SCJ 2017

The defendant, having been entirely successful at trial, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegations of fraud and dishonesty.

The court found that the plaintiff made serious allegations of deliberate wrongdoing without any effort to prove them, using the litigation to try to escape a commercial agreement.

The court held this conduct was reprehensible and warranted punitive costs.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of $456,560.11 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiffs' claims against three individual defendants for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and to strike the entire claim as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs claimed over $3.8 million in damages arising from a 70-day delay in refinancing their mortgage, alleging the defendants fraudulently registered a charge on their property after a bankruptcy proposal.

The court dismissed the majority of the motion, finding that the pleadings sufficiently alleged personal liability for fraud and negligence against the individual defendants.

However, the court struck redundant claims under the Business Practises Act and cautioned the plaintiffs about the high threshold for proving fraud and the risk of costs.

Following a 22-year marriage, the applicant sought spousal support, retroactive child support, and remedies for spoliation of evidence and civil contempt.

The court found the applicant entitled to spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds, refusing to impute full-time income to her.

The court included the respondent's significant post-separation income increases in the support calculation, ordering indefinite spousal support of $16,734 per month.

The court also ordered a retroactive adjustment for child and spousal support.

Furthermore, the court drew an adverse inference against the respondent for intentionally destroying business records (spoliation) and found him in civil contempt for selling a property in breach of a court order, imposing a $10,000 penalty.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process and a vexatious proceeding, the court determined the costs payable to the successful defendants.

The court considered the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct and the time-intensive nature of the motion.

Costs were fixed at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable within 30 days.

The applicant sought Crown wardship for five children who had been apprehended due to domestic violence and physical discipline.

The mother, a victim of domestic violence, consented to Crown wardship with access, recognizing her limitations in caring for the children.

The father sought the return of the children to his care.

The court found that the father had not sufficiently addressed his emotionally and physically abusive parenting style and posed a risk of harm to the children.

The court ordered that the four youngest children be made Crown wards with access, while the oldest child remain in the father's care subject to supervision.

Following a successful constitutional challenge to back-to-work legislation, the applicants sought costs against the intervener, the employer.

The intervener sought costs against the applicants for a subsequent unsuccessful remedial motion.

The court analyzed the general rule that interveners are neither liable for nor entitled to costs, and the exceptions based on the intervener's direct private interest and level of participation.

The court found the intervener had a direct private interest in both proceedings.

The court ordered the intervener to pay $54,000 in costs for the main application, and ordered the applicants to pay $26,000 to the intervener for the remedial motion.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary hearing judge's order discharging the accused on a charge of dangerous driving causing death.

The Crown alleged the accused and the deceased were street racing when the deceased crashed and died.

The reviewing judge found the preliminary hearing judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to take the Crown's evidence at its highest and by creating a reasonable apprehension of bias through excessive intervention and questioning of a police witness regarding speed calculations.

The application was granted, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused for trial on charges of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving while street racing causing death.

The respondent mother sought costs of $17,122.13 on a full indemnity basis following her successful motion for retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

The applicant father argued costs should be limited to $1,000.

The court found no bad faith by either party and determined the mother's offer to settle did not strictly meet the requirements of Rule 18(14).

The court awarded the mother costs fixed at $10,000.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary spousal support, claiming an inability to work due to medical issues.

The respondent brought a cross-motion for a defence medical and to sever the divorce from corollary relief.

The court dismissed the spousal support motion, finding the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case for entitlement or provide cogent medical evidence of his inability to work.

The court granted the respondent's motion to sever the divorce, noting there were no children of the marriage.

The respondent was awarded costs of $5,000.

The applicant father brought a motion to change seeking an increase in child support, while the respondent mother sought to terminate support for their two adult children pursuing master's and PhD degrees.

The court held that given the family's high income and academic expectations, the children remained dependents entitled to support.

However, the court ruled that once a child moves away from home, monthly support should be reduced and all living expenses treated as extraordinary expenses, offset by the child's own resources.

The court also applied a three-year average to the mother's fluctuating professional income.

The payor brought a motion to set aside a default order and warrant of committal that resulted in his incarceration for unpaid child support arrears.

The payor had repeatedly failed to attend court appearances.

The court applied Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found it was in the interests of justice to set aside the warrant, noting the payor's inability to pay the arrears in full, his recent employment, and that further incarceration would serve as punishment rather than enforcement.

The payor was ordered released, but his request to limit enforcement to his monthly support obligation was dismissed.

The applicant sought an equalization of net family property following the parties' separation.

The respondent, who self-identified as an Algonquin, argued that the matrimonial home was exempt from provincial legislation under the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Daniels decision.

The court dismissed this argument, finding the Family Law Act applicable.

The court also declined to order the immediate sale or financing of the home, citing a lack of jurisdiction under section 9 of the Family Law Act at this stage.

After determining the value of the matrimonial home, household goods, and debts, and rejecting deductions for the date of marriage value of the land and inheritances invested in the home, the court ordered the respondent to pay an equalization payment of $107,252.03.

The plaintiff brought an action for damages against his former partner, several police officers, and the police services board for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and Charter breaches arising from two arrests related to a property dispute.

The court found that two officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the plaintiff for break and enter and breach of recognizance, respectively, and failed to conduct adequate investigations.

The court held the two officers and the police services board liable for negligent investigation and false arrest, awarding $40,192 in damages.

The claims for malicious prosecution and the claims against the former partner and other officers were dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to change seeking to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligations to his former spouse.

The applicant argued that the respondent's re-partnering, receipt of a substantial inheritance, and his inability to deduct support payments on his US income tax return justified a reduction.

The court treated the motion as a review rather than a variation, requiring a fresh look at entitlement and quantum.

The court found the respondent was still entitled to compensatory and needs-based support following a 25-year traditional marriage.

Spousal support was reduced to $2,500 per month, and the annual review clause was removed.

The defendants made a written request under Rule 2.1.01(6) to have the plaintiff's slip and fall action dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or abusive.

The court reviewed the statement of claim and found nothing on its face to support such a finding.

The court declined to direct the Registrar to send a notice to the plaintiff, noting that Rule 2.1 is reserved for the clearest of cases and is not an alternative to a pleadings motion or summary judgment.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting his 18-year-old daughter child support and university expenses.

The daughter had withdrawn from parental control, and the central issue was whether this withdrawal was involuntary under s. 31(2) of the Family Law Act.

The appeal judge found that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment because there were significant facts in dispute regarding the voluntariness of the withdrawal that required a trial.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment was set aside, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The interim support order was varied to account for financial contributions made by the mother.

The applicant was successful on an interlocutory injunction related to a habeas corpus application challenging his placement in administrative segregation.

The issue was whether costs for the injunction should be payable immediately to the applicant or in the cause.

The court held that costs should be in the cause, noting that the injunction did not end the litigation, the issues were inextricably linked to the merits of the main application, and the application judge would be in a better position to assess costs with the benefit of hindsight.

The applicant, charged with importing cocaine, brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel after being refused Legal Aid.

The court found that while the charges were serious and counsel was essential for a fair trial, the applicant failed to prove she was indigent.

The court rejected her evidence regarding her financial circumstances, noting unexplained frequent international travel and large cash transfers while purportedly living solely on disability benefits.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants sought declaratory and injunctive relief regarding an express right of way over the respondents' adjacent property.

The applicants were renovating their building, which required altering doors that accessed the right of way to comply with fire regulations.

The respondents blocked access to these doors and changed locks on the first floor.

The court found that the easement had not been abandoned and that the applicants' renovations fell within their ancillary rights under the easement.

The court granted a declaration that the easement was valid and ordered an injunction preventing the respondents from interfering with the applicants' use of the right of way.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to exclude sworn jurors from the courtroom during the challenge for cause process using rotating triers.

The Crown argued that recent appellate jurisprudence eliminated the trial judge's inherent jurisdiction to exclude sworn jurors.

The court held that it retained the common law discretion to exclude sworn jurors, as the Criminal Code is silent on the matter.

The court exercised its discretion to exclude the sworn jurors to prevent them from sitting idly in court for up to a week while the remainder of the jury was selected, which would diminish respect for the process.