a series of adjournments, successfully deferring the father’s contempt proceedings.

107. The mother might have continued to adjourn the enforcement proceedings indefinitely had Justice Steger not rejected her third request on December 18, 2025 stating that “this Court will not be held hostage waiting for the IRB to handle its caseload.”

108. In response, the mother argued the case of Kirby v Woods, 2025 ONCA 601 at the December 18, 2025 hearing before Justice Steger. Kirby v Woods is a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had been released only a few months earlier. The decision reversed a lower court’s order to return a child to a left behind country; finding that the application judge failed to properly apply the rebuttable presumption of grave risk arising from a positive refugee determination, and had failed to place sufficient weight on the child’s views and preferences.

109. The rebuttable presumption of grave risk was established in the 2011 Court of Appeal decision of A.M.R.I. v. K.E.R., 2011 ONCA 417. The Court in A.M.R.I. preserved judicial discretion in the face of a positive refugee determination and explicitly recognized that because the IRB is not bound by legal or technical rules of evidence, there is a serious potential for abuse of the refugee determination process by an abducting parent seeking tactical advantage.

110. In his January 6, 2026 reasons, Justice Steger was alive to this risk, writing at page 11 that the inquisitorial/non-adversarial nature of the Canadian Refugee determination system render its decisions “ineligible for estoppel or res judicate” before an American court. He then goes on to make findings based on the evidence of each parent, ultimately ordering a return of the child to California, a reversal of primary residence and limits on the mother’s ability to travel with “A”.

111. The mother now argues in this Application that I should conduct a fresh inquiry into the exception of grave risk, arguing in her closing submissions that:

a. The California hearing should not be given any weight because she did not have time to retain counsel for the initial attendance on July 25, 2024. I need not address this ground further in the face of the mother’s full participation in the subsequent 18 months, and ongoing litigation before the California Superior Court.

b. The California Superior Court order of December 20, 2024, is not binding on her because she had already left California at the time that it was made. I need not address this ground further as it conflates the jurisdiction to make a binding decision and the enforcement of that decision in another country.

c. She feels unsafe in California and wants to stay away from the father and the paternal family.

d. Her evidence and that of her family members establish a grave risk of harm should “A” be returned to California.

e. “A” has now lived 22 of his 36 months of life in Ontario, in the exclusive care of his mother and her family. As a result, Ontario is “A’s” habitual residence.

112. I will deal with 111(c) and (d) together.

113. As explained by Justice Kurz in Zaidi v Zia [2026] O.J. No. 284, at paras. 194-210 the test for a finding of grave risk of harm is a high threshold, see Ellis v. Wentzell-Ellis, 2010 ONCA 347, 102 O.R. (3d) 298, at paras. 37, 40.

114. The threshold does not require that a child be "pushed beyond the limits of endurance": Landman v. Daviau, 2012 ONSC 547, 17 R.F.L. (7th) 332, at para. 103, aff'd in Husid v. Daviau, 2012 ONCA 655, 298 O.A.C. 182, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 485, but it must be a "situation that an individual child should not be expected to tolerate" see F. v. N., 2022 SCC 51, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 616, at para. 73, as cited in Osaloni v. Osaloni, 2023 ABCA 116, at para. 12.

115. Madsen J, writing for the court in Kirby v. Woods, best sets out the meaning of grave risk of harm within the Hague Convention, citing Thomson v. Thomson 1994 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, at p. 580. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that to constitute grave risk, the risk must be weighty and substantial and must place the child in an intolerable situation: at p. 597. The word "grave" modifies the "risk" and not the "harm": Thomson, at p. 596. The assessment must be undertaken from a child-centered perspective: Thomson, at p. 597.

116. In Ojeikere v. Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372, 8 R.F.L. (8th) 253, at para. 59, Laskin J.A. compared the "intolerable situation" standard of art. 13(b) of the Hague Convention to the less onerous "serious harm" standard which applies to non-Hague child abduction/retention cases under s. 23 of the CLRA. He found that the "intolerable situation" standard imports a more stringent standard than simply "serious harm" under s. 23 of the CLRA. At para. 60, Laskin J.A. described the Hague Convention standard as "exacting".

117. The onus of proof is on the party alleging that an Article 13(b) exception applies: Husid v. Daviau 2012 ONCA 655, 21 R.F.L. (7th) 336, at para. 20, leave to appeal refused Husid v. Daviau, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 485.

118. This trial was organized in a manner that all witnesses and the parties would provide their evidence in chief by way of an affidavit. In the rush to get this to an early decision point, the task of setting page limits was missed. The mother took advantage of this lapse and filed hundreds and hundreds of pages. Much of the content of each affidavit was hearsay. Much of the content of each affidavit was the opinion evidence of the maternal family as to the father’s unfitness.

119. I have listened carefully to the mother’s oral evidence and that of her mother, two sisters and her brother. The mother testified that she was abused financially, physically and sexually. She speaks of being confined at the Sonora home with restrictions on her movements.

120. The grave risk threshold may be met by the actions or pattern of behavior of a parent, with or without physical violence against a child. However, an allegation of domestic violence is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason to refuse a return of the subject child. That is due to the presumption that the court of the return state can and will provide sufficient protection to the abused parent: Finizio v. Scoppio-Finizio (1999), 1999 CanLII 1722 (ON CA), 179 D.L.R. (4th) 15 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 34-35, citing Medhurst v. Markle (1995), 1995 CanLII 9273 (ON CTGD), 17 R.F.L. (4th) 428 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at p.

121. Here, the mother does not assert that the State of California cannot offer adequate protection to her and “A” should they return. She confirmed in cross examination that she was aware and understood that the California court can issue and enforce protective orders, including non-contact terms. She agrees that California courts apply the same best interests analysis as is done in Ontario.

122. The mother does not state that she is unable to financially re-establish herself in California. She is a U.S. citizen. In fact, the father is bound by a number of undertakings in this proceeding, some of which have already been placed into the January 6, 2026 Order. For example, he undertakes to pay for the travel costs of the mother to return, six months of housing costs up to $600 a month, to assist in finding employment, not to have direct contact other than as ordered and/or to use Our Family Wizard, to request rapid case management and obtain mirror orders, and to secure a pediatric appointment for “A” within 10 days of arrival. He has consented to terms that prohibit any consumption of alcohol and non-prescribed medication within 6 hours of being in a care-giving role for “A”.

123. The basis of the mother’s allegations of grave risk instead arises from the father’s alleged conduct towards her and “A” during the times that they resided together: April 2023 to the end of June 2023 and from November 23, 2023, to January 30, 2024. The dates are important because they provide important context. For example, a number of the maternal family members were not present during periods in which they assert knowledge of events that they state support a finding of grave risk of harm.

124. In assessing the evidence of grave physical or psychological harm in these reasons, I will focus on the maternal family’s allegations of gun violence in the father’s Sonora home. I was also told by the maternal grandmother that the father had placed a knife in the baby’s hands and had forced “A” to drink alcohol. Although I may not reference each allegation specifically, I have considered all the allegations made by the maternal family.

125. The gun violence allegations (as well as the knife and alcohol allegations) were made for the first time in this Ontario Superior Court proceeding. Prior to this proceeding the abuse reported by the mother was more general in nature. In her October 2023 statement the mother spoke about the father’s lack of interest in the baby and his inability to care for him. In earlier filings, the maternal family testified as to a “tea incident” in which hot tea was almost spilled on “A” and on another occasion, one of the sisters spoke about how the father almost dropped “A” while standing on a balcony. Much was made of the father’s sobriety, a trip to the temple when he was intoxicated and a stay in hospital. The grandmother and one sister stated that they watched the father speak to spirits.

126. The father doesn’t deny occasions of alcohol abuse which he regrets, and he explains that his time in hospital was caused by a flare-up of his Crohn’s disease. The balance of allegations is vigorously denied.

127. The direct evidence set out in the mother’s, her two sisters’ and the grandmother’s affidavits for this Trial were cut from a wholly different cloth. All of the affidavits were in the same voice. No statement was too extreme to be placed before the court even when internally inconsistent.

128. For example, the mother placed in a factum dated January 23, 2026, at para 40 that the father “told her that he would kill “A”, himself and her.” In her affidavit of January 6, 2026, she attributes that threat in paragraph 54 to a statement made by the father to the grandmother, which she overheard. Later in the same affidavit at para. 142 she states that the father once said to her that “If there is no other choice, I can kill you and “A”, and then I will shoot myself, and no one can do anything after that.” She writes in the next paragraph that “[t]he Applicant father threatened many times that he would kill both “A” and me. He would tell me that he had a gun and could kill “A” and me anytime. He also told me that he murdered someone, and no one could find out about it. He also said that he knew some people who would kill anyone at his request.”

129. This latter statement took on many different forms. In her affidavit at para 158 she writes that the father “also claimed that he had contacts in Mexico who could do anything for him upon his request, including killing anyone.” In cross examination the mother testified that the father told her that “he had killed someone, and no one knows where the body of that person is thrown away.”

130. Dolly Seroya states in her affidavit sworn February 9, 2026 that during her visit to Sonoma from December 19, 2023 to December 31, 2023 she clearly saw the father “reach for and take out a pistol..[and that] my mother urgently intervened and persuaded him to put the pistol back into a drawer. This incident was extremely frightening and created serious and immediate safety concerns for everyone present, including [the mother] and child. The environment at that time felt dangerous and out of control.”

131. In the next paragraph, Dolly writes that she felt someone could be seriously harmed and that the situation could turn fatal. Five paragraphs later she again describes observing the father take out a pistol inside the home, open the firearm and display it in a manner that made it clear “that it was fully loaded.” Without transcribing the balance of that paragraph, it greatly differs from the earlier paragraph in which the grandmother intervened. The paragraph does not indicate that this was a different event.

132. I found a third version of that event within the December 31, 2025 affidavit of the maternal grandmother. She states at affidavit 86 that the father ‘was lunging across the room to get his gun to shoot his father. [The father] got his gun. I grabbed [the father] firmly so that he would not actually fire the gun. However, [the father] said, “Leave him. Let him kill me today.”

133. The mother’s affidavit sworn January 6, 2026, sets out a fourth, differing account of that same event. She states that she, her mother and Dolly were present when the father threatened to kill his father and he reached into the drawer where the gun was kept. She states that she was afraid that someone would be killed and that “the overall environment was one of panic and fear, and I genuinely believe that serious harm could occur.”

134. The location of the gun in the house is different between accounts. The mother stated that it was kept in the baby’s room. The grandmother and sister stated that it was in the top drawer of a chest in front of the bathroom in the Sonora home.

135. The father denies all these assertions. He acknowledges that he owns a permitted gun which he keeps at the liquor store for security purposes. He affirms that it is never taken home.

136. None of these gun-related allegations were contemporaneously (or ever) reported to the California police, medical or child welfare authorities where they could have been investigated. The mother, her sister and the grandmother told no one prior to the allegations being placed in the December, January and February affidavits prepared for this trial. There are no pictures of the gun, videos or recordings. It was confirmed in cross examination that each deponent had a cellphone with a camera at the time of the alleged incident.

137. The mother attempted to corroborate her view of the father as dangerous during this trial by tendering the following documents into evidence. Despite police and other searches, she advises that these two reports are the only documents available.

a. In a police report dated April 27, 2022, a couple (not the parties) were observed pushing an elderly male out the door at the father’s place of business. A call to the police was made by a passer-by. There was no follow-up.

b. On January 5, 2024, a Notice of Violation said that the father had been found to be storing alcohol in a private warehouse, i.e. his garage.

138. The paternal grandfather testified that there is no gun in the home and that he has never been threatened by his son. The father denies ever threatening self-harm, harm to “A” or to harm the mother. While not dispositive, I place considerable weight on the father and paternal grandfather’s denials because they are more consistent with the evidence as a whole.

139. I recognize in saying this that I must be careful to avoid assuming that there is but one way in which a victim of domestic abuse will react. A court must not rely on myths or stereotypes regarding the way a victim of any form of abuse will be expected to respond to their abuse. Eyewitnesses can perceive the same event in different ways and be telling the truth, especially in traumatic circumstances.

140. At the same time, I cannot ignore glaring evidentiary inconsistencies. The mother argues in this proceeding that she and the father knew the relationship was over in January of 2024 and that they agreed that she and the baby were permanently moving to Ontario. If she is being truthful, there would have been no reason for all three women who purportedly were present, (the mother, her sister and the grandmother) to fear reporting incidents of gun violence to the authorities.

141. Moreover, it is unimaginable that the mother would not have brought these events to the California Court’s attention when the father sought custody in June 2024. At the time, she was safe in Ontario and would have had no reason to fear the father. Instead, she and her family members raise these events for the first time in this proceeding.

142. Credibility and reliability are interrelated, but distinct concepts. Credibility has to do with a witness’s genuine efforts to tell the truth in a wholesome manner, not leaving out details that could mislead the listener. Reliability relates to the parties’ ability to accurately observe, recall, and recount events in issue. A credible witness may not be reliable despite his or her best efforts to tell the truth, but should a witness prove not to be credible, then his or her evidence cannot be found to be reliable absent corroboration.

143. A trier may believe none, part or all of a witness’ evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness’ evidence. (See R. v. D.R. 1996 CanLII 207 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291 at [para.] 93 and R. v. J.H. supra).

144. With respect to the allegations of gun violence, I do not find the mother, the grandmother, or the sisters’ assertions to be credible. Neither do I find credible the grandmother’s statements that the father gave “A” a knife and forced alcohol upon him.

145. I make this finding with a sincere appreciation that the maternal family suffered a great loss in the spring of 2024 and were reeling in the aftermath. It is understandable that they might act to keep the mother and their new baby grandson close to them in Ontario; especially given the father’s decision not to marry the mother. But as mirrored in Justice Steger’s decisions, I find that the situation has gone too far. What might have been amicably resolved has devolved into a situation requiring court intervention.

146. A party claiming grave risk of physical or psychological harm faces a high threshold. In Hassan v. Garib, 2017 ONSC 7227, at para. 10, Engelking J. asked the three following questions to determine whether the "grave risk of harm" defense had been made out:

a. Has the alleged past violence been severe and is it likely to recur?

b. Has it been life-threatening?

c. Does the record show that the left-behind parent is not amenable to control by the justice system?

147. I do not find that the mother has proven the first two branches of this test because the allegations of her and the maternal family, as they relate to the risk of grave physical or psychological harm are neither credible nor reliable.

148. With respect to the third test, I could not be more certain that the State of California will provide “A” with the maximum protection possible, as necessary, and that the father - who has participated throughout each of the California Court and the Ontario Court proceedings in the upmost good faith - will be amenable to control by the California justice system.

149. Returning to paragraph 111(e), I will briefly address the mother’s assertion that A has now spent more time in Ontario than California and ought to be found to be habitually present in Ontario. Her assertion rests on the premise that a court ought to allow post removal circumstances to sanction a wrongful act.

150. As stated by Justice Shore at para. 37 of Knight v. Gottesman, 2019 ONSC 4341:

“[I]n the case before me, I cannot consider the children's connections to Ontario created after their wrongful retention in Ontario. In using the hybrid approach set out in Balev,² I can still only consider the relevant factors in place prior to the children's wrongful retention and not those formed since returning to Ontario.”

151. In Pruitt v. Pruitt, 2025 ONSC 3405, at para. 25, McVey J. articulated a further reason why the court must reject post-removal evidence as a ground for finding habitual residence in the new location, even for infants. She wrote:

“I cannot accept the proposition that, when dealing with an infant, the location of the primary caregiver alone should determine habitual residence, without reference to the child's home environment immediately prior to their removal. Such an approach, in my view, conflicts with the objectives of the Convention. While I acknowledge that the Respondent's argument is more nuanced given the child's ties to Ottawa, the broader concern is that if an infant's habitual residence is driven almost exclusively by the primary caregiver's location, it would permit that caregiver to move the child at will, effectively transferring custody issues to another country that may not be best placed to resolve them. This creates significant unfairness for the left-behind parent and is contrary to the aims of the Convention and the child's best interests.”

152. Such is the case here. To permit the mother to establish a new habitual residence in Ontario, following a period in which she has deliberately disobeyed the orders of the California Court would be to promote the wrongful removal/retention of children, contrary to the terms of the Hague Convention which Canada has a legal obligation to uphold.

153. In making an order for return, I recognize that it operates only with respect to “A”. The mother, despite her statements to the contrary, could choose to stay in Ontario.

154. Nonetheless, I make this order. Courts must be prepared to order the return of a child despite a risk of separation from their primary caregiver to deter and remedy child abductions. As stated in Jamali v. Gillani, 2021 BCSC 2134, at para. 101, to decide otherwise, “could allow abducting parents, in some situations, to rely on their status as primary caregivers to circumvent the due process for custody determination and remove the children from the authority of the courts that would normally have jurisdiction. This could ultimately risk making Ontario a haven for child abductions.”

Conclusion

155. Order to issue pursuant to draft order signed this day. Specifically:

156. Order for the immediate return of the child namely [redacted] born on December [redacted], 2022, to Sonora, California, USA pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

157. I declare that Ontario lacks jurisdiction under the Children’s Law Reform Act s. 22(1)(a) and (3) and that all custody and parenting claims with respect to [redacted] are in the sole jurisdiction of the California Superior Court in accordance with the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

158. Order instructing and authorizing the Peel Regional Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Border Security Agency, and any other law enforcement agencies to enforce the provisions of orders relating to return of [redacted] as required.

159. If further orders are required to enforce Justice Streger’s order dated January 6, 2026 in Ontario I may be spoken to on an urgent basis by emailing my assistant Anita at SCJ.CSJ.General.Brampton@ontario.ca.

Costs

157. The father was the successful party on this Application and is presumptively entitled to his costs under Rule 24(3) of the Family Law Rules. The parties are to confer on the costs of this proceeding, including any claim to necessary expenses under Article 26 of the Hague Convention and any costs of enforcing this Order.

158. If there is no agreement as to the amount of costs to be paid to the Applicant father, each party shall serve, file, and upload to Case Centre written submissions not to exceed five pages, double spaced, one-inch margins, plus a Bill of Costs and Offers to Settle by April 17, 2026. Case law is to be hyperlinked. No reply is permitted.

McGee J.

Released: March 27, 2026

Schedule A: December 20, 2024 � niJ r!fi--!Dl . ;j

i L,l,l-, Ii.,

2 DEC 2 0 2024

·_JJ

j

"1

Superior Court of California

4 CountY. of Tuolumne

by:�

Clelk

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

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COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

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Case No. FL18618

REVISED ORDER AFTER HEARING

20 In this proceeding, the parties disagree as to how disputes regarding custody and visitation for

21 their minor child should be resolved. The child was conceived and born here in California, but

22 surreptitiously relocated to Ontario, Canada, after Mother refused to return. Although Mother has

23 repeatedly affirmed to this Court her long-term intention of returning to the United States on a

24 permanent basis, she contends that the courts in Ontario, Canada, should exercise primary (if not

25 exclusive) jurisdiction herein because that is where she is presently residing (albeit on a tourist visa).

26 Both sides have expressly stipulated to this bench officer serving as Judge Pro Tern for all purposes

27 (see CCP § 259(d), CRC Rule 2.816 and express consent provided in open court on 07/25/2024).

28 ; ; /

I.

2 11 Pertinent Background

3 11 Petitioner Mandccp Raj (hereinafter "Father") and Respondent Jyoti Scroya (hereinafter

4 II "Mother") first became acquainted in 2012 through an onlinc dating platform called Shadi.com. Father

5 II was but a few years removed from an earlier marriage (sec FL7498), and was trying to get back in the

6 II saddle. Although love sparks did not fly in both directions, Father stayed in touch with Mother's

7 11 family and positioned himself as a friend for nearly a decade.

8 11 In 2015, Mother secured permanent residency (green card) here in the United States. Soon

9 11 thereafter she met and married Sunccl Rangnekar. He filed for divorce in 2021 (sec Delaware County

10 II Court, OK, case no FD-2021-00134). At the time of their separation, Mother was reportedly living in

11 11 Florida. This was an uncontested dissolution, finalized by submitted decree two months later.

12 II In January of 2022, Father and Mother reconnected. Mother needed assistance securing a job,

13 11 and Father came through with an offering for her in Sacramento, California just two hours from

14 11 where Father lived in Sonora, California. The two started a dating relationship and soon conceived a

15 11 child. According to Mother, she was convinced not to terminate the pregnancy with Father's promises

16 11 of marriage. A DNA test reportedly confirmed parentage.

17 11 On 10/03/2022, Mother filed a petition in Sacramento County, California, to change her legal

18 11 name back to Jyoti Scroya. Sec 34-2022-00327602. That petition was summarily granted without

19 11 hearing on 12/22/2022, the same day that Father and Mother welcomed into the world a son they

20 11 named […] (hereinafter "A.R.") via scheduled C-section. Mother included Father on the birth

21 II certificate (after signing a Voluntary Declaration of Parentage), gave the child Father's surname, and

22 11 openly acknowledged Father's parentage at least while the couple lived here in California.'¹

23 11 Immediately following A.R.'s birth, Mother and child moved in with Father at his home on

24 11 Stewart Street here in Sonora, California.² Father and Mother applied for a social security card for

25 11 A.R. - which arrived at their Stewart Street residence in due course. Sec Petitioner's Exhibit #4.

26 II Father added A.R. to his health insurance plan with Kaiser Permanente. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. 27

1According to Father, Mother now disputes - or at least permits some question about - Father's parentage.

2Mother contends that the move did not occur until April of2023 but the difference is of no consequence since the question here is A.R. 's connection to California as his home state, not which county should serve as venue for this dispute.

On or about 06/14/2023, Mother began an online application to renew her Indian passport.

2 11 Therein, she indicated a permanent residence here in California.

3II On or about 07/28/2023, Mother, Father and A.R. traveled to Ontario to attend a festival

4 11 (presumably the Mississauga Italfest, but unclear). Father returned to California to tend to his

5 11 businesses, while Mother and A.R. remain in Ontario. According to the record, Mother did not return

6 11 to California until mid-November.

7 11 On 12/19/2023, as part of her application to renew her Indian passport, Mother completed a

8 11 sworn affidavit attesting to her new name and identifying California as her place of residence for that

9 11 passport. As further proof of her new address, she submitted billing statements from JS West

10 11 (propane), PG&E (electric) and Vonage (phone) - all of which showed her residence in California.

11 II On 12/22/2023, Father was reportedly impaired at A.R.'s first birthday party. According to

12 II Mother, Father has a serious drinking problem that did not surface until after A.R. was born, and this

13 11 was just one of many events that Father ruined for everyone. According to Mother, Father checked

14 11 himself into Kaiser Permanente in Elk Grove, and Adventist Health here in Sonora for medical care

15 11 associated with his excessive drinking - but stayed only one day at each facility.

16 II On 01/30/2024, Mother decided it was time to bring her mother back to Ontario. She learned

17 11 that her sister in Ontario who had been ill for quite some time was nearing end of life. Although

18 11 A.R. was just barely over a year old, Father agreed to allow A.R. to travel with Mother to Ontario to be

19 11 with family during her sister's final days. Mother's sister died in March of 2024, but Father was

20 11 barred from attending the family services.

21 11 On or about 04/28/2024, Father received a phone call from Mother's other sister, advising him

22 11 that Mother had decided to remain in Ontario indefinitely, and that she would not be returning to

23 11 California to gather her belongings. Father also received an email from Mother, asking him to send

24 11 her personal items to her mother's townhouse on Mississauga Valley Boulevard in Ontario. It was at

25 11 this time that Father formed the opinion that Mother was intending to "kidnap" A.R.

26 11 On 06/07/2024, Father filed the pending petition to determine parental rights. Therein, he

27 11 prayed for joint legal custody, sole physical custody, and visits to Mother only after she returns with

28 11 the child to California.

On 07/25/2024, Father and Mother appeared at the initial hearing hereon. Mother appeared by

2 Zoom, and informed the Court that (1) her time in Ontario was temporary for a family matter, (2) she

3 was intending to return to California in a month or two, and (3) she requested a reprieve in order to

4 complete her family business and retain a California attorney. The parties stipulated to jurisdiction in

5 California, and the venue here in Tuolumne County. The matter was taken under submission to permit

6 Mother time to retain local counsel.

7 On 09/25/2024, this Cami issued an Order After Judicial Review, noting that Mother had

8 apparently decided not to return to California and that an evidentiary hearing would be required to

9 confirm primary jurisdiction.

10 On 10/09/2024, Mother caused to be filed herein a statement signed under penalty of petjury,

11 making clear her desire and intention to move back to the United States with A.R., to find a job, and to

12 settle down. Her sworn statement make plain that she did not intend to establish permanent residency

13 in Ontario. The salient excerpts from her lengthy declaration include:

14 " "We are soon moving back to US (me, my mother, A.R)" - Page 3, Para. 3.

15 11 "I plan to move back to the U.S. eventually" Page 5, Para. 6.

16 " "My family lives in Canada, and I still want to live in the U.S." - Page 6, Para. 8.

17 11 "I will soon start applying for jobs in the U.S." - Page 7, Para. 3.

18 On 10/17/2024, the parties were invited to submit briefing for this Court's consideration of the

19 question of primary jurisdiction. Father and Mother, having each retained competent local counsel,

20 filed comprehensive legal briefs. While the briefs touched upon some of the key issues regarding

21 jurisdiction, Mother's brief included a disproportionate focus on allegations of Father's unfitness to

22 serve in the role of parent which is arguably immaterial to the jurisdiction question. 23

24 On 12/05/2024, both sides answered ready for the hearing. Father appeared in person; Mother

25 did not. The attorneys stipulated to treating the briefing as sworn statements for purposes of evidence.

26 Father took the stand and provided testimony (under direct examination and cross examination).

27 Father submitted a few additional items as evidence. Both sides provided an opening statement and

28 closing argument. The matter was taken under submission.

II.

2 11

Legal Discussion

3 11

Child custody jurisdiction rests on the state's relationship to the child, not on the parents'

4 11

relationship to the state. The state-child relationship must satisfy fundamental jurisdictional

5 11

requirements set by the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 USC §1738A) and the

6 11

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Family Code §3400 et seq.); but so long as

7 11

those requirements are met, and each parent receives notice and an opportunity to be heard, California

8 11

courts are empowered to determine custody even though a parent (or the child) is not physically

9 11

present in and has no "personal jurisdiction ties" to the state. See Family Code § 3421(c); Marriage of

10 11

Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478,493; In re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236, 246.

11 11

It is well settled in California that the UCCJEA jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied

12 11

whenever a state court is called upon to make either an initial or a modified custody determination.

13 II

See §§ 3402, 3465; in accord, In re Stephanie M (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 310; A.M v. Superior Court

14 II

(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 343,353; Marriage of Kent (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 487,493. Although Mother

15 11

and Father both stipulated previously that California has proper jurisdiction to resolve this dispute,

16 11

Mother now contends that her "language barrier" and "confusion" at the prior hearing makes her

17 11

stipulation unenforceable. The fact that Mother made a voluntary general appearance and secured a

18 11

continuance on her promise to return to California is sufficient to find personal jurisdiction over her,

19 11

with or without the stipulation. Jvfarriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 15-17; Marriage of

20 II

Torres (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378. As such, rather than detour into the dark labyrinth of

21 II

Mother's subjective understanding of what was taking place at the hearing on 07/25/2024, it is easier

22 11

to simply do the jurisdictional analysis from scratch.

23 11

Pursuant to Family Code §§ 3402 and 3421, California has jurisdiction to make child custody

24 11

and visitation determinations if any of the following arc true: (I) the child has lived in California for at

25 I I

least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of the proceeding; (2) the child

26 11

previously lived in California within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, and a

27 11

parent continues to live in California; (3) the child's current state has declined to exercise jurisdiction;

28 II

and (4) no other state court qualifies for home state status, and the child has a significant connection to

California. The six-month requirement docs not staii over just because there was "a period of

2 II temporary absence." Sec e.g., In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728, 735-736.

3 11 Father commenced the within proceeding on 06/07/2024. Since A.R. did not leave California

4 11 until O1/30/2024, and did not declare his intention to stay away until 04/28/2024, California qualifies

5 11 as A.R. 's home state. A.R. was conceived, born, and raised here in California - giving AR. a

6 11 significant connection to California. Father has lived here for decades and owns several

7 11 homes/businesses in California - giving him a significant connection here as well. Mother lived here

8 11 in California for over a year, and used California as her permanent address for a myriad of purposes,

9 II not the least of which was securing a renewed passport. But for Mother's refusal to return him, A.R.

10 11 would have enjoyed permanence here in California. For these reasons (§3421(a)), California clearly

11 11 has jurisdiction. Sec also Marr;age of D;ck (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144, 154-156.

12 11 The fact that California has jurisdiction does not end the inquiry, because according to

13 11 Mother's counsel, Mother is attempting to create jurisdiction in Ontario even though she has

14 11 provided this Court with sworn statements attesting to her intention to leave Canada and return to the

15 11 United States as soon as possible. Mother appears to be forum shopping.

16 11 In Ontario, jurisdiction over non-marital custody and visitation disputes is codified in Chapter

17 1122 of the Children's Law Reform Act (1990). Pursuant thereto, a court may exercise its jurisdiction to

18 11 make a parenting/contact order if the child is a "habitual resident" of Ontario. A child has "habitual

19 11 residence" if, but only if, (1) both parents reside together in Ontario, (2) one parent resides in Ontario

20 11 with the "consent, implied consent or acquiescence" of the other parent, or (3) one parent has resided

21 II in Ontario "on a permanent basis for a significant period of time." The first element does not apply

22 11 since the parties do not cohabitatc in Ontario. As for the second, Father did consent to, and acquiesce

23 11 in, Mother's tempora,y v;s;r to Ontario to tend to family matters, but at no time did he consent to, or

24 11 acquiesce in, Mother's permanent relocation to Ontario. As to the third clement, while reasonable

25 11 minds might differ, this Court concludes that Mother did not effectively make Ontario her residence

26 11 until 04/28/2024 when she asked Father to send her the balance of her personal effects from their home

27 II in California. Given that Father filed here on 06/07/2024, Mother's six weeks of regular residency in

28 11 Ontario was not "a significant period of time" as a matter oflaw and common sense. Moreover, there

is no "permanence" to her current living situation, noting that she and her mother plan to move with

2 11 i.R. back to the United States very soon.³

3 11 Separately, a court in Ontario may exercise jurisdiction if (1) the child is physically present in

4 11 Ontario at the commencement of the application for the order, (2) substantial evidence concerning the

5 11 best interests of the child is available in Ontario, (3) no application respecting decision-making

6 11 responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the child is pending before an extra-provincial

7 11 tribunal in another place where the child is habitually resident, (4) no extra-provincial order respecting

8 11 decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the child has been recognized

9 11 by a comi in Ontario, (5) the child has a real and substantial connection with Ontario, and (6) on the

10 11 balance of convenience, it is appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised in Ontario. Arguably, most of

11 11 the six aforementioned factors could support jurisdiction in Ontario: the child resides in Ontario; the

12 11 child no longer has "habitual residence'' in California; there are no pending orders from this Court

13 11 recognized by a court in Ontario; the age of the child is such that he has as much connection to, and

14 11 best interests evidence in, Ontario as he does anywhere else; and the "convenience" and fairness

15 11 factors appear evenly-split.

16 11 Because it would appear that both California and Ontario could exercise jurisdiction to decide

17 11 the custody/visitation issues between Father and Mother, the tiebreaker is the 1996 Hague Convention

18 11 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental

19 11 Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. Pursuant thereto, "subiect to Article 7, in

20 11 case of a change of the child's habitual residence to another Contracting State, the authorities of the

21 11 State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction." Chapter II, Art. 5(2) [emphasis added]. Even if

22 11 Ontario were to qualify as A.R.'s current habitual residence (which it should not given Mother's

23 11 confessed intention of moving back to the U.S.), Article 7 provides in pertinent part as follows:

24 Ill

25 Ill

26 Ill

27

28 3 As far as this Court is aware, Mother has not sought to acquire permanent resident status in Canada. If she has done so, her sworn declaration filed here could be pe1jurious.

"In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the authorities of the

2 Contracting State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the

3 removal or retention keep their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual

4 residence in another State, and a) each person, institution or other body having

5 rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention; or b) the child has

6 resided in that other State for a period ofat least one year after the person, institution

7 or other body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge of the

8 whereabouts of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still

9 pending, and the child is settled in his or her new environment." 10

11 11 Since Father did not acquiesce in a new residence for A.R., or sit on his rights for over a year,

12 11 jurisdiction under the Hague Convention rests primarily and exclusively with California as long as

13 11 Father had, and was using, his legally recognized parental rights when Mother decided she would

14 II remain in Ontario. Mother makes much ado of the fact that Mother left for Ontario before any comi

15 11 proceedings began here in California. That is true: there were no "court orders" in place giving Father

16 11 parenting rights, and no "court orders" in place barring Mother from taking A.R. to Canada. However,

17 II "court orders" are not required. In California, Mother and Father "are equally entitled to the custody

18 11 of" A.R. See Family Code §3010. Father has a lawful right "to share the rights and responsibilities of

19 11 child rearing," and A.R. has a lawful right to "frequent and continuing contact with" Father. See

20 II Family Code §3020(b). Stated more precisely, "absent a custody order, a presumed father retains the

21 11 right to physical custody of his child unless it is relinquished by death, inability or refusal to take

22 II custody, or abandonment of the child." People v. Ryan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1314. Father

23 11 qualifies as a presumed parent because he signed a Voluntary Declaration of Parentage after taking a

24 II DNA test, was placed on A.R.'s birth certificate as the biological father, received A.R. into his home,

25 II and held A.R. out as his biological child. Sec Family Code§§ 7570, 7573, 7611(d). As soon as he

26 11 signed the VDOP, that was enough to trigger his lawful right to at least some physical custody of A.R.

27 II Since Mother has refused to bring A.R. back to California, over Father's picas, and to this Court's

28 11 knowledge without a "good cause" affidavit, it does reasonably appear that Mother has wrongfully

retained A.R. outside of California. The charge of interference with custodial rights (Penal Code 2 11 §278.5) does not require as a condition precedent a "court order" establishing those rights.

3 11 Undeterred, Mother contends that Father has waived his right to retain jurisdiction here in

4 11 California because he failed to file a "return petition" in Ontario. This is a reference to the 1980 Hague

5 11 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which applies "to any child who

6 11 was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access

7 11 rights." Chapter I, Art. 4. Mother is mistaken in her belief that relief is only available with a petition

8 11 filed in Canada. Pursuant to Chapter III, Art. 8, Father "may apply either to the Central Authority of

9 11 the child's habitual residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for assistance

10 II in securing the return of the child." In other words, Father is free to file a petition with the U.S.

11 11 Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Directorate for Overseas Citizen Services, Office of

12 II Children's Issues (phone: 888-407-4747; email: PreventAbductionl@statc.gov), and perhaps he

13 11 already has. Sec 22 USC §§ 9006, 9009. However, it is not always necessary to file a formal return

14 11 petition with the U.S. Department of State because Congress has given state courts "concurrent

15 11 original jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention," allowing any person seeking the return

16 11 of a child or rights of access to a child to do so by filing a civil action "in any cou1i which has

17 11 jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the

18 II child is located at the time the petition is filed." 22 USC§ 9003. Although A.R. was not "located"

19 11 here in California when Father's petition was filed, pursuant to the Hague Convention the child is

20 11 deemed to have been here by proxy due to Father's primafacie showing of wrongful retention. It is

21 11 true, of course, that had Father filed in Canada, that office would have an obligation to "take or cause

22 11 to be taken all appropriate measures in order to obtain the voluntary return of the child" (see Chapter

23 11 III, Art. 10), and this matter may have ended quickly given that A.R. is a U.S. Citizen, but that was not

24 11 Father's only option for recourse. Since making any report to authorities includes the very real

25 11 potential of placing Mother in criminal jeopardy, it is possible that Father was hoping this could be

26 11 worked out without creating an international kerfuffle. That now appears unlikely. As Oscar Wilde is

27 11 credited with saying, from Father's perspective, "no good deed goes unpunished."

28 II/ II

III.

2 Conclusion

3 California is the forum with primary jurisdiction over this custody dispute. The child was

4 conceived, born and raised here in California. Father is a permanent resident of California. Mother

5 was a resident of California (and permanent resident of the United States) before taking the child and

6 fleeing to Canada. Father has pursued the return of the child, and his lawful rights to judicial

7 intervention. Mother swore under oath to this Court that she intended to return to California with the

8 child in due course. That was false.

9 With jurisdiction firmly established, this Court now makes the following temporary interim

10 custody orders:

11 o Father and Mother shall share joint legal custody of A.R.;

12 o Father and Mother shall share joint physical custody of A.R. until such time as Mother

13 proves her allegations under Family Code §3041.5 and/or §3044.

14 o Because it has been some time since A.R. was out of his Mother's immediate care, Father

15 shall have limited parenting time with A.R. as follows:

16 o Every Tuesday and Thursday from 2pm - 6pm.

17 o Alternate Weekends (Sat@ 10am - Sun@ 6pm).

18 o Father shall not smoke during his parenting time; and shall not ingest/consume any

19 intoxicating/impairing substances during his parenting time or within 6 hours thereof.

20 Father's parenting time shall begin 02/08/2025. If Mother fails to facilitate said parenting time,

21 this Court reserves all authority to suspend Mother's parental rights and to trigger law enforcement

22 involvement. A review hearing is set for 02/27/2025 at 10:30 a.m. in Department 5. Father and

23 Mother are required to appear in person.

24 IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 DATED: December 20, 2024.

26

27 !2� ½��--

28 HON. STEVEN s. sTREGErlV

SUPERIOR COURT COMMISSIONER

Superior Court of California

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

12855 Justice Center Drive Sonora, CA 95370

I

DEC 2 0 2024

Superior Court of California County of Tuolumne 1iy,Ja!:lr�it·:a Mullan _Cle!l<

Mandeep Raj

Plaintiff/ Petitioner,

vs.

Jyoti Seroya

Defendant/ Respondent.

Superior Court Case No. FL18618

Clerk's Certificate of Service by Mail (CCP 1013a[4])

I am a clerk at the above named Court, and do certify that I am not a party to the above-entitled cause. On the

date shown below I served a copy of the Revised Order After Hearing, by depositing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a separate, sealed envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, addressed respectively to the person(s) as shown below.

Hal B Channell PO Box 5347

Sonora, CA 95370

Nathan Nutting

270 Barretta Suite A Sonora, CA 95370

Mailed at Sonora, California Superior Court of California, Tuolumne County Hector X. Gonzalez, Jr., Court Executive Officer

Date: December 20, 2024 By: Jessica Muffen

Jessica Mullen, Superior Court Clerk

Clerk's Certificate of Service by Mail

Schedule B: March 13, 2025

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8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

9 COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

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l l Case No. FL18618

FILED

MAY 1 3 2025

Superior Court of California Counw of Tuolumne

by:_ �� losJ{ Clerk

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ORDER AFTER INITIAL HEARINGS ON PETITIONER'S CONTEMPT FILINGS

19 In these proceedings, the parties disagree as to how disputes regarding custody and visitation

20 for their minor child should be resolved. The child was conceived and born here in California, but

21 surreptitiously relocated by Mother to Ontario, Canada. Although Mother had affirmed to this Court

22 her intention to return to California and deal with custody here, it now appears that her only intention

23 is to secure permanent residency in Canada. Although she has previously submitted to jurisdiction

24 here in California, and stipulated to this bench officer serving as Judge Pro Tern for all purposes (see

25 CCP § 259(d), CRC Rule 2.816 and express consent provided in open court on 07/25/2024), it further

26 appears that she has no intention of complying with custody orders unless they issue from a Canadian

27 court. Until such time as the respective courts resolve their Hague Convention concerns, the first court

28 to exercise jurisdiction is ordinarily entitled to full faith and credit. That would be California.

Case Number PL I 8618 Order re Contempt filings

Page I or 13

I.

2 11 Pertinent Background

3 11 Petitioner Mandeep Raj (hereinafter "Father") and Respondent Jyoti Seroya (hereinafter

4II "Mother") first became acquainted in 2012 through an online dating platform called Shadi.com. Father

5 11 was but a few years removed from an earlier marriage (see FL7498), and was trying to get back in the

6 11 saddle. Although love sparks did not fly in both directions, Father stayed in touch with Mother's

7 11 family and positioned himself as a friend for nearly a decade.

8 11 In 2015, Mother secured permanent residency (green card) here in the United States. Soon

9 11 thereafter she met and married Suneel Rangnekar. He filed for divorce in 2021 (see Delaware County

10 II Court, OK, case no FD-2021-00134). At the time oftheir separation, Mother was reportedly living in

11 11 Florida. This was an uncontested dissolution, finalized by submitted decree two months later.

12 11 In January of 2022, Father and Mother reconnected. At the time Mother was unemployed and

13 I I living in Florida. Mother needed assistance securing a job, and Father came through with an offering

14 11 for her in Sacramento, California - just two hours from where Father lived in Sonora, California.

15 11 Father helped Mother move in with a family in Sacramento, and lined her up with a sales position at

16 11 AH Brands. The two started a dating relationship, and within two months they conceived a child.

17 11 According to Mother, she and Father spoke of marriage.

18 11 On 09/03/2022, Mother and Father jointly rented an apartment at the lavish Kensington Park

19 11 Apartments in Sacramento, CA. This is an upscale apartment complex with 300 units, a dog park,

20 11 pickleball courts, a fitness center and three swimming pools.¹

21 11 On 10/03/2022, Mother filed a petition in Sacramento County, California, to change her legal

22 11 name back to Jyoti Seroya. See 34-2022-00327602. That petition was summarily granted without

23 11 hearing on 12/22/2022, the same day that Father and Mother welcomed into the world a son they

24 11 named [redacted] (hereinafter ·'J.R.") via scheduled C-section. Mother included Father on the birth

25 II certificate (after signing a Voluntary Declaration of Parentage), gave the child Father's surname, and

26 11 openly acknowledged Father's parentage - at least while the couple lived here in California. 27

28

1 Mother states in her FLR 35.1, at Para 7. that she lived there "without proper lighting in the bedroom," likely to imply that the apartment was somehow substandard. There is nothing substandard about this apartment complex: https://www.livcatkensington.com/.

Immediately following A.R. 's birth, Mother and child moved in with Father at his home on

2 11 Stewart Street here in Sonora, California. Father and Mother applied for a social security card for A.R.

3 11- which arrived at their Stewart Street residence in due course. See Petitioner's Exhibit #4. Father

4 11 added A.R. to his health insurance plan with Kaiser Permanente. Sec Petitioner's Exhibit# 1.

5 11 On or about 06/14/2023, Mother began an onlinc application to renew her Indian passport.

6 11 Therein, she indicated a permanent residence here in California.

7 11 On or about 07/28/2023, Mother, Father and A.R. traveled to Ontario to attend a festival

8 11 (presumably the Mississauga Italfest, but unclear). During that trip, Mother claims that Father

9 I I "almost" spilled hot tea on A.R. Father returned to California to tend to his businesses, while Mother

10 11 and A.R. remain in Ontario. According to the record, Mother did not return to California until

11 I I 11/22/2023. Upon her return, she completed an online application to renew her Indian passport,

12 11 attesting under penalty of perjury that California was her permanent place of residence.

13 11 On O1/30/2024, Mother learned that her sister in Ontario who had been ill for quite some time

14 11- was nearing end of life. Although A.R. was just barely over a year old, Father agreed to allow

15 11 Mother to travel again with A.R. to Ontario to be with family. Mother's sister died in March of 2024.

16 11 On or about 04/28/2024, Father received a phone call from Mother's other sister, advising him

17 11 that Mother had decided to remain in Ontario indefinitely, and that she would not be returning to

18 11 California to gather her belongings. Father also received an email from Mother, asking him to send

19 11 her personal items to a townhouse on Mississauga Valley Boulevard in Ontario. It was at this time that

20 11 Father formed the opinion that Mother was intending to "kidnap" A.R.

21 11 On 06/07/2024, Father filed the pending petition to determine parental rights. Therein, he

22 11 prayed for joint legal custody, sole physical custody, and visits to Mother only after she returns with

23 11 the child to California.

24 11 On 07/25/2024, Father and Ai/other appeared at the initial hearing hereon. Mother appeared by

25 11 Zoom, and informed the Court that (1) her time in Ontario was temporary for a family matter, (2) she

26 11 was intending to return to California in a month or two, and (3) she requested a reprieve in order to

27 11 complete her family business and retain a California attorney. The parties stipulated to jurisdiction in 28

California, and the venue here in Tuolumne County. The matter was taken under submission to permit

2 11 Mother time to retain local counsel.

3 11 On 09/25/2024, this Court issued an Order After Judicial Review, noting that Mother had

4 11 apparently decided not to return to California and that an evidentiary hearing would be required to

5 11 confirm primary jurisdiction.

6 11 On 10/09/2024, Mother caused to be filed herein a statement signed under penalty of pe1jury,

7 11 making clear her desire and intention to move back to the United States with J.R., to find a job, and to

8 11 settle down. I Icr sworn statement submitted to this Court makes plain that she did not intend to

9 11 establish permanent residency in Ontario, but instead had every intention of returning here in due

10 11 course. Excerpts from her declaration include the following materials admissions against interest:

11 II o "We are soon moving back to US (me, my mother, J.R)"- Page 3, Para. 3.

12 II o '·I plan to move back to the U.S. eventually" -Page 5, Para. 6.

13 11 o "My family lives in Canada, and I still want to live in the U.S." Page 6, Para. 8.

14 11 o '·I will soon start applying for jobs in the lJ.S." Page 7, Para. 3.

15 11 This Court took her at her word.

16 11 On 10/l 7/2024, the parties were invited to submit briefing for this Court's consideration of the

17 11 question of primary jurisdiction. Father and Mother, having each retained competent local counsel,

18 11 filed comprehensive legal briefs. While the briefs touched upon some of the key issues regarding

19 11 jurisdiction, Mother's brief included a disproportionate focus on allegations of Father's unfitness to

20 11 serve in the role of parent - which is arguably immaterial to the jurisdiction question. However, this

21 11 Court reserved for later determination the obvious concern about Father's alleged unfitness and

22 11 whether he indeed should have his parenting time curtailed accordingly.

23 11 On 12/05/2024, both sides answered ready for the hearing. Father appeared in person; Mother

24 11 did not. The attorneys stipulated to treating the briefing as sworn statements for purposes of evidence.

25 11 Father took the stand and provided testimony (under direct examination and cross examination).

26 11 Father submitted a few additional items as evidence. Both sides provided an opening statement and

27 11 closing argument. The matter was taken under submission.

28 II///

II.

2 11 Jurisdictional Reprise

3 11 Child custody jurisdiction rests on the jurisdiction's relationship to the child, not on the parents'

4 11 relationship to the jurisdiction. Herc in the United States, that relationship with the child must satisfy

5 11 fundamental requirements set by the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 USC §1738A)

6 11 and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Family Code §3400 et seq.). So

7 II long as those requirements are met, and each parent receives notice and an opportunity to be heard, the

8 11 child's "home state" is empowered to determine custody. See§§ 3402, 3465; in accord, In re

9 II Stephanie M (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,310; A.M v. Superior Court (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 343,353;

10 11 Marriage a/Kent (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 487, 493.

11 11 As previously noted, California has primmy jurisdiction to render custody and visitation orders

12 11 pertaining to A.R. for the following reasons:

13 11 1) Mother and Father both stipulated in open Court that California has proper jurisdiction

14 11 to resolve this dispute;

15 11 2) Mother made a voluntary general appearance and secured a continuance of the

16 11 proceedings on her promise to return to California (see Marriage o.f'Obrecht (2016) 245

17 II Cal.App.4th I, 15-17;Marriagec�f'Torres(1998)62Cal.J\pp.4th 1367, 1378);

18 11 3) Because A.R. lived in California for at least six months, Father still lives here, and A.R.

19 11 was living here within six months of when Father filed this action (06/07/2024),

20 II California qualifies as A.R.'s home state (sec Family Code§§ 3402 and 3421);

21 11 4) California is the first jurisdiction to issue legally enforceable custody and visitation

22 11 orders involving A.R.

23 11 As previously noted, this Court leaves room for the possibility that Ontario might have

24 11 secondmy jurisdiction to render custody and visitation orders pertaining to A.R. because, in Ontario,

25 11 jurisdiction is apparently tied to the parent's "habitual residence" -- which is where one parent has

26 II resided "on a permanent basis for a significant period of time." See Chapter 22 of the Children's Law

27 11 Reform Act (1990). Mother apparently decided in April of 2024 that she would remain in Canada for

28 11 the foreseeable future (despite telling this Court something else), going so far as to file an application

for special "refugee" protection in Canada. While her application remains pending, she is allowed to

2 11 remain in Canada for provisional status. Thus, she may be effectively "permanent."

3 11 This Court is informed and believes that the court in Ontario is moving forward with

4 11 proceedings despite this Court's primary jurisdiction. When two sovereign countries exercise

5II concurrent jurisdiction over custody/visitation, one must eventually abate. If the secondary will not

6 11 voluntarily abate to the primary, and both countries are Hague signatories, the "tiebreaker" is typically

7 II the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-

8 11 operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. The

9 11 general rule is this: "in case of a change of the child's habitual residence to another Contracting State,

10 11 the authorities of the State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction." Chapter II, Art. 5(2).

11 11 I Iowever, there is an exception (Article 7), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

12 11 ''In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the authorities of the

13 11 Contracting State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the

14 11 removal or retention keep their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual

15 11 residence in another State, and a) each person, institution or other body having

16 11 rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention; or b) the child has

17 11 resided in that other State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution

18 11 or other body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge of the

19 11 whereabouts of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still

20 11 pending, and the child is settled in his or her new environment."

21 11 Congress has given state courts "concurrent original jurisdiction in the place where the child is

22 I I located at the time the petition is filed" to decide jurisdictional issues under the I Iague Convention. 22

23 11 USC §9003. Since Father did not acquiesce in Mother's removal of A.R. from California, and no other

24 11 state would have authority to act in this instance, this court is authorized to address the Hague concern.

25 11 This Court is authorized to find, and does find, that Father did not acquiesce in a new

26 11 residence for A.R., or sit on his rights for over a year. As such, jurisdiction under the I Iague

27 11 Convention rests primarily and exclusively with California as long as Father had, and was using, his

28 II legally recognized parental rights when Mother decided she would remain in Ontario. I le did.

Mother made much ado of the fact that she left for Ontario be.fhre any court proceedings began

2 11 here in California. While there were no "court orders" in place barring Mother from taking J.R. to

3 II Canada, Mother and Father "are equally entitled to the custody of" A.R. Sec Family Code §3010.

4 11 Father has a lawful right "to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing," and J.R. has a

5 I I lawful right to "frequent and continuing contact with" Father. Sec Family Code §3020(b). Stated

6II more precisely, "absent a custody order, a presumed father retains the right to physical custody of his

7II child unless it is relinquished by death, inability or refusal to take custody, or abandonment of the

8II child." People v. Ryan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1314. Father qualifies as a presumed parent

9II because he signed a Voluntary Declaration of Parentage after taking a DNA test, was placed on A.R. 's

10 11 birth certificate as the biological father, received A.R. into his home, and held A.R. out as his

11 II biological child. Sec Family Code§§ 7570, 7573, 761 l(d). As soon as he signed the VDOP, that was

12 II enough to trigger his lawful right to at least some physical custody of AR. Since Mother has refused

13 II to bring A.R. back to California, over Father's pleas, and to this Court's knowledge without a "good

14 11 cause" affidavit, it does reasonably appear that Mother has wrongfully retained A.R. outside of

15 11 California. The charge of interference with custodial rights does not require as a condition precedent a

16 I I "court order" establishing those rights.

17 11 III.

18 11 The Current "Contempt" Concerns

19 II On 12/12/2024, this Comi issued the following initial custody and visitation orders:

20 11 • Father and Mother to share joint legal custody;

21 11 • Father and Mother to share joint physical custody;

22 11 • Beginning forthwith, Father to have parenting time:

23 11 o every Tues/Thurs from 2pm 6pm;

24 11 o alternate weekends Sat@ 10am - Sun @ 6pm;

25 11 • Mother may be sanctioned if she "fails to facilitate"

26 II • Father and Mother to appear ·'in person" at review hearing on O1/23/2025.

27 II On 12/19/2024, Mother filed several court documents taking issue with how quickly Father's

28 11 parenting allocation was expected to commence. As Mother explained:

"The Court made an order that Mother shall forthwith present the child for

2 11 visitations here in Tuolumne County. The Court needs to consider that Mother is

3 11 in Canada and has no place to live in Tuolumne County. There needs to be an order

4 11 allowing a transition to have the child available in Tuolumne County ... Mother

5 11 docs not have ability to comply with the Court's order. Mother has no job, no place

6 11 to stay in Sonora."

7 11 Mother did not claim that this Court lacked jurisdiction to make the aforementioned orders, nor

8 11 did she claim that a return to California with A.R. was impossible. She only asked for more time and a

9 11 new hearing date to address the commencement of Father's parenting allocation. Rather than summon

10 11 the parties for another hearing, this Court opted instead to grant Mother's request ex pctrle and give

11 11 Mother time to work out an implementation plan. This Court issued a revised custody and visitation

12 II order providing that Father's parenting time would instead commence in early February, with a review

13 11 hearing set for late February. The revised order was mailed to counsel for the parties the same day it

14 11 was issued (12/20/2024). Neither party filed any objections, requests for reconsideration, or similar

15 11 collateral challenges to the revised order. In other words, Mother accepted this Court's revised order.

16 11 Unbeknownst to this Court, Mother's request for additional time was prctcxtual. Mother had

17 11 no intention of actually returning to California with the child. Instead, Mother used the extra time to

18 11 complete a Basis of Claim (BOC) Form to support an application for refugee protection. See FLR

19 1135.1, Para 66. Mother completed/submitted the BOC Form to the Immigration and Refugee Board,

20 11 and received on O l /10/2025 a Refugee Protection Claimant Document (RPCD) for both herself and

21 11 A.R. Because her BOC Form contained the minimal showing needed to receive a review, Mother and

22 11 child became eligible for health-care coverage.

23 11 At the scheduled review hearing here on 02/27/2025, Mother did not attend as ordered.

24 11 Mother's local attorney was in attendance, and advised that Mother would not be participating in the

25 11 hearing because she had applied for "refuge protection" in Canada. This Court reminded counsel that

26 II"refuge status" docs not hamper Mother's ability to comply with an obligation to appear at court

27 11 hearings, particularly given this Department's flexibility with remote Zoom-based appearances. The

28 11 hearing was continued for Mother's participation.

Soon after the aborted 02/27/2025 hearing, this Court was informed that Mother commenced

2 11 her own family court case in Ontario. The details of this filing arc scant, but it appears to this Court

3 11 that Mother sought decision-making orders, abduction-prevention orders, and perhaps some kind of

4 11 restraining order against Father. While seemingly acknowledging California's jurisdiction and her

5 11 own promises to return (sec Para 63), Mother stated in her FLR 8 and 35. l that she no longer intended

6 11 to return to California let alone cooperate with Father's custodial rights - due a litany of unproven

7 11 allegations of physical, mental and financial abuse by Father against both Mother and child.²

8 11 On 03/28/2025, Father caused to be filed a motion requesting a change in custody/visitation, an

9 11 order compelling the immediate return of A.R. to California, and a citation for contempt based on

l O 11 Mother's expressed refusal to cooperate. It was implied, though not directly stated, that Mother failed

11 11 to facilitate Father's parenting time after the effective date of 02/08/2025.

12 11 On 04/08/2025, at approximately l :26 p.m., Mother was personally served by a process server

13 11 with Father's various motions. Per the summons, Mother was ·'ordered to appear in this court" on

14 1104/24/2025, and "to give any legal reason why this court should not find you guilty of contempt."

15 11 On 04/24/2025, Mother failed to appear as directed in the contempt summons, despite the

16 11 common knowledge that parties are free to appear in matters here via Zoom. Mother's local attorney,

17 11 who did appear, offered no cogent explanation for her absence, except to note that Mother was filing a

18 11 separate family law case in Canada. A discussion ensued regarding a §3040(a) implementation plan,

19 11 and the hearing was continued to 05/08/2025.

20 11 On 05/08/2025, Mother again failed to appear. No explanation was offered for Mother's

21 11 absence. Mother's Canadian attorney, who was not required to appear, was kind enough to join the

22 11 hearing via Zoom. She provided this Court with information regarding Mother's refuge application

23 11 and family law case, which this Court appreciated. However, the information was only general and not

24 11 explanatory for why Mother was not in attendance. 25

26

27 11 2 Contrary to Mother's assertion that "the California court decided in favour or [Father]" and that Mother "should have returned to California," neither is accurate. Mother repeatedly confirmed her intention to return to California. and never raised any question

28 11 regarding jurisdiction until she retained a lawyer. Mother was invited to present evidence regarding Father's alleged physical/substance abuse. but as yet has declined to do so - opting instead to present such evidence only to the court in Ontario. This Court is well-equipped to address concerns relating of substance/physical abuse in parentage cases. and to consider requests for international move-aways.

Mother's failure to appear at these hearings constitutes a quasi-direct contempt which may be

2 11 summarily punished with a sanction pursuant to CCP §177.5. Mother was personally served with an

3 11 order to appear to answer to the charge of contempt, and failed to appear - several times - with no

4 11 good cause or substantial justification. Mother also failed to appear at the hearing on 02/27/2025,

5 11 despite a direct order from this Court that she appear in person. It seems to this Court that Mother has

6 11 zero regard for this Court, but hopefully a small monetary sanction will generate the deference one

7 11 would expect. Mother is hereby ordered to pay to the Court the sum of $500, representing $250 for

8 11 each court hearing she failed to appear at since being served with the order to show cause. Payment

9 11 for that is due within 10 days.

10 11 Since Mother's presence would have made it easier to work on an implementation plan, this

1 1 11 Court further finds that her absence rendered the hearings on 04/24/2025 and 05/08/2025 useless. As

12 11 such, reimbursement for legal fees to Father is warranted. Family Code §271 authorizes a trial court to

13 11 ··base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or

14 11 attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where

15 11 possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation betv.:een the parties and

16 11 attorneys." This statute codifies the Legislative intent to enforce a minimum level of cooperation

17 11 between the parties to favor settlement and reduce litigation costs. In other words, even actions that

18 11 are technically authorized by zealous advocacy and the "letter of the law"' may expose a party to

19 11 sanctions if that conduct is obstreperous and adverse to the ultimate goal of peaceable resolution. See

20 11 Featherstone v. Martinez (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 775, 783-784; A1ene:::es v. Ade Demiel (2019) 44

21 11 Cal.App.5th 340, 349; Boblitt v. Boblitt (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 603, 612; Marriage of'Dcmie!s ( 1993)

22 1119 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1107. Under the circumstances, this Court finds that Father should be

23 11 reimbursed one hour of attorney time for each of those hearings, for a total of $900.00. Payment for

24 11 that is clue within 10 clays, directly to Attorney Nutting.

25 11 As for the contempt itself, that will require a bit more nuance. One parent's interference with,

26 11 or deliberate sabotage of, the other parent's custodial/visitation rights may provide sufficient legal

27 11 grounds for contempt, changes in custody/visitation, or monetary sanctions. See Marriage <�{Burgess

28

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 36 n.6; County c�/San Diego v. P.13. (2020) 55 al.App.5th 1058, 1071; Cooper v.

2 11 O'Rourke (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 243, 246.

3 11 ► Contempt. In a contempt proceeding pursuant to CCP § I 209(a)(5), the accuser must

4 II prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following four clements: (1) the making of a valid

5 II court order; (2) the accused's knowledge of the order; (3) the accused's ability to

6 II

7 11

8 II

9 II

comply with the order; and (4) the accused willful disobedience of the order. Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 396, 428; In re Marcus (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th I 009, IO15. The order must be clear, specific, and unequivocal; Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused. Id.; in accord, Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc.

10 11 v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 820, 827. If found guilty, '·the court shall

11 11 order the contcmncr to perform community service of up to 120 hours, or to be

12 11 imprisoned up to 120 hours, for each count of contempt." CCP §1218(c)

13 ► Modification. It is the public policy of this state to ensure that children have frequent

14 and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have ended their relationship.

15 Family Code §3020(b). To that end, "the court shall consider, among other factors,

16 which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the

17 noncustodial parent [andj may require the parents to submit to the court a plan for the

18 implementation of the custody order." Family Code §3040(a)(l). "One of the key

19 factors the court should address as grounds for modifying custody is the custodial

20 parent's deliberate efforts to impair the children's frequent and continuing contacts with

21 the noncustodial parent." Jane J v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894, 907.

22 In fact, "it is common knowledge among family law practitioners that the quickest way

23 for a parent to lose primary physical custody is for that parent to obstruct the visitation

24 rights of the other parent." };/arriage o/Moschella ( I 994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1234.

25 ► Sanctions. Pursuant to Family Code §3028, "the court may order financial

26 compensation for periods when a parent has been thwarted by the other parent when

27 attempting to exercise custody or visitation rights limited to the reasonable expenses

28 incurred by a parent for or on behalf of a child, resulting from the other parent's

thwarting of the parent's efforts to exercise custody or visitation rights. Compensation

2 11 may be requested by motion " provided that there arc "at least three occurrences of the

3 11 thwarting." Attorney's fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party, if solvent.

4 11 Although Mother has failed to appear for any of the hearings on the OSC re Contempt, this

5 11 Court has learned from Father that no genuine effort has been made on his part to actually facilitate

6 11 parenting time. Although the attorneys in this case are of the mistaken belief that this Court actually

7 11 included facilitation conditions in the visitation orders, that did not occur. The only thing this Court

8 11 ordered was parenting time, and left facilitation to the parties. In fact, this Court did not even specify

9 II that Father's parenting time had to take place here in California (this was Mother's assumption). This

10 11 Court merely confirmed that Father has joint rights, and granted him specific parenting timeshares. It

11 11 was reasonably presumed that Mother would facilitate that parenting time by bringing the child here to

12 11 California because she previously advised that was her plan; however, since those representations were

13 11 made Mother filed for refuge protection, and one might surmise that voluntary trips to the country of

14 11 alleged persecution could weaken a refuge application.-' Since Father has made no effort to sec A.R. in

15 11 Canada, and Mother might have at least a skeletal explanation for not coming here, it is premature to

16 II leap all the way to contempt or custodial modification without requiring Father to put in some effort

17 11 toward an implementation plan. Only if Mother refuses to engage with Father (directly or through

18 11 counsel) to implement a parenting allocation would contempt or modification orders be warranted.

19 11 These are incrementally escalating penalties, not penalties in the first instance.

20 11 Sanctions, however, are corning. Father is free to file an RFO after "three successive events''

21 II which thwart Father's parenting allocation. Mother already has two failures to appear at hearings.

22 11 Most of the visitation disputes that exist in cases assigned to this Department arc resolved between the

23 11 parties at hearings, with the guidance of this bench officer. When one party refuses to attend, and that

24 11 party's attorney has no information or authority, nothing can be accomplished. Father is free to ask Cor

25 11 §3028 sanctions once Mother misses, or fails to effectively participate in, one more hearing. 26

27

28 11³ In order to secure refugee status, Mother would have to show generally that return to India or the United States would subject her torture or cruel and unusual treatment that is neither lawful nor indigenous. This Court docs not have access lo Mother's BOC, but would be quite surprised if her application is granted.

IV.

2 11 Conclusion

3 11 Although Father would obviously prefer that this Court order Mother to bring A.R. to

4 11 California for visits, this Court must politely remind Father that Mother and child we.re already living

5 11 in Canada when he commenced this parentage action. "The statute docs not state that a child who is

6 11 already residing [elsewhere] at the time the petition is filed must be returned to California." Samh B.

7 11 v. Floyd B. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 938, 944-946.

8 11 The knee-jerk reaction for any parent is to insist that the court order the child returned to the

9 II former habitual residence, but it is every court's obligation to put the child's best interests above the

IO II wants and needs of a parent. Maintaining the continuity and stability of the bonds established with the

11 11 primary caretaker arc paramount in evaluating the best interests of a toddler. Burchard v. Garay

12 II (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531,538; Marriage ofC.T & R.B. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 87, 107; Anne fl. v.

13 11 Michael B. (2016) I Cal.App.5th 488, 502. For better or worse, this child has for the past 15 months

14 II - only known Ontario, Mother, and Mother's side of the family in Ontario. Given his tender years,

15 11 there is a reasonable likelihood that A.R. might not have any idea who Father is. For these reasons,

16 11 reunification with Father is most likely to succeed, if at all, in the place where A.R. is most at case.

17 11 That place, for now, is Ontario. Father has the flexibility to travel. Once a bond with Father takes

18 11 root, coming here will be an option. For now, Father may travel to Ontario for a week, enjoy parenting

19 11 time with A.R. every day for up to four hours (2 in the morning, 2 in the late afternoon), and may

20 11 submit to this Court the costs associated with that trip for possible re-allocation to Mother. If Mother

21 II refuses to follow this order and/or cooperate with Father's parenting time in Ontario, this Court will

22 11 certainly consider different options.

23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24 DATED: May 13, 2025

25

26

HON. STEVENS. STREGER

27 SUPERIOR COURT COMMISSIONER

28

Case Number FLl8618 Order re Contempt filings

Schedule C: January 6, 2026

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8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

9 COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

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FILED

JAN O 6 2026

-of,CaJlfornia

T '�'J'

,-c���-

' .,,' -1

11 11 Jn re

Case No. FL18618

12 MJ\NDEEP RAJ,

13

14 VS.

15 JYOTI SEROY A,

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17

18

Petitioner.

Respondent.

ORDER GRANTING FATHER'S IU[QlmST FILED 09/15/2025 FOR EMERGENCY INTERIM CUSTODY AND VISITATION ORDERS \VITI I CONDITIONS FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN OF TIIK CHILD TO CALIFORNIA, USA

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This is Father's petition to solidity parental rights under the Uniform Parentage Act. Sec Family Code §7600 el seq. The purpose of the Act is two-fold: (1) to confirm that ''the parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents" (Family Code §7602); and (2) to make clear that the parent-child relationship is imbued with inalienable "rights and privileges" (Family Code §7601(b)). including the right lo have "frequent and continuing contact"' with each other (Family Code§§ 3020(6), 3040(a)(l )) and to develop a

parent-child bond (Family Code§§ 3040(1), 3041 (c)). On 09/15/2025, Father filed his third motion seeking return of his child from Canada. Despite giving Mother every opportunity to avoid this death knell, Mother has spent the last year ignoring lesser court orders and intentionally interfering with the rights of Father and child. Father has now established a legal basis for the seismic order he seeks.

I.

2 II PRl<;AMBLE

] 11 Petitioner is tlw father of the subject child (sec Family Code §76IO(a)). Both parties have

4 II stipulated to this Court's jurisdiction (sec Family Code§§ 3402, 3465, 7620), empowering this Court

5 II to ·'order pcndente lite relief consisting or a custody or visitation order ... in the best interest of the

6 11 child." Family Code §7604. Following a series or hearings, in which both parties were represented,

7 11 this Court made interim custody and visitation orders. to wit: joint legal custmly. joint physical custody

8 11 (primary to Mother). and visits to Father (commencing in seven \Vecks) to allow time for Mother to

9 II prove up her domestic abuse allegations. Mother was given a standard warning: if she failed to

IO 11 facilitate Father·s interim parenting time, this Court "reserved all authority to suspend Mother's

11 11 parental rights and to trigger law enforcement involvement." Sec Decision dtd 12/20/2024.

12 II Mother did not object lo, challenge, or appeal this Court's order.

I] 11 Sadly. Mother also did not comply with the order - despite an unambiguous representation thal

14 11 she would facilitate Father's visits once the seven-week grace period expired. Instead, Mother used

15 11 the time to hire Canadian counsel and apply for refugee protection. When Father learned that iV1other

16 II ,vould not comply with orders for visits, he filed motions for emergency custody orders, return of the

17 II child to California, and contempt against Mother. Arter scheduled hearings on the topic in which

18 11 Mother failed to personally appear (despite remote technology options), this Court look the issue, and

19 11 the various filings, under submission.

::w 11 On 05/13/2025. this Court issued a written decision overruling Father·s charge of contempt and

21 II clari(ying Mother's obligations. After retracing the procedural hist01y, and highlighting Mother's

22 II unfulfilled promises or compliance, this Court held that Mother's transgressions did not yet establish

2] 11 contempt.¹ To help clarify visits going forward, and explain why a return to California was not yet

24 11 watTanted, this Court provided the following explanation (as excerpted):

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26

1 '"Ahhough �1othcr has faikd to appear lnr any nf the hearings on the OSC n: Contempt. this Court ha� karncd from Fatht·r that no

27 genuine effort has hem made n11 his pan 10 actually facilitate parenting time. Although the attorneys in lhis i:asc an: or the mistak.:n belief that this Court actlrnlly included facilitation conditions in the visitation orders. that did not occur. The only thing this Court onkred

28 was parenting time. and ld't facilitation 10 the partks. In fact, this Court did 1101 even specify that Father's p,ir,·nting time had to take place hen: in California (this 1111s Mother's assumption). This Court merely confirmed that Father has joint rights, and granted him

specific parenting timeshares," Sci.' Decision did 05/1.1/2025.

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·The knee-jerk reaction for any parent is to insist that the court order the child returned to the Conner hahitual residence, hut it is every court's obligation to put the child's best interests above the wants and needs of a parent. For better or worse. this child has for the past 15 months only known Ontario, Mother, and Mother's side of the family in Ontario. (jivcn his tender years, there is a reasonable likelihood that fthc child] might not have any idea who Father is. For these reasons, reunification with Father is most likely to succeed, if at all, in the place where lthe child] is most at case. That place, for now, is Ontario. Father has the llcxibility to travel. Once a bond

,vith Father takes root coming here will be an option. For now, Father may travel to Ontario for a week, enjoy parenting time with !the child I every day for up to four hours, and may submit to this Court the costs associated with that trip."

Part of the reason this Court invited Father to travel lo Canada (rather than order Mother lo travel here) was because Mother's Canadian attorney, (,race Mackintosh, appeared via remote video technology (Zoom) the week prior to issuance of that order and conlirmcd that ··there is nothing in place lo prevent visitation for Father'' (nr words lo that effect). It was reasonably understood at that hearing that if Father went to Canad:.i, he could sec the child. Mother \Vas given a similar compliance warning: "I/Molher n.fi,.,·es tojh/1()\r this order am//c>r cooperate ll'ith F'arher 's parenting time in Ontario. this Court will ccrtain�v consider different options.'' Sec Decision dtd 05/13/2025.

On 05/25/2025, Father traveled to Canada in order to sec his child, but when landed. he was greeted with the following email from Attorney ivlackintosh: "My client is seeking a restraining order. She is terrified of your client. Your client has stated that he \viii kill the baby and my client. We do not recognize any order from outside Canada."

Huh?

1 lad Attorney Mackintosh said anything close to this during her Zoom time with this Court on 05/08/2025, perhaps Father \vould not have incurred the linaneial burden of 11ying to Canada in the hopes of seeing his child.

I lad Attorney Mackintosh said anything close to this during her Zoom time with this Court on 05/08/2025, perhaps this Court might have developed a different strategy for Father's visits ·· such as in the presence of a prol'cssional supervisor or inside a secured facility (like a courthouse).

!lad Mother bothered to appear via Zoom for any of'thc previous hearings and advised ol'hcr intern to seek a restraining order, she would have been directed to file that here and allowed this Court the opportunity to evaluate the evidence underlying her concerns as part of the visitation orders.

This was an ambush, plain and simple ... and Father did not get to sec his child in Canada.

II.

2 II MOTHER'S PROCEDURAL on.rncT10N

3 11 On 12/02/2025, this Court set a hearing for 12/18/2025 to obtain infon11alion from the parties

4 11 regarding the Canadian court proceedings. This Court asked Mother to '·personally appear via remote

5 II technology (Zoom)" and invited her to rely on her sister Dolly for interpretive services as she had in

6 II the past. This Court noted that "in light of' Mother's failure to appear at !priori hearings. this Court

7 II will not incur the cost of having a certified/registered Punjabi interpreter at the ready.'' Courts do not

8 11 have Punjabi interpreters, and must reserve one through an agency, incurring a nonrefundable cost.²

9 11 At the scheduled hearing on I 2/18/2025, Mother appeared via remote video technology

IO 11 ("Zoom"). Iler attorney likewise appeared, and advised that sister Dolly was not feeling well enough

11 11 to join Mother l'or the hearing. Mother elected not to bring any other "trusted individual" for

12 II interpretative services. which informed this Court that inteqwctative services were not actually needed.

13 II Attorney Channell requested that the hearing be reset, but since Father·s counsel from Canada was

14 11 kind enough to appear, Mother's Canadian attorney might appear. and Mother had been dl.'laying thes.'

15 11 procel.'dings for over a year. this Court elccll:d tn mow forward ,vith the hearing. Father offered lo

16 11 providl.' interpretive services. as did a paralegal in the onicc of Father's Canadian attorney. ivlother's

17 11 allmm:y declined. The hearing did not involw any questioning of Mother, and only involved brief'

18 11 questioning of' Father and his Canadian attorney (regarding court proceedings up north). Mother's

I 9 II involvement ,vas unnecessary. Nevertheless, Mother's attorney objected to this Court's inquiry or

20 II those present, and to this Court's decision to take the matter under submission.

21 II Until just recently, Mother had only appeared al the hearing on 07/25/2024. Although the

22 II Minute Order from that hearing omits rcf'crence thereto. this Court has an independent recollection or

23 II tvlother appearing via remote video technology (..Zoom") alongside her sister Dolly from an

24 II undisclosed location in Canada. The Minute Order (attached) acl'.urately captures the content or thl'

25 II discussion had with the parties, but docs not acrnratcly capture the fact that Dolly indkatcd to this 26

27 11' l'ursu:mt to (';\Evidence Code §756(a), "the .l11dicial ('ou1wil shall rcimhursc courts for court intcrprctcr SL'n-ices prm hied in civil actions and prncccdings tn any party who is present in court and who docs 1wt prolicicntly speak or unth:rstand the English h111g11agc."

28 11 Then: arc twn conditions for reimbursement: the party must be present (mcaninµ the interpreter was actually used). and the party w;1s imkcd I.El' and in ne.:d ofan interpreter. That is why this Court docs lllll pn:-ordcr illlcrprelcrs for partks who might need lhl'ln and \1ho mig/11 actually appear al the hearing. This is also why Allnrncy Channell had n duty to advise under CRC 2.895(c) (sce /11/i·u).

Court that Mother·s English was "not great" and that she (Dolly) wanted to assist. Father had no

2 11 objection, and neither did this Court. At 110 time did Mother affirmatively state that she needrd the

3 II assistance of a ccrtilicd interpreter. nor did Mother verify an actual inability to pm1icipatc in the

4 II proceedings ,vithout the use or a ccnilicd interpreter. This Court did not give Dolly the interpreter's

5 11 oath because it appeared that Mother was able to follow along. In fact, this Court recalls Mother

6 11 occasionally ans,vcring questions posed by this Court in English, prior to Dolly's interpretation.

7 11 Mother did not make an appearance at any or the next seven {7) hearings: 10/17/2024,

8 II 12/05/2024, 02/27/2025, 04/24/2025. 05/08/2025, 06/05/2025, or 10/09/2025. As such, the question or

9 11 her "need'' ror ccrti ficd interpreter services was never raised.

10II Mother's objection to this Court's inquiry or Father am.I his attorneys at the 12/18/2025

11 11 hearing. in the absence of an interpreter Ii.Jr her, was. anJ is. overruled for the following five reasons.

12 11 First, per CRC 2.895(a), this Court uses the default statewide process in which a party may

13 11 simply submit a \Titten request using the Judicial Council model form INT-300. Those requests arc

14 II immediately directed to the on-site court services supervisor. Since INT-300 does not require the party

15 11 to prm·e that they have limited English proficiency in orJcr to qualify for an interpreter (as compared

16 II to this court's l.EP Plan), all requests arc approved. Mother has never filed an INT-300 in this case, so

17 11 no timely request was ever made.

18 II Second, there is no absolute right to an interpreter in a civil proceeding without an affirmative

19 II showing of need. Sec 111 re Raymundo B. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1447, 1453. \Vhen Mother lirst

20 11 appeared with her sister on 07/25/2024, it was unclear \Vhat degree of English proficiency Mother had.

21 11 When her attorney appeared at the next hearing, he merely advised this Court that "there was a

22 I I language barrier.'' Sec Minute Order dtd I 0/17/24. Although Mother did not appear at hearings

23 11 thereafter, she filed numerous documents all <d' which 11·err in Hnglish. She filed a written response

24 11 to Father's petition, complete with a seven-page, single-spaced declaration all in lc-'nglish. 1 lcr

25 11 Canadian filings (FLR 8 and 35. l) were also in English. In California, documents prepared by an

26 11 individual lacking proficiency in English require ccrtilicd translations or interpretations. Sec Evie!.

27 II Code §753, and CRC 3.11 l0(g). Since Mother lib! documents here in English without a certified

28 11 translation attached. it must be that she is sufficiently proficient in English.

Case Number FL 1861!i

Order re Custody ,md Return of Child to California

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Third, Mother" s implied request for interpretative services - if one existed - \Vas forkitcd.

7 11 Pursuant to CRC 2.895(c)... ifa party who has requested an interpreter for herself or himself is

3 11 represented by counsel, the attorney must notify the court in advance whenever the party will not he

4 11 appearing al a noticed proceeding.'· The reason for this notification requirement is explained in

5 11 footnote 2 (supra). In order for a trial court to be n:imbursed for interpretative services, the party must

6 11 be present. Mother's attorney has appeared in her stead at the previous seven (7) hearings. Never once

7 II did her allorncy inform this Court. prior tn the hearing, that Mother would not be attending. It was

811 incumbent upon her attorney to lile the INT�300, and to timely notify this Court in advance of her

9 absence - and he did neither.

IO II Fourth, "improper procedures in the use or an interpreter do not rise to the level of' a

11 11 constitutional violation unless they result in prejudice." People v. Suarez (2020) IO Cal.5th 116. l 44.

12 II As it pertains to Dolly, ''whether the interpreter's oath is considered to be optional. or mandatcd. failurc

13 11 of timely request or objection constitutes a waiver of oath." l'eopl<! '. Carr<?on ( 1984) 151 Cal.App.3d

14 II 559, 582; in accord, Peopl<! '. Rodriguez ( I 986) 42 Cal.3d I 005, I 014. The burden is on �viother to

15 11 "dcmonstrale the error was prcjudicial, that is, that it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to I6 11 that party would have been reached in the absence of the error.'' Afarriage <?{Jackson (2006) 136

17 11 Cal.App.4th 980. 997. As reflected in the Minute Order from 12/18/2025, nothing learned at the

18 11 hearing led to adverse rulings; instead, this ruling is the byproduct of Mother's refusal to cooperate.

19 II Firth. Attorney Channell has rcpeatcdly slalcd in this Court, and elsewhere, that he was relaincd

20 11 by Mother for the limited purpose of litigating the question of jurisdiction. Although California Rules

21 11 of Court 3.36 required Attorney Channell to actually file a Notice of Limited Scope Representation

22 II (Cl V-150), and he neglected to do so, this Court takes him at his word. The hearing on 12/18/2025 did

2.1 II not involve questions of jurisdiction. In fact, none or the hearings alter 12/05/202./ had lo do with

24 II jurisdiction: every hearing alter that had to do with Mother's alleged contempt and/or failure to adhcre

25 11 to ordcrs, not to this Court's li.mdamental jurisdiction to make orders.⁵ I!is objection was 11/tru ,·ires.

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27 II5 It wa, recently brought to this Court·s attention that Attornl'.y Channell sent a kttcr directly to Justice Yee claiming that "that: i, 1111 Calit'tm1ia onkr selling nut jurisdh:tion.. and that thb Court is ",111aiting clarilkation" from Canada lo make a ..tinal determination Ill' 28 JI Jurisdiction." Sec Letter dtd 11/0212025. Those rcprcsL·ntations arc i11u,,urati:. and if made for the purpose of inducing rdim1L·,,ial'tio11 h} the Canadian courts. the representation (and any �imilar statements offi:rcd hy others) should be vic\Cd \ith distrusl.

Case Number FL! 8618

Order re Custody and Return or Child to California

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CALIFORNIA'S PRIMARY ,JURISDICTION

Child custody jurisdiction rests on the jurisdiction's relationship to the child, not on the parents' relationship to the jurisdiction. It is the child's home state that controls. Sec §§ 3402, 3465; in accord, In re Stephanie i\I. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295. 310; A.M. v. ,'uperior Cow·r (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 343,353; Marriage of'Kcnr (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 487,493. As previously noted, the child's home state is and has always been California for the following reasons:

I) In early 2022. Mother and Father com:eivcd the child in Califi:wnia. Sec \fothcr's FL-

320. By law, •'a person who has sexual intercourse in this state submits to the jurisdiction of the courts or this slate as to an action brought umkr" the Uniform Parentage Act (Family Code §7620(a));

2. In lkcember of 2023, Mother completed numerous documents here in California attesting to her intention to establish long-tenn residency here in California. Those documents included an application to renew her Indian passport. as well as several applications lo establish utility services (propane, electric. phone);

3. The child was a permanent resident of California for the entirely of his life prior to hcing wrongfully withheld in Canada on 04/28/2024.⁴ Father filed this action for parental rights just six weeks later (on 06/07/2024) - so California never lost home state status (sec Family Code §§ 3402 and 3421 );

4. On 07/25/2024, Mother and Father appeared in person al the first court hearing and stipulated that California was the child's home state. At that saml' hearing. i\i!other promised to return with thc child to panicipate in this custody proceeding.

5. On I 0/09/2024, Mother caused to be filed in this Court a sworn declaration, stating "we arc soon moving back to U.S." (pg 3 ifJ). ''I still want to live in the U.S." (pg 6 i;s) and "I will soon start applying for jobs in the U.S." (pg 7 il3);

27 11' l.'ndcr the l lagui.' Crnm.-nlion, wmngful retention occurs not when th,: child leaves home. but rather when thr custodial parent clear!) rnmmunkah:s to th,· 11,1111.:u,tndi.1I pan;rH that th.: child\ ill nol he rnming back. Sec ,\fonasky v 7i1,!lt<'ri (2020) 58'J lJ.S. 68. 71-79:

28 11 Pal<'11L'ia 1·. /'.•re::, 'J2 I F.3d I .lJJ. 1.142-1 J.lJ (11th Cir. 2019): /Jlacklcdge 1·. fJ/aekledge, 866 F..id 169. 179 (Jrd ( 'ir. 2017): 11£ilkcr 1•. IVii!Aer. 70 I F.1. d I I HJ, 1118 t 7th Cir. 2012). It is not nrnh:rial tlrnt Fath.:r allowed the child to be in Canada for thrc•,· months prior thereto. since Mother prn111is,:J to ri:turn with th,: child allcr lll'r Jll'I-iod of family mourning.

Case Number Fl, 18618

Order re Custody and Return of Child to California

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6. Despite the initial stipulation, on l 2/05/2024, this Court conducted a regularly-scheduled cvidcntiary hearing on the question of jurisdiction. Mother and Father \Vere both represented by local allorneys, and had the opportunity to present evidence and witnesses. Based on the evidence and pre-trail briefing, this Court found (v.:ithout regard to the earlier stipulation) that jurisdiction here was proper;

7. By accepting jurisdiction in July or 2024, conducting a trial in December or 2024, and

issuing written decisions in December of2024 and May of 2025, this Court had already exercised primary jurisdiction and issued legally enforceable custody and visitation orders involving the child. Canada has made no orders to date.

California has exercised primary jurisdiction over the subject child for over one year. !other did not appeal this Court's decision vis-,-vis jurisdiction. and did not tile any application ror permission to move (remain) abroad with the child. Mother has ignored several orders to appear remotely at hearings, and every order relating to custody/visitation. Mother did not file any application for protective orders in this case. despite this Court's abundant expertise in the subject (and California's remarkably IO\v cvidentiary standard for domestic violence restraining orders). Whatever relief Mother is/was seeking in Canada (save for refugee status), she was more than welcome to seek the same relief here in California. Mother has simply declined to participate.

Ontario has acknowledged California's first-in-time status. and presumed priority jurisdiction, but declined to voluntarily abate Mother's family law case. Mother filed motions relating to custody and protection in Ontario, but not here. Mother is forum shopping, plain and simple.

Father did not acquiesce in the child's permanent settlement in Ontario - that is clear. Father did not sit on his rights for the Iaches period of one year (Art. 12) - that too is clear.

Mother is guilty or wrongH.tl retention · that too is clear. Sec 22 U.S.C. §9003(e)( I)). Pursuant to the I!ague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Chapter 1 Art. 3, a parent is guilty of wrongl'ul retention if the retention resulted in a breach of the other parent's custody rights, and that other parent would have exercised those parenting rights but for the retention. The Article goes on to spcci fy that the rights of custody "may arise in pm1icular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under

Case Number FLI 8618

Order re Custody and Return of Child to California

Page 8 nf2J

the law or that State.'' Id. In this case, Mother and Father were ..equally entitled to the custody of' of

2 11 the child the moment Father signed the voluntary declaration of parentage and anixed his name to the

3 11 child's birth certificate. Sec Family Code§§ 3010, 7570, 7573, 7611(d); in accord. People v. Ryan

4 11 ( 1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1314 Ino court order is required to create custodial rights j.

5 11 Thus, the day the child \Vas born, Father acquired the legal right to:

6 11 • "have frequent and continuing contact'' with his child (Family Code §3020(b));

7 II • ..share the rights and responsibilities of'' raising his child (Family Code §3020(b)):

8 11 • access ..records and information pertaining to" the child (Family Code §3025 ):

9 • fulfill ..the child's physical and psychological needs'' (Family Code §3041 (c));

10 • ''change the residence of the child'' (Family Code §7501(a));

11 • '·to make the decisions relating to the health, education. and wcl Care or· the child

12 11 (Family Code§§ 3003, 3083).

13 11 Between 12/22/2022 and 01/30/2024 (thirteen months), Father actually exercised many or his

14 11 custodial rights and responsibilities. I le provided for the child a home. food, clothing, and everything

15 11 the d1ild m:1.xkd lo survive and thrive in those early tender years. Father did not obj1:d when Mother

16 II asked to take the child to Canada to be with family during a stressful time. largely because Father

17 11 understood that Mother \Vould return in due course with the child. Soon alter learning in April of 2024

18 11 that Mother was not going to return, Father retained an attorney and began the judicial process or

19 II perfecting his legal parenting rights.

20 II A retention beyond the original consent of the other parent can be wrongful even ii' both parents

21 11 have equal custody rights. From the Convention's standpoint, the ·'wrongfulness'' is not based on

22 II whether the action violates the law of the child's habitual residence, but instead derives "from the f'act

23 11 that such action has disregarded the rights of the other parent which arc also protected by law, and has

24 11 interfered with their normal exercise.'' Marriage cf Witherspoon (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 963, 972.

25 11 I Icre. Father has visitation orders, but Mother has to date refused to comply with any of the orders.

26 11 She rcl'uscd to l'acilitate Father's alternate weekends, and refused to allow him to sec the child when he

27 11 flew to Canada. Father also has joint legal custody rights, but Mother has refused lo involvl.' Father

28 II with any of th.' decision-making.

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In Mauri::io R. v. L ( •. (2011) 20 I Cal.App.4th 616. the Second District Court of Appeal issucJ an opinion addressing some of the concerns relating lo \Vnmgful retention. In that case, the mother falsely told the father that she and the child were leaving the country for a brief visit and would return. Upon learning that mother had no intention of doing so, father filed a number of legal actions. As is pertinent to the case al bar, the Court held as follows (at 633):

•'The sole function or an action under the I Iague Convention is to determine if the abducted child should be returned to the country of the petitioning (complaining) parent. The action docs not govern the merits of custody disputes; those issues must be decided in appropriate proceedings in the child's country or habitual residence. The issue or which plm:emcnl ts best for a child in the long run is not relevant. A petitioner under the I Iague Convention hears the burden of proving the child's wrongful removal or retention by a preponderance of the evidence. If the petitioner succeeds in showing a wrongful removal, the convention requires repatriation of the abducted child to its country of habitual residence in all but a few exceptional circumstances. Exceptions to the I!ague Convention must be narrowly interpreted lest they s,vallow the ruk or return:·

This Court is not aware of any exceptions Mother might assert to the repatriation requirement. but the only one that could even plausibly be raised would be the one set forth in Art lJ(b), to wit: ..there is a grave risk that his return would expose the child lo physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." l lowevcr. as explained in Mauri::io, this standard must be established by clear and convincing evidence which is hard to do absent "credible evidence or sexual abuse, other similarly grave physical or

psychological abuse. death threats, or serious neglect." Id. at 633, 635. The Court noted that ''the grave risk to the child analysis is a !'act-intensive inquiry that depends on carcl'ul consideration or several factors, including the nature and frequency of the abuse, the likelihood of its recurrence, and whether there arc any enforceable undertakings that would sufficiently ameliorate the risk or harm to the child caused by its return." Id. at 636. Although Mother has made some rather scandalous accusations between herself and Father in some of her papers Ii led in Canada, there has not yet been any evi<lentiary hearing to this Court's knowledge in which those allegations have been proven - and no proof of risk to the child. Moreover, this Court is more than qualified to

hear the evidence and to put in place whatever protections would be warranted. Sec Family Cock

§§ 3424, 3604: in accord, Mar,.;age o/Forrest & fadc(v (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th I 202, 1212-1214:

Marriage cf Witherspoon (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 963. 974-977.

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Order re Custody and Return of Child to California

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Mother invites this Court to consider Kirhy v. IVoods, 2025 ONCJ\ 60 I. In that case. it was undisputed that the mother wrnngfully retained a teenage child in Canada after falsely informing the father that mother and child would return to their home state after holiday. While in Canada, mother filed a refugee application for herself and the tci:nage child. Father filed a petition for Hague repatriation. The child's refugee applkation was approved. The Superior Court. acknowledging that refugee status created a ri:buttablc presumption of ·'grave risk'' for repatriation, nevertheless granted father's petition and issued an order for the subject child lo be returned. It appears that the application judge did not believe that the child was at grave risk if returned, and instead felt that mother had coached the daughter lo stale her desire to remain in Canada. l\fother appealed, successfully. Despite acknowledging that the presumption is temporal (Para 56, 71), and that refugee claims can be tactical (Para 65, 78), the Court or Appeal concluded that the application judge gave lip service to the ri:buttable presumption and in fact went "behind the presumption'' to challenge the refugee determination itsclf(Para 87-92, 97). The Court also found that the application judge failed to give due weight to the child's preference (Para 113-121 ).

The Kirby opinion acknowledges a very troubling circumstance in ,vhich a party admittedly guilty of child abduction can sanitize that crime by participating in a one-sided, closed-door hearing before the !RB. If successful. that determination significantly handcuffs application judges from even-handedly evaluating I!ague repatriation petitions. The Court in Kirby acknowledged that the Refugee Determination System is inquisitorial/non-adversarial. which in

20 11 the United States ,votlld make such determination ineligible for esloppel or resjudica/a but that 2 I 11 is effectively the holding of Kirby, to wit: the IRB decision is entitled to full faith and credit,

22 11 obligating a non-participating pan.mt lo prove a negative, to \Vit: whatever risk the IRB found to be

23 I I '"grave" no longer exists. The Court in Kirby offered no guidance lo application judges on this

24 11 topic. exct.!pt to state that the application judge "could'" go behind the refugee determination ir the

25 I!judge had "'serious doubt" about the foundation for the decision (Para 78.f.). The application

26 11 judge in Kirby did have serious doubts, hut the Court or Appeal gave those lip service.

27 11 Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly advised that if the subject child is granted rel'ugcc

28 II status in Canada. this Court will stay its return order to allow Father time to appeal the IRI3

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Order re Custody and Return of Child to California

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decision through finality. and to run a subsequent I!ague petition once the refugee issue is set in stone. For now, the issue has been open for over a year. Since Mother is not willing lo co-parent in the interim, this Court will not be hl'ld hostage waiting for the JRB to handle its caseload.

As a reminder, this Court stopped short of' the "knee-jerk" reaction to order the child returned to California because (1) children arc not Amazon packages to be tossed about in the hack or a box truck for their parent's whim, and (2) there is a high likelihood that this child would experience significant (albeit temporal) distress if separated from the only family he knows even if his limited exposure to Father is the result or Mother's wrongful activity. Courts must not

punish the child for one parent's transgressions. l lowevcr, there comes a time and place vvhen one parent's transgressions transcend the role of parent, obligating a court to potentially expose the child to temporary distress in exchange for the greater good. That time has come.

IV.

FATHER IS ENTITLED TO PHYSICAL CUSTODY

In California, custody of a child comes in two forms: physical and legal. Marriage olFurie (201 7) 16 Cal.App.5th 8 I 6, 826. A parent with ·'physical" custody has the right to supervise. cohahitatc, and enjoy frequent/continuing contact with, the child. Family Code §3004. Prior to the entry of any coun orders, the law presupposes that the biological mother and the presumed father ··arc equally entitled to the custody of the child.'' Family Code §3010. This ordinarily yields a conpcrati'c agreement between new parents to split parenting time in the best interest or the child (and consistent with each party's schedule and availability).

Initial custody orders in this case were delayed. At the hearing on 07/25/2024, Mother informed this Court that she would be voluntarily returning to California "soon" and that she would be working with Father and this Court to establish a visitation schedule with Father. 'l\vo months later, counsel for Father advised that Mother \Vas apparently not coming back, and was no\V contesting this Court's jurisdiction. Sec Minute Order dtd 07/25/2024 and OJ\JR dtd 09/25/2024. The jurisdiction issue was resolved by way of a bench trial on 12/05/2024, clearing the way for visitation orc.krs.

On 12/20/2024, this Court issued the rollowing pertinent orders:

Case Number FL!8618

Onkr re Custody and Return or Child to California

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o Father and Mother lo share joint physical custody until such time as Mother proves her

2 domestic violence allegations (which she declined to do);

, ·' o Commencing aiter 02/08/2025:

4 o Father to have time every Tuesday from 2pm 6pm;

5 o Father to have time every Thursday from 2pm 6pm:

6 o Father to have time on alternate weekends (Sat@ I 0am Sun@ 6pm).

7 On 05/13/2025, this Court added to Father's parenting allocation the option lo travel lo Canada.

8 and to enjoy sen.:n days with the child: two hours each morning. and two hours each afternoon.

l) By virtue of these orders. there is currently in place an interim order that Mother and Father arc both

10 entitled to "significant periods" of custody so as lo assure ·'frequent and continuing contact.'' Family

11Code §3004. l lowewr, contrary to popular belict� ·•joint" physical custody need not equate to "50/50:''

12 instead. it is merely a shorthand descriptor of a parenting allocation that gives both parents a

13 significant timeshare. Sec City and County <fSu11 f<iw1cisc,o •. fl.I I. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 531, 543-

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544; Jason P v. /Jc111iclle S. (::w17) 9 Cal.App.5th l 000, I 034; Celia S. '. 1/ugo II. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655, (,63. Father is entitled to roughly an 18% timeshare. Apparently believing that she

has no obligation to Father or the rule of law, Mother has refused to communicate with Father, facilitate the visits in any way (in-person, remote technology, etc), offer any alternative to the court-ordered visits, petition this Court for different orders, submit a good cause report to the local prosecutor's onicc (Penal Code §278.7) or tile an appeal of this Court's orders.

Father would like additional time. In order to change any portion of an existing order, it is necessary first lo determine whether the order is "permanent," thereby obligating the moving party to demonstrate a signi Iicant change of circumstances so affecting the child that modification is essential to the child's we!fore. A custody order will be treated as "permanent" for purposes or triggering the more-rigorous changed circumstances rule "only if' there is a clear affirmative indication" that the Court or the parties intended such a result. Afontl!11egm 1: Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249,258; FT, •. LI.

(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th I, 19-20; Keith R. 1i Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th I 047, 1054:

Marriage cf Rose and Riclumlrnn (2002) I 02 Cal.App.4th 941, 951-952. All of the visitation orders issued by this Court were expressly interim/temporary. As such, this is a best interests analysis.

Case Number FL 18618

Order re Custody and Return of Child to California

Page 13 of�3

Every '·best interests·· analysis has at its core the overarching purpose ..to maximize the child's

2 II opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult.'' Keith R. v. i'l'uperior Court (2009) 174

3 11 Cal.App.4th I047, 1053: in accord, .I.Al. v. Ci.I I. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 925, 933-938. Extrapolating

4 11 from the various pn:cedents on the topic (sec Alarriage <�f'/,aMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th I 072, I 094-

5 111098). the following represents a comprehensive list or factors a trial court must consider as part or the

6 11 overarching ·'best interests'' inquiry ,vhi:11 a parent is seeking long-distance visitation:

7 i.

II.

8 iii.

IV.

() V.

VI.

10 Vil.

VI LI.

11 IX.

12X.

any parental problems with alcohol or drugs;

any history .of ahusc/ncgkct by either /)arenl or their respective cohabitants; the health, sal'ctv. and welfan: or the e1il<l;

the child's interest in stability and continuity in the custodial arrangement: the distance of the move;

the age of the child:

the child's n:lationship with both parents, including degrees of bonding; the relationship het\vcen the parents (aka ..friendly parent"" doctrine): the wishes or the chi Id ir mature enough to be heard; and

the existence or any bad faith surrounding the proposed move.

13 11 The "problem with alcohol" factor is more defined in Family Code §3011 (a)(4) as "the

14 11 habitual or continual abuse of alcohol." Although the statute docs not specify a quantum of evidence

15 11 nccl!ssary, independent corroboration from mcdil:al n:ports. law enforcement reports or ..a conviction

16 11 within the last five years·• (Family Code *3041.5) is usually sufficient. Unfounded allegations aside.

17 11 there is no evidence that either parent sul'Ji:rs substance abuse issues.

18 11 The "ahusc/ncgkct" factor is not limited to actual physical injury, and is broadly defined to I l) 11 encompass behavior which places a person in a situation in \vhich his or her person or hcal!h is

20 11 endangered, in reasonable apprehension or imminent serious bodily injury, or ·'any behavior that has

21 11 been or could be enjoined pursuant tn Section (i320'' which includes disturbing the peace and

22 11 destroying the mental or emotional calm of another. Sec Family Code§§ 3011 (a)(2)(B), 6203,

23 I I 6320(c); Penal Code § 11165.3. The quantum or proof' here is unspecified, and no actual convictions

24 II arc n:quired to make this finding. Unfounded allegations aside, thcn: is no evidence that either parent

25 is guilly of abuse. /\s for neglect, the foct that Mother has purposefully deprived the child of access lo

26 Father without evidence of good t:ause · qualifies as neglect.

27 The "health, safety, welfare" factor is complex, due in part to the fact that the child has been

28 11 ,vrongfully retained in Canada. The evidence available to this Court suggests that Mother is doing an

Case Number FL I 8618

Order re Custody and Return or Child to California

Page 14 of 23

adequate job caring for the child, and lonking out for his health and safety. It is also apparent that the 2 11 child has extended family in Ontario, which provides a degree of comfort and welfare. I lowevcr, "the 1 11 rights or personal relations forbid the abduction or cnticen1ent of a child from a parent entitled to its

4 11 custody." Civil Code §49(a). As such, Mother is not entith.:d to bonus points for solely providing for

5 11 the child's health, safety and welfare when she is doing so only because of her child abduction. There

6 II is no evidence presented showing that Father is unfit to also provide for the child's needs.

7 11 The "stability/continuity" factor is not hard. "When custody continues over a signi Iicant

8 11 period, the child's need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role.'' /11 re

<) 11,'teplwnie M. ( 1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; In re IJ. I'. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1295; Ragghanti "·

10 II Reyes (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 989,999. The trial court must view the importance of stability and

11 11 continuity from the perspective or "the potential harm or disrupting bonds established when one parL'nl

12 II has been the primary caretaker Ifor a consiJerablc period of'timcJ:' Marriage ollleath (2004) 122

I1 11 Cal.App.4th 444. 448; in accord. Family Code �3040. In this case, the child has spent most of his lire

14 11 in thL' constant care of Mother. While it seems she was likely the primary caregiver while co-parenting

15 11 with Father here in California. she has undoubtedly become the child's caregiver while in Canada.

16 II ;\Ithough rvtother·s unclean hands must he taken into account, the fact remains that stability and

17 11 continuity arc important for the child.

18 11 The "distance of the mon" is another factor. As noted, if Father vvants to sec the child in the

19 11 chi Id's current natural habitat, Father has to lly thousands of miles and incur thousands of dollars in

20 II direct costs. By the same token, it is unclear whether Mother would have the ability to travel here on a

21 11 regular basis. The distance is an issue for both parents.

22 II The "age of the child" factor relates lo general bonding. It seems to go \Vilhout great dispute

2. II that a father otherwise fit to parent should be given access lo his children. A well-publicized article in

24 11 Psychology Today from 2012 reported that children who failed to bond with, or grow up with, a father,

25 II m:n: more likely to experience ··episodic bouts or self-loathing; difficulties with social adjustment:

26 11 problems with friendships: truancy and poor academic performance: delinquency and youth crime:

27 11 promiscuity; substance abuse; homelessness; exploitation and abuse; psychosomatic health symptoms:

28 11 and shorter life span." That is not to put blame on single mothers at all, for many single mothers arc

Case Number FL I 8618

forced into that role. But here, we have an adequately capable - and obviously loving ··· parent that is

2 11 being excluded. The child did not ask lo be raised without a father, and the child has rights.

3 11 The "child's relationship" factor here clearly favors Mother, but only bccausc he has really

4 11 only known Mother as a constant in his life.

5 11 The "friendly parent" factor is in Fathi:r's fovor. All of the factors frequent contact, sharing

6 II obligations, voluntary support. making the effort. encouraging contact with the other parent - arc part

7 11 of what is commonly rcfc1Tcd lo as the friendly parent doctrine. The concept here is that, all things

8 11 being equal. the ..friendlier'' parent should be entitled to a bump in the parenting time allocation. This

9 II Court h;is seen unfriendly cases, but few rival the silent warfare of this one (sce discussion il1/i'a).

l O II The last factor is "bad faith" surrounding the move. Mother's bad faith is obvious. Father, on

11 11 the other hand, has not shmvn to this Court any bad faith on his part. Father has appeared al every

12 11 hearing asking this Court to allow him to sec his child. Father does not bad-mount Mother, or even

13 11 blame her for her 1:hoiccs. Father simply asks this Court to allow him lo start being a parent.

14 11 Taking al1 or the aforementioned factors together, the chart below represents a mL·chanical

15 11 dktennination nn the merits of Father's petition lo alter custody and secure his visits: 16

Factor

17 Substance Issues

18 Abuse

_Ncglc�_t

Father

0

I

Mother

19 I !cal th

Safety

20 Welfare Stabilitv

21 Contint1ity_

Distance or the �;frivc

3Age of the Child

23 Bond to Parents F,:iendfyl'arent

24 Bad Vii1th

·-cf

0

-0

0

l

-(j

j I I

I

-"�-· ----� -- i

25 TOTAL

4 _. I

26 II With the score tied, this Court reverts to the policies underlying co-parenting and the evils of'

27 II self-help. "II is the public policy or this state lo ensure that children have frequent ;ind continuing

28 11 contact with holh parents and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of d1ild

Case Number FL 18618

Order re Custody and Return of Child 10 California

rearing in order to effect this policy." Family Code §3020(b). "ln making an order granting custody to

7 11 either parent. the court shall consider. among other factors, which parent is more likely lo allow tht:

3 II child fn:qucnt and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent." Family Code §3040(a)( I). 1\ trial

4 lljudge must "take into consideration ,vhich pan.:nt. as primary custodian, will best facilitate a good

5 II relationship with the other parent." Marriage o/Steiner & 1/osseini (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 519. 529.

6 II ''Conduct by a custodial parent designed to frustrate visitation and communication may be grounds !'or

7 II changing custody." Marriage <?f'!Jurgcss (19%) 13 Cal.4th 25, 36 n.6. In fact, "it is common

8 11 knowledge among family law practitioners that the quickest way for a parent to lose primary physical

9 11 custody is for that parent to obstruct the visitation rights of the other parent." Alarriagc o/Moschetta

10 II (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1234. Mother has purposefully interfered with Father's parenting rights

11 11 for almost a year, and denied the child his own right to a relationship with Father. She claims to have

12 II done so to protect the child, but has submitted zero evidence of this. Mother has elected silence and

13 11 self-help. This behavior cannot be countenance<l any further.

14 II Finally, this Court notes that all of the lesser remedies imposed to date have failed to generate

15 II compliance. This Court declined to hold �v1othcr in contempt for failing to facilitate visits here in

16 II California because Mother did not have the means to travel here, whereas Father was free to travel to

17 11 Canada. This Court found that making Father travel in the short run was in the best interests or the

18 II child, at least until a bond was established. To this Courrs dismay, Mother refused - with no lawful

l 9 II authority to allow Father any visits when he traveled to Canada. This Court is informed that Mother 20 11 docs not have the financial resources to post a bond, and an injunction would not work to bring the

21 11 child here for regular visits. Finally, a court can impose sanctions "when a parent has been thwarted

22 II by the other parent when attempting lo exercise custody or visitation rights." Family Code �3028(a). 2:1 111 lowever, Father docs not really want 1110111:y. and neither docs this Court. Besides, a sanction order

24 11 would be hard to enforce across international lines. Mother was warned by this Court on 12/20/2024

25 11 and 05/13/2025 that failure to cooperate with court orders would likely result in suspension of her

26 II parenting rights. While this Court is loath to take such a drastic step, especially ,vith such a young

27 II child, no lesser order would he honored by Mother or deliver Father/child the rights they have been

28 11 deprived. Father is hereby awarded sole temporary physical custody.

Case Number Fl,18618

Order re Custody and Return or Child to California

Page 17 of':n

V.

2 II FATHER IS ENTITLED TO DECISION-MAKING AlJTIIORITY

3 11 ;\ parent with ''legal" custody has thl� right to make decisions relating to the health, education,

4II and welfan.: of' the child. Family Code §3006. Prior to the entry of any court orders, the law

5 11 presupposes that the biological mother and the presumed father ··arc equally entitled to the custody of

6 II the child." Family Code §3010. As such, Mother and Father automatically share joint legal custody of

7 II the child the moment the child is born. Sec discussion supra.

8 11 Joint legal custody - when created by operation of law means that "either parent acting alone

9 11 may exercise legal control of the child.'' Family Code §3083. It is a common mispcrceplion amongst

10 II parents and family law practitioners that joint li.:gal custody means that the parents must meet, confer

11 11 and agree before any action can be taken. Not so. Either parent may make independent decisions

12 11 relating to the health. education, and welfare or the child, so long as those decisions do not impact an

13 11 existing "physirnl custody order.'' Family Code §3083; Cie/Jila v. Board of P.,)'Clwlogy (2024) I00

14 11 Cal.App.5th 19, 41. Similarly, ''a parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change the

15 11 n:sidence of the chi Id, subject to the pO\vcr of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the

16 II rights or wclrarc or the child." Family Code *7501(a). In this instance, Mother's unilateral decisions

17 II regarding where the child would reside, personal associations, schooling, and health care. have directly

18 11 impacted an existing physical custody order and prejudiced the rights of the child to enjoy frequent and

19 11 continuing contact with Father.

20 11 Once formal orders are made. the right lo make unilateral decisions will presumably change.

21 11 As set forth in Family Code §3083, '•in making an order of joint legal custody, the court shall specify

22 11 the circumstances under which the consent of both parents is required to be obtained in order lo

23 11 exercise legal rnntrol of the child and the i:onscqucnces of the failure to obtain mutual consent... The

24 II Judicial Council has created a form that tracks this very requirement (sec FL-341 (E)), inviting the

25 11 parties and the Court to make the general award of joint legal custody, and then designate specific

26 11 areas where the parents lose their right lo ad independently.

27 11 Father is requesting sole legal custody or the child, which requires a "best intcn:sts" analysis

28 11 similar to the one above for physical rnstody. I lowever, it appears to this Court that Father is not

Case Number Fl.18618

Ortkr re Custody and Return or Child to California

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actually seeking an order barring Mother from having a scat at the decision-making table. Father has never alleged that tv1other lacks the requisite degree of introspective, consideration or empathy needed to make informed decisions for the weIfore of the child. Although reasonable minds could differ, these parents arc both entitled to havt.: a scat at tht.: table: joint legal custody is the correct long-term solution. Sec Family Code s3082; in accord, klarriage <�/Adams & Jack A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1568 I.joint legal custody promotes the value of' countervailing vicwpoints j. llowcvcr. since Mothcr is presently unwilling to co-parent with Father, and shows no willingness to honor the letter or spirit or joint custody, Father must be given special decision-making authority over discrete issues to ensure that he is able to enjoy parenting rights.

As required by Family Code §3083, this Court is supposed to specify any topics which this Court finds that it is in the child's best interests 10 require both parents to agree. and by negative inlcrcncc specify those topics for which the parents may still act independently. Sec Marriage ol Buser (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 639. 644 [specification is only required if the court finds that joint

consent is actually warranted J. However, complying with §3083 will not resolve the problem here

because the parties have been unable.: lo act independently or by consensus; instead, the parties require a tic-breaker. The Family Code dnt.:s nol actually provide a mechanism for establishing a tic-breaker. and there is a remarkable dearth of published casdaw on this topic. The FL-341 ( E) includes a section for designating topics in which one parent is given "special decision-making" authority.

The case of Cassady v. Signol'l:lli (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 55. is one of the few published '"tie-breaker" cases on record. In that case, mother and father disagreed about the child's health care needs and schooling. Mother wanted lo home school the child, but father wanted the child to attend ··an appropriate public, private, or parochial school... Father also wanted sole authority over health care decisions. Although the trial court round that join! legal custotly was warrantctl, it specified that father should have tic-breaker vote for school enrollment and health care decisions: "mother had difficulty

coping \vith the stresses and pressures of life jand I had questionable decision making ability that would

obviously impair her ability to competently tcuch a full range or subjects ... mother's ability lo make appropriate medical decisions for I the child I might be impaired." Id. at 62.

Case Number Fl.18618

Order re Custody and Return or Child to California

The issue presented by the parties in this dispute is how best to break a tic when Mother clearly

2 11 uses her vote to keep Father from enjoying parenting rights. The direct evidence is obvious: Mother

3 11 ignores court orders and rcf'uscs to allow Father to participate. Moreover, character of a parent is

4 11 generally at issue in all custody actions. Sec in re Domthy I. (1984) 162 Cal.J\pp.3d 1154, 1158-1159.

5 11 Although Mother accuses Father or a great many transgressions, she has only made those allegations as

6 11 evidence in her Canadian lilings (not here), and she has still not secured refugee status or restraining

7 11 order despite claiming that Father has been abusive to both Mother and child. Mother has declined this

8 11 Court's numerous invitations to submit any evidence or Father's transgressions here, as this Court is

9 11 more than willing to impose restraints where needed. On the llip side. Father docs not accuse :vlothcr

10 11 of any transgressions outside or the custody dispute. I lowcvcr, Mother has amassed a long list of

11 II transgressions before this Court in just her limited involvement. ;'vlothcr's transgressions inclu(k:

12 11 o �viother gave false testimony to this Court on 07/25/2024 when she advised of her

13 II intention to return to California with the child:

14 11 o ivlother gave false testimony under oath in a written statement dated 10/03/2024.

15 11 ,vhcrcin she stated her intention to return to California and start looking for a job:

16 o Mother failed to appear at the hearing on I 0/17/2024, despite being ordered to appear;

17 o Mother misled this Court by filing on 12/19/2024 a request for additional time to

18 11 comply with <.:ourt orders because "mother has no job, no place to stay in ICalifornia].'"

19 11 Mother had no intention or facilitating Father's visits here in California or elsewhere.

20 II o Mother failed lo honor Father's legal custody rights by refusing to involve him in

21 II decisions relating to the t:hil<l's health care, schooling, or other similar needs:

22 11 o Mother foiled to focilitatc Father's court-ordered parenting time on Tuesdays from 2pm

23 II - 6pm (commencing 02/08/2025);

24 II o Mother failed to facilitate Father's court-ordered parenting time on Thursdays from 2511 2pm - 6pm (commencing 02/08/2025);

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)"

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o Mother failed to appear at the review hearing on 02/27/2025. despite being expressly ordered lo appear:

o Mother failed to appear al the contempt hearing on 04/24/2025. despite being personally

served with the citation and order lo personally appear at said hearing;

o Mother failed to l'acililatc Father's court-ordered parenting time in Ontario (4 hrs/day for seven consecutive days).

To date, Mother has given Calse testimony to this Court on three prior occasions. failed to appear in this Court as ordered on three prior occasions. and failed to facilitate approximately 124 court-ordered visits for Father. In addition, Mother has authorized Attornc:y Mackintosh to appc:ar in these pro<.:ei.:dings. who gave false inferences to this Court on 05/08/2025 about Mother's willingness to cooperate ,vith Father" s visit in Canada. Mother has also authorized Attorney Channell to offer misleading information in a letter to Justke Yee about the absence ofjurisdictional rulings from this Court. While this Court historically treads lightly on such things, Mothcr"s direct and indirect transgressions in tll_is Court lead inexorably to the condusion that l'vlother has demonstrated so far a lack of good charackr for someone expected to co-pan.:nt.

This Court linds and concludes on the evidence presented to date that thi.: best interests of the

child warrant an order granting Father special decision-making authority over the following topics: enrollment in school or daycare; out-of-country and out-of-state travel; general location where child may reside: and members or \fothcr's family who may associate ,vith the child. All other subjects (health care providers. counseling/therapy, extracurricular activities, religious activities) shall be relegated to traditional ,ioint consensus decision-making.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Father Mandeep Raj is awarded sole physical custody of the subject chi Id, […] DOB 12/22/2022, who is a citizen or the United Stales. Father is further awarded special decision-making authority for the child regarding out-of-country (US) and out-of-state (Calirornia) travel; city/state where child may reside (Sonora, California); and what members of Mother's family may associate with the child (Father having made no dection yd). The child shall be returned in the company or

Case Number Fl. I 8618

Order re Cust()dy and Return or Child to California

Page 21 of 23

Father (or Father's dcsignec) to the United Stales of America forthwith. Father has the exclusive right 2 11 to the physical and legal custody orthc minor child Juring the period or time required to return the

3 II minor child to California, United Stales. Father is authorized to utilize the enforcement services of'thc

4 II U.S. State Department, the 1-:mhassy/Consulate, and any authority \Vithin Canada -- including local law

5II enforcement to retrieve the child from his whereabouts in or about Mississauga, Ontario, or wherever

6II the child may be found, and tn deliver the child to Father or Father's dcsigncc for repatriation. By this

7II order, all commercial air carriers and the Canada Border Services Agency arc directed to cooperate

8II with Father's travel with the child to the United States - whdhcr that travel occur by airplane or

9 11 automobile travel across the border. Should Father ckct to make that return via air travel, he shall IO 11 arrange upnn notice that the child has been retrieved, !'i._)r llight ddails and port or entry.

11 11 Mother is ordered lo turn-over the child and all vital records and travel documents (birth

12 II certilicatc. passport. government issued identification) tu Father or Father's designee. Until the child

13 11 is returned to California. Mother shall have no parenting time at all. Thereafter. l\fother may be

14 11 allowed up to three hrs/day every Mon/Weds/Fri with the child (schedule to be determined by Father)

15 11 and. commencing twelve weeks l{/ier the child is returned to California, alternate weekends (Sat@

16 II 10am Sun (Cl; 2pm).

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2_,,,

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This Court had hoped to avoid making a return order. knowing it could cause the child emotional harm if Mother elected not to join the child. I lmvcvcr, consideration of a child's bond with the abducting parent or bis sense or security in 111:·w surroundings arc not valid bases for ignoring Mother's transgressions. The fact that […] might suffer stress and anxiety based on separation from Mother makes him no different from many children in similar positions - with or without an international abduction.

Finally, as observed by the Court in Maurizio R, supra:

''Where I it appears I that an unconditional return would pose psychological danger for a child, the court would be remiss not to consider the harm to the child that would be caused by removing him ... The only issue is how his return can be accomplished with a minimum amount of harm to the child. Mother cannot be compelled lo return, but her return with I the child I is the option that the trial court recognized as the most efficacious ... We remain hopeful that Mother will choose lo accompany I the child] and take whatever steps necessary to maintain and facilitate her son1s mental health

,vhile the issue of custody is being rl�solvcd.'' Id. at 642.

Case Number FL I li6 I 8

Order re Cust()dy and Return of Child to California

!'age 21 or 23

Father is granted discretion whether to permit Mother to accompany the child on the return

2 II flight, but is encouraged to do so for the sake of the child. If Mother docs, Father shall cover Mother's

3 II roundtrip airfare and three days oriodging. It is this Court's hope that Mother will accompany the

4 11 child back to California, and utilize th<: many options available to her here to secure whatever court

5 11 and custody orders she feels arc warranted.

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11 Encls:

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 6, 2026

2 c '" CJ /- c·

1:�-;, ;:6 L--- y

I ION. STEVENS. STREGER

SUPERIOR COURT COMMISSIONER

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• Additional Fl.-341 Custody and Visitation Conditions incorporated herein (9 pgs)

• Referenced Minute Orders (8 pgs)

Case Number Fl. I li6 I 8

Order re Cust()dy and Return of Child to California

Page 23 of 23

FL-341 CUSTODY AND VISITATION CONDITIONS

FL-341

CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION (PARENTING TIME) ORDER ATTACHMENT

TO Findings and Order After Hearing (form FL-340) D Judgment (form FL-180) CR] Judgment (form FL-250)

D Stipulation and Order for Custody and/or Visitation (Parenting Time) (form FL-355)

D Other (specify):

1. Jurisdiction. This court has jurisdiction to make child custody orders in this case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Fam. Code, §§ 3400-3465).

2. Notice and opportunity to be heard. The responding party was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, as provided by the laws of the State of California.

3. Country of habitual residence. The country of habitual residence of the child or children in this case is

CR] the United States D Other (specify):

4. Penalties for violating this order. If you violate this order, you may be subject to civil or criminal penalties, or both.

5. CR] Child abduction prevention. There is a risk that one of the parties will take the children out of California without the other party's permission. (Child Abduction Prevention Order Attachment (form FL:3A HB)) is attached and must be obeyed.)

6. The court refers the parties to child custody mediation or child custody recommending counseling as follows:

7. � Child custody. Custody of the minor children of the parties is awarded as follows:

a. Cbild'sName Blrth_lJJ!le

[…] 12/02/2022

Legal custody to:

(person who decides about the child's hea/th,edJJQJ�tiQ.nJJ.n.d welfare)

PRIMARY TO FATHER (see FL-34HE))

Physical custody to: (person the child regularly lives with}

SOLE TO FATHER

b. Joint legal custody of the child or children will be exercised as specified in the following order: D A((acl11,;er1t

CR] Joint Legal Custody Attachment (form FL-341(E))

8. Child custody and visitation (parenting time) involving allegations of a history of abuse or substance abuse

a. Allegations have been raised in form FL-311, other documents filed in the court, or in a court hearing that

(1) D Petitioner D Respondent D Other parent/party is (or are) alleged to have

a history of abuse against any of the following persons: a child, the other parent, their current spouse, or the person they live with or are dating or engaged to.

(2) D Petitioner D Respondent D Other parent/party is (or are) alleged to have the habitual or continual illegal use of controlled substances, or the habitual or continual abuse of alcohol, or the habitual or continual abuse of prescribed controlled substances.

b. D The court does NOT grant sole or joint custody of the minor children to:

D petitioner D respondent D other parent/party

c. D (1) Even though there are allegations of a history of abuse or substance abuse, the court GRANTS sole or joint custody of the minor child as set out in item 7.

(2) As required by Family Code section 3011(a)(5)(A), the court's reasons for making the orders:

(A) D Are in writing and filed separately (form F L-351 may be used for this purpose.)

(8) D Were recorded as follows: In a minute order By a court reporter

D Other (specify):

(3) The court finds that the order is in the best interests of the child, protects the safety of the parties and the child, and is specific as to time, day, place, and manner of transfer {exchange) of the child as Family Code sections 3011(a)(5)(A) and 6323(c) require.

THIS IS A COURT ORDER.

Judicu.d Council of Callforrna,

go� Child Custody and Visitation (Parenting Time)

FL-341, Page 1 of 4

R<N. January 1. 2026, Oplional Foon

Fam. Code,§§ 3011, 3020. 3022. 3025.

3040-3044, 3048. 3100, 6340, 7604

Order Attachment ➔

FL-341

9. CR] Visitation (parenting time)

a. D Reasonable right of visitation to the party without physical custody (not appropriate in cases involving domestic

violence)

b. See the attached -page document

c. D No visitation (parenting lime)

d. D The visitation (parenting time) will be supervised as specified in the attached Supervised Visitation Order

(FL-341(A)).

e. [BJ Visitation (parenting time) for the D petitioner [8J respondent other (name):

will be in person, by virtual visitation (not in person), and/or other ways as specified below:

(1) 0 In person, as follows

(A) D Weekends starting (date):

(Note: The first weekend of the month is the first weekend with a Saturday.)

Weekend Day(s) Times Start of (or After) School

(if applicable)

a.m. D p.m. [ ) start of D after

a.m. D p.m. start of after

D a.m. D p.m. D startof D after

a.m. D p.m. D startof D after

D a.m. D p.m. D startof D after

a.m. D p.rn. D startof D after

a.m. D p.m. start of D after

D a.m. p.m. D startof D after

a.m. D p.m. D startof D after

D     a.m. D     p.m.         D     startof                  after

(a) The parties will alternate the fifth weekends, with the D petitioner D respondent

D other parent/party having the initial fifth weekend, starting (date):

(b) D The D petitioner D respondent D other parent/party will have the fifth weekend in Dodd D even numbered months.

(B) D Alternate weekends starting (date):

(C) D Weekdays starting (date):

from at D a.rn. D p.m. D startof after to at D a.m. D p.m. D startof after

(D) IT] Other visitation (parenting time) days and restrictions are D listed in Attachment 9e(1JtDJ

(form MC-025 may be used for this purpose) [TI as follows:

Mother's visitation is set forth in written decision, and does not trigger until child returns to California

FL-341

(3) D Other ways visitation can happen that are in the best interests of the child are as follows:

10.0 Supervised visitation (parenting time).

Until D further order of the court D other (specify):

D petitioner D respondent D other parent/party (name):

will have supervised visitation (parenting lime) with the minor children according to the attached Supervised Visitation Order (fc.1rmfL-34J(A)).

11. [BJ Transportation for visitation (parenting time) and place of exchange

a. The children must be driven only by a licensed and insured driver. The vehicle must be legally registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles, and must have child restraint devices properly installed, as required by law.

b. D Transportation to begin the visits will be provided by the petitioner D respondent

D other (specify):

c. D Transportation from the visits will be provided by the D petitioner D respondent

other (specify):

d. D The exchange point at the beginning of the visit will be at (address):

e. D The exchange point at the end of the visit will be at (address):

f. D During the exchanges, the party driving the children will wait in the car and the other party will wait in the home (or

exchange location) while the children go between the car and the home (or exchange location).

g. CE] other (specify):

See 12.c. below.

12. [BJ Travel with children. The D petitioner D respondent D other parent/party(name):

must have written permission from the other parent or a court order to take the children out of

a. D the state of California.

b. D the following counties (specify):

c. IT] other places (specify):

See written order for conditions. Mother shall turn over the child to Father or Father's designee in Canada for immediate return to California. With Father's express written consent, Mother may travel with the child and Father (or his designee) to California for the sole purpose of reducing the child's stress. If Mother and Father agree to this, Father shall cover the cost of Mother's roundtrip airfare and three days of hotel accommodations.

FL-341

13. D Holiday schedule. The children will spend holiday time as listed D below D in the attached schedule. (Children's Holiday Schedule Attachment (form FL-341(C)) may be used for this purpose.)

14. [BJ Additional custody provisions. The parties will follow the additional custody provisions listed D below 0 in the attached schedule. (Additional Provisions-Physical Custody Attachment (form FL-341(DJ) may be used for this purpose.)

15. Access to children's records. Both the custodial and noncustodial parent have the right to access records and information

about their minor children (including medical, dental, and school records) and consult with professionals who are providing services to the children.

16. D Other (specify):

THIS IS A COURT ORDER.

Re,. January 1, 2026 Child Custody and Visitation (Parenting Time)

Order Attachment

Print Save

FL-341, Page 4 of 4

FL-341(8}

CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION ORDER ATTACHMENT

TO [KJ Child Custody and Visitation (Parenting Time) Order Attachment (form FL-341) D Custody Order-Juvenilfr-Final Judgment (form JV-200)

D Other (specify):

1. The court finds there is a risk that (specify name of party): JYOTI SEROYA

without permission because that party (check all that apply):

will take the child

a. [KJ has violated-or threatened to violate-a custody or visitation (parenting time) order in the past.

b. [KJ does not have strong ties lo California.

c. [KJ has done things that make it easy for him or her to take the children away without any permission, such as

{check all that apply):

D quitajob.

D closed a bank account. sold or gotten rid of assets.

D sold his or her home. D ended a lease.

D hidden or destroyed documents.

[KJ

[KJ

applied for a passport, birth certificate, or school or medical records.

Other {specify):

Wrongfully retained the child in another country without Father's consent

d. has a history of (check all that apply):

D domestic violence.

D child abuse.

[KJ not cooperating with the other parent or party in parenting.

e. has a criminal record.

f. [KJ has family or emotional ties to another county, state, or foreign country.

(NOTE: If item "f' is checked, at least one other factor must be checked, too.)

THE COURT ORDERS, to prevent the party in item 1 from taking the children without permission:

2. 0 Supervised visitation (parenting time). The terms are (check one):

D as specified on attached form FL-341(A) [KJ as follows:

Father may elect to retain, at his sole expense, professional supervision of Mother during her parenting time with the child to ensure that Mother does not attempt to flee or secre away the child. If Father does, Mother shall cooperate with supervisor.

3. D The party in item 1 must post a bond for $ . The terms of the bond are (specify):

4. The party in item 1 must not move from the following locations with the children without permission in writing from the other parent or party or a court order:

D Current residence D Current school district (specify):

[KJ This county [KJ Other (specify): All travel in excess of 25 miles must be aooroved bv Father

5. [K] The party in item 1 must not travel with the children out of (check all that apply):

D this county. [KJ the United States. [KJ California. D Other (specify):

6. The party in item 1 must register this order in the state of (specify):

travel to that state for visits.

before the children can

7. [KJ The party in item 1 must not apply for a passport or any other vital document, such as a visa or birth certificate, that can be used for travel.

THIS IS A COURT ORDER.

Pago 1 of 2

Fonn Adopted for Mandatory Uso Judicial Council of California FL,341(8) (Rev. July 1, 2025)

CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION ORDER ATTACHMENT 22 U.S.C. § \1001 ot soq.

FL-341(8)

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:

OTHER PARENT/PARTY:

CASE NUMBEH:

8. [TI The party in item 1 must turn in all the children's passports and other vital documents in the party's possession or control as specified below (List the documents that must be turned in. Include the details for turning in the documents to the court, one of the attorneys, the other party, or another person):

All passports, government issued identification cards, travel papers, and vital records shall be turned over to Father or Father's designee immediately.

9. The party in item 1 must give the other parent or party the following before traveling with the children:

D The children's travel itinerary

D Copies of round-trip airline tickets

Addresses and telephone numbers where the children can be reached at all limes

D An open airline ticket for the other parent in case the children are not returned Other (specify):

10. [KJ The party in item 1 must notify the embassy or consulate of (specify country): Canada. India this order and provide the court with proof of that notification within (specify number): 10 days.

about

11. [=1 The party in item 1 must get a custody and visitation (parenting time) order equivalent to the most recent U.S. order before the children may travel to that country for visits. The court recognizes that foreign orders may be changed or enforced according to the laws of that country.

12. IT] Enforcing the order. The court authorizes any law enforcement officer to enforce this order. In this county, contact the Child Abduction Unit of the Office of the District Attorney at (phone number and address):

13. Other orders (specify):

See written order issued this date.

14. This order is valid in other states and in any country that has signed the Hague Convention on Child Abduction.

Date: 01/06/2026 £ � �.<2 r--. �"'

="JU¥cw_oF�

THIS IS A COURT ORDER.

H-3�!(El) IRov. July 1, 2025) CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION ORDER ATTACHMENT

l��J!SJ�.\�tlJJt�f8�ilI Save this form !

Pago 2 ol 2

l- '91i'af:'tti.l•.f<>rm�

FL-341(0)

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS-PHYSICAL CUSTODY ATTACHMENT

TO Petition D Response D Request for Order D Responsive Declaration to Request for Order Stipulation and Order for Custody and/or Visitation of Children [BJ Findings and Order After Hearing or Judgment

D Custody Order-Juvenile-Final Judgment Other (specify):

The additional provisions to physical custody apply to (specify parties): CR] Petitioner CR] Respondent D Other Parenl/Party

1. CR] Notification of parties' current address. CR] Petitioner CR] Respondent D Other Parenl/Party must notify all parties within {specify number): 15 days of any change in his or her

a. address for CR] residence D mailing CR] work CR] e-mail

b. telephone/message number at home CR] cell phone D work the children's schools

The parties may not use such information for the purpose of harassing, annoying, or disturbing the peace of the other or invading the other's privacy. No residence or work address is needed if a party has an address with the State of California's Safe at Horne confidential address program.

2. CR] Notification of proposed move of child. Each party must notify the other (specify number): 60 days before any planned change in residence of the children. The notification must state, to the extent known, the planned address of the children. including the county and state of the new residence. The notification must be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested.

3. CR] Child care.

a. CR] The children must not be left alone without age-appropriate supervision.

b. [[] The parties must let each other know the name, address. and phone number of the children's regular child-care providers.

4. D Right of first option of child care. In the event any party requires child care for (specify number): hours or more while the children are in his or her custody, the other party or parties must be given first opportunity. with as much prior notice as possible, to care for the children before other arrangements are made. Unless specifically agreed or ordered by the court, this order does not include regular child care needed when a party is working.

5. [BJ Canceled visitation (parenting time).

a. [TI If the noncustodial party fails to arrive al the appointed time and fails to notify the custodial party that he or she will be late, then the custodial party need wait for only (specify number): 30 minutes before considering the visitation (parenting time) canceled.

b. CR] If the noncustodial party is unable to exercise visitation (parenting time) on a given occasion, he or she must notify the custodial party (specify):

[BJ at the earliest possible opportunity.

D Other (specify):

c. [RJ If the children are ill and unable to participate in the scheduled visitation (parenting time), the custodial party must give the noncustodial party (specify):

[BJ as much notice as possible.

D A doctor's excuse.

D Other (specify):

6. [RJ Phone contact between parties and children.

a. [RJ The children may have telephone access to the parties [RJ and the parties may have telephone access to the children al reasonable times, for reasonable durations.

b. The custodial parent must make the child available for the following scheduled telephone contact (specify child's telephone contact with each party):

c. [[] No party or any other third party may listen to, monitor, or interfere with the calls.

FOfm Awovmt tor OphMal Uso Judidal Counc,I of ca1,tomia

FL-341(O) (Hov. July 1, 2016)

Pag• 1 of 2

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS-PHYSICAL CUSTODY ATTACHMENT Family Code,§§ 3003, 3024, 3083

WNW,COH/15.CB gov

FL--34_!{Q}

7. I ,(] No negative comments. The parties will not make or allow others to make negative comments about each other or about their past or present relationships, family, or friends within hearing distance of the children.

8. [[] Discussion of court proceedings with children. Other than age-appropriate discussion of the parenting plan and the children's role in mediation or other court proceedings, the parties will not discuss with the children any court proceedings relating to custody or visitation (parenting time).

9. [[] No use of chlldren as messengers. The parties will communicate directly with each other on matters concerning the children and may not use the children as messengers between them.

10. [[] Alcohol or substance abuse. The [D petitioner respondent D other parenUparty may not consume alcoholic beverages, narcotics, or restricted dangerous drugs (except by prescription) within (specify number): 6 hours before or during periods of time with the children and may not permit any third party to do so in the presence of the children.

11. [[] No exposure to cigarette or medical marijuana smoke. The parties will not expose the children to secondhand cigarette or medical marijuana smoke.

12. [[] No interference with schedule of any party without that party's consent. The parties will not schedule activities for the children during the other party's scheduled visitation (parenting time) without the other party's prior agreement.

13. Third-party contact.

a. The children will have no contact with (specify name):

b. The children must not be left alone in the presence of (specify name):

14. Children's clothing and belongings.

a. D Each party will maintain clothing for the children so that the children do not have to make the exchanges with additional clothing.

b. D The children will be returned to the other party with the clothing and other belongings they had when they arrived.

15. D Log book. The parties will maintain a ''log book" and make sure that the book is sent with the children between their homes. Using businesslike notes (no personal comments), parties will record information related to the health. education. and welfare issues that arise during the time the children are with them.

16. [[] Terms and conditions of order may be changed. The terms and conditions of this order may be added to or changed as the needs of the children and parties change. Such changes will be in writing, dated and signed by the parties; each party will retain a copy. If the parties want a change to be a court order, it must be filed with the court in the form of a court document.

17. Other (specify):

FL,3411D} {Hov July 1,21116) ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS-PHYSICAL CUSTODY ATTACHMENT

For your protection and privacy, please press the Clear

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Page 2 of 2

I'c1�'ffi•• form-I

FL-341(E)

JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY ATTACHMENT

TO CJ Petition CJ Response D Request for Order CJ Responsive Declaration to Request for Order

D Stipulation and Order for Custody andfor Visitation of Children IT] Findings and Order After Hearing or Judgment

CJ Custody Order-Juvenile-Final Judgment D Other (specify):

1. The parties (specify): [KJ Petitioner CR] Respondent CJ Other Parent/Party will have joint legal custody of the children.

2. In exercising joint legal custody, the parties will share in the responsibility and discuss in good faith matters concerning the health, education, and welfare of the children. The parties must discuss and consent in making decisions on the following matters:

a. CJ Enrollment in or leaving a particular private or public school or daycare center

b. W Beginning or ending of psychiatric, psychological, or other mental health counseling or therapy

c. 0 Participation in extracurricular activities

d. [KJ Selection of a doctor, dentist, or other health professional (except in emergency situations)

e. 0 Participation in particular religious activities or institutions

f. CJ Out-of-country or out-of-state travel

g. Other (specify):

3. If a party does not obtain the consent of the other party to those items in 2, which are granted as court orders:

a. He or she may be subject to civil or criminal penalties.

b. The court may change the legal and physical custody of the minor children.

c. CJ Other consequences (specify):

4. 0 Special decision making designation and access to children's records

a. The CR] petitioner D respondent D other parenUparty will be responsible for making decisions

regarding the following issues (specify): Any and all travel outside the State of California; the city/state where the child shall reside (§7501) and attend school; and what members of the Seroya family may associate with the child.

b. Both the custodial and noncustodial parent have the right to access records and information about their minor children (including medical, dental, and school records) and consult with professionals who are providing services to the children.

5. c:E] Health-care notification.

a. [8J Each party must notify the other of the name and address of each health practitioner who examines or treats the children; such notification must be made within (specify number): 3 days of the first treatment or examination.

b. 0 Each party is authorized to take any and all actions necessary to protect the health and welfare of the children, including but not limited to consent to emergency surgical procedures or treatment.The party authorizing such emergency treatment must notify the other party as soon as possible of the emergency situation and of all procedures or treatment administered to the children.

c. CR] The parties are required to administer any prescribed medications for the children.

6. 0 School notification. Each party will be designated as a person the children's school will contact in the event of an emergency.

7. 0 Name. The parties will not change the last name of the children or have a different name used on the children's medical, school, or other records without the written consent of the other party.

8. D Other (specify):

Form ,\pfxovud lor Optional Use Jud,aal Council or Califomia H.:M1tE}(Rov. July 1. 20161

Pago 1 of 1

JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY ATTACHMENT Family Code.§§ 3003. 3025. 30/:J

wv.-w courts rtJ 901'

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

MandeepRaj )

Plaintiff/Petitioner, )

v. )

Jyoti Seroya )

Defendant/Respondent. )

Case No. FL18618

Event Date: July 25, 2024

Event Type: OSC Hearing

Mtn/OSC: Child CuatodyNlaltatlon

Add'I Info: And Immediate Return of the Child to Tuolumne County Zoom

Judge: Steven S. Streger

Clerk: Lella Losik

Reporter:

Family Law/Support - Minutes

Appearances:

Respondent: Jyoti Seroya, via Zoom is present appearing Pro Per. Petitioner: Mandeep Raj is present appearing with/by Nathan Nutting. Party/Parties stipulate to Commissioner acting as Judge Pro Tern.

OSC Hearing:- Child Custody/Visitation:

Case regularly called. Party/Parties stipulate to Commissioner acting as Judge Pro Tern and sign consent form in open Court. Respondent orally stipulates.

Mother informs the Court she just received Petition late yesterday and request time to prepare and hire Counsel.

Parentage is confirmed, parties stipulate.

The Court ask Mother if planning to keep Child in Canada as Father has right to see Child. Mother states they are there temporarily for a family emergency.

Attorney Nutting states Child has been gone since December of 2024 and Father has not seen him. Counsel request Child be returned to California in 2 weeks.

The Court will take the matter under submission. Parties will receive ruling with hearing date to follow via email. Email addresses are exchanged. Mother concedes notifications from Court and Father via emails.

Parties concede jurisdiction in California and the venue is Tuolumne County. Canada is temporary.

Court informs Mother response to petition needs to be filed.

Findings:

[X] Mother intends to bring Child to California.

[X] Parties concede parentage.

TUO-CS-200

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

12855 Justice Center Drive Sonora, CA 95370

Space below for use of Court Cieri< only

FILED

SEP 2 5 2024

Superior Court of California

Plaintiff/Petitioner:

Mandeep Raj

DefendanURespondent: Jyoti Seroya

Case Number: FL18618

ORDER AFTER JUDICIAL REVIEW

After the Court's review of:

IT IS ORDERED:

At the prior hearing on 07/25/2024, Respondent advised this Court that (1) petitioner herein is the biological father of the minor child, (2) she would be returning to Tuolumne County with the minor child very soon, and (3) she would be retaining an attorney. Since return of the child would resolve petitioner's TECO, this Court took the matter under submission, expecting to learn in due course that the child was back and that the parties had resolved their difference(s). That has apparently not occurred. An evidentiary hearing is now required to determine this Court's jurisdiction and, assuming jurisdiction exists, proper orders for the custody and parenting time of the minor child (to include travel restrictions and abduction orders). Both parties are ordered to appear in person at the upcoming hearing.

0 Other Action:

0 Denied. Reason:

ORDER AFTER JUDICIAL REVIEW

TUO-CS-200 - Form Adopted for Non-Mandatory Use - New 10/2023

Local Rules of the Superior Court of California Page 1 or 1

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

Mandeep Raj )

Plaintiff/Petitioner, )

v. )

Jyoti Seroya )

Defendant/Respondent. )

Case No. Event Date: Event Type: Mtn/OSC: Add'I Info: Judge: Cieri<: Reporter:

FL18618

October 17, 2024 Hearing: Other

Evldentlary Hearing for Jurisdiction

Steven S. Streger Lella Loslk

Family Law/Support - Minutes

Appearances:

Petitioner: Mandeep Raj is present appearing with/by Attorney Nathan Nutting. Attorney Hal Channell is present appearing on behalf of Respondent: Jyoti Seroya.

Hearing Other/Bvidentiary Hearing for Jurisdiction:

Case regularly called. Party/Parties have signed a prior stipulation to Commissioner acting as Judge Pro Tern.

Attorney Channell informs the Court there is a language barrier, and his client may have filed a Court cases in Canada Attorney Channell request more time to research case.

Attorney Nutting argues father has not seen child for 9 months and request child be brought back to California immediately.

Parties discuss Childs legal residency and the fact that mother was to bring child back to California but hasn't yet. The Court sets evidentiary hearing for jurisdiction.

Deadlines are set to serve and file opening brief, oppositions, exhibits, declarations, and replies. Parties stipulate to service by email.

By Order Of The Court:

[X] Parties shall serve and file opening brief by 11/04/2024. Not to exceed 15 pages.

[X] Parties shall serve and file oppositions, declarations, or exhibits by l l/18/2024. Not to exceed 15 pages.

[X] Parties shall serve and file reply by 11/26/2024.

Next Court Date:

The matter is set for the following date:

I DATE/fIME II DEPT. II PURPOSE I

12/05/2024 1:30

PM

Department

5

Court Trial: Short Cause. Evldentiary Hearin2'Jurisdiction

The matter is set for the followinp; date:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

Mandeep Raj )

Plaintiff/Petitioner, )

v. )

Jyoti Seroya )

Defendant/Respondent. )

Case No. Event Date: Event Type: MtnlOSC: Add'I Info: Judge: Clerk: Reporter:

FL18618

December 5₁ 2024

Court Trial: Short Cause

Evldentlary Hearing/Jurisdiction

Steven S. Streger

Lella Loslk

Family Law/Support - Minutes

Appearances:

Petitioner: Mandeep Raj is present appearing with/by Attorney Nathan Nutting. Attorney Hal Channell is present on behalf of Respondent: Jyoti Seroya.

Court Trial -Establish UCCJEA and/or Hague Jurisdiction:

Case regularly called. Party/Parties have signed a prior stipulation to Commissioner acting as Judge Pro Tern.

Parties stipulate to allowing all trial briefs to be submitted as sworn testimony.

Petitioners witness called:

Mandeep Raj - s - direct - cross - Court - redirect - recross - re-redirect - rest.

Exhibits marked for identification for Petitioner:

P-1: Sons Kaiser Permanente medical card. - admitted. P-2: JS West Bill - admitted.

P-3:Sons Social Security card letter. - admitted.

P-4: UPS letter. - admitted.

All exhibits are admitted to evidence with no objection of the parties. Parties give closing arguments.

Matter is taken under submission.

IN TltE SlJPEHIOH COUlff OF CALIFOR�IA COUNTY OF lTOUJ:\1:''F:

Man<lccp Raj

Plaintiff/Pei it ioncr.

Jyoti Sl•rnya

Det'cnJa11l/Ri:spondc11t.

Case No. Event Date: Event Type: Mtn/OSC: Add'I Info: Judge:

Clerk: Reporter

FL18618

May 8, 2025

OSC Hearing

Child CustodyNisitation FURTHER

Steven S. Streger

Lella Losik

Family Law/SuJ>porr - l\1inutcs

Appearances:

Petitioner: Mandecp Raj is present .ippcaring wi1h/by Attorney Nathan Nutting. Attorney Hal Chai1rn:II is pn:sent on behalf of Rcspondl·nt: Jyoti Scroya.

Allorncy (iracc t-.tacldntosh via Zoom is prcsc111.

OSC Hearings: - Child CustodyNisitation: I Contempt:

Case regularly called. Parties have signed a prior stipulation lo Commissioner acting as Judge Prn Tem.

Court prnlls copy of dcclaratilln tiled on 05102/2025 for Attorney Nulling in open Court.

Discussion is hdJ regarding hearing date on 05/2912025 in Canada. Father confirms he has attorney in Canada.

Atlorncy Mackintosh represents case in Canada for health benefits, support and \Vork search, and confirms with the Court there in nothing in place to prevent visitation from father.

Court encourages falher lo visit chilJ and all parties tu share infommtion n:garding ( ·anada Court case.

Attorney ( 'hanncll informs the Court he docs not have access to Canada case.

Attorney Nutting requests a review IK·aring alkr the Canada's hearing date.

Next Court Date:

The mailer is sd for the foll1..w,ing date:

! DATE/TIME II DEPT. I[

PURPOSE 7

j 0<,/05/2025 H:J0 Al\l II llt:partmcnt 5 II

Rc\•icw Hearing. I

IN TIIE SUPERIOR COlJRT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

Mandecp Raj

Plaintiff/Petition1:r,

V.

Case No. Event Date: Event Type: Mtn/OSC:

FL18618

December 18, 2025 Review Hearing

Jyoti Seroya

Defendant/Respondent.

Add'I Info: re: submissions from parties dated 10/15/25 and 10/30/2025

Judge: Steven S. Streger

Clerk: Lella Losik

Reporter:

Family Law/Su1>port - Minutes

Appearances:

Petitioner: Mandcep Raj is present appearing with/by Attorney Nathan Nutting. Respondent: Jyoti Scroya is present, via Zoom appearing with/by Attorney Hal Channell. Attorney Rupa Murthi appearing via Zoom, as Counsel for Petitioner in Canada.

Review Hearing:

Case regularly called for hearing. Party/Parties have signed a prior stipulation to Commissiorn:r acting as Judge Pro Tern.

Evidence re: Petitioner's legal custody rights and update on Canada proceedings. The Court is awaiting declaration from Petitioner regarding legal custody issues.

Attorney Channell infonns the Court that the Respondent is in need of interpreter as her sister is sick.

Attorney Murthi updates the Court regarding the Ontario Court of Justice proceedings and confirms that the Respondent has filed a restraining order against the Petitioner in Canada however, it has been stayed due to the on goings here in the United States and that there arc no restraining orders against Petitioner in Canada at this time.

Attorney Channell objects to moving forward with any questions re: the on goings in Canada without an interpreter for his client. lt is mandated that Attorney Channell shall appoint an interpreter for Respondent.

Matter is still under submission.

Case No.: FL18618 1 Event Date: December 18, 2025

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE

12855 Justice Center Drive Sonora, CA 95370

FILE

JAN O 6 2026

Superior Court of California Couµty Q!,.;�yplumne

L,, Lv,:;,d!

by: \g, Clerk

Mandeep Raj

Plaintiff/ Petitioner,

vs.

JyotiSeroya

Defendant/ Respondent.

Superior Court Case No. FL18618

Clerk's Certificate of Service by Mail (CCP 1013a[4])

I am a clerk at the above named Court, and do certify that I am not a party to the above-entitled cause. On the date shown below I served Order Granting Father's Request Filed 9/15/2025 by depositing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a separate, sealed envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, addressed respectively to the person(s) as shown below.

Hal B Channell PO Box 5347

Sonora, CA 95370

Nathan Nutting

Placed in Attorney Pick Up Box in Tuolumne Courthouse

Mailed at Sonora, California Superior Court of California, Tuolumne County Shalom Rosenfelder, Court Executive Officer

Footnotes

1. 1Although it is vigorously disputed whether the mother lacks facility in English, any procedural concern was abated during this Trial through the use of a simultaneous interpreter, and allowance for the mother’s siblings to sit beside her at counsel table as soon as each completed their testimony to help her with any translation issues.
2. 2Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398 (Can.)