Sandra Chapnik

The applicants, the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) and a professional engineer, brought an application for judicial review challenging the validity of amendments to the Building Code.

They argued that the amendments unlawfully established a duplicate registration and disciplinary scheme for PEO licence holders who design or conduct general reviews of buildings.

The Divisional Court held that while the sub-delegation of examination administration was lawful, certain provisions of the Building Code exceeded the regulatory authority granted by the Building Code Act.

Furthermore, the court applied the modern rule of statutory interpretation to find that the Building Code Act did not authorize regulations that impinge on the PEO's exclusive statutory authority to regulate the character, competence, and conduct of professional engineers.

The court declared the conflicting provisions invalid or inapplicable to PEO licence holders.

The self-represented appellant appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his claim for malicious prosecution against an assistant crown attorney.

The motion judge had found no genuine issue for trial regarding the absence of reasonable and probable grounds or malice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the motion judge's decision and noting the appellant failed to address any purported errors.

Following a successful application for judicial review that prohibited the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal from hearing a complaint, the applicant sought substantial indemnity costs against the Commission and the Tribunal for both the judicial review and the underlying human rights proceedings.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Human Rights Code or the Courts of Justice Act to award costs for the tribunal proceedings.

For the judicial review, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $20,563.57 against the Commission alone, finding the hours claimed by the applicant excessive and declining to award costs against the Tribunal as it had not engaged in misconduct or taken an adversarial position on the merits.

The appellant's appeal was previously dismissed as premature.

The respondents sought costs for the appeal.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that costs should be deferred to the end of the proceeding, noting the appeal was a discrete episode.

Applying the principle of what is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay, the court fixed costs at $4,000 for the Chiropractic Review Committee and $3,000 for the General Manager, payable in six months.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which found it had jurisdiction to hear a complaint regarding a withdrawn job offer following a positive pre-employment drug test for marijuana.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to dismiss the complaint, as recreational marijuana use without actual or perceived disability does not fall under the protected ground of disability in the Human Rights Code.

The Court granted an order of prohibition preventing the Tribunal from hearing the complaint.

Following the dismissal of an inmate's application for judicial review of a disciplinary decision, the respondents sought $7,000 in costs.

The inmate argued that no costs should be awarded on public interest grounds.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the inmate raised bona fide issues of procedural fairness that were of potential importance to all inmates.

Recognizing the inmate's vulnerable position and the chilling effect a costs award would have on future inmates seeking to protect their rights, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The applicant, a beginning hothouse tomato farmer, sought judicial review of a decision denying it full funding under the Ontario Farm Income Disaster Program.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness and relied on the doctrine of legitimate expectations regarding the calculation of its reference margins.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had been afforded procedural fairness through its participation in the review process, and that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not create substantive rights to a particular funding calculation.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's interim award ordering it to make ex gratia payments to a grieving employee whose sick leave benefits had been terminated.

The Divisional Court held that while the arbitrator's interpretation of the Labour Relations Act as granting jurisdiction for the interim award was unreasonable, his alternative reliance on the collective agreement was not patently unreasonable.

The interim award was upheld and the application for judicial review was largely dismissed.

The applicant, City of Toronto Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO), was successful on an application for judicial review regarding a freedom of information request made by the respondent, Showline Limited.

TEDCO sought partial indemnity costs of $18,479.00 against Showline.

Showline argued that no costs should be awarded as it was merely exercising its statutory rights and the case raised novel issues of statutory interpretation.

The Divisional Court held that costs should follow the event, noting that Showline is a private commercial entity that mounted a vigorous response.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court found the requested amount fair and reasonable and awarded TEDCO $18,479.00 in costs against Showline.

The plaintiff brought a class action against the manufacturer of a medical device and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging Health Canada was negligent in its regulation of the device.

The Attorney General moved to strike the claim on the basis that it owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiff.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding a full factual record was necessary.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the claim, holding that it was plain and obvious under the Anns test that the federal government did not owe a private law duty of care to individual consumers of medical devices, and that residual policy considerations negated any such duty.

The applicant sought judicial review to set aside grievance awards, arguing the arbitrator erred by acting as both mediator and arbitrator and exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias during mediation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Labour Relations Act expressly permits an arbitrator to act as a mediator with the parties' consent, which was given here.

The court also held that the arbitrator's tentative opinion expressed during mediation did not meet the high threshold for establishing bias.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a judgment but failed to file any materials other than a notice of motion and notice of appeal.

The applicant also failed to attend the hearing, providing only a doctor's note stating he missed school due to a motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant's conduct to be an abuse of process, and awarded costs of $450 to the respondent.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review of a labour arbitration award that granted part-time nurses overtime pay for regularly scheduled Saturday shifts.

The arbitrator had found that Saturday work fell outside the normal work week defined in the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and concluded that the arbitrator's interpretation was rationally supported by the language of the agreement.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitration award and a decision of the Ontario Police Arbitration Commission.

The arbitrator had dismissed a grievance regarding the inclusion of cadet service in the calculation of 'continuous active service' for a seniority premium, finding he lacked jurisdiction to define the term as the parties had not yet done so.

The Commission subsequently refused to appoint a conciliation officer, finding no notice to bargain had been given for the current collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining the standard of review for the arbitration award was patent unreasonableness and for the Commission's decision was reasonableness.

The Court found neither decision met the threshold for intervention and dismissed both applications for judicial review.

The applicant, City of Toronto Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO), sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario (IPC) which found that TEDCO was deemed to be part of the City of Toronto under subsection 2(3) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The IPC had ordered the City to obtain records from TEDCO responsive to a freedom of information request.

The Divisional Court quashed the IPC's decision, holding that the adjudicator erred in interpreting the term 'officers' in subsection 2(3) to include 'directors'.

The Court found that TEDCO, incorporated under the Business Corporations Act, is not subject to the Act.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over a claim involving a Band Council and declaratory relief.

During the appeal, the parties agreed to reconcile most of their difficulties and issue a new Statement of Claim focusing on unjust dismissal.

The Divisional Court declined to decide the remaining issue of whether a Band Council member can sue the Band Council, leaving it to be raised against the new pleading if necessary.

No costs were awarded.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal of a summary judgment order, the respondents sought costs of the appeal on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Divisional Court found no evidence of bad faith to justify substantial indemnity costs.

Taking into account the quantum of the claim, the costs previously awarded, and the factors set out in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $5,000 to the respondent Gaydon and $3,500 to the respondent Burger King.

The appellant chiropractor appealed a preliminary decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) that struck out certain grounds of appeal regarding an OHIP billing audit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as premature, holding that administrative proceedings should not be fragmented and the appellant could raise the issues after a final decision on the merits.

The applicant, an inmate at Maplehurst Correctional Complex, sought judicial review of a decision finding him guilty of assaulting another inmate and imposing a penalty of 10 days in segregation.

He argued the process was procedurally unfair and that the disciplinary system violated section 7 of the Charter due to institutional bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was treated fairly, as he was informed of the charge, offered counsel, and given the opportunity to question his accuser and call witnesses, which he declined.

The Court also declined to decide the Charter issue, noting the lack of an evidentiary record to support the claim of institutional bias.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award upholding discipline against a grievor who refused to clean a workplace washroom.

The grievor, who had Hepatitis C, suffered a nosebleed and disposed of bloody tissues in the washroom.

When directed to clean and sanitize the area, he refused, claiming discrimination based on his disability.

The arbitrator found the employer's request reasonable and held that a single instance did not constitute a course of vexatious conduct under the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no error in the arbitrator's conclusion that the incident was a matter of industrial discipline rather than discrimination or harassment.