Ronald F. Caza

The court was asked to determine the amount of debts owed by a religious foundation to various individuals who allegedly advanced funds used to purchase a church property and whether those debts should be paid from the proceeds of the property’s sale held in trust.

The moving parties asserted numerous loans, while the opposing faction disputed several claims and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.

Applying principles relating to burden of proof, credibility in undocumented loan transactions, and adverse inferences for missing evidence, the court reviewed each claimed advance individually.

The court accepted certain claims supported by documentary evidence, including mortgage-related advances and payments made to satisfy obligations to a vendor mortgagee.

Other claims were rejected where evidence was inconsistent, unsupported, or contradicted by banking records.

The court ordered payment of specific sums from the sale proceeds to certain creditors, including the Kabelu parties and two additional lenders.

Parties disputed the debts owed by a foundation in connection with funds held from the sale of a building.

The court determined the specific creditors and amounts owing, including debts related to a second mortgage, institutional loans, and private advances.

The court directed that the purchaser of the property could appear within seven days to show cause why the identified debts should not be paid immediately from trust funds held by a law firm or the court registrar.

Absent such notice, the trustee or registrar was ordered to distribute the specified amounts to the named creditors, with any remaining balance payable to the foundation.

Following earlier interlocutory proceedings involving an injunction and Anton Piller order in a dispute concerning confidential engineering information and alleged misuse of intellectual property, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The responding party sought costs for obtaining the ex parte injunction and Anton Piller order and for successfully resisting a motion to set them aside.

Applying the factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including success, complexity, proportionality, and reasonable expectations of the losing party, the court found the hourly rates and claimed time generally reasonable.

Although the moving parties achieved limited success in varying certain terms of the Anton Piller order, the injunction and order were maintained.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the responding party for the initial ex parte motion and the motion to set aside, with costs of a later motion left in the cause.

Following a successful application determining that the respondents could not unilaterally revoke their resignations as directors of a charitable foundation, the applicants sought costs.

The court found the respondents' conduct in attempting to retake control of the foundation and removing its property to be unreasonable.

The court awarded costs to the applicants on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $65,000 plus HST and $7,000 in disbursements.

The applicant sought an order compelling a cottage owners association to modify a trail on Crown land that had been improved pursuant to work permits issued by the provincial natural resources ministry.

The applicant alleged that the association had effectively constructed an unauthorized road rather than improving an existing trail, threatening the semi-closed status of a remote lake and potential vehicle access.

The court held that the appropriate remedy would have been judicial review of the ministry’s permitting decisions rather than an equitable order against the association.

The evidence demonstrated the association complied with the permits and that the trail was restricted to ATVs and snowmobiles, with no evidence of use by cars or trucks.

The application was therefore dismissed.

Former employees and a competing corporation moved to set aside or vary an interim injunction and Anton Piller order obtained ex parte by their former employer.

The employer alleged the employees copied large volumes of confidential engineering files relating to proprietary sonar technology before leaving to establish a competing business.

The court found strong prima facie evidence of copying confidential files in breach of confidentiality agreements, a risk of serious commercial harm, and a real possibility that electronic evidence could be destroyed.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the injunction and preservation measures.

The injunction remained in effect and the Anton Piller order was varied largely on consent while preserving seized materials under the supervision of an independent supervising solicitor.

The applicants sought declarations regarding the corporate governance of a non-share capital charitable corporation after two directors, who were also pastors, resigned and later attempted to revoke their resignations.

The court held that under the Canada Corporations Act and the corporation's by-laws, a director's resignation becomes effective when irrevocably sent to the corporation.

The court further held that a director cannot unilaterally revoke a resignation once it has been received and accepted by the board.

Consequently, the respondents were no longer directors and had no authority to act on behalf of the corporation.

Following the dismissal of the defendant municipality’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued that the municipality advanced unfounded allegations that the plaintiff corporation was a “sham” created to circumvent the Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act (Construction Labour Mobility), 1999.

The court held that although fraud was not ultimately pursued, the allegations effectively challenged the plaintiff’s honesty and business integrity, justifying substantial indemnity costs.

However, the court found the time spent preparing the motion response excessive and reduced the amount claimed.

Costs were awarded on a substantial indemnity basis in the reduced amount plus disbursements.

The appellant lawyer represented two clients in unsuccessful applications to quash a municipal by-law.

The application judge ordered the lawyer to personally pay 40 percent of the respondent municipality's costs under Rule 57.07(1), finding his conduct and lack of preparation caused unnecessary costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the lawyer's appeal and set aside the personal costs order, holding that the application judge erred in principle by failing to distinguish the lawyer's conduct from his clients' instructions, particularly where solicitor-client privilege was not waived, and by using hindsight to evaluate strategic decisions.

The appellants challenged a municipal by-law requiring all new exterior commercial signs to be bilingual in French and English.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that one appellant lacked standing as he did not reside or operate a business in the municipality.

For the second appellant, the Court found the by-law was intra vires the municipality's power to pass by-laws respecting social well-being under the Municipal Act, 2001.

Although the by-law infringed the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter by compelling the use of a language, the Court held the infringement was justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect and promote the equality of the French and English languages.

The defendant developer brought a motion under s. 46 of the Construction Lien Act to declare that the plaintiff's construction lien had expired under s. 37 because the plaintiff's specific action was not set down for trial within two years.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that another lien claimant's action, which arose from the same improvement, had been set down for trial within the two-year period.

Under the Act, an action commenced by one lien claimant is an action in which all other liens may be enforced, thus protecting the plaintiff's lien from expiry.

Following an application concerning enforcement of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property, the court determined entitlement and quantum of costs.

The purchaser applicant had succeeded in obtaining an order confirming that the vendor corporation remained obligated to convey title and extending the closing date.

Competing internal factions within the respondent corporation advanced opposing positions, but neither faction was treated as a party for purposes of the costs determination.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court held that partial indemnity costs were appropriate and rejected a claim for higher or substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed in favour of the applicant purchaser and payable by the respondent corporation.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's breach of tender claim.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff, an Ontario corporation, was an ineligible bidder under the Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act because the effective bidder was its related Quebec corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff had effectively relocated to Ontario by establishing a corporate office and expanding its operations in the province, thereby exempting it from the restrictions of the Act.

The applicant purchaser brought an emergency application for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a commercial property.

The respondent vendor failed to close the transaction on the scheduled date, citing the purchaser's lack of mortgage funds, while the vendor itself had failed to answer requisitions or prepare closing documents due to an internal corporate dispute.

The court found that the vendor's failure to perform its obligations and its implied renunciation of the contract relieved the purchaser of the requirement to tender.

The court ordered specific performance, enforcing an extension of the closing date agreed to by the vendor's ostensible representatives.

The appellants sued an investment advisor and his company for bad investments.

The insurer defended the action for over a year before denying coverage because the advisor sold securities, not insurance.

The advisor went bankrupt, and the appellants obtained an assignment of his rights against the insurer.

The appellants argued the insurer was estopped from denying coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the insured suffered no prejudice from the insurer's conduct, as the insured was bankrupt and could not have defended the action anyway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for malicious prosecution and wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, finding they clearly showed the pathway to the result.

However, the Court agreed with the appellants that the trial judge erred by duplicating the award of 'Wallace' or 'Honda' damages and aggravated damages for malicious prosecution, as the same factors were used to justify both.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the $15,000 'Wallace' damages award, but otherwise dismissed.

Following an appeal where success was divided, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The appellant succeeded on the central issue of the court's jurisdiction, while the respondents succeeded on the issues of venue transfer and striking out portions of the statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $12,000 in costs for the appeal, reflecting her success on the primary issue but acknowledging the divided outcome.

The costs order for the first instance motion was varied to no costs, as success on that motion was also divided.

Following an appeal that reduced the respondents' damages from $500,955 to $147,855, the court determined the costs of the trial.

The court considered various settlement offers made by both parties, including a non-compliant offer by the respondents that remained open and a mid-trial offer by the appellants.

The court also noted the appellants' failure to contest the negligence issue at trial, which required the exercise of the court's discretion on appeal and likely affected the respondents' settlement decisions.

The respondents were awarded trial costs fixed at $140,000.

The respondent employee was pushed by her supervisor during a confrontation and subsequently placed on a performance improvement plan.

She sued for constructive dismissal and various torts.

The trial judge found the employer and supervisor liable for battery, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and negligent infliction of mental suffering.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the tort of negligent infliction of mental suffering is not available in the employment context.

The Court also found the elements for intentional infliction of mental suffering were not met.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the tort damages to $15,000 for battery, but upholding the constructive dismissal and awarding $45,000 for mental distress under the Honda framework.

The appellant, a doctoral student, sued her university and two professors for breach of contract, negligence, and intentional infliction of mental suffering, alleging harassment and academic delays.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding the court lacked jurisdiction over academic disputes, and transferred the venue to Ottawa.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court does have jurisdiction over tort and contract claims arising in an academic context.

The Court set aside the jurisdictional dismissal but struck the majority of the statement of claim for pleading evidence rather than material facts, granting the appellant leave to amend.

The venue transfer to Ottawa was upheld.