Simon Bjarn Cox

The court imposed a 21-day jail sentence on a corporate officer for civil contempt of court.

The officer repeatedly refused to attend examinations in aid of execution despite multiple court orders, summons, and opportunities to comply.

The court found that suspended sentences and fines would be ineffective given the respondent's pattern of non-compliance.

The court also awarded costs of $15,750 to the creditor union.

The underlying dispute involved unpaid wages and benefits owed to union members under a collective agreement, with an arbitrator's award of $50,587.38 that remained largely unpaid.

The appellant contractor appealed a trial decision awarding prejudgment interest at the Courts of Justice Act rate rather than the higher contractual rate.

The respondent homeowners cross-appealed the trial judge's award of damages for two change orders and the refusal to award damages for deficiencies covered by a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) settlement.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal.

The court found the trial judge did not err in the interest award because the contractor had withdrawn its claim for the contractual rate at trial.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings that the change orders were payable as extras and that the LAT had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement regarding deficiencies.

The appellant, a former nurse, appealed the dismissal of her motion for a declaration that her insurer (HIROC) owed her a duty to defend against multiple civil actions.

These underlying actions alleged the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, negligence, breach of statute, and breach of fiduciary duty, stemming from her unauthorized access of patient records to obtain narcotics.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no duty to defend.

The court affirmed that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, whether intentional or reckless, involves conduct that is not "accidental" and thus falls outside the policy's definition of "occurrence" and within the intentional act exclusion.

The court also rejected the argument that denying coverage for intentional privacy breaches would nullify the policy, as it still covered negligent privacy breaches.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident action brought a motion for the disclosure of unedited surveillance videos, surveillance reports, and a social media report in the defendants' possession.

The defendants claimed litigation privilege over the reports and the surveillance footage in which the plaintiff did not appear.

The court ordered the defendants to produce the unedited surveillance videos and social media images they had already partially disclosed, finding waiver of privilege by implication.

However, the court upheld the claim of litigation privilege over the investigator's reports and the surveillance footage where the plaintiff was not seen.

The defendants were also ordered to provide a further and better affidavit of documents detailing the particulars of the privileged surveillance.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order to compel the plaintiff to attend a defence medical examination without the condition that the examining doctor obtain further consent for supplementary reports.

The plaintiff argued that such consent was required under the Health Care Consent Act, the Medicine Act, and the Regulated Health Professions Act, asserting that a supplementary report constituted a new report requiring fresh consent.

The court found that consent was not required, as the preparation of a supplementary report is not a "treatment" under the Health Care Consent Act.

Furthermore, Rule 33 and Section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act were deemed a complete code for court-ordered medical examinations, implying the ability to prepare supplementary reports.

The defendants' motion was granted without the plaintiff's requested condition, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.

Following a two-week jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision, the jury awarded the plaintiff $15,000 in general damages for a minor soft tissue strain.

The trial judge was required to determine whether the plaintiff met the statutory threshold under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court found that while the plaintiff suffered a permanent impairment from a soft tissue injury to his left shoulder, the impairment was neither 'serious' nor 'important' as it did not substantially interfere with his employment or usual activities of daily living.

The plaintiff's claim for general damages was therefore dismissed.