SCJ 2017

The applicant was successful on the application and sought costs of $20,000 plus HST.

The respondent argued for reduced costs of $15,000 due to divided success, claiming the applicant abandoned some relief at the hearing.

The court found no evidence that the respondent incurred additional costs due to the abandoned relief.

The court awarded the applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $17,157.72, all inclusive.

The defendants appealed a Master's order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their Statement of Claim to seek damages for breach of a settlement agreement.

The defendants argued the new causes of action were barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's decision.

The court held that, at the pleadings stage, the plaintiffs' reliance on the defendants' ameliorative efforts to cure the breach may have rendered legal proceedings inappropriate, thereby postponing the commencement of the limitation period.

The applicant tenant brought an urgent application under the Commercial Tenancies Act regarding a dispute over additional rent and a threatened eviction.

The court found the cited sections inapplicable but utilized the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure to avoid technical irregularities.

The court ordered the tenant to pay base rent plus an estimated amount for additional rent and arrears to avoid eviction, directed the landlord to provide an architect's certificate and actual figures, and converted the matter to a Rule 14 application.

The defendants brought a motion to vary a Mareva injunction to permit payments for legal fees and living expenses out of frozen funds.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing the defendants failed to demonstrate they lacked access to other assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the moving parties failed to discharge their onus because they did not provide evidence explaining why related corporate defendants (Incryptex and ApexDX) could not fund the litigation, nor did they provide sufficient details of their living expenses or account for other funds.

The moving party sought to terminate his spousal support and life insurance obligations, arguing that his voluntary retirement at age 56 constituted a material change in circumstances.

The parties had previously executed a separation agreement providing for spousal support for a fixed ten-year period.

The court found that the retirement was voluntary, the moving party retained the capacity to earn income, and the parties had intended for support to continue for the full ten-year term to allow the recipient to plan her financial affairs.

The court concluded there was no material change in circumstances and dismissed the motion.

The plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by a pothole.

They initially sued the City of Toronto and 'John Doe Maintenance Company'.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiffs successfully moved before a Master to substitute the Region of York and Brennan Paving as defendants, relying on the doctrine of misnomer.

The defendants appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the appeal, finding that the Master erred in law by extending the doctrine of misnomer too far.

The court held that the 'litigating finger' did not clearly point to the proposed defendants, as the Statement of Claim identified the accident location in a different municipality, and it was unreasonable to expect the proposed defendants to connect the claim to a notice letter sent nearly two years earlier.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' solicitor negligence action for delay, the defendant Whyte was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs appealed the initial assessment officer's certificate, and the parties consented to have the court assess the costs de novo.

Applying the factors under Rule 58.06(1), the court reduced the time claimed for discoveries and trial preparation, ultimately assessing the costs at $23,438.50 and ordering the defendant to return the excess amount previously paid by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion to remove the defendant corporation's counsel of record, who was also the sole officer and director of the corporation and a key participant in the employment negotiations at issue.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to strike the plaintiff's exhibits based on settlement privilege and to allow the counsel to act as an agent if removed.

The court dismissed the cross-motion, finding that any privilege had been waived.

The court granted the motion to remove counsel, holding that while his status as a potential witness alone did not disqualify him, his demonstrated personal attachment to the litigation compromised his impartiality as an advocate.

The court also denied leave for him to act as an agent for the corporation.

The accused, charged with criminal harassment, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The charge arose from an incident where the accused allegedly followed and watched a 13-year-old girl on her way to school, having previously followed her and a friend weeks earlier.

The court amended the indictment to conform to the evidence regarding the date of the offence.

The court dismissed the motion for a directed verdict, finding that there was sufficient evidence of 'watching' under s. 264(2)(c) of the Criminal Code upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

During a criminal trial, the Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow a witness to testify via Skype.

The witness was unable to attend court due to a high-risk pregnancy.

The defence objected, arguing the anticipated evidence was vague and bordered on bad character evidence.

The court found the evidence relevant to the issue of opportunity and held that trial fairness would not be undermined by the use of technology.

The application was granted, permitting the witness to testify remotely.

The estate trustee applied to resolve two questions arising from the deceased's Will.

The deceased had named his estranged spouse as the beneficiary of a Life Income Fund Account but later directed in his Will that the funds be used to pay estate debts.

The court found that the spouses were living separate and apart at the time of death, meaning the spouse was not automatically entitled to the funds under pension legislation.

The court also held that the Will effectively revoked the earlier beneficiary designation.

Finally, the court ordered the spouse to pay $2,160 to the Estate for occupational rent and expenses incurred after the 60-day rent-free period provided by the Family Law Act.

The plaintiff sought an interim injunction against former employees and their new competing business, alleging breach of a confidentiality and non-solicitation agreement.

The court found the plaintiff established a prima facie case of breach, but dismissed the motion because the plaintiff failed to show it would suffer irreparable harm that could not be compensated by damages.

Various public interest groups brought motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in a Charter challenge regarding the application of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to administrative tribunals.

The court granted leave to intervene on consent to several groups.

For the contested proposed intervenors, the court granted leave to the Ontario Judicial Council and Justice for Children and Youth, finding they would bring unique perspectives and expertise.

The court denied leave to the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario and the Workers' Health and Safety Legal Clinic, finding their proposed contributions would be largely repetitive of positions already represented by other parties and intervenors.

The applicants, several humane societies, challenged the governance model of the respondent provincial animal welfare society.

After the respondent successfully resisted the application following a membership vote, the parties sought costs.

The applicants argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants.

The court rejected this argument, finding the dispute was primarily about internal governance and control rather than a matter of public importance.

The court apportioned costs based on the stages of litigation and ordered the applicants (excluding one that withdrew) to pay $100,000 in costs to the respondent.

Following a two-week jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision, the jury awarded the plaintiff $15,000 in general damages for a minor soft tissue strain.

The trial judge was required to determine whether the plaintiff met the statutory threshold under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court found that while the plaintiff suffered a permanent impairment from a soft tissue injury to his left shoulder, the impairment was neither 'serious' nor 'important' as it did not substantially interfere with his employment or usual activities of daily living.

The plaintiff's claim for general damages was therefore dismissed.

During a case management conference in a complex multi-party family and corporate dispute, a party objected to an opposing party's recent retainer of new counsel on the eve of scheduled examinations, alleging a historical conflict of interest.

To avoid derailing the long-established litigation schedule with a formal motion to remove counsel, the case management judge invoked Rule 50.13(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Citing the culture shift mandated by Hryniak v. Mauldin, the judge summarily ordered that the opposing party could not be represented by the newly retained counsel at this time, finding the retainer to be an act of tactical mischief designed to delay proceedings.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary custody, access, child support, and spousal support.

The parties disputed the respondent's income from his self-employed hair salon business and whether he should have overnight access given allegations of substance abuse.

The court granted the applicant primary care and control of the children and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent was granted conditional access, including overnights, provided he abstains from alcohol and drugs.

Due to insufficient financial disclosure, the court imputed the respondent's income at $100,000 and ordered interim child and spousal support accordingly.

The moving party (respondent in the main proceeding) brought a motion to set aside a final order that struck his pleadings and released the proceeds of the sale of the family home to the responding party.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction as the proper route to challenge a final order is an appeal to the Court of Appeal or Divisional Court.

In the alternative, the court held that the motion would be dismissed on the merits due to the moving party's recalcitrant conduct, failure to comply with disclosure orders, and failure to provide evidence supporting his claims.

Costs were awarded to the responding party.

The applicant rental car company sought a declaration that the respondent insurer was the first loss insurer for a driver involved in an accident while driving a rental car.

The driver was a listed driver, but not a named insured, under her father's policy with the respondent.

The court interpreted section 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act harmoniously with the standard Ontario Automobile Policy 1 (OAP1), finding that the respondent's policy did not provide coverage for a listed driver driving a rental car unless an OPCF 27 endorsement was purchased.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant's insurer was deemed the loss insurer.

Following a successful motion by the moving party to terminate his spousal support obligations, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court noted deficiencies in the bills of costs provided by both parties, as they were not organized by major steps in the case.

Applying the Family Law Rules and considering factors including an offer to settle served shortly before the hearing, the court awarded costs of $7,000 to the successful moving party.