Sarah Jones

A doctoral student appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against a university for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

The student alleged that his supervisory committee pressured him to transfer out of his Ph.D. program because members lacked expertise in his specialized research area and were unwilling to acquire it, and that they misled him about funding availability.

The motion judge found genuine issues of fact but dismissed the action as a matter of law, holding that academic matters should be resolved through the university's internal complaint process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that courts have jurisdiction to entertain claims by students against universities for damages based on tort or breach of contract, even where the dispute arises from academic matters.

The remedy sought—damages—is indicative of jurisdiction, not whether the dispute is academic in nature.

The plaintiff was successful in defending a Rule 21 motion brought by the defendant to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff sought costs of approximately $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant submitted that costs should be in the range of $3,500, consistent with two previous similar motions.

The court found the plaintiff's costs outline to be surprisingly high and noted that the defendant should not have to pay for the plaintiff's previous failures to properly plead the claim.

The court exercised its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to award the plaintiff costs fixed at $3,500, allowing the defendant to set off $3,000 in unpaid costs owed from a previous motion.

The defendant university brought a motion under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiff's fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff, a former medical resident, sued the university for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the residency program was substandard and failed to prepare him for his specialist licensing exams.

The court found that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded the nature and source of the contract, as well as the vulnerability and reliance necessary for a fiduciary duty claim.

The court held that the claim was novel but arguable, and dismissed the motion to strike.

The defendant, the University of Western Ontario, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff, a former Ph.D. student, alleged breach of contract and fiduciary duty due to inadequate supervision and misleading information about funding after his thesis supervisor died.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, on the basis that the plaintiff's complaints were academic issues that should have been resolved through the university's internal processes, subject to judicial review, rather than a civil action.

The court emphasized the university's expertise, the policy of judicial deference to academic decisions, and the more effective remedies available through internal university mechanisms.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory decision granting the plaintiff's motion to add a receptionist at the Ocular Health Clinic as an individual defendant.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against the receptionist personally for either negligence or wilful misrepresentation.

The court emphasized that employees are generally protected from personal liability unless their actions are tortious in themselves or exhibit a separate identity or interest from the employer.

The defendants, Lakehead University and Gordon Hayman, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff, a PhD graduate, sued the university and his professor for breach of contract and negligence, alleging unreasonable delays in dissertation review.

The court granted the motion, striking the claim without leave to amend, on the basis that disputes between students and universities regarding academic matters are not subject to breach of contract or tort claims.

The Applicant sought accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident but subsequently lost contact with her counsel, who was removed from the record.

The Applicant failed to attend the arbitration pre-hearing or communicate her intentions despite multiple notices.

The Insurer brought a motion to dismiss the application.

The Arbitrator dismissed the Application for Arbitration without a hearing under Rule 68 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code, finding the proceeding frivolous, vexatious, or commenced in bad faith due to the Applicant's failure to participate.

The Applicant was ordered to pay $1,100 in legal costs to the Insurer.

The plaintiff, a former nursing student, sued the defendants for damages after they falsely accused her of academic fraud.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, related to an academic matter, and was an abuse of process.

The court found that while the university has broad discretion in academic matters, this does not extend to the negligent performance of an internal investigation or intentional torts.

The court struck the claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, bad faith, and breach of privacy due to pleading deficiencies, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend the statement of claim.

A university brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging negligence, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith arising from alleged deficiencies in a medical residency training program.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because discoverability and factual context had not yet been fully developed.

The court further held that although courts generally defer to universities on academic matters, contractual claims may proceed where the plaintiff alleges failure to meet express or implied contractual obligations.

However, several causes of action were insufficiently pleaded or legally unavailable in the context of academic discretion.

Portions of the claim were therefore struck, some with leave to amend and others without leave.

The appellant, a medical doctor dismissed from a residency program, sued the university and several faculty members for various torts including conspiracy and intimidation.

The motion judge struck all claims against the individual respondents and the intimidation claim against the university, denying leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims, finding the pleadings failed to distinguish individual acts from corporate acts or plead the essential elements of the torts.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, granting the appellant leave to amend her statement of claim since no prior amendments had been made and the motion judge provided no reasons for denying leave.

The defendants moved to strike a graduate student's Statement of Claim arising from allegations that university officials pressured him to switch from a PhD program to a Master's program and interfered with funding.

The court found the pleading prolix, deficient in material particulars, and inadequate to support pleaded causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in its current form.

However, it was not plain and obvious that the claims were incapable of amendment, particularly regarding alleged contractual rights to funding and limits on university discretion.

The claims against the individual defendants, and the claims for conspiracy and fraudulent misrepresentation, were withdrawn on consent.

The impugned remaining claims were struck with leave to amend, and no costs were ordered.

Following a successful motion for leave to appeal an order refusing to strike conspiracy claims alleged to merge with fraud claims, the moving defendants sought $20,052.74 in costs.

The court considered the reasonableness of the time spent on research, drafting materials, and waiting time for the motion to be heard.

The judge held that the requested amount was excessive, particularly given that much of the work had already been completed for the initial motion and that waiting time in court should not generally be borne by the losing party.

Balancing the complexity of the legal issue with proportionality considerations, the court awarded a reduced amount.

Costs were fixed at $9,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order refusing to strike a conspiracy claim pleaded alongside fraud in an action by an insurer alleging fraudulent statutory accident benefit claims.

The defendants argued that the conspiracy claim merged with the underlying fraud and was redundant.

The court reviewed conflicting authorities regarding the doctrine of merger at the pleadings stage, including cases distinguishing between conspiracy based on a predominant intent to injure and conspiracy based on unlawful means.

The motion judge had declined to strike the claim and left the issue of merger to trial.

The court found reason to doubt the correctness of that decision and held that the broader question of whether merger can ever be applied at the pleadings stage was an issue of general importance.

Leave to appeal was therefore granted.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his claims against the respondent university.

The appellant conceded his original statement of claim could not stand but argued he should have been granted leave to amend it to plead breach of contract for the university's failure to graduate him in 2004.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the proposed amendment would entirely recast the claim, which originally focused on academic marks and unfair treatment.

The applicant commenced an action against York University, which was struck by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant then brought an ex parte motion before another Superior Court judge to set aside the dismissal, which was denied.

The applicant appealed this denial, but the appeal was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal refused to set aside the Registrar's order.

On a motion to review the single judge's decision, a panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the underlying appeal because the second Superior Court judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the first judge's order.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court judgment in a dispute involving family medicine program respondents and universities.

The Court of Appeal held that, assuming amendments to the Regulated Health Profession Act applied, they applied to the College and not to any of the respondents.

The court further held that the action was an abuse of process for the reasons given below.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed costs payable to the respondents.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiffs' pleadings.

They argued the motion judge erred by failing to apply the doctrine of merger to strike the conspiracy claims and by applying the wrong test to the fraudulent misrepresentation claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motion judge correctly declined to apply the doctrine of merger at the pleadings stage and correctly applied the test for pleading fraud.

The moving defendants brought a motion to strike out the plaintiff insurers' claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to submit fraudulent medical treatment and assessment claims.

The court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded the material facts for fraudulent misrepresentation against the individual defendants, who could be held personally liable for tortious acts.

The court also declined to strike the conspiracy claims, holding that the applicability of the merger doctrine should be determined at trial and that the claims were properly based on unlawful acts under the Insurance Act and Criminal Code.

The motion was dismissed, though two plaintiffs were ordered to amend their pleadings to specify special damages for conspiracy.

The defendants brought a motion to strike a self-represented plaintiff’s claim arising from repeated unsuccessful attempts to obtain a family medicine residency position.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, bad faith, unequal treatment, and Charter violations after being denied interviews and admission to residency programs.

The court held the action was an attempt to re‑litigate issues previously determined in multiple proceedings and was barred by cause of action estoppel and abuse of process.

The pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action and failed to establish viable claims in negligence, contract, or discrimination.

The court also held that academic admissions decisions fall within universities’ broad discretion and are reviewable, if at all, by judicial review rather than civil action.

The applicant municipalities sought a declaration that their insurers had a duty to indemnify them for damages sought in two underlying actions relating to the expropriation of lands for a Toyota manufacturing plant.

The insurers argued the application was premature as the underlying actions involved substantial disputed facts and potential coverage exclusions, including whether the municipalities gained a personal profit or advantage, or if the claims were for restitution or statutory compensation.

The court dismissed the application, holding that unlike the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify must generally be determined after trial based on findings of fact, and the current record contained too many disputed facts to resolve the coverage issues prematurely.