Sarah Jones

The defendants and third party moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached on November 12, 2024, at an exit pre-trial conference.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, sought to repudiate the settlement, alleging that her lawyer, Eli Karp, lacked authority to settle and that the settlement was procured under duress with overbroad release language.

The court found that the parties entered into a binding settlement with all essential terms agreed upon, that Karp had both actual and ostensible authority to settle, and that the settlement was not procured under duress or through misrepresentation.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments regarding the adequacy of the settlement amount and the scope of the releases, finding them to be standard and reasonable.

The motion to enforce the settlement was granted.

This costs decision follows a lengthy guardianship and estate litigation between Edi Ferritto and her brother, Alfredo Ferritto, regarding their mother Lucia Ferritto.

The court reviews the procedural history, the parties' conduct, and the applicable legal principles for awarding costs.

Edi Ferritto, as the successful party, is awarded substantial indemnity costs for the trial and partial indemnity costs for the applications and motions, with certain reductions.

The decision details the calculation of fees and disbursements, and the rationale for the scale of costs awarded.

The court approved a class action settlement between Elias Faiz and Canadian All Care Inc. (operating as Canadian All Care College) regarding the college’s Diagnostic Medical Sonography program.

The settlement provides $1.4 million in compensation for non-tuition losses to class members, with a minimum of $450 per month of enrollment.

The court approved the settlement, the contingency fee agreement, class counsel fees and disbursements, the appointment of Verita as claims administrator, and the notice plan, but declined to award an honorarium to the representative plaintiff, Faiz, finding no exceptional circumstances.

The decision reviews the legal principles for settlement approval, contingency fees, and honoraria in class actions.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful application by Rosanna Di Frangia to be appointed guardian of her mother's property, a position opposed by Maurizio Campolucci.

The court found Rosanna entirely successful in the underlying application and noted Maurizio's unreasonable conduct, including his failure to comply with a prior order and his lack of settlement efforts.

Despite Maurizio not filing costs submissions, the court carefully reviewed Rosanna's request for full indemnity ($136,362.66).

The court awarded Rosanna costs of $100,000.00, representing an elevated partial indemnity (approximately 70% of full recovery), payable by Maurizio by January 2025, or from his share of the estate if unpaid.

The appellant, Thanuja Dhuruvasangary, appealed her removal as attorney for property for her mother, Logaranee Dhuruvasangary, and the appointment of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as Logaranee’s guardian of property.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by refusing an adjournment, failing to apply the correct test, reversing the burden of proof, and concluding there was sufficient evidence of misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the denial of the adjournment given the urgency and overwhelming evidence of misconduct.

The court also affirmed that the application judge properly understood and applied the two-part test for terminating a power of attorney and did not reverse the burden of proof.

This class action concerned historical sexual abuse perpetrated by Ralph Rowe, an Anglican priest and Scout leader, against Indigenous boys in remote communities.

The court approved a $13.25 million settlement, which included a unique trauma-informed claims process with two tracks (simplified Schedule A up to $140,000, and more rigorous Schedule B up to $350,000).

The settlement also provided for apologies from the Anglican Church of Canada and Scouts Canada, and funding for counselling.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class members, emphasizing the benefits of timely resolution and the innovative, claimant-centric claims protocol.

This is an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) decision that found the appellant, P.P., incapable of managing her property.

P.P. argued that the CCB proceedings were procedurally unfair.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the procedure used by the CCB was indeed procedurally unfair, specifically regarding the granting of an adjournment to the assessor to obtain corroborating evidence and the decision to permit the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) to intervene as a party.

The court noted that the PGT's investigative role under s. 27 of the Substitute Decisions Act was improperly blurred with the voluntary assessment process under s. 16, leading to a lack of transparency and an unfair advantage for the PGT in controlling the hearing.

Emphasizing the high standard of procedural fairness required in cases affecting personal autonomy, the court set aside the CCB's decision.

The applicant, Shelley Ottele, initiated an application challenging the validity of Powers of Attorney signed by her deceased father, Leo Racine, appointing Aimy Racine, and sought damages for fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty.

This endorsement addresses two motions: the applicant's motion to stay proceedings pending an appeal, and the respondent Aimy Racine's motion for security for costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to stay, finding no persuasive basis.

The court granted the respondent's motion for security for costs, finding good reason to believe the applicant's underlying application was frivolous and vexatious and that she had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs, as required by Rule 56.01(1)(e).

The applicant was ordered to pay $75,000 as security for costs and $25,253.24 in costs for the motion.

Following a decision to set aside a guardianship order, the parties made written submissions on costs.

Although the respondent was successful in setting aside the order, the court declined to award her costs due to her unreasonable conduct, which included prolonging the hearing and ignoring the spirit of the judgment.

The applicant was also denied costs as he was unsuccessful and had relied on inaccurate information.

The court ordered no costs to either party.

The moving party, the wife of the incapable person, brought a motion to set aside a 2019 ex parte Guardianship Order that appointed the incapable person's son as his sole guardian of property and person.

The court found that the original order was intended to be temporary and was granted based on allegations of missing funds and abandonment that were later admitted to be untrue.

The court set aside the Guardianship Order on grounds of procedural fairness and under Rule 59.06(2)(a) based on facts discovered after it was made.

However, the court temporarily stayed the setting aside of the order for 90 days to prevent a vacuum in the incapable person's care while the parties determine the validity of competing powers of attorney.

Following a consent order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as guardian of the respondent's property, the PGT sought its costs of the application.

The respondent opposed, arguing that Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to deny costs.

The court held that section 8 of the Public Guardian and Trustee Act provides statutory authority for the PGT to deduct its reasonable fees and expenses from the respondent's property, and this provision prevails over Rule 57.

The court found the PGT's requested costs of $21,173.38 to be reasonable and ordered them payable from the respondent's funds.

The appellant, Narine Loojune, appealed an order that substituted the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as guardian of property for his catastrophically injured nephew, Dataram Loojune.

The substitution was ordered due to the appellant's repeated failure to comply with court-ordered obligations to account for his nephew's property.

The appellant sought to adjourn the appeal to submit fresh evidence alleging fraud by a PGT employee and argued the motion judge applied the wrong legal test and was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment application, finding no credible evidence to support the claims or impact the appeal.

The court affirmed the motion judge's application of the "best interests" test and found no evidence of fraud, harassment, or judicial bias.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to the PGT.

The appellants, Gilles Jozias Overtveld, Enrique M. Jurado, and Rachida Youmouri, appealed several interlocutory orders made by a case management judge in an underlying application concerning Mr. Overtveld's capacity to manage property and personal care.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals as all challenged orders were interlocutory, not final.

The orders included dismissal of a contempt motion, a motion to strike the application, motions regarding access to Mr. Overtveld, a motion to remove counsel, and a motion for payment of accounts.

The court quashed the appeal, affirming that interlocutory orders do not finally dispose of the parties' rights.

This endorsement addresses the quantum of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action as vexatious and an abuse of process.

The court awarded costs to the defendants, applying principles for self-represented litigants' costs.

The Attorney General's costs were awarded as sought, Ms. Goldenfajn-Abrahams's costs were reduced due to an excessive hourly rate and hours, and Ms. Roll's (a self-represented lawyer) costs were awarded nominally due to insufficient evidence of lost opportunity costs, in line with the Benarroch decision.

The Public Guardian and Trustee applied for an order appointing it as the permanent guardian of property for the respondent, Diane MacFarlane, under section 22 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The application was based on evidence that Ms. MacFarlane was incapable of managing her property, including a capacity assessment report indicating cognitive impairment and anecdotal evidence of her inability to understand financial information and the consequences of her decisions, such as attempting to give away large sums of money to an "Elvis impersonator." The court found Ms. MacFarlane incapable of managing property as defined by section 6 of the SDA and appointed the PGT as her permanent guardian of property.

The court also addressed and ordered the payment of costs for both the PGT and Section 3 Counsel from Ms. MacFarlane's property.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) applied for an order requiring Andrew Willis to pass accounts for his mother, Ruth Ilene Willis, from January 1, 2015, and to replace him as interim Guardian of Property.

Andrew Willis, acting under a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property since May 2, 2018, consented to the PGT becoming guardian after the sale of his mother's home, and sought to limit the accounting period to his appointment date.

The court found Andrew Willis acted in a fiduciary capacity since at least 2015 and ordered him to provide detailed explanations for financial transactions from January 1, 2015, and a formal passing of accounts from May 2, 2018, to July 31, 2020.

The court also ordered the PGT to be appointed temporary Guardian of Property for Mrs. Willis as of August 1, 2020, regardless of the home's sale, citing Andrew's conflict of interest and neglect of his mother's welfare.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal from a summary judgment that had dismissed the appellant's action against the respondent University.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment in favor of the University but declined to award costs.

Following the successful appeal, the appellant sought costs of the summary judgment motion on a partial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellant in the amount of $22,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST, a middle ground between the appellant's claim of $40,669.71 and the University's submission of $15,480.45.

A doctoral student appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against a university for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

The student alleged that his supervisory committee pressured him to transfer out of his Ph.D. program because members lacked expertise in his specialized research area and were unwilling to acquire it, and that they misled him about funding availability.

The motion judge found genuine issues of fact but dismissed the action as a matter of law, holding that academic matters should be resolved through the university's internal complaint process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that courts have jurisdiction to entertain claims by students against universities for damages based on tort or breach of contract, even where the dispute arises from academic matters.

The remedy sought—damages—is indicative of jurisdiction, not whether the dispute is academic in nature.

The plaintiff was successful in defending a Rule 21 motion brought by the defendant to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff sought costs of approximately $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant submitted that costs should be in the range of $3,500, consistent with two previous similar motions.

The court found the plaintiff's costs outline to be surprisingly high and noted that the defendant should not have to pay for the plaintiff's previous failures to properly plead the claim.

The court exercised its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to award the plaintiff costs fixed at $3,500, allowing the defendant to set off $3,000 in unpaid costs owed from a previous motion.

The defendant, the University of Western Ontario, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff, a former Ph.D. student, alleged breach of contract and fiduciary duty due to inadequate supervision and misleading information about funding after his thesis supervisor died.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, on the basis that the plaintiff's complaints were academic issues that should have been resolved through the university's internal processes, subject to judicial review, rather than a civil action.

The court emphasized the university's expertise, the policy of judicial deference to academic decisions, and the more effective remedies available through internal university mechanisms.