Real Estate Law - SCJ

The plaintiff real estate brokerage brought an action against the vendor, its principal, and the purchaser for an unpaid real estate commission.

The vendor and purchaser had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale during the listing period, which was later revived and closed under a different corporate purchaser name at the vendor's insistence to avoid paying the commission.

The court found that the commission was earned and payable under the listing agreement.

The court also held the vendor's principal and the corporate purchaser liable for intentional interference with contractual relations for their bad faith conduct in attempting to circumvent the commission.

The applicant purchaser brought an emergency application for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a commercial property.

The respondent vendor failed to close the transaction on the scheduled date, citing the purchaser's lack of mortgage funds, while the vendor itself had failed to answer requisitions or prepare closing documents due to an internal corporate dispute.

The court found that the vendor's failure to perform its obligations and its implied renunciation of the contract relieved the purchaser of the requirement to tender.

The court ordered specific performance, enforcing an extension of the closing date agreed to by the vendor's ostensible representatives.

Condominium unit owners sought removal of a certificate of lien and correction of a status certificate after the condominium corporation claimed additional legal costs under s.134(5) of the Condominium Act, 1998 following a compliance order.

The corporation asserted it could add substantial additional legal fees as common expenses beyond the court-ordered costs.

The court held that s.134(5) permits recovery only of reasonable legal costs incurred in obtaining the compliance order, not costs incurred afterwards in attempting to enforce or escalate the dispute.

Finding the corporation’s claimed $41,599.45 unreasonable for a simple application largely resolved by consent, the court assessed the recoverable costs at $6,500 inclusive of prior awards.

The lien was ordered vacated and the corporation ordered to pay costs of the motion.

A secured creditor applied for the appointment of a receiver over a debtor real estate holding company under s. 243(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent argued that the appointment of a receiver should not proceed by application and that ordinary remedies were available.

The court held that the governing legislation expressly contemplates appointment by application and that such an order constitutes a final order determining the issues raised.

Given the debtor’s continuing default, the enforceability of the creditor’s security, and the lack of an operating business, the court found it just and convenient to appoint a receiver.

At a Rule 48.14 status hearing, the plaintiff was required to show cause why a civil action alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and professional negligence arising from real estate transactions should not be dismissed for delay.

The court reviewed the procedural history and found that the plaintiff had taken minimal steps to advance the action over several years, failed to provide any reasonable explanation for the delay, and had not diligently pursued service, pleadings, or discovery.

The court further held that the deaths of two key defendants created significant non-compensable prejudice because their evidence regarding the disputed transactions could no longer be obtained.

Applying the principles in Savundranayagam v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada and related authorities, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to satisfy both branches of the test required to avoid dismissal.

The action was therefore dismissed for delay.

On a Rule 20 summary judgment motion, moving defendants sought dismissal of claims as statute-barred under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court heard affidavit and oral evidence on discoverability and due diligence, and found the responding parties knew by 2005-2006 of the impugned transfer and related litigation but chose not to investigate potential claims against additional actors.

Applying the objective branch of discoverability and diligence principles, the court held that a reasonable person in their circumstances ought to have known the material facts in 2006.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring trial on the limitations defence and dismissed the action against the moving defendants.

On a defendant mortgagee's summary judgment motion, the court considered whether a mortgagee in possession owed and breached a duty to act prudently regarding insurance of the mortgagor's property interest after cancellation of coverage.

The record contained material conflicts on notice of cancellation, communications between agents, and whether reliance on the mortgagee's blanket insurance could reasonably be inferred, requiring credibility assessments not suitable for summary judgment.

Applying summary judgment principles, the court held that genuine issues requiring a trial remained on duty, breach, causation, and damages, including potential accounting issues tied to any insurance recovery.

The court granted limited summary judgment only to strike the personal plaintiff's claim and the improvident sale allegation, and otherwise dismissed the motion.

The moving defendants sought dismissal of a civil action for delay under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, arising from a 2003 real estate transaction and alleging solicitor’s negligence and unpaid purchase funds, had remained largely inactive for over seven years.

The court found the delay to be inordinate and inexcusable, particularly given the plaintiff’s failure to advance the case despite prior administrative dismissal and reinstatement with directions to schedule a case conference.

Prejudice was established due to the death of a key participant and witness whose testimony was central to the disputed arrangements between the parties.

Balancing the plaintiff’s right to proceed against the defendants’ right to a fair trial, the court concluded that the defendants’ ability to defend the action had been irreparably compromised.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a transfer of real property that severed a joint tenancy, which would otherwise determine whether the deceased’s interest passed through survivorship or through his estate.

The parties urged the court to treat the matter as suitable for summary judgment based solely on the written record.

The court held that the motion record revealed significant factual disputes, including conflicting evidence from witnesses and potential credibility issues.

Relying on appellate guidance regarding the limits of summary judgment where a full appreciation of evidence is required, the court concluded that viva voce evidence was necessary.

The court ordered that specified witnesses provide oral evidence with limited cross-examination to facilitate a fair determination.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment relating to a mortgage debt that had been in default since 2001.

The defendants conceded judgment but sought a temporary stay of enforcement pending the determination of a separate action against their former lawyer for alleged breach of fiduciary duty and contribution or indemnity.

The court considered Rule 20.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the broad discretionary authority under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act to stay proceedings where the interests of justice require.

Given the circumstances surrounding the initiation of the action and the alleged involvement of the former lawyer, the court concluded that the equities favoured granting a temporary stay of execution.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff but enforcement was stayed on terms pending progress of the related litigation.

The plaintiffs sought an extension of time to serve a statement of claim on a contractor nearly nine years after the action was commenced, and the defendants moved to dismiss the entire action for delay.

The court found the plaintiffs’ efforts to locate and serve the contractor were lackadaisical and that significant prejudice resulted from the lengthy delay, including loss of records, faded memory, and the death of a witness.

Accordingly, the court refused to extend time for service on that defendant.

However, although the court found a period of “inexcusable delay” in prosecuting the action, it held that the remaining defendants had not demonstrated prejudice sufficient to create a substantial risk that a fair trial was no longer possible.

The motion to dismiss the entire action for delay was therefore refused.

The applicants sought to strike an agreement from the land registry that had been registered on the title of their residential property for nearly 25 years.

The agreement, made between siblings, contained a right of first refusal and provided for equal distribution of net proceeds upon the sale of the property.

The court found that the agreement was intended to survive the death of the parties and bind their heirs.

The court also held that the addendum binding the applicant's spouse was supported by valid consideration in the form of forbearance.

Finally, the court confirmed the agreement was properly registered on title under both the Registry Act and the Land Titles Act.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim arising from a prior settlement involving the sale and transfer of property.

The court found that the plaintiff had executed minutes of settlement, a release, an agreement of purchase and sale, and a transfer, and had received the agreed payment in 2005.

Any alleged additional losses would have been discovered no later than November 1, 2005, making the claim subject to the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.

Because the action was not commenced until August 28, 2008, it was statute-barred.

The court also held that a conspiracy claim could not succeed where only one defendant remained and noted that the remaining defendant acted only as a trustee of the property.

The action was dismissed on summary judgment without costs.

A commercial landlord sought recovery of unpaid rent and damages from prior assignees and indemnifiers of a lease after the final tenant defaulted.

The defendants argued that subsequent assignments and amendments to the lease without their consent discharged their indemnity obligations.

The court held that mere assignment of the lease did not materially alter the risk to indemnifiers and did not release them.

However, a later amendment extending the lease at higher rent increased the indemnifiers’ risk and therefore terminated the indemnities after the original lease term ended.

The court awarded the landlord arrears owing as of the original expiry date, subject to credits for deposits and improperly handled chattels.

On competing summary judgment motions, the plaintiff sought commission recovery arising from a completed sale of commercial property, while the defendant sought dismissal of the action.

The court held the record established no enforceable agreement requiring the defendant vendor to pay commission on the closed transaction, particularly given contractual terms assigning commission responsibility to the purchaser.

The court further found that, even if such an agreement could be inferred, dual agency conflict principles and inadequate disclosure would bar recovery.

Applying Rule 20 to dispose of the matter without trial, the court granted the defendant's cross-motion and dismissed the action.

In a costs-only decision following a successful summary judgment and possession order under a mortgage, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The moving party sought substantial indemnity costs based on contractual entitlement and a Rule 49 offer, while also alleging bad faith and unreasonable delay under Rule 20.06.

The court rejected findings of bad faith or unreasonable conduct, but held the contract and Rule 49 consequences supported substantial indemnity costs.

After applying Rule 57.01 factors and proportionality, the court reduced the amount claimed and fixed fair and reasonable costs at $10,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, payable forthwith.

The commercial tenant sought an interim and interlocutory injunction restraining the landlord from terminating the tenancy and re‑entering the premises.

The tenant argued it was an over‑holding tenant on a year‑to‑year tenancy and that the landlord’s notice to quit was invalid.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue for trial regarding whether the tenancy was year‑to‑year or month‑to‑month.

The court accepted that immediate eviction would cause irreparable harm by forcing closure of the tenant’s long‑standing restaurant business and loss of employment for staff.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo, and an interim injunction was granted with conditions requiring payment of rent and additional funds into court.

The plaintiff corporation sought an adjournment of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the action for failure to comply with interlocutory orders requiring payment of costs and posting of security for costs.

The plaintiff also requested extensions of time and a reduction of the security amount.

The court considered Rules 56.06, 56.07, 57.03, and 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the balance between enforcing court orders and allowing disputes to be decided on their merits.

Although the plaintiff had failed to comply with prior orders and had only partially raised the required funds, the court found limited evidence supporting a short final extension.

The court granted a final extension of time to post security for costs and pay outstanding costs but refused to reduce the security amount.

The plaintiffs sought a certificate of pending litigation and an interlocutory injunction concerning property purchased by their daughter after funds had earlier been loaned to assist in purchasing a different property.

The defendant brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim for repayment of the loan was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held the alleged acknowledgment of debt contained in family litigation financial disclosure did not revive the limitation period because it was made after expiry and was not directed to the creditors.

Claims framed in unjust enrichment and constructive trust could not circumvent the limitation period, and the plaintiffs had no equitable mortgage or proprietary interest in the property.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action and the plaintiffs’ motions for a certificate of pending litigation and injunctive relief were dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought a vesting order over residential property registered in their daughter's name, alleging that title had been placed in her name solely to obtain financing due to their bankruptcies.

They asserted an oral agreement that ownership would be transferred to them once the loan used to purchase the property had been repaid.

The defendant denied the agreement and argued that any compensation should be limited to monetary reimbursement for payments made.

The court found that the plaintiffs had paid the purchase-related expenses and loan repayments and that the defendant would be unjustly enriched if she retained the property.

Applying resulting trust principles, the court ordered that the property be vested in the plaintiffs.