SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: INTERNATIONAL OFFTAKE CORPORATION AND SHEROY IRANI
Plaintiffs
AND:
INCRYPTEX LTD., AGONCAERUS INC., AGONCAERUS INC. S.L., WESLEY KAM A.K.A. WESLEY WEBER, MICHELLE KAM AND APEXDX LTD.
Defendants
BEFORE: JUSTICE FAVREAU
COUNSEL: Aaron Kreaden James Zibarras
for the plaintiffs for the defendants
HEARD: September 14, 2017
ENDORSEMENT
Introduction
1The defendants, Michelle Kam and Agoncaerus Inc. S.L. ("Agon SL") (collectively the "Moving Parties") bring a motion seeking a variation of a Mareva injunction to permit payments for legal fees and living expenses out of the funds currently frozen.
2The plaintiffs oppose the motion on the basis that the Moving Parties have not discharged their onus of demonstrating that they do not have access to other assets.
3For the reasons set out below, I agree that the Moving Parties have not discharged their onus, and the motion is accordingly dismissed.
Background facts
Background to litigation
4The plaintiff, Sheroy Irani, is the managing director and majority shareholder of the other plaintiff, International Offtake Corporation ("International Offtake").
5Ms. Kam and the defendant, Wesley Kam a.k.a Wesley Weber (Mr. Weber) are in a common law relationship and have one child. The defendant Agon SL and Agoncaenus Inc. are holding companies wholly owned by Ms. Kam.
6The defendant, Incryptex Inc. (Incryptex) is a company that was created for the purpose of providing a trading platform for digital currencies. Ms. Kam and Mr. Weber were both involved in the formation of Incryptex. In 2014, all of Incryptex's assets were transferred to a newly formed company, ApexDX Inc, which is also a defendant in this action.
7In the context of a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants last year which was dismissed, reported at 2016 ONSC 4793, at paras. 3 to 11, Pattillo J. of this Court describes the issues between the parties in this action as follows:
3 The Plaintiffs claim damages of $1,325,000 for breach of contract or in the alternative, for fraudulent misrepresentation or unjust enrichment. The Plaintiffs also seek a constructive trust based on fraudulent conveyance and assert an oppression claim all arising out of dealings between Irani and Weber and Kam concerning Incryptex, a corporation established to carry on a digital currency exchange.
4 The claim alleges that in November 2014, following meetings and discussions with Weber representing Incryptex, Irani entered into an agreement with Incryptex which provided that Irani would use his connections to establish a relationship between Incryptex and a bank, manage that relationship and act as CEO and Director of Incryptex. In exchange for his services, Irani was to receive compensation in the form of 12% of the shares of Incryptex on the understanding that the value of Incryptex was in the range of $3 million to $10 million and annual compensation of $150,000 for his role as CEO and Director of Incryptex.
5 Subsequently, Irani received 3,429,600 shares of Incryptex pursuant to the agreement which he directed be held through IOC.
6 The allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations relate to both Weber and Kam's representations to Irani about Weber's role in Incryptex, his actions on behalf of Incryptex, and his representations concerning a public offering of Incryptex's shares and the value of those shares.
7 In early September 2015, the Plaintiffs allege that they learned for the first time that Weber had been using an assumed name and that he had prior criminal convictions for, among other things, fraud as well as issues with the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC"). A criminal investigation involving, among others, Weber, Kam and Incryptex followed.
8The Plaintiffs allege that although Irani subsequently provided the services agreed to, Incryptex has breached its agreement with him by failing to compensate him. They further allege that based on their fraudulent misrepresentations to Irani, Weber and Kam are personally liable for all damages incurred as a result of those representations.
9Further, in November of 2015, Incryptex entered into an agreement with ApexDX which provided for the transfer of substantially all of Incryptex's assets and certain liabilities to ApexDX in exchange for ApexDX shares. The Plaintiffs allege that the transaction was a fraudulent conveyance designed to defeat the claims of Irani and IOC. They further submit that the business and affairs of Incryptex were conducted in a manner that is oppressive to the interests of IOC who is a shareholder.
10In defence to the claims, the Defendants do not dispute that there was an agreement with Irani concerning his becoming involved in Incryptex in financial management as well as assisting with corporate valuation and corporate strategy in exchange for 7% of the then outstanding shares of Incryptex and an "executive salary" to be paid monthly once operations start. They plead, however, that there was never any agreement as to the amount of salary and in any event, operations never commenced. Further, they plead that Irani failed to perform his duties as CFO or assist Incryptex in obtaining a relationship with a bank. They deny any breach of contract or unjust enrichment. Further, they deny that any misrepresentations were made to Irani and that he knew about Weber's criminal background long before Weber told him in September 2015.
11The Defendants further plead that the sale of Incryptex's assets to ApexDX was done for proper business purposes and was approved by all shareholders except IOC. They deny there was any fraudulent conveyance or that they have acted in a manner oppressive to IOC.
Mareva injunction
8On November 9, 2015, the plaintiffs commenced thia action against the defendants.
9Around the same time, the plaintiffs commenced proceedings in Saint Lucia, claiming that Ms. Kam improperly transferred assets to a bank account held by Agon SL in that jurisdiction. On December 8, 2015, the plaintiffs were successful in obtaining an ex parte interim injunction restraining Agon SL from disposing of funds held in an account at the Via Bank Ltd. in Saint Lucia (the "Via Bank Account").
10Agon SL then brought a motion to discharge the injunction. The motion ultimately proceeded on consent, and on February 15, 2016, the Court in Saint Lucia made an order that included the following terms (the "Freezing Order"):
a. Agon SL "by itself, and or agents or whosoever otherwise or any party or individual whatsoever" is precluded from "removing, disbursing, disposing or diminishing the funds in the Bank Account up to the sum of $1,325,000" (the "Frozen Assets").
b. $30,000 was to be paid out of the Frozen Assets to the law firm in Saint Lucia that acted for the defendants in the Saint Lucia proceedings;
c. $150,000 was to be paid out of the Frozen Assets to the Ontario law firm retained at that time by the defendants to be used for the legal costs in defending for this action;
d. Either party could apply to vary or discharge the Freezing Order on notice to the other parties; and
e. The underlying proceeding in Saint Lucia was to be stayed pending the determination of this action.
11On March 17, 2017, the parties consented to an order in this Court that provides that all of the funds currently held under the Freezing Order in Saint Lucia are the subject of a Mareva Order in this Court on the same terms and conditions as the order made in Saint Lucia.
12The amount currently remaining on account of the Freezing Order is $596,390.
Status of the litigation
13As indicated above, in 2016, the defendants brought a motion for summary judgment. The motion was dismissed on August 3, 2016, with costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $45,000. In dismissing the motion, the motion Judge concluded that the motion was "ill-advised", finding in part that the defendants had not met their burden as they had failed to provide any direct evidence from Mr. Weber and that, in any event, many of the issues in the action turned on matters of credibility that could not be resolved on the motion.
14The defendants were originally represented by the law firm of Garfinkle Biderman LLP. Sometime following the motion for summary judgment, the defendants retained new counsel, Brauti Thorning Zibarras LLP. Up until recently, the defendants were all represented by the same lawyers. However, in response to an argument advanced by the plaintiffs on this motion to the effect that the Moving Parties had failed to advance evidence that Incryptyx and ApexDX cannot fund the litigation, counsel for the Moving Parties obtained an order on March 28, 2017 removing themselves as counsel of record for these two corporations. There is currently no one on record representing Incryptyx and ApexDX.
15Despite efforts by the plaintiffs to move the action forward since the motion for summary judgment, to date the only step taken by the defendants is this motion to vary the Freezing Order. They state that the $150,000 provided to their previous lawyers pursuant to the Freezing Order has almost been exhausted and that they require further funds for their new lawyers to defend the action.
Parties' positions and evidence on the motion
16On this motion, the Moving Parties seek:
a. Release of $453,000 from the Frozen Assets to be held in trust by the Moving Parties' lawyers, in anticipation of future legal fees which are estimated as follows:
i. $2,500 to establish a timetable and attend Civil Practice Court;
ii. $7,500 to prepare materials on the motion to vary;
iii. $15,000 to prepare for and attend cross-examinations on the motion to vary;
iv. $10,000 to prepare for and argue the motion to vary;
v. $70,000 to pursue pre-trial motions such as a motion to amend pleadings, a motion for security for costs and a motion to strike claims against various defendants;
vi. $15,000 to complete oral and documentary discoveries;
vii. $15,000 to complete the mediation;
viii. $8,000 to attend the pre-trial;
ix. $10,000 to communicate with opposing counsel throughout the action;
x. $75,000 to prepare for trial;
xi. $150,000 to conduct the trial; and
xii. $75,000 for disbursements and applicable taxes; and
b. Payments of $6,730 per month (for an annual amount of $80,760) to be paid to Ms. Kam for living expenses for herself, Mr. Weber and their child.
17The Moving Parties' evidence in support of the motion consists of two affidavits sworn by Ms. Kam and one affidavit sworn by Mr. Weber.
18In her initial affidavit, Ms. Kam states that the $150,000 provided to the defendants' previous lawyers under the Freezing Order has almost been exhausted, and that the defendants' new lawyers require $453,000 to cover future defence costs. She also states that, other than the amounts in the Via Bank Account, Agon SL essentially has no assets. She does state that the company holds 4,910,500 shares of Incryptex, but that she believes that these shares have no value. She also outlines her limited assets and the extent of her debts. She states that she does not have access to any money from her family. Finally she states that she supports Mr. Weber and their child, and that she has limited assets to do so.
19In her second affidavit, Ms. Kam discusses her financial relationship with a property management company, again stating that no assets are available from the company for her defence costs or living expenses.
20In his affidavit, Mr. Weber states that he too does not have sufficient assets to cover the defence costs or his living expenses. He states that he is unable to work due to his criminal record, and that it is Ms. Kam who supports the household. He also provides a summary of his debts and assets.
21While the Moving Parties have put forward evidence of their own financial situation and Mr. Weber's financial situation, they have not put forward any evidence of the financial situation of Incryptex or ApexDX. In fact, in the context of the cross-examinations, counsel for the Moving parties refused at least one question put to Mr. Weber about money raised by Incryptex on the grounds that the information was not relevant, and that it would only be relevant at discoveries.
22In addition, while Ms. Kam provides a breakdown of the amounts required by her lawyers to pursue the defence of the litigation, she does not provide any details related to her family's expenses, simply stating that without funds from the Frozen Assets "I will be unable to meet my living expenses".
23In response to the motion, the plaintiffs have put forward an affidavit sworn by Mr. Irani. Mr Irani's affidavit reviews the background to the proceedings. He also candidly states that he does not have any firsthand information about the Moving Parties' financial situation, but that he relies in part on evidence provided by the defendants' on the motion for summary judgment, and he thereby attaches inter alia two affidavits sworn by Ms. Kam for the purposes of that motion.
24In her affidavit sworn April 22, 2016, she makes the following statement in relation to her position with Incryptex:
- I am the President and chairman of the board of directors of Incryptex Ltd. ("Incryptex")…
25While Ms. Kam does not specifically make reference to position with ApexDX, she does refer to her personal involvement in the formation of ApexDX and the asset transfer:
The directing minds of Incryptex decided that it was important to disassociate the business from Wes (Mr. Weber), as a result of the Ontario Securities Commission investigation and the pending charges against Wes.
In order to do so, we, with the help of our counsel, devised a plan in which a new "clean" entity would be incorporated, and the shareholders of Incryptex would be given shares of the new "clean" company, after which the assets belonging to Incryptex would be transferred to over to the new "clean company".
26She also suggests that ApexDX is continuing as a viable business:
- ApedDX now owns all of Incryptex's assets, and is attempting to move forward with developing its business with the expectation of reaching the initial hoped for valuations.
27In that affidavit, she also makes reference to Mr. Weber's continued involvement in ApexDX:
- With respect to paragraph 98 of the Irani Affidavit, I confirm that Wesley is not employed by Apex. He does speak to Wayne Isaacs, the CEO of Apex, in order to transfer his knowledge of cryptocurrencies to Isaacs, for Apex's use.
Issues and analysis
28The primary issue on this motion is whether the Moving Parties have discharged their onus of demonstrating that they do not have access to other assets to pay their legal fees and Ms. Kam's living expenses.
29However, as a preliminary matter, I will address evidentiary issues raised by the Moving Parties.
Evidentiary issues
30The Moving Parties' counsel objected to some of the evidence and arguments relied on by the plaintiffs in response to the motion and requested that I strike the plaintiffs' factum or, alternatively, parts of the plaintiffs' factum.
31The Moving Parties argue that the plaintiffs' materials are deficient in the three following respects:
a. The plaintiffs improperly argue and rely on the merits of the underlying action in their factum;
b. The plaintiffs improperly rely on exhibits that were marked only for identification purposes on the cross-examinations as evidence; and
c. The plaintiffs' argument that the Moving parties have failed to put forward evidence in relation to Incryptex and ApexDX's assets offends the rule in Browne v. Dunn because the plaintiffs' counsel had not put questions about the availability of assets from these companies to Ms. Kam and Mr. Weber on cross-examination.
32On the first issue, the plaintiffs' factum does set out their position in the litigation generally, but they do not purport to rely on this background in support of their position on the motion. It is easy for the court to distinguish between background information about the plaintiffs' position in the action, and evidence relevant to the test for varying a Mareva order.
33On the second issue, I agree that exhibits marked with letters for identification purposes cannot be considered as part of the evidence on the motion: see Hinke v. Thermal Energy International Inc., et al., 2010 ONSC 6091 (Sup. Ct., Master). However, in my view, as evident from the analysis below, none of these exhibits are necessary to my decision on the motion.
34Having said this, I do note that, contrary to the position taken by counsel for the Moving Parties, there is nothing improper about counsel on cross-examinations putting documents that are not included in an affidavit to a witness. If the witness is able to identify the document and it is relevant to the issues on the motion, it can be marked as an exhibit and the witness can be asked relevant questions about the document. If the witness is unable to identify the document or counsel objects on the basis of relevance, the document cannot be marked as an exhibit to the cross-examination except as a lettered exhibit for the purpose of identification.
35On the third issue, in their factum, the plaintiffs argue that the Moving Parties have not met their onus on the motion to vary because they have not demonstrated that Incryptex and ApexDX do not have sufficient assets to defend the action. The Moving Parties take the position that this argument offends the rule in Browne v. Dunn, because Ms. Kam and Mr. Weber were not asked any questions on cross-examinations about their access to the assets of these two companies. In my view, this argument completely misconceives the rule in Browne v. Dunn and the test on this motion. The purpose of the rule was recently described in Yan v. Nadarajah, 2017 ONCA 196, at para. 15:
15 We agree with the motion judge that the appellants seem to have misunderstood the rule in Browne v. Dunn. The application of that rule is generally restricted to situations where a party cross-examining a witness called by the opposite side is planning on adducing contradictory evidence to impeach the witness's credibility. The cross-examiner must "put" the contradictory evidence to the witness to allow the witness to provide an explanation for it: R. v. Quansah, 2015 ONCA 237, 125 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 75-76, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 203. The rule reflects fairness to the witness whose credibility is attacked and to the party whose witness is impeached. It "prevents the 'ambush' of a witness by not giving him an opportunity to state his position with respect to later evidence which contradicts him on an essential matter": R. v. Verney (1993), 1993 CanLII 14688 (ON CA), 87 C.C.C. (3d) 363 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 376, cited in R. v. M.B., 2009 ONCA 524, 68 C.R. (6th) 55, at para. 73.
16 In the present case, there was no element of the kind of unfairness or surprise that the rule in Browne v. Dunn protects against. The contradictory evidence used to impeach the appellants came in the form of the appellants' own affidavits. Moreover, at the beginning of the cross-examination the appellants were asked whether there was anything in their affidavits that was incorrect or needed to be changed. They declined to make any changes or corrections. In the circumstances, there was no violation of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.
36In this case, what is at issue is not even evidence, but rather an argument. The plaintiffs had no obligation to put questions to the Moving Parties relevant to an argument they intended to advance in response to the motion. As discussed below, on a motion to vary a Mareva injunction, the moving party has the onus of demonstrating that it has no other assets. If the Moving Parties have failed to put forward the evidence required to meet their onus, there is no requirement for the respondent to give the Moving Parties an opportunity to fix the deficiency.
37In fact, I note that at least one question was put to Ms. Kam about access to Incryptex's assets, and the question was refused. Furthermore, to the extent that the plaintiffs rely on evidence in support of the argument that the Moving Parties have not met their onus, they rely on affidavits sworn by Ms. Kam on the motion for summary judgment referred to above; she could hardly be said to be taken by surprise by statements in her own previously sworn affidavits.
38Accordingly, while I have disregarded any of the evidence contained in the exhibits marked for identification on the cross-examination, in my view there is otherwise no basis for striking the plaintiffs' factum or disregarding the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs in response to this motion.
Test on a motion to vary a Mareva injunction
39The parties agree that the test to be applied on a motion to vary a Mareva injunction is the test articulated by Molloy J. in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Credit Valley Institute of Business and Technology, 2003 CanLII 12916 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 40 (Sup. Ct.), at para. 26:
Accordingly, the test to be applied is as follows:
(i) Has the defendant established on the evidence that he has no other assets available to pay his expenses other than those frozen by the injunction?
(ii) If so, has the defendant shown on the evidence that there are assets caught by the injunction that are from a source other than the plaintiff, i.e. assets that are subject to a Mareva injunction, but not a proprietary claim?
(iii) The defendant is entitled to the use of non-proprietary assets frozen by the Mareva injunction to pay his reasonable living expenses, debts and legal costs. Those assets must be exhausted before the defendant is entitled to look to the assets subject to the proprietary claim.
(iv) If the defendant has met the previous three tests and still requires funds for legitimate living expenses and to fund his defence, the court must balance the competing interests of the plaintiff in not permitting the defendant to use the plaintiff's money for his own purposes and of the defendant in ensuring that he has a proper opportunity to present his defence before assets in his name are removed from him without a trial. In weighing the interests of the parties, it is relevant for the court to consider the strength of the plaintiff's case, as well as the extent to which the defendant has put forward an arguable case to rebut the plaintiff's claim.
40In this case, the respondents do not assert that the Frozen Assets are proprietary assets. Rather, the focus of the respondents' argument is on the first part of the test. They argue that the Moving Parties have not met their onus of demonstrating that they have no other assets available. They argue that the Moving Parties' failure to provide any evidence in relation to the inability of Incrypex or ApexDX to fund the litigation is fatal to the motion. In addition, they argue that Ms. Kam, Mr. Weber and Argon SL have failed to meet their onus because there are various sums of money received by these defendants that have been left unexplained. The respondents also argue that the Moving Parties’ evidence is not credible.
41The case law makes clear, including the Court of Appeal’s decision in Waxman v. Waxman, 2007 ONCA 326, at para. 39, that parties seeking to vary a Mareva injunction have the onus of demonstrating that they have no other assets available for legal fees or living expenses:
It is clear from Credit Valley that the defendant has the onus of proving that he has no assets, other than those frozen, from which to pay his legal fees. As noted above, the defendant must establish "on the evidence" that he has no other assets: Credit Valley at para. 26.
42In meeting this onus, it is evident that the courts expect parties to be candid about their ability to obtain funds from various sources, and that a failure to do so can lead to a finding that the onus has not been met.
43For example, in Waxman v. Waxman, supra, at para. 43, the Court of Appeal found that the party seeking access to frozen funds had not met his onus based on many refused questions related to potential sources of available funds:
In addition, even if it were inappropriate to look beyond the assets of Chester and his sons to determine whether any funds were available for the payment of legal fees, it can be said that in this case Chester and his sons did not meet the onus of establishing on proper evidence that they personally had no other assets available to them. While Robert stated in his affidavit that he and his father had made efforts to arrange for funding of legal fees, in cross-examination he refused to answer any questions beyond stating that the $100,000 monthly sum was insufficient. I observe that this statement, on its face, would be highly dubious in the eyes of almost any reasonable Canadian. Further, Robert refused to answer any questions about what family resources were being conserved for the payment of Chester's medical fees.
See also Royal Bank v. Welton, [2009] O.J. No. 3675 (Sup. Ct.), at paras. 32 to 34; AE Hospitality Ltd. v. George, 2015 ONSC 1785 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 4, leave to appeal denied 2015 ONSC 3802 (Div. Ct.); Trade Capital Finance Corp. v. Cook, 2015 ONSC 7776 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 46; and Right Business Ltd. v. Affluent Public Ltd., 2012 BCSC 1541 (Sup. Ct.) at paras. 32-33; and Mining Technologies International Inc. v. Krako, 2013 ONSC 7280 (Sup. Ct.), at para. 215.
44It is evident that in considering the availability of other assets, assets from corporations with which a moving party has a relationship is relevant. For example, in Mining Technologies International Inc. v. Krako, supra, at para. 215, the Court found that there were many factors in that case that weighed against granting access to frozen assets, including the failure to disclose assets from other corporate entities owned or controlled by the moving party in that case.
45The requirement to make frank disclosure and to demonstrate that there are no other assets is especially relevant in cases such as this one in which the Mareva injunction only applies to a specific account or part of a party's assets: AE Hospitality Ltd. v. George, 2015 ONSC 3802 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 7-8.
46In this case, I agree with the plaintiffs' argument that the Moving Parties' failure to disclose any information about funds that may be available from Incryptex and ApexDX is fatal to the Moving Parties' ability to succeed on the motion. In my view, there are two reasons that support this finding.
47First, Incryptex and ApexDX are also defendants in this action. Until very recently, all defendants were represented by the same counsel. They filed a joint statement of defence, and they jointly brought a motion for summary judgment. Counsel for the Moving Parties only removed themselves as solicitors for Incryptex and ApexDX when the issue of assets available from these two companies was raised. The timing appears strategic rather than reflecting a genuine difference between the parties requiring separate legal representation, especially since Incryptex and ApexDX have not in fact retained new counsel. At the very least, in order to discharge their onus, the moving parties ought to have filed evidence explaining why Incryptex and ApexDX cannot fund the defence of the litigation or at least part of the defence of the litigation.
48Second, beyond the fact that all defendants were jointly represented until recently, it is evident from Ms. Kam's evidence on the motion for summary judgment and from the positions taken in the statement of defence that Ms. Kam and Agon SL are closely tied to Incryptex and ApexDX as directors and as shareholders, and that they were involved in the decision to transfer Incryptex's assets to ApexDX. Accordingly, the Moving parties ought to have filed evidence demonstrating that they do not have access to assets these companies with whom they are are closely related.
49The onus was on the Moving Parties to establish that they have no other assets with which to pay their legal fees. Without any evidence in relation to Incryptex and ApexDX, I cannot see how they have discharged their onus.
50On the motion, the plaintiffs also argued that, even if the Moving Parties did not have an obligation to provide evidence in relation to Incryptex and ApexDX’s assets, the Moving Parties themselves and Mr. Weber have not sufficiently established that they do not have access to other assets. Given my finding in relation to the lack of evidence from Incryptex and ApexDX, I do not have to make a finding in relation to these other issues, including findings in relation to Ms. Kam and Mr. Weber’s credibility. However, there is certainly support in the record for the need for better disclosure and explanations from Ms. Kam and Mr. Weber about their own assets. For example, Ms. Kam did not account for payments of $853,171 and $500,000 made to her holding companies, and Mr. Weber testified during cross-examination that he arranges for money owed to him to be placed in other people’s bank accounts.
51Ms. Kam also seeks money from the frozen assets for living expenses. However, besides the flaws in her financial disclosure, her affidavit evidence on the motion fails to set out what those needs are. She simply states that she has been supporting Mr. Weber and her daughter with her savings and income, but that she is unable to keep up with reasonable monthly living expenses. In my view, without providing some information about the family’s monthly living expenses, it is not possible to assess whether she and Mr. Weber have sufficient funds to meet those expenses.
52Finally, I note that even if I had found that the Moving Parties met their onus, I have serious concerns about the amounts being sought on the motion. The amounts sought would effectively wipe out what is left of the Frozen Assets. Moreover, there is some evidence the defendants have failed to move the litigation forward, including by bringing the motion for summary that Pattillo J. characterized as “ill advised”.
Conclusion
53For the reasons provided above, the motion is dismissed.
54If the parties cannot agree on costs, the plaintiffs are to provide their costs outline and written submissions not exceeding 3 pages within 20 days of the release of this decision, and the Moving Parties are to provide responding submissions not exceeding 3 pages within 10 days of receiving the plaintiffs' submissions.
FAVREAU J.
Date: December 15, 2017