Joseph Marcuccio

The Plaintiffs brought a motion for discovery of documents from the City of Greater Sudbury and interveners in advance of cross-examinations on affidavits for a pending interlocutory injunction motion.

The Plaintiffs sought documents related to the City's alleged bad faith and unfair treatment towards them, particularly in comparison to how the City dealt with their neighbours (the interveners).

The court found that allegations of bad faith or unfair treatment were not relevant to the pleaded causes of action (negligence, negligent misrepresentation, estoppel) or the criteria for injunctive relief as currently framed in the Statement of Claim.

Consequently, the request for documents pertaining to the neighbours' properties (1380 Keast Drive and 1366 Keast Drive) was dismissed.

However, the court ordered the City to produce records of communications related to the Plaintiffs' own permit applications and construction at 1377 Keast Drive, finding these relevant.

The plaintiff vendor sued the defendant purchasers for breach of contract after the defendants failed to close a real estate transaction.

The defendants argued there was an implied term that their obligation to close was conditional on the sale of their own home, which had fallen through.

The court rejected this argument, finding no such implied term in the unambiguous agreement.

The court also dismissed the defendants' argument that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages.

The plaintiff was awarded damages of $110,588.66, assessed as of the date she successfully sold the property to a third party, representing the difference in purchase price and carrying costs.

The plaintiffs sought a vesting order over residential property registered in their daughter's name, alleging that title had been placed in her name solely to obtain financing due to their bankruptcies.

They asserted an oral agreement that ownership would be transferred to them once the loan used to purchase the property had been repaid.

The defendant denied the agreement and argued that any compensation should be limited to monetary reimbursement for payments made.

The court found that the plaintiffs had paid the purchase-related expenses and loan repayments and that the defendant would be unjustly enriched if she retained the property.

Applying resulting trust principles, the court ordered that the property be vested in the plaintiffs.

The insurer's counsel of record sought to be removed just days before the scheduled arbitration hearing, and the insurer's newly retained counsel requested an adjournment to prepare.

The claimant opposed the adjournment, citing prejudice, her advanced age, and costs already incurred.

The arbitrator granted the removal of counsel and the adjournment to ensure a full and fair hearing, but awarded the claimant $5,000 in expenses for costs thrown away due to the late adjournment request.

The insurer brought a motion for an order compelling the applicant to attend further psychological and orthopaedic assessments under section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, and for an adjournment of the upcoming arbitration hearing.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding it to be an exercise in tactical brinkmanship on the eve of the hearing.

The insurer failed to provide a reasonable explanation for its delay in requesting the assessments, despite having early notice of the psychological and orthopaedic components of the claim.

Furthermore, the arbitrator noted a lack of jurisdiction to directly compel attendance at a section 42 examination.