SCC 2021

The appellant appealed as of right from a Quebec Court of Appeal decision upholding his convictions for sexual assault and breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence.

Both the Court of Appeal majority and the SCC majority agreed the trial judge erred in characterizing a prior event as similar fact evidence.

The SCC majority, adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, held the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied and dismissed the appeal.

The dissent disagreed, finding that because credibility of both the accused and complainant was central, the Crown's evidence could not be considered overwhelming, making the curative proviso inapplicable.

The appeal was dismissed, with Brown and Rowe JJ. dissenting.

The Crown appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision acquitting the respondent on fraud charges.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had held the guilty verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient circumstantial evidence and that the trial was unfair because the Crown failed to invoke s. 9 of the Canada Evidence Act during the accomplice's testimony.

A majority of the Supreme Court, adopting the dissenting reasons below, found the verdict was not unreasonable and the failure to invoke s. 9 did not render the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and the guilty verdict restored, with Kasirer J. dissenting.

The appellant was convicted of internet child luring after initiating contact in an internet chat room with an undercover police officer posing as an underage girl, proposing a meeting for sex, and being arrested at the meeting place.

The appellant applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing that the officer had provided him with the opportunity to commit the offence.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding that no opportunity had been provided, and the majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld that conclusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of Justice Miller of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Three provincial appellants challenged the constitutionality of the federal Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, which established minimum national standards of greenhouse gas price stringency operating as a backstop to provincial pricing systems.

The courts below were divided, with the Saskatchewan and Ontario Courts of Appeal upholding the Act while the Alberta Court of Appeal struck it down.

A 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court held that the Act's pith and substance is the establishment of minimum national standards of greenhouse gas price stringency to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and that this matter falls within Parliament's jurisdiction under the national concern branch of the peace, order, and good government power.

The majority further held that the fuel and excess emissions charges are constitutionally valid regulatory charges rather than taxes.

The appeals by the Attorneys General of Saskatchewan and Ontario were dismissed and the appeal by the Attorney General of British Columbia was allowed, with Côté J. dissenting in part and Brown and Rowe JJ. fully dissenting.

The appellant Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal quashed the respondent's convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, finding them inconsistent with an acquittal on sexual assault arising from the same conduct.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that a legal error in the trial judge's jury instructions — misdirecting the jury that the 'force' required for sexual assault differed from the 'touching' required for the other two offences — materially bore on the acquittal while leaving the convictions untouched, thereby reconciling the apparent inconsistency.

The majority restored the convictions, set aside the acquittal, and entered a stay of proceedings on the sexual assault charge pursuant to s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code.

Brown and Kasirer JJ. dissented in part, arguing that the only available remedy on a Crown appeal from a jury acquittal is a new trial, and that the majority's framework invites improper speculation into jury deliberations contrary to the scheme of the Criminal Code and the Court's prior decision in R. v. J.F.

The appellant Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal overturned terrorism convictions and ordered a new trial on the basis that the jury was improperly constituted due to a jury selection error.

The trial judge had erred by refusing to exercise his common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors while using rotating triers, instead imposing static triers against the respondents' preferred procedure.

The Supreme Court confirmed the jury was improperly constituted but held that the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code can apply to cure jury selection errors.

The Court interpreted 'jurisdiction over the class of offence' to refer solely to the statutory jurisdictional capacity of the trial court to try the relevant class of offence, not to whether the jury was properly constituted.

Finding no prejudice to either respondent because the static triers procedure was a Parliament-sanctioned method and was implemented with care and attention, the Court restored the convictions and remitted the remaining grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The accused was convicted at trial of incest and sexual interference against the complainant, his daughter.

The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge improperly extended or relied upon principles from governing cases regarding the timing of complaint, thereby sidestepping inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons on how he resolved those inconsistencies.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the further appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant waste contractor alleged that the respondent municipal district breached a contractual duty of good faith by reallocating waste from a more distant disposal facility to a closer one, thereby preventing the appellant from achieving its target operating profit ratio for 2011.

The majority held that the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith requires exercise of discretion in a manner connected to the purposes for which the discretion was granted, and that exercising it unreasonably — meaning in a manner unconnected to those purposes — constitutes a breach.

The majority found that the respondent's reallocation was guided by legitimate objectives of maximizing efficiency and minimizing costs, and was therefore not unreasonable.

The concurring minority agreed the appeal should be dismissed, emphasizing that the standard of review was correctness given the statutory right of appeal, and that good faith cannot be used to create unbargained-for obligations.

The appeal was unanimously dismissed with costs.

A young person charged with second degree murder elected trial before a superior court judge and sought judicial interim release before a Queen's Bench justice, who declined jurisdiction on the basis that the provincially designated youth court held exclusive authority.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, finding that a superior court justice deemed a youth justice court judge under ss. 13(2) or 13(3) of the YCJA has jurisdiction over pre-trial applications including judicial interim release, because 'the proceeding' in those sections encompasses all steps taken after election, not merely the trial.

The Court further held that s. 33(8) of the YCJA, which grants release authority to 'a youth justice court judge', does not qualify that term to exclude s. 13(1) provincially designated youth court judges.

Accordingly, jurisdiction over judicial interim release is concurrent between the superior court and the designated youth justice court, a result Parliament intended to provide flexibility and accessibility, particularly for Indigenous youth in rural areas.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that had set aside a jury's convictions of the respondent for indecent assault and gross indecency on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable.

The sole issue was whether inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony — as between his police statement, preliminary inquiry evidence, and trial evidence — were so significant that a conviction based on his evidence was unreasonable as a matter of law.

The majority held that the inconsistencies, while troubling, did not render the jury's verdict unreasonable, as the complainant offered an explanation (that counselling had improved his memory) and the jury was entitled to accept it after thorough cross-examination and a comprehensive, unchallenged jury charge.

The majority further held that the Crown was not required to adduce further evidence or expert evidence regarding the role of counselling in refining memory.

The convictions were restored; Brown and Rowe JJ. dissented, substantially for the reasons of Justice White below.

The appellant was convicted at trial of trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime based primarily on identification evidence from an undercover buy officer and a surveillance officer.

The Alberta Court of Appeal majority affirmed the conviction, while a dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge should have conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of the identification evidence and reviewed the video and photo herself.

The Supreme Court of Canada majority dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority, adding that the combination of the buy officer's evidence, the surveillance officer's evidence, and defence counsel's concession regarding the person arrested provided sufficient admissible evidence to support the conviction.

One judge dissented and would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed as of right on questions of law following the Quebec Court of Appeal's majority decision setting aside a manslaughter conviction of a police officer and ordering a new trial.

The majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in law by denying the accused's motion for disclosure of third-party records that met the threshold of likely relevance for full answer and defence.

The trial judge further erred in her treatment of evidence crucial to the accused and in her assessment of expert testimony concerning the accused's conduct as a police officer.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, with two justices dissenting on both the disclosure and expert evidence issues.

Three appellants were convicted at trial of assault causing bodily harm, with two also convicted of unlawful confinement.

Following the trial judge's reasons, the appellants moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, but the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding the net delay was below the Jordan ceiling.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal in the result and leaving several s. 11(b) legal issues — including treatment of multiple accused and post-conviction applications — to be resolved in a future case.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopic colectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which her left ureter was injured, ultimately necessitating removal of her left kidney.

The trial judge found that the surgeon breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the injury requiring the kidney's removal.

The Court of Appeal majority set aside the trial decision, holding the trial judge erred in law in identifying and applying the standard of care.

The dissenting judge found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's approach and conclusions.

The Supreme Court unanimously restored the trial judgment, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge.