Sandra Chapnik

The defendants appealed an order of the motion judge regarding the plaintiffs' failure to comply with discovery undertakings.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge's order was vague and lacked reasons, and noted that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow a party to delay providing particulars until 90 days before trial.

As the plaintiffs had satisfied most undertakings after the appeal was perfected, the Court set aside the motion judge's order and directed the plaintiffs to particularize their future healthcare costs within 14 days, failing which the action could be struck from the trial list.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal refusing his application for a mortgage broker licence.

The Tribunal had denied the licence due to the appellant's recent criminal convictions for assault, criminal harassment, and mischief, as well as his false statement on the application that there were no outstanding criminal charges against him.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's honesty and integrity within the context of the mortgage industry was well-founded.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a decision by the Local Health Integration Network (LHIN) to approve a Service Accountability Agreement with a hospital, which included a plan to consolidate mental health services to eliminate a budget deficit.

The applicant argued the LHIN failed to engage in required public consultation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the LHIN's funding decision did not constitute an 'integration decision' under the Local Health System Integration Act that would trigger statutory consultation requirements.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness or legitimate expectations.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which quashed its complaints regarding the property assessments of two properties.

The Board had found the City failed to comply with the notice provisions in s. 40(3) of the Assessment Act because it mailed the notices to the previous owner's address on the assessment roll despite knowing the properties had been sold.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the City acted reasonably and in good faith by using the address on the roll, which had not been revoked.

The Court found the Board erred in imposing a higher standard of inquiry on the municipality, set aside the decision, and remitted the complaints for a hearing on the merits.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee damages for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge had found that while the employee's behaviour, including racial slurs and breach of email policy, was inappropriate, it did not amount to just cause for summary dismissal without a clear warning.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's application of the McKinley test for wrongful dismissal.

The appellants, who had previously been declared vexatious litigants, appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing their motion for leave to institute further proceedings against the respondents.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that section 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act expressly precludes any appeal from a refusal to grant leave under section 140(3).

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The third parties, who were directors and officers of the plaintiff company, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order refusing to strike out third party claims brought against them personally by the defendant auditors.

The defendants had been sued for negligence in performing audits and sought contribution and indemnity from the third parties for their alleged tortious personal conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, as the pleadings properly founded a reasonable cause of action against the third parties.

The applicants sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $116,000 following their successful challenge to provisions of the Building Code Act, 1992 and the Building Code Regulation.

The applicants argued they were public interest litigants.

The court agreed, finding that the applicant Association was virtually compelled to bring the application to defend its statutory mandate to regulate professional engineers.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs but reduced the quantum to $75,000, finding the claimed amount exceeded what was fair and reasonable for a two-day hearing.

The moving party defendants sought leave to appeal a motions judge's refusal to strike out the plaintiff's claims for 'knowing assistance of breach of fiduciary duty' and 'assisting or facilitating breach of contract' in a proposed class action arising from investments in a hedge fund.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that there were conflicting decisions regarding the existence of the tort of assisting breach of contract, and good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision regarding knowing assistance of breach of fiduciary duty given the plaintiff was not a client of the defendants.

The issues were deemed to be of general importance to the investment industry.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding costs and the calculation of interest following its judgment on an appeal and cross-appeal.

The court clarified that interest on excessive management compensation should be calculated at the lower of the presumptive rate under the Courts of Justice Act or the prevailing chartered bank prime lending rate, using a floating rate for simple interest.

Due to divided success on the appeal and cross-appeal, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The applicant teachers' federation sought a stay of a Minister of Labour order pending judicial review.

The order revoked a previous designation allowing a multi-site joint Health and Safety Committee, requiring the school board to establish site-based committees at each of its 94 schools.

Applying the RJR Macdonald test, the court found there was a serious issue to be tried, but the applicant failed to demonstrate clear and non-speculative irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the respondent school board, as the multi-site system was not working and impeded its ability to comply with health and safety obligations.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to stay a Board decision granting a liquor license to a large nightclub pending appeal.

The applicant argued that the influx of patrons would jeopardize public safety in the entertainment district.

The court applied the RJR-Macdonald test and found a serious issue to be tried, but concluded the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as the safety concerns were speculative and subject to other regulatory regimes.

The balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to substantial financial investments.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellants were successful in obtaining a notable reduction in the costs award against the respondents and sought their costs.

The Divisional Court considered the divided success on various issues, including the leave motion, interest date, substantial indemnity, and fresh evidence.

The court fixed the appellants' costs at $35,000, apportioning liability between the Yemec respondents (two-thirds) and the Bungaro respondents (one-third) to reflect their different levels of participation and liability.

The appellants, majority shareholders of a family company, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for oppression and breach of trust against the minority shareholders.

The trial judge found they breached their fiduciary duties by purchasing their sisters' shares and by paying themselves excessive management compensation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding no breach of trust in the share purchase given the company's precarious financial position at the time and the minority's failure to complain.

However, the Court upheld the finding that the retroactive management compensation was oppressive and excessive.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part to award prejudgment interest on the excessive compensation.

The Minister of Transportation appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Ontario Municipal Board compensation award for expropriated land.

The dispute centered on the 'before and after' valuation method, specifically whether development and delay costs were double-counted when calculating the 'after' value of the remaining parcel.

The Court of Appeal found that deducting the full development costs while also factoring in the betterment of the remaining lands amounted to double-counting.

The appeal was allowed, and the compensation payable to the respondent was reduced from $1,110,344 to $623,121.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him personally liable for a pre-incorporation lease he signed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the corporation did not signify its intention to be bound by the lease within a reasonable time after coming into existence, as required by s. 21(2) of the Business Corporations Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant father appealed a decision dismissing his motion for leave to bring a motion for access to his 12-year-old son.

The motion judge had refused leave solely because the father had not paid previously ordered costs.

The Court of Appeal held that it is an error in law to bar a parent from seeking access solely on the ground of unpaid costs without considering the amount, reasons for non-payment, and ability to pay.

The Court set aside the decision, granted the father leave to bring his access motion, and ordered interim unsupervised access, noting the troubling history of ex parte non-contact orders that lacked evidentiary foundation.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out allegations of the tort of intimidation from its statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the tort of intimidation requires pleading not only a threat and intent to injure, but also that an act was taken or forgone as a result of the threat, causing damages.

As the appellant only pleaded a threat and intent to injure, the claim was properly struck without leave to amend.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing two guarantees they provided for the indebtedness of their corporation.

The Court of Appeal found no error by the motion judge, concluding there was no triable issue regarding an enforceable agreement between the respondents and the corporation, nor any indication that such a contract was a term of the guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a costs order of $691,304.74 on a substantial indemnity basis, awarded after the respondents successfully moved to set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction and Anton Piller order.

The Divisional Court upheld the substantial indemnity scale, finding the appellants' failure to make full and frank disclosure was not inadvertent.

However, the court found the motion judge erred in failing to properly analyze the bills of costs and apply the Boucher principles to ensure the quantum was fair and reasonable.

The court reduced the costs awarded to the Yemec respondents by 40% and to the Bungaro respondents by 20%.

The court also held that post-judgment interest on the costs award should run from the date of the costs order, not the date of the decision on the merits.